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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays analysing corporate governance (CG) reforms in 
emerging economies, with a particular focus on Oman. The three essays focus on three 
closely related CG topics that quantitatively examine the extent to which Omani CG 
reforms have been effective in enhancing three main corporate policy decisions.   
In the first essay, the thesis investigates the level and determinants of voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure. The central objective of this essay is to empirically examine 
two main research questions: First, what is the level of voluntary compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG rules contained in the 2002 Omani CG Code for listed firms?; Secondly, 
what factors determine the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG 
recommendations contained in the 2002 Omani CG Code for listed firms? Exploring these 
questions has the capacity of improving current understanding of firms’ willingness to 
voluntarily engage in and disclose more transparent information about their CG practices. 
The findings indicate that Omani firms have responded positively to the 2002 CG Code’s 
best practice recommendations. Relying on insights from agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence and signalling/stakeholder theories, the findings also suggest that ownership 
structure and board characteristics have significant impact on firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure. Specifically, the findings suggest that government ownership, institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership, board size, the presence of a CG committee, and board 
diversity on the basis of nationality are positively related to the level of CG compliance 
and disclosure, whereas block ownership and board diversity on the basis of gender are 
negatively associated with the level of CG compliance and disclosure.   
The second essay investigates how effective the CG measures contained in the 
2002 Omani voluntary CG Code and other CG mechanisms proposed by other laws, such 
as the Companies Law, mitigate agency problems associated with capital structure (CS) 
decisions. The main purpose of this essay is to empirically examine the extent to which 
firm-level CG quality, ownership structure and board/audit characteristics influence capital 
structure, as well as the corporate decision (choice) to issue equity or debt in seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). This examination has the ability to expand current understanding 
of Omani firms’ capital structure decisions and the role that CG mechanisms can play with 
respect to this corporate decision. Informed by insights from tax-driven (e.g., Modigliani-
Miller capital structure irrelevance and trade-off) and non-tax-driven (e.g., agency, market 
timing, pecking order, and signalling) capital structure theories, the empirical evidence 
reveals that CG is a significant determinant of capital structure decisions and SEOs. First, 
2 
 
 
 
the findings suggest that CG index, government ownership, institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership, board size, audit firm size and CG committee are negatively related to 
capital structure, whereas block ownership is positively associated with capital structure. 
Second, the results indicate that firms with better governance structures, more institutional 
ownership and audited by big four are more likely to raise additional financing through 
SEOs. By contrast, firms with poor CG mechanisms, more government ownership more, 
foreign ownership, block ownership, large boards, and CG committee are less likely to 
raise additional financing through SEOs.   
The final essay investigates the extent to which a broad composite CG index, 
corporate ownership structure, and board/audit characteristics can explain observable 
changes in firm-level earnings management (EM). The key objective of this essay is to 
investigate how effective the CG recommendations contained in the 2002 Omani CG Code 
and other CG mechanisms proposed by other laws, such as the Companies Law, constrain 
earnings management practices. The result has the potential of deepening current 
understanding of the ability of different CG measures to mitigate agency problems and 
reduce agency costs associated with earnings management. Utilising insights from agency, 
stakeholder, stewardship and signalling theories, the study finds that firms with better 
governance structures, government ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, 
audited by big four and CG committee are negatively related to earnings management. In 
contrast, firms with poor CG mechanisms, more block ownership, larger boards, and CG 
committee are positively associated with earnings management. The reported empirical 
findings of the three essays are fairly robust across a number of econometric models and 
estimations that take into account alternative variables and potential endogeneity problems.  
In brief, given the dearth of empirical evidence on the nature of CG’s influence on 
these three corporate policy decisions in emerging economies in particular, this thesis 
seeks to contribute to the literature by providing new insights with specific focus on CG 
reforms that have been pursued in Oman. Specifically, this thesis contributes to the limited, 
but steadily growing body of literature on the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in 
influencing a number of crucial managerial decisions, including voluntary disclosure, 
financing and earnings management, in emerging economies.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The world has witnessed a number of corporate scandals at major institutions, such 
as Enron, WorldCom and Barings Bank. A considerable number of firms have been 
exposed to financial distress and bankruptcy following the recent financial crisis of 
2007/2008. Weak CG structures have been commonly suggested as a probable cause of 
these incidents, because they influence corporate policy decisions, such as voluntary 
disclosure, financing (i.e., capital structure) and earnings management. Specifically, the 
agency problem associated with the separation of ownership and control, along with 
information asymmetry between different stakeholders, has largely led to such incidents. 
The absence of effective internal controls allows managers to behave opportunistically by 
making decisions that allow them to reap personal benefits at the expense of shareholders 
and other stakeholders, which in turn can have a negative effect on firm value. In this 
regard, CG has been suggested by academics, practitioners, professionals and regulatory 
authorities, as an effective remedy for such agency problems (Cadbury Report, 1992; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Report, 1999; Rwegasira, 
2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). In response to these suggestions, 
CG policy reforms have been globally pursued to encourage firms to commit to high 
standards of CG practices. International and national initiatives have been launched to 
provide recommendations for good CG practices, with the aim of promoting high standards 
of corporate behaviour. Many countries have issued national codes of good CG practices 
aimed at improving the quality of their firms’ governance.  
A considerable number of emerging countries have issued codes of good CG 
practices as a result, including Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. 
Observably, efforts to promote CG in Oman started earlier than in other emerging 
economies in general and the MENA region in particular. Specifically, Oman reviewed its 
corporate regulatory framework by initiating a number of corporate reforms aimed at 
making firms less vulnerable to financial distress and bankruptcy following the 1997 Asian 
crisis. These reforms began with a number of amendments to the 1974 Companies Act, 
establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 1998 and the introduction of the 
Capital Market Law in 1998. Importantly, Omani policy-makers realised that there was a 
need to improve the quality of domestic firms’ governance to ensure high standards of 
corporate behaviour. As a result, the voluntary CG Code was issued in 2002 and 
effectively implemented in 2003. This is regarded as a major CG reform aimed at 
improving CG practices and standards. It was designed to provide greater protection for all 
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stakeholders by promoting a culture of compliance, quality disclosure and accountability. 
An important aim of the CG Code is to assist firms in setting up effective CG mechanisms 
that can mitigate agency problems associated with managerial and corporate policy 
decisions. A crucial issue is that the CG recommendations contained in the 2002 Omani 
CG Code were built on an Anglo-American CG tradition and are drawn mainly from the 
1992 UK Cadbury Report, particularly those recommendations relating to the composition 
and functions of the board of directors. One of the major concerns of this thesis, therefore, 
is the extent to which reliance on an Anglo-American CG model can provide effective CG 
mechanisms that are able to enhance corporate policy decisions, given the differences 
between the emerging Omani context and the developed corporate settings.   
Specifically, and as will be discussed furher, the impact of CG recommendations 
proposed by CG codes on a number of important managerial decisions, including voluntary 
disclosure, financing and earnings management in emerging economies, such as Oman, can 
be expected to be different from those of developed countries because of the differences in 
corporate contexts. The examination of CG reforms in Oman shows that emerging 
countries have unique features differentiating them from developed countries. This can be 
expected to have important implications on the willingness of Omani listed firms to 
voluntarily adopt and implement CG provisions contained in the code. More specifically 
and briefly, the Omani context which is characterised by religious notions built around 
Shariah Law, informal rules and concentrated ownership; and thus these characteristics 
may lead to different results from what has been reported in developed countries regarding 
CG codes’ ability to encourage firms to engage in good CG practices.  
While studies in developed countries report evidence that CG has a crucial impact 
on voluntary disclosure, financing (i.e., capital structure) and earnings management, the 
CG literature shows that there is a clear paucity of empirical evidence in emerging 
economies in general, and Oman in particular. Therefore, examining the impact of CG on 
these topics in the Omani context, is arguably one way of providing a deeper 
understanding of whether and the extent to which firms’ managerial decisions in emerging 
economies can be influenced by CG mechanisms.  
This thesis, therefore, consists of three essays that examine how and why a firm’s 
CG mechanisms may influence its policy decisions by focusing on three closely related 
corporate decisions, namely voluntary CG disclosure, financing (i.e., capital structure) and 
earnings management. It considers emerging economies with a specific focus on Oman.     
The first essay empirically examines the extent to which Omani listed firms 
disclose CG information, and determinants that may affect such disclosure. The first 
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central research question it seeks to answer is: What is the level of voluntary compliance 
and disclosure with the 2002 CG Code among listed firms? Four sub-questions are also 
posed from this central research question as: (i) To what extent has the introduction of the 
2002 CG Code improved CG practices?; (ii) Which CG provisions do listed firms comply 
with most?; (iii) Is there a significant difference between financial and non-financial firms 
in terms of providing CG disclosure?; and (iv) To what extent can reliance on an Anglo-
American model lead to improved CG standards in an emerging country like Oman?  
The first essay also seeks to answer its second central research question of whether 
the observed cross-sectional differences in firms’ voluntary CG disclosure can be 
explained by traditional ownership structures and board/audit characteristics. In doing so, a 
multi-theoretical approach was adopted to develop hypotheses and interpret the results, 
where the chosen theories were considered complementary rather than competing 
perspectives. The multi-theoretical framework includes critical insights from agency, 
resource dependence, legitimacy and signalling theories. Nine hypotheses were 
quantitatively examined to specify the nature of the relationship between firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure and government ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership, block ownership, board size, audit firm size, board diversity on the basis of 
gender, the presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of nationality. 
Using a sample of 116 listed firms with 1,152 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2011, 
and multiple linear regression analysis and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as estimation 
methods, these hypotheses were examined.    
The first essay expects that CG disclosure in the Omani context may be different 
from what is reported in developed countries because of the differences in institutional 
structures; hence, investigating the level and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure in 
the Omani context is arguably appropriate empirical investigation. This investigation found 
generally, that, ownership and board characteristics have significant impact on firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure. Specifically, the results indicate that firms with more government 
ownership, more institutional ownership, more foreign ownership, larger boards, a CG 
committee and more nationalities diverse boards are more likely to disclose more CG 
information.  In contrast, the findings suggest that block ownership impacts negatively on 
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure, whilst audit firm size and board diversity on the basis 
of gender have no significant impact on voluntary disclosure of CG practices.   
The second essay contained in this thesis empirically examines the extent to which 
CG drives a firm’s capital structure and the choice of financing (i.e., whether to issue 
equity or debt). It addresses two main research questions: Are better-governed firms likely 
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to employ higher or lower levels of leverage in making their capital structure decisions?; 
and Are better-governed firms more likely to issue equity or debt when seeking new or 
additional financing? These two central research questions were split into three sub-
questions, including: (i) What is the impact of firm-level CG on a firm’s level of capital 
structure and equity issuance?; (ii) Does ownership structure influence a firm’s level of 
capital structure and equity issuance?; and (iii) Do board and audit characteristics impact 
on a firm’s level of capital structure and equity issuance?  
The second essay also adopts a multi-theory approach in order to benefit from 
insights provided by existing relevant capital structure theories to develop its hypotheses 
and interpret its results. These include tax-driven (e.g., Modigiliani-Miller irrelevance 
theorem and trade-off) and non-tax (e.g., pecking order, signalling, market timing and 
agency) theories of CS. The relationship between CG and CS on the one hand, and CG and 
equity issuance on the other hand were investigated. Specifically, the thesis developed 
eight hypotheses that examine the impact of a broad composite CG index, corporate 
ownership structures, and corporate board/and audit characteristics on capital structure and 
equity issuance. Two data sets were used to perform these investigations. The hypotheses 
relating to capital structure were examined based on a sample of 1,152 firm-year 
observations over eleven years via the application of multiple OLS linear regression 
analysis, whereas the hypotheses relating to equity issuance were examined based on a 
sample of 1,049 firm-year observations for the same period, but through the application of 
logistic regression techniques. 
The second essay, however, expects that the Omani corporate contextual 
characteristics, namely religious notions, informal rules and concentrated ownership may 
suggest that the impact of CG on capital structure decisions may be different from that 
observed in developed countries. This, therefore, underlies the need to empirically analyse 
the extent to which firm-level CG drives CS and the choice of financing. The results of this 
essay indicate that capital structure decisions and SEOs can be significantly influenced by 
CG. First, the empirical evidence reveals that CG index, audit firm size and CG committee 
impact significantly and negatively on firm-level CS. Government ownership, institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership, board size and audit firm size impact negatively, but 
insignificantly on capital structure, whereas block ownership is insignificant and positively 
related to firm-level CS. Second, CG index, government ownership and institutional 
ownership are significantly and positively related to equity issuance. Block ownership, 
board size, audit firm size and CG committee have no significant impact on equity 
issuance.  
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The final essay empirically assesses the extent to which CG measures can be useful 
in understanding earnings management behaviour among listed firms. It seeks to answer its 
main research question: Are better-governed firms more or less likely to engage in 
earnings management practices? Three sub-questions were also examined: (i) What is the 
relationship between firm-level earnings management and firm-level CG quality? (ii) Does 
ownership structure drive or constrain earnings management?; and (iii) Do board and audit 
characteristics influence firm-level earnings management? Similar to essays 1 and 2, this 
essay adopts a multi-theoretical approach to undertake its investigation by developing a 
multi-theoretical framework incorporating crucial insights from earnings management 
relevant theories, including agency, signalling, stakeholder and stewardship theories. The 
multi-theoretical framework was used to develop nine hypotheses investigating the impact 
of a broad composite CG index, corporate ownership structures, and board/audit 
characteristics on firm-level earnings management. The hypotheses were examined using a 
sample of 116 listed firms with 1,152 firm-year observations over the 11-year period and 
multiple OLS linear regression technique.   
This essay expects that the association between firm-level earnings management 
and firm-level CG in the Omani context may be different from what is found in developed 
countries. Thus, examining the ability of CG measures to curb managerial opportunistic 
behaviour in general and earnings management practices in particular may be crucial in 
providing a deeper understanding of why and how a firm’s CG strategy might drive or 
constrain its earnings management practices. The results of this examination indicate that 
CG and ownership have significant impact on earnings management. The empirical 
evidence suggests that CG index, government ownership and institutional ownership are 
negatively associated with earnings management, whereas block ownership has a positive 
relationship with earnings management. Foreign ownership, audit firm size and board 
diversity on the basis of gender are negative, but statistically insignificant. Board size and 
the presence of a CG committee are insignificant and positively associated with earnings 
management.  
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ABSTRACT 
The first essay empirically investigates whether Omani listed firms voluntarily 
comply with and disclose recommended good CG practices proposed by the 2002 Omani 
Code of CG and, if so, the main determinants that influence such voluntary CG disclosure 
behaviour. Employing one of the largest and extensive dataset to-date on CG in emerging 
economies (i.e., a sample of 116 Omani listed firms from 2001 to 2011 and 1,152 firm year 
observations) and a broad CG index consisting of 72 CG provisions, the study finds that 
although Omani firms have shown some positive response to the voluntary 2002 Omani 
Code‘s recommendations, CG compliance and disclosure among these firms is generally 
low compared to those reported for other developing and developed economies. It also 
finds that firms with more government ownership, more institutional ownership, more 
foreign ownership, larger boards, audited by big four, have a CG committee and more non-
Omani directors tend to voluntarily disclose more information on CG compliance, whereas 
those with high block ownership and board diversity on the basis of gender disclose less 
CG information. The study’s results are fairly robust across a number of econometric 
models that sufficiently account for alternative CG proxies and different endogeneity 
problems. Overall, the findings of the study are generally consistent with the predictions of 
a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, resource 
dependence, legitimacy, and signalling/stakeholder theories.  
 
 
Keywords: Voluntary CG disclosure, corporate governance; the 2002 Omani Code of 
corporate governance; multi-theoretical approach; emerging economies; Oman; 
endogeneity.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background  
Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed a number of corporate failures. 
Specifically, the corporate scandals of major institutions, such as Enron, WorldCom and 
Barings Bank, amongst others, have drawn the attention of academics and professionals to 
the concept of CG (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Ntim et al., 
2014a, b; Soltani, 2014). In a similar vein, the Asian financial crisis during the 1990s 
raised crucial questions about whether firms with weak CG systems can survive, and how 
they can maintain their credibility (Rwegasira, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). In response to these events, international and national initiatives have been 
launched to provide recommendations for good CG practices, with the aim of promoting 
high standards of corporate behaviour (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Collett and Hrasky, 2005). 
The suggested recommendations are genearally aimed at  promoting greater transparency 
in financial and non-financial reporting, clear-cut responsibility and more accountability in 
the corporate environment. Arguably, this may assist firms in maintaining stakeholders’ 
confidence and protecting shareholders’ rights, as well as improving performance 
(Cadbury Report, 1992; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Report, 1999).   
At the national level, many countries have issued codes of good CG practices 
aimed at improving the quality of their firms’ governance (Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Davies and Schlitzer, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Solomon, 2010). A 
common feature of most of these codes is self-regulation (‘voluntary regulation’/‘comply 
or explain’) (Wymeersch, 2006), mainly originating from the UK’s influential 1992 
Cadbury Report. Given their voluntary nature, the ability of such codes to improve CG 
standards is subject to firms’ voluntary desire to comply with their provisions (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). This has motivated 
researchers to undertake empirical studies to investigate the extent to which firms comply 
with such codes, and the factors influencing such compliance (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Bozec and Bozec, 2012). In this regard, Deegan (2002, pp.302) 
states that “As long as such disclosures remain predominantly of a voluntary nature then 
accounting academics will undoubtedly continue efforts to understand the motivations for 
reporting”. However, most of these studies have been conducted in developed countries 
with similar institutional contexts with limited evidence on emerging countries in general 
and the MENA in particular (Barako et al., 2006a; Ntim et al, 2012a). This may suggest 
that voluntary compliance with CG codes in emerging countries could be different from 
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that in developed countries, where institutional contexts are different (Chau and Gray, 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Krambia-Kaprdis and Psaros, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). Therefore, investigating voluntary CG disclosure in emerging 
economies, where empirical evidence is lacking, may be essential in providing a broader 
picture to understanding firms’ voluntary CG compliance and disclosure behaviour.    
A number of theories have sought to explain firms’ motivations to voluntarily 
disclose CG practices, such as agency, resource dependence, legitimacy and signalling 
theories. For instance, from an agency theory perspective, managerial incentives are 
regarded as one of the main motivations influencing firms to engage in voluntary CG 
disclosure. The basic premise of the theory is that CG disclosure can reduce the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders. In this view, increased information about CG 
practices can reduce information asymmetry, as well as agency costs that result from the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Cooke, 1993; 
Raffournier, 1995; La Porta et al., 2002). Further, by providing more CG information, 
managers offer shareholders a way to continuously monitor their actions, hence, reassuring 
them that they are working in line with their interests (Raffournier, 1995). Thus, agency 
theory considers CG disclosure as a governance mechanism by which shareholders can 
reduce agency costs and mitigate the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers.  
Resource dependence theory provides another view to explain managerial incentive 
to comply with and disclose best practice CG recommendations. It suggests that firms are 
motivated to disclose more information about CG practices in order to address the needs of 
a wide range of external actors (e.g., local communities, government, and suppliers), 
whose resources firms rely on (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This theory assumes that 
external actors are more likely to provide firms who provide additional transparent CG 
disclosures with the needed resources, especially financial ones than those who disclose 
less transparent disclosures about their CG practices. Additional information on CG 
compliance is considered by external actors as assurance that there are effective CG 
mechanisms in place to reduce the misuse of resources. In this regard, firms may be 
expected to provide additional information on CG practices in order to ensure more 
commitment and involvement from external actors, which may be helpful in the provision 
of resources. Hence, a firm’s failure to provide adequate disclosure of CG practices may 
limit its ability to secure critical resources.  
Stakeholder and signalling theories have also their expainations regarding a firm’s 
motivations for voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. Stakeholder theory suggests that 
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firms are motivated to disclose more CG information to a broad range of stakeholders (e.g., 
creditors, suppliers, employees and society) in order to mitigate conflicts of interest 
between managers and stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Stakeholders are confronted with the problem of ensuring that their utilities 
are protected from opportunistic managers. Hence, stakeholder theory emphasises the need 
to consider stakeholders’ interests along with shareholders’ interests, which can encourage 
firms to disclose more information about CG practices. Signalling theory predicts that 
firms are motivated to redue information asymmetry by signalling more CG information 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977). It suggests that firms should rely on voluntary 
disclosure as a means to inform outsiders about a firm’s quality and its true value. Thus, 
disclosing more CG information can act as a signal to outsiders, which will positively 
affect stakeholders’ perceptions.   
Therefore, and applying insight from these theories, this study seeks to shed new 
light on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure in the Omani context. Oman issued a 
voluntary code of CG for listed firms in 2002; it was effectively implemented in 2003. The 
issuance of the Omani CG code (OCGC) was as a result of major national and international 
developments. Since 1998, the Omani economy has witnessed remarkable reforms towards 
its development as a market-oriented economy (Shankaraiah, 2004). A central aim of the 
economic reforms was an attempt to improve the quality of domestic firms’ governance 
(Dry, 2003). Indeed, many countries have responded to corporate failures by establishing 
codes of good CG practice, such as Denmark (2000), Taiwan (2002), Turkey (2003) and 
Norway (2004), to mention, but a few. In response to these developments, Oman also 
implemented its national CG code with the aim of promoting high standards of corporate 
behaviour. Specifically, and as will be discussed further in Section 2, the main purpose of 
the code was to promote a culture of compliance, quality disclosure and accountability in 
order to provide greater protection for all stakeholders (Omani Code, 2002). Like many 
emerging countries, Oman has adopted an Anglo-American model in promoting CG 
standards; the OCGC was drawn mainly from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, principally in 
relation to the composition and functions of the board of directors (see Table 2). Arguably, 
reliance on an Anglo-American model may raise concerns about the ability of such a 
regime to promote high standards of corporate behaviour, given the nature of the Omani 
corporate setting.    
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1.2 Motivation 
The Omani context is characterised by strong Islamic religious notions,
1
 informal 
rules and concentrated ownership; these characteristics are expected to have important 
effects on the adoption and implementation of high CG standards. First, there is an 
expectation that societies with strong religious notions are more likely to exhibit higher 
levels of transparency and compliance with regulations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Boytsun 
et al., 2011). Typically, within the Omani context, individuals appear to rely primarily on 
religious norms in order to monitor business activities (Rahman, 1998; Kamla et al., 2006). 
Unlike most previous studies, which were conducted in contexts, where business is not 
influenced by religious tenets, this study is conducted in Oman, where Shariah Law2 plays 
a vital role in business.  
In this context, strong Islamic notions applicable to CG, such as transparency, 
responsibility and accountability, may have important implications for CG compliance and 
disclosure (Abu-Tapajeh, 2009; Ahmed, 2011a). For instance, the Islamic concepts of 
“Taklif” and “Hesab” directly relate to a number of theories, such as stewardship, resource 
dependence and stakeholder theories (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). “Taklif” means that a 
manager, as a responsible person, is a trustee of the firm and should act as a guardian and a 
deputy of stakeholders (Rahman, 1998; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004, Hearn et al., 2011). The 
principle of “Hesab” (account) indicates that directors, as individuals, have been trusted 
with resources (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010); hence, they will be accountable to their creator 
and punished or rewarded for their actions accordingly in the hereafter (Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Ahmad, 2011b). These principles can serve as governance mechanisms that 
discipline managers and mitigate agency problems. In particular, it can be argued that 
Shariah law encourages insiders to credibly signal quality information to outsiders by 
providing extensive information about CG practices and disclosure (Baydoun and Willett, 
2000). As a result, Omani managers can be expected to be socially responsible, as 
encouraged by their inherent Islamic values.  
Second, weak legal enforcement means that firms operating in emerging countries 
are expected to be more affected by informal rules than those operating in the developed 
world (Allen et al., 2005). In this sense, Oman can be considered a collectivistic country 
                                                 
1It is noted that whereas some contextual factors, such ownership concentration are explicitly incorporated into the 
research design, measured and empirically tested, due to data limitations, others such as Islamic notions and 
norms are not captured and tested empirically. Due to their observable presence within the Omani context, 
however, they are normatively relied on as part of the motivation for all three essays. The inability to provide 
empirical testing of such contextual factors is explicitly acknowledged as part of the study’s limitation throughout 
the three essays and also in the summary and conclusion section, which have been suggested as part of the 
potential avenues for future research.  
2
Shariah Law is based on the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings, God bless upon him, which serve as 
guidance for Muslims in all aspects of life (Kamla et al., 2006). 
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where both formal and informal rules can be expected to have a crucial influence on firms 
(Moideenkutty et al., 2011). Specifically, managers can be significantly influenced by 
informal rules; family, Arabic custom and tribalism are expected to be more highly 
prioritised than formal rules and CG mechanisms, such as establishing audit and CG 
committees (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Metcalfe, 2007; Common, 2008; Boytsun et al., 
2011). Thus, social aspects may impact OCGC compliance, if informal rules are more 
influential than formal rules. For instance, managers who hold powerful positions are 
expected to act in their families’ and tribes’ interests; if they do not, they are regarded as 
‘useless’ (Hassab-Elnaby and Mosebach, 2005; Boytsun et al., 2011). They may not be 
willing to comply with the OCGC because they will be more closely observed and 
controlled by stakeholders in general and shareholders in particular. Arguably, the 
potential adverse effects of societal and cultural values may weaken Omani directors’ 
ability to independently monitor managers and encourage firms to disclose higher levels of 
information about their CG practices.  
Finally, different factors, including ownership structure, have been reported to 
influence firms’ motivations to voluntarily provide information on CG practices (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988). Unlike developed countries, where there are 
diverse ownership structures, a large number of Omani firms have concentrated ownership, 
predominantly through institutions, which may have important implications for CG 
compliance and disclosure (Elsayed, 2007; Najib, 2007; Omran et al., 2008, Bishara, 
2011). As will be discussed further, the OCGC was mainly drawn from the UK code, but 
the UK CG model tend to be effective in a context in which ownership is widely held or 
there is a dispersed ownership, and thereby permitting shareholders to have control through 
takeovers, mergers and acquisitions as mechanisms of corporate control (Rwegasira, 
2000). In the case of Oman, high ownership concentration may impact negatively on 
compliance with the OCGC, especially in a situation, where the market for corporate 
control is weak. This suggests that the high concentration of ownership renders some 
external CG mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control and hostile takeovers, 
ineffective in motivating managers to engage in voluntary CG disclosure (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Gillan, 2006; Chahine and Tohme, 2009; Bishara, 2011). In addition, the 
high concentration of ownership leads to agency problems inherent in the conflict of 
interest between large and minority shareholders, as opposed to developed countries, 
where the conflict tends to be between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Alves, 2012). Block holders are expected to discourage managers from making CG 
disclosures, as providing such information may not be helpful in expropriating minority 
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shareholders. Arguably, the ownership concentration in the Omani context can be expected 
to limit the OCGC’s ability to promote a culture of compliance and quality disclosure, as 
firms’ willingness to voluntarily provide transparent information on CG compliance is 
expected to be low.   
These distinctive features of the Omani context may lead to different results from 
what is reported in developed countries. Thus, investigating the level and determinants of 
voluntary CG disclosure in the Omani context may help enhance current understanding of 
the drivers of corporate voluntary disclosure of CG practices. In spite of the distinctive 
features of the Omani context, the literature on CG shows that there is a clear paucity of 
empirical evidence on the level and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure in Oman; 
hence, the current study is also driven by the dearth of empirical research on Omani CG 
compliance and disclosure.  
There are, however, a few prior studies addressing some aspects of CG in Oman 
that need to be explicitly acknowledged. The first is a descriptive study by Dry (2003). He 
addresses the development of CG in Oman, paying particular attention to the Omani code 
of CG practice. The second study, by Omran et al. (2008), includes Oman in a cross-
country study. They investigate whether firms with high ownership concentration 
performed differently from those without concentrated ownership over the period 2000-
2002. Their results indicate that ownership concentration does not have a major impact on 
a representative group of Arab countries’ firms’ performance. Of close relevance to the 
current study is a study conducted by Mohamed et al. (2009), which examines the 
reporting of CG practices by Omani listed firms between 2002 and 2006. They find that the 
level of CG reports provided by Omani listed firms increased from 2002 to 2006. The final 
study by Malkawi et al. (2014) also includes Oman in a cross-country study. They examine 
CG disclosure in Gulf Cooperation Council’s countries (GCC). They report evidence that 
suggests that Omani firms engage in high level of CG compliance among GCC countries.  
As well as being limited in number, studies in the Omani context are limited in 
scope. Specifically, the current study is different from existing ones in two main aspects. 
First, previous studies do not examine the level and determinants of compliance with the 
2002 OCGC, which is the main purpose of the present study. The first and second prior 
studies do not consider the level and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure, whereas the 
third prior study, by Mohamed et al. (2009), identifies only whether a particular listed firm 
includes a CG report in its annual report or not. Similarly, Al-Malkawi et al. (2014)’s study 
mainly examines the levels of compliance among the GCC’s firms, including Omani firms, 
with the 2004 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s guidelines 
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(OECD), which is different from the current study, where the level of compliance among 
Omani firms will be measured according to the 2002 OCGC’s provisions and other CG 
laws, such as the Companies Law. Second, the generalisability of prior studies’ findings is 
arguably limited since the samples used by those studies are smaller than the current 
study’s sample. For instance, Omran et al. (2008) employ a sample of 304 firms in their 
cross-country study; only 70 firms were from Oman.3 The current study employs a sample 
of 116 Omani listed firms from 2001 to 2011. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
this is the most recent and extensive time period that has been investigated within the 
Omani context in relation to CG in general and CG compliance and disclosure in 
particular. 
1.3 Research questions and contributions 
Given this context, the central objective of this study is to empirically examine the 
extent to which Omani listed firms disclose CG information, and determinants that may 
affect such disclosure. In doing so, the study aims to make distinct contributions to the 
extant literature. First, the current study contributes to the extant literature by providing, 
for the first time, empirical evidence on the level of voluntary CG disclosure among Omani 
listed firms in relation to the 2002 Omani CG Code. Second, it provides detailed evidence 
on traditional ownership structures and internal CG mechanisms that are expected to have 
a direct impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. Importantly, it examines a number 
of factors which have not been widely investigated in the CG literature, such as board 
diversity on the basis of nationality, foreign ownership, board diversity on the basis of 
gender, government ownership, and the presence of a CG committee. Conducting such an 
empirical study is crucial to improving current understanding of the factors that can have a 
major influence on the level of voluntary CG disclosure in Oman, where different 
stakeholders, such as the state, the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) and the CMA, have a 
keen interest in promoting CG practices.  
1.4 Structure of the essay  
          The remainder of this essay is organised into eight sections. Section 2 addresses the 
institutional setting and CG in Oman. Section 3 reviews the related literature on voluntary 
CG disclosure and develops hypotheses. The research deign is described in Section 4, 
while OLS assumptions and descriptive statistics are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses the empirical findings. Section 7 discusses robustness tests, whilst the final 
section provides a summary and conclusion.      
    
                                                 
3
Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) do not specify the number of Omani firms in their data set. 
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2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN OMAN: BACKGROUND AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK      
           Good CG has been suggested as a solution to the reduction of agency problems 
(Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Consequently, CG policy reforms have been globally 
pursued to encourage firms to commit to high standards of CG practices (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Observably, attempts at promoting CG in Oman started early 
compared with its counterparts in MENA region (see Table 1). In 1998, however, Oman 
was affected by the Asian crisis, and the MSM witnessed a dramatic drop in share prices 
(Fleety, 2010). The MSM’s collapse compelled the government to initiate major economic 
reforms. The most important aspect of the economic reforms was an attempt to promote a 
legal and regulatory framework aimed at protecting investors by improving the quality of 
firms’ governance practices (Dry, 2003). The Omani CG regulatory framework can be 
classified into external and internal bodies. The subsections below briefly discuss the 
external and internal CG frameworks, as a way of providing the reader useful insights on 
the operating context and background to this essay, as well as the subsequent two essays. 
 
Source: European Corporate Governance Institute’s website. 
 
2.1 THE EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM  
          Figure 1 below depicts the external CG framework, which involves three important 
matters. First, the external framework refers to the key financial regulatory and 
enforcement bodies, which are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of 
mandatory corporate regulations. Second, it briefly describes the main responsibilities of 
the external CG bodies. Finally, it shows a number of legislative Laws and instruments that 
market participants (e.g., firms, banks and pension funds) must comply with. The major 
regulators that shape this framework include: (i) the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(MCI); (ii) the CMA; and (iii) the MSM. The three regulatory institutions will be briefly 
discussed consecutively in the following subsections.   
Table 1: Corporate governance codes in the MENA region 
Date of issue 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Oman Turkey Egypt 
Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Qatar 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Algeria 
Palestine 
Bahrain 
Yemen  
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Figure 1: The external CG framework of Oman.  Source: Researcher’s construction. 
 
 
2.1.1 Ministry of Commerce and Industry      
           The MCI was established in 1974 to oversee the statutory regulation of firms. As 
demonstrated by Figure 1, it has supervisory power over the CMA and the MSM. In 
particular, the MCI is responsible for governing firms towards proper implementation of 
the relevant regulations and laws. Mainly, the ministry deals with firms through two main 
statutory bodies: Commercial Registration Body (CRB) and Firm’s Licence Body (FLB). 
The CRB plays a key role in ensuring that all firms are registered with the MCI. Firms are 
required by this body to provide detailed CG information in order to be registered. The 
FLB has regulatory power; firms are required to disclose financial and non-financial details 
to this body in order to obtain licences and be able to operate in the market.  
2.1.2 Capital Market Authority  
           The CMA was established in 1998 to serve as an independent regulatory and 
supervisory government body to oversee the MSM. It carries out its functions through two 
main departments, Market Regulation Department (MRD) and Legal Affairs and 
Legislation Departement (LALD). Through both departments, the CMA plays a vital role 
in encouraging a CG disclosure culture among Omani firms, and has issued a number of 
ouncil of Ministers   
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legislative instruments. For instance, the Related Party Transactions circular was issued in 
2001, recommending several rules regulating transactions between firms and boards of 
directors. In the same year, the Corporate Governance Rules circular recommended terms 
and conditions for electing directors and rules for convening firms’ general meetings. More 
importantly, the CMA issued its code of good CG practice in 2002, which was effectively 
implemented in the following year.   
2.1.3 Muscat Securities Market 
The MSM was established in 1988 as a government body responsible for the listing 
and trading of securities. It is the only formal stock market in Oman that provides 
information and financial data about listed firms’ performance in order to enable investors 
to make accurate investment decisions. As Figure 1 shows, the MSM deals with firms 
through two main statutory sections, Market Surveillance Section (MSS) and Firm Follow-
up Section (FFS). Both sections ensure transparency of activities and support the market by 
applying listing requirements and trading rules to listed firms. Among them, the listing 
provisions have a direct relevance to CG, as listed firms are required to provide detailed 
CG information, and submit a listing application form with a number of documents. 
According to these provisions, firms are required to submit quarterly and annual reports to 
the MSM, and investors can access these reports online through the MSM’s website. 
Importantly, firms are required to provide a separate section on CG and management 
discussion analysis to the MSM, and are encouraged to comply with the provisions of the 
2002 code on a comply-or-explain basis. Firms are advised to comply with the code, but if 
a firm chooses not to comply with one or more governance provisions, it must explain its 
non-compliance. By the end of 2014 there were 117 firms listed in the MSM, operating 
mainly in nine industries, including basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, 
financial services, industrial, utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and gas.  
2.2 The Internal Corporate Governance System 
The Omani CG internal framework consists of statutory and corporate laws and a 
code, including: (i) the 1974 Omani Companies Law; (ii) the 1998 Capital Market Law; 
and (iii) the 2002 code of good CG practice. The Omani Companies Act and Capital 
Market Law are considered statutory laws, whereas the 2002 code of CG is viewed as a 
voluntary regulation. The governance provisions included in the laws and the code are 
discussed below.    
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2.2.1 The Companies Act   
The 1974 Omani Companies Law, no.4, is regarded as the main statutory 
commercial law regulating Omani firms. It has been amended several times in accordance 
with national and international corporate developments. As Wymeersch (2006) indicates 
that the Companies Act has a considerable number of provisions that govern internal 
relationships between boards of directors, firms, shareholders and external auditors. The 
provisions suggested by the Companies Act that are related to each group are discussed 
consecutively in the following subsections. 
With respect to boards of directors, the Companies Act addresses the issue of 
related party transactions by determining any activities that contain conflicts of interest. 
Directors are not allowed to engage in such transactions without authorisation from 
shareholders (Article 108). The Act also requires firms to have a minimum of five directors 
on their boards (Article 95) in order to ensure effective supervision of managers. 
Additionally, board directors are not permitted to be members of more than five other 
boards, and their term of membership in the board of the main firm should not exceed three 
years (Article 95). These rules aim to ensure that directors will devote enough of their time 
and professional skills to the firm.   
Regarding the firm, Article 97 of the Act stipulates that firms must specify the 
number of firm shares that an appointed director is permitted to possess. This is to ensure 
that directors’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests. The Companies Act also 
requires firms to make their articles of association available to all shareholders (Article 6). 
Further, firms have to disclose each board director’s remuneration to the shareholders. 
More importantly, the Act requires firms to prepare and disclose: (i) balance sheets; (ii) 
profit and loss accounts; (iii) board of directors’ report; and (iv) an external audit report to 
their shareholders before the general assembly meeting (Article 101).   
            The Act grants shareholders various rights, which they should exercise. These 
include: (i) approving the board of directors’ remunerations (Article 101); (ii) appointing 
an external auditor (Article 120); (iii) attending and voting during general assembly 
meetings (Article 94); (iv) removing any director from his/her position; and (v) reducing or 
increasing the firm’s capital (Article 84).  
           Finally, and with reference to the external auditor, under Article 111, the appointed 
external auditor should be independent and should not serve the firm for a long period of 
time. The Companies Act also requires the external auditor to verify that firms’ records are 
prepared according to proper accounting standards (Article 112). More importantly, the 
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external auditor is required to provide a report on the firm’s financial position, to be made 
available to shareholders before the general assembly meeting (Article 113).    
Although the Companies Act has several governance provisions that protect 
shareholders’ interests, it does not clearly recognise the importance of different 
stakeholders, such as employees, debt providers and the community, in improving the 
profitability and competitiveness of a firm. For instance, stakeholders can play an 
important role in enhancing monitoring of managers by acting as independent non-
executive board directors.   
2.2.2 The Capital Market Law 
The 1998 Capital Market Act, no.80, is also one of the internal CG systems in 
Oman. It has been amended several times in response to developments within global and 
local markets. It was primarily issued in order to re-structure the MSM after its collapse 
during the Asian crisis. The Act mainly provides corporate provisions on listing and 
trading of securities. It requires firms to disclose a number of corporate issues. For 
instance, firms are required to prepare un-audited financial quarterly statements, and 
disclose them after they are approved by the board of directors. Firms also have to disclose 
audited annual financial reports, and provide a comparison with the same items for the 
previous year. The annual report must include: (i) a balance sheet; (ii) an income 
statement; (iii) a cash flow statement; (iv) a statement on changes in shareholders’ equity; 
and (v) notes on the financial statement (Articles 279 and 284). Under Article 285, firms 
are required to make their financial statements available to the public by publishing them 
in two daily newspapers. The Capital Market Act is also important because it provides a 
number of corporate provisions regarding responsibility and transparency. These 
provisions take the form of: (i) obligatory quarterly and annual reports; (ii) obligations to 
publish reports; and (iii) obligations to disclose accurate information. Despite its 
importance, the Act focuses mainly on corporate disclosure in annual reports, and does not 
provide governance provisions to regulate the internal relationships between boards of 
directors, executive management and shareholders, among others.  
2.2.3 The 2002 Omani Code of Corporate Governance 
As indicated earlier, the OCGC is regarded as the most significant CG policy 
reform in Oman. It is also a central motivation underpinning the three essays contained in 
this thesis and thus, it will be discussed in more detail in the following subsections. For 
brevity, however, subsequent easys will be addressed in detail as will be addressed in this 
essay, but will be cross-referenced, where appropriate. The discussion will include the 
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background of the code, CG recommendations proposed by the code, compliance with and 
enforcement of its proposals, and major achievements and challenges facing the 
implementation of the code.    
2.2.3.1 Background 
            Alongside Companies Act and Capital Market Law, the Code of good CG practices 
is the most sophisticated regulation that shapes the Omani internal CG framework. The 
issuance of the 2002 Code of good CG practices is mainly attributed to two key factors. 
First, sharp declines in MSM’s market value of listed firms in 1997 had a negative impact 
on the Omani economy in general and firms in particular. The government had to make 
major corporate policy reforms in order to respond to such negative effects (Fleety, 2010). 
Second, Oman was also influenced by a worldwide flood of self-regulatory initiatives to 
establish CG regimes as a remedy for corporate failures. A considerable number of 
countries, especially developed economies had CG reforms, and attempts to reform CG 
and disclosure practices in Oman began in June 2001, when the CMA organised a 
workshop to develop a CG code. This resulted in the formation of a committee comprising 
representatives of various stakeholder groups (Omani code, 2002). The main objective of 
this committee was to draft a Code of good CG practices by adapting the best CG practices 
from around the world that will be applicable to the Omani corporate setting (Omani code, 
2002). The second workshop organised by the CMA was in May 2002; at this time the 
committee presented its proposal to the CMA and obtained approval for its proposed draft 
(Al-Busaidi, 2008). Based on this draft, the CMA issued the OCGC in June 2002 into 
effect in January 2003.  
           According to the OCGC, the main purpose of the code is to promote a CG 
disclosure culture of transparency and accountability in order to provide greater protection 
for shareholders’ interests. The code applies to all Omani firms listed on the MSM, and 
foreign firms with statutory residence in Oman are recommended to comply with its 
provisions as well. A main characteristic of the code is its reliance on self-enforcement, 
mainly through market forces, to implement and enforce its recommendations. This 
suggests that the OCGC is similar to a considerable number of national codes, where 
compliance is on a comply-or-explain basis. 
Importantly, the OCGC is based on the 1992 UK’s Cadbury Report. This was 
expected for three main reasons. First, Oman has historic and economic links with the UK, 
as the country was a British colony for a period of time. Second, it has been argued that 
emerging countries tend to adopt commonly accepted standards of CG in order to be 
globally competitive and attract foreign investments (Solomon et al., 2003). In this regard, 
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Oman is expected to diversify its economy by attracting new investment opportunities. 
Adopting commonly accepted standards of CG permits Oman to meet foreign investors’ 
expectations by providing investor protection that can encourage international investors to 
invest in the country. Finally, Oman seems to be influenced by the concept of CG 
harmonisation, where countries with different types of CG regimes tend to adopt similar 
CG frameworks to the UK model, rather than having a different system (Solomon et al., 
2002).   
Although the 2002 OCGC is not as detailed as the 1992 UK code, both share some 
similarities. Table 2 below summarises and compares the key CG provisions of the two 
codes. The Omani CG Code is compared with UK one because the CG provisions 
contained in the Omani Code is drawn predominantly from the UK Code, and rendering 
comparison appropriate. Both codes have similar CG provisions on board characteristics, 
including: (i) board structure; (ii) non-executive directors; (iii) independent non-executive 
directors; and (iv) role duality. For instance, both codes recommend the board of directors 
conduct a review of the effectiveness of the firm’s internal control systems and disclose it 
to their shareholders in the annual report. Further, they implicitly recognise the need for 
firms to benefit from external auditing in order to provide transparent information to 
shareholders.   
Despite the similarities, there are differences between the two codes for a number 
of CG provisions. These provisions include: (i) UK firms are recommended to clearly 
identify the chairman’s responsibilities; (ii) the UK code suggests that firms should 
establish internal audit functions; and (iii) it recommends that firms establish a number of 
board sub-committees, including nomination, remuneration and audit committees. 
Similarly, the OCGC has several provisions on crucial issues not covered by the UK code, 
including: (i) Omani firms are recommended to provide more transparent information on 
related party transactions; (ii) the OCGC requires firms to disclose the roles and 
responsibilities of executive management; and (iii) firms are recommended to provide 
transparent information related to ownership structure.  
In summary, the OCGC represents the most advanced CG policy regime in Oman. 
Although its CG provisions have been drawn mainly from the 1992 UK Code, its ability to 
enhance CG practice is expected to be influenced by the Omani context; hence, levels of 
governance disclosure may be different from what has been documented in developed 
countries.   
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Table 2: A comparison of the key corporate governance provisions of the 1992 UK code and the 2002 OCGC  
Corporate Governance Provisions The 1992 Cadbury Report The 2002 Omani Code 
Compliance Voluntary Voluntary 
Enforcement Board,  institutional investors & 
external auditor 
Board & external auditor 
Applicability Listed firms Listed firms 
Code of Principles Openness,  integrity & 
accountability  
Transparency, responsibility & 
accountability 
Board and Directors   
        Board structure Unitary board system Unitary board system 
        Chairperson Non-executive director Non-executive director 
        Non-executive  A minimum of three directors  Majority of board members  
        Independent        --  A minimum of two directors  A minimum of two directors  
        Role duality Split Chairperson & CEO Split Chairperson & CEO 
        Board committees  Nomination, remuneration & audit Establish audit committee  
        Board meetings  Frequently &  regularly  At least four times a year 
Accounting and Auditing   
        Accounting reporting  Accounting standards (GAAP) Accounting standards (IASs) 
        Internal audit Establish internal audit function  Not covered 
External Auditors & Internal Control   
       Internal control system Establish internal control system Establish internal control system 
       External auditing Appointment & responsibilities  Appointment & responsibilities   
       Rotation of external auditor Not specified  Maximum four years 
Disclosure and Transparency   
       Chairman Clear  responsibilities Not covered  
       Executive management Not covered Roles and responsibilities  
       Related party transactions Not covered Rules for related party transactions 
       Ownership structure Not covered Distribution of shareholding 
Source: Compiled from the 1992 Cadbury Report and the 2002 Omani Code. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms Proposed to Firms by the Code 
             As mentioned earlier, several CG provisions have already been issued by the CMA 
in the form of circulars, while others appear in the Companies Act. These provisions, in 
addition to other principles adopted from the 1992 UK’s Cadbury Report, have been 
elaborated in the form of a code that presents the best CG practices. The following 
discussion reviews the main elements of the code, including: (i) board and directors; (ii) 
accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; (iv) disclosure 
and transparency; and (v) compliance and enforcement of the code.  
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i) Board and Directors  
             As Table 2 demonstrates above, similar to the UK code, the OCGC implicitly 
recognises the importance of having effective boards, and pays much attention to the 
directors of boards. It follows the UK code by recommending a unitary board. Omani listed 
firms are recommended to compose their boards mainly from non-executive and 
independent directors.4 Specifically, the OCGC recommends boards should be composed 
of mostly non-executive directors, as well as a minimum of two independent directors. 
This is in line with theoretical predictions (e.g., resource dependence theory) that the 
experience and independence of non-executive and independent directors can add value to 
firms, as they bring independent judgements of how firms should run, and assist them in 
acquiring resources. 
Further, and in line with the UK code, the OCGC recognises the significant role of 
Chairpersons in ensuring that the board effectively performs its duties. The OCGC 
recommends firms split the roles of Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer. This is 
consistent with theoretical suggestions (e.g., agency theory) that the Chief Executive 
Officer can be expected to behave opportunistically in order to reap personal benefits at the 
expense of shareholders.  
In addition, the OCGC emphasises the crucial role of the board by suggesting that 
board directors have a duty to approve interim and annual financial statements, and should 
report to shareholders about the ongoing concern status of the firm. Also, board directors 
are required to state in their annual reports that the board has conducted a review of the 
effectiveness of the firm’s internal control systems. Thus, it can be argued that the OCGC’s 
recommendations related to the board of directors are consistent with commonly accepted 
CG standards, such as the 1992 UK code.  
ii) Accounting and Auditing 
          The OCGC makes limited proposals related to accounting and auditing. With regard 
to accounting, the OCGC recommends that boards appoint directors who are able to 
understand financial reports, where at least one director should have expertise in financial 
accounting and corporate finance. The OCGC also recognises the importance of 
accounting standards by recommending firms follow International Accounting Standards 
(IASs) in preparing and reporting their financial reports.  
                                                 
4
A director is defined as an independent non-executive director “if he or she or any of his/her first degree family member 
has not occupied any senior position (such as chief executive officer, general manager or similar posts) in the 
company for the last two years. Also, he or she should not have had any relations with the company, its parent 
company or its affiliated or sister companies which could result in financial transactions” (Omani Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2002, pp.5-10).  
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With regard to auditing, unlike the UK code, internal audit functions are not 
covered by the OCGC. Similarly, of board sub-committees (e.g., remuneration, nomination 
and risk), only audit committees are recognised by the OCGC. Omani firms are 
recommended to set up an audit committee comprising at least three non-executive 
directors, with a majority of them being independent. The OCGC sought to increase the 
effectiveness of this committee by recommending its members meet at least four times a 
year, with their attendance disclosed to shareholders in the annual report. The OCGC 
suggests the committee’s duties should include: (i) reviewing annual and quarterly 
financial reports; (ii) reviewing the adequacy and efficacy of the firm’s internal control 
systems; (iii) evaluating risk management policies; and (iv) proposing contacts and 
transactions regarding related parties. Hence, the OCGC recognises the important role that 
the audit committee can play in ensuring reliable and accurate financial reporting. 
iii)  External Auditors and Internal Control Systems  
            Similar to the UK code, the OCGC recognises the significant role the external 
auditor can play as a governance mechanism, and makes several recommendations related 
to the relationship between firms and external auditors. It requires a firm’s general 
assembly to appoint an external auditor based on recommendations from the firm’s board. 
Importantly, the Omani code distinguishes its CG provisions from the UK code, which 
does not specify the rotation of external auditors, by recommending that firms should 
appoint external auditors for a maximum of four consecutive financial years. Further, audit 
firms are not recommended to provide audit and non-audit services to the same firm. This 
aims to minimise any negative implications of audit costs, which may in turn reflect on 
audit quality. According to the OCGC, external auditors are required to report on a number 
of governance issues, including: (i) the adequacy and efficacy of a firm’s internal control 
systems; (ii) whether a firm is able to carry out its business; (iii) whether a firm has the 
ability to comply with its internal control systems; and (iv) any financial fraud. Therefore, 
unlike internal audit, the OCGC seems to heavily emphasise external audit in assisting 
boards of directors to enforce good CG practices.   
 iv) Disclosure and Transparency 
Similar to the UK code, the OCGC emphasises the need for firms to provide 
transparent information on CG compliance and disclosure. It recommends firms to adopt a 
transparent policy regarding remuneration of directors and top executives. In particular, 
firms are required to disclose details of their directors’ and key executives’ salaries, 
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bonuses and stock options. Crucially, the OCGC distinguishes its CG provisions from the 
UK code by emphasising three main requirements.  
First, firms are called to address agency relationships by providing information 
about related party transactions. In this regard, the OCGC requires firms to disclose details 
about contracts and transactions that may involve a conflict of interests between agents and 
principals. Second, firms are required to provide information related to executive 
management’s roles and responsibilities to ensure that its performance is aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. Finally, firms are recommended to disclose a narrative on the 
distribution of shareholding. This is to inform the providers of capital (potential investors) 
of whether ownership structures are diffused or not in a particular firm, which may affect 
their investment decisions. In addition, firms are required to provide a narrative on various 
CG issues to shareholders in the annual report, including: (i) a professional profile of the 
external auditor; (ii) a firm’s policy in running its activities; (iii) investment opportunities; 
(iv) financial and operational performance; (v) risks and concerns; (vi) dividends policy; 
(vii) market price data; (viii) firms’ loans; (ix) firms’ analysis of its products; (x) penalties 
and strictures imposed on the firm; and (xi) a firm’s vision and expectations to its future. 
Unlike the UK code, however, the OCGC does not recommend firms disclose information 
about Chairman’s responsibilities. Unclear definitions of Chairman’s responsibilities may 
have significant implications in setting and promoting a firm’s CG practices.    
v) Compliance and Enforcement of the Code 
Similar to the influential 1992 UK Code and many other CG codes that followed it, 
the implementation of the OCGC’s CG recommendations is voluntary (comply or explain) 
and the code is self-enforced. In this sense, the OCGC leaves the door open for firms to act 
in accordance with their interests, as it assumes that a firm will provide an explanation for 
each instance of non-compliance. To encourage voluntary compliance, the OCGC was 
appended to the MSM’s listing rules, and has become part of the listing requirements 
(Article 50, clause 8). With respect to enforcement, it relies on market forces to ensure that 
its recommendations are implemented (Keay, 2014). The code assumes that a firm which 
neither complies nor explains its non-compliance will be penalised by capital market 
instruments, such as shareholders. Importantly, the OCGC regards boards of directors and 
external auditors as key in ensuring that firms adopt and implement its provisions. The 
board of directors, through its committees, especially audit committee, has been given the 
responsibility to promote CG practices by clearly defining governance arrangements and 
ensuring that the governance framework adopted by the firm is followed and updated. 
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Similarly, the OCGC requires external auditors to report to shareholders on the extent to 
which the firm complies with and applies its provisions.     
2.2.3.3 Major Achievements and Weaknesses of the Code 
As discussed above, Oman embarked upon significant legal and regulatory reforms 
to improve CG practices. The publication of the OCGC was the most important of these 
reforms, and listed firms are recommended to voluntarily comply with its provisions. As 
illustrated in Table 1, it can be argued that the code was the first code of CG in Arab 
countries to offer firms a coherent CG framework (Al-Busaidi, 2008). It contributed to 
promoting a culture of CG compliance and disclosure by recommending a number of 
internal and external CG mechanisms. Indeed, greater efforts have been made to reform 
CG practices in Oman, as the concept of CG itself was a new area for Omani society in 
general and firms in particular. Although the OCGC is less detailed than the UK code, it 
was an early attempt in the MENA region to provide governance provisions in four key 
areas, including board and directors, accounting and auditing, external auditors and internal 
control, and disclosure and transparency.  
Despite its reliance on Anglo-American CG codes, especially those recommended 
by the 1992 UK code, the OCGC has been able to distinguish its provisions from UK code 
in a number of ways. First, the OCGC offers firms a coherent CG framework that requires 
firms to provide information in the case of related party transactions. Second, it recognises 
the importance of executive management by providing clear guidance for its roles and 
responsibilities. Third, the code specifies how external auditors should be rotated and 
recommends that firms should not appoint external auditors for more than four years. 
Finally, it emphasises the need for firms to provide a narrative on the distribution of 
shareholding.    
In spite of its achievements, the OCGC seems to suffer from some weaknesses, and 
deviates from the UK code in a number of ways. First, while the OCGC recognises the 
crucial role of an audit committee, it fails to recommend that firms should establish other 
committees, such as remuneration, nomination, risk and CG committees. The presence of 
such committees is expected to give the board more independence and assistance in 
performing its duties effectively. Second, it does not address the important issues relating 
to internal audit functions. This is different from the UK code, in which firms are 
recommended to provide detailed account of their internal audit functions and 
responsibilities. The absence of provisions relating to internal audit and control may 
increase the potential conflict of interests between audit committee and internal audit 
functions. Third, it does not offer guidance for shareholders to enable them to evaluate the 
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effectiveness of boards and board sub-committees. Without such guidance, shareholders 
may be confronted with the problem of being unable to identify directors that are 
performing well from those that are not. This can affect shareholders’ decisions on critical 
issues, such as directors’ remuneration and nomination. Fourth, it arguably fails to 
emphasise Islamic values and use them as complementary CG mechanisms. Using Islamic 
notions could have been expected to increase directors’ independence, where true 
independence is required to ensure that their decisions are in line with shareholders’ 
interests. Finally, the OCGC is unable to relate its provisions to a number of important 
issues, such as informal rules, ownership structures and social responsibility. The OCGC 
was unable to introduce provisions that enable firms to mitigate the negative effects of 
informal rules and encourage both managers and directors to be more committed to CG 
systems than societal values. Clear provisions on, for example, the definition of an 
independent director, can be anticipated to reduce directors’ tendency to pursue personal 
relationships at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Likewise, governance provisions 
that encourage diffuse ownership structure could have been expected to encourage firms’ 
to engage in increased voluntary compliance because the market for corporate control will 
work effectively in a corporate setting with less concentrated ownership. Similarly, the 
OCGC mainly focuses on shareholders; hence, offering provisions which consider the 
interests of a larger stakeholder group could have been expected to motivate firms to comply 
with the OCGC, as stakeholders have great influence on firms.  
However, despite the Omani corporate setting and given the OCGC’s reliance on 
the Anglo-American model, the initial theoretical prediction is that adopting high CG 
standards in the form of code can improve CG practices in general and increase CG 
disclosure in particular. This needs to be empirically investigated in order to ascertain the 
extent to which Omani firms provide information on their CG practices.  
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical and empirical literature on CG voluntary compliance5 and the 
factors influencing such compliance and disclosure are discussed in this section. 
Specifically, Subsection 3.1 reviews the most relevant extant theories that aim to explain 
the determinants of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, whereas the central 
theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature relevant to each determinant are 
presented in Subsection 3.2.  
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
Although corporate and academic interest in CG compliance has increased recently, 
there is no uniform theoretical framework providing a full explanation of firms’ 
motivations for voluntarily complying with CG practices and disclosure (Carpenter and 
Feroz, 1992; Deegan, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). In this regard, Roberts et al. (2005, pp.6) 
state that “there are calls for greater theoretical pluralism and more detailed attention to 
board processes and dynamics”. In particular, researchers such as Filatotchev and Boyd 
(2009), Ees et al. (2009) and Chen and Roberts (2010) have highlighted the need to 
advance theoretical development by drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives rather the 
ubiquitous agency theory alone in CG research. In response to these calls, recent empirical 
studies use a range of individual theories to examine different issues relating to the effect 
of CG on various aspects of corporate financial decision-making (e.g., Oliveira et al., 
2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).  
While each individual theory is useful in explaining the motivations for voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure, the ability of a single theory to provide a complete 
explanation for different CG mechanisms and impact on corporate outcomes is arguably 
limited (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). For instance, agency theory can explain compliance 
with CG requirements, but its explanatory power is limited as it restricts its assumptions to 
only shareholders. However, legitimacy theory may explain firms’ motivations to comply 
with CG proposals, as it addresses the interests of different groups of stakeholders. Thus, 
relying on more than one theory is helpful in gaining a broder explanation and overcoming 
the inadequacies of individual theories.  
Using a range of multiple theories has been suggested as a way to consider the 
interdependencies of CG practices (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). As a result, a multi-
theoretical approach is adopted in this study to explain the determinants of voluntary CG 
                                                 
5
CG compliance is defined in this study as the implementation and disclosure of recommendations proposed by the 2002 
Omani CG code in addition to other CG requirements specified by Omani laws in their annual reports.  
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compliance and disclosure, where the chosen theories are considered as complementary 
rather than competing perspectives (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). Importantly, the current 
study is conscious that combining theories may result in incompatibility problems, but 
such potential differences among the theories have been minimised as their selection is 
based on the commonness of their focus, as discussed above (Reverte, 2009a, Oliveira et 
al., 2011; Chen and Roberts, 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).  
Thus, in line with prior studies (e.g., Oliveira et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a, b) 
which found that combining theories provides richer insights, the present study adopts the 
theories most commonly used by past studies in its investigation. These theories include 
agency, resource dependence, legitimacy, and signalling/stakeholder theories. The 
perspective of each individual theory with respect to voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure is discussed briefly in the following subsections.   
3.1.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory (AT) is widely used to explain the problems associated with the 
principal-agent relationship in modern firms. AT has been the principal underlying theory 
for many past studies on CG compliance and disclosure (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). The 
historical origins of AT date back to Smith (1776), who discussed the nature of the 
relationship between managers and owners, stating “the directors of such [joint-stock] 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, 
it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance 
with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. 
…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company” quoted by (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
pp.305). While various scholars (e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979; Fama, 1980) have contributed to 
AT, Jensen and Meckling (1976) are regarded as the main contributors and developers of 
AT.     
In this theory, the definition of the agency relationship is “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp.308). Based on this definition, AT predicts that an 
agency relationship where ownership and control is separate involves two critical problems 
between principals and agents, including conflict of interest and information asymmetry 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Hill and Jones, 1992). AT suggests three main 
reasons for these problems. First, the agent and the principal have different preferences for 
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making risky decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, both parties have different objectives 
and interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, because the agent and the principal are assumed 
to be utility maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent may tend to behave 
opportunistically to reap personal benefits at the expense of principal (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
AT has sought to align the divergence of interests between agent and principal by 
introducing the concept of CG. It suggests that the principal can establish appropriate 
incentives (CG mechanisms) to control the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). AT also 
emphasises that establishing such mechanisms creates three main agency costs, including 
monitoring costs (i.e., budget restrictions), bonding costs (i.e., compensation) and residual 
loss6 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The monitoring and bonding costs can be viewed as 
governance structures, where the principal expends resources to reduce the agent’s self-
serving behaviour, and spends resources to guarantee that the agent’s actions will not harm 
the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
As a result, AT seeks to bring the interests of managers to be aligned with 
shareholders’ interests; hence, reducing the divergence of interests between the two parties. 
In this regard, AT identifies three ways in which shareholders’ wealth may be minimised 
due to the incurrence of agency costs caused by managers. First, managers may be 
motivated to expropriate firm resources either by awarding themselves generous benefits 
derived from pecuniary returns (i.e., remuneration packages) and/or consuming more non-
pecuniary utilities (i.e., the physical appointments of the office) (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Second, they may decide to invest excess cash flows in less profitable projects 
rather than pay dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Finally, managers 
may not use their time, effort and professional skills suitably (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986).  
To reduce opportunistic managerial behaviour and minimise agency costs, AT 
suggests establishing internal and external mechanisms. These mechanisms are known 
today as CG systems (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). AT proposes that by incurring both 
monitoring and bonding costs, shareholders can establish internal CG systems that include: 
(i) hierarchical board structures (Fama, 1980); (ii) control systems (i.e., internal auditing 
and budget restrictions) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); (iii) remuneration systems (i.e., 
performance targets) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and (iv) written contracts (i.e., 
                                                 
6
Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp.308) define residual loss as “The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal due to this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship”.  
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operating rules) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The external CG systems that AT suggests 
include the market for corporate control and external auditing (Fama, 1980).    
In the context of CG compliance and disclosure, however, AT relies on managerial 
incentives to explain the need for voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. It posits that 
disclosing CG practices can contribute internally and externally to shareholder wealth. 
Internally, by providing more CG information, managers offer shareholders a window 
through which to continuously monitor their actions. For instance, increased managerial 
motivation towards superior CG disclosure can assure shareholders that managers are not 
investing in wasteful projects with excess cash flow instead of paying back dividends 
(Jensen, 1986), nor awarding themselves excessive compensation and perquisites (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Externally, increased information about CG practices can decrease 
information asymmetry and assist in lowering agency costs and lead to lower managerial 
expropriation, which are caused by the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Cooke, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; La Porta et al., 2002). Increasing 
shareholder information, reducing investor uncertainties and minimising agency costs can 
ultimately maximise shareholders’ wealth.  
AT assumes that shareholders bear more agency costs in firms with lower levels of 
CG disclosure than in those with more CG disclosure. This is mainly because they are 
effectively unable to observe, measure and control managers’ performance in the presence 
of information asymmetry. In addition, due to the divergence of interests between the two 
parties, AT posits that managers need to provide CG information to reassure shareholders 
that they are working in line with their interests (Raffournier, 1995). For instance, 
managers are motivated to disclose CG information to correct any misunderstanding 
regarding their performance. Such misperceptions may lead to a loss of firm value, which 
will negatively impact stock compensations.  
To sum up, AT assumes that CG compliance and disclosure lead to reduced agency 
costs and closer alignment between the interests of managers and shareholders. The theory 
has provided a foundation to launch international (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development Report, 1999) and national (e.g., Omani code, 2002) initiatives 
which suggest proposals for good CG practices. These initiatives have sought to promote a 
culture of governance compliance and high-quality disclosure among firms. Due to the 
voluntary nature of such initiatives, academic researchers continue their efforts to 
understand firms’ motivations for disclosing information on CG practices (Deegan, 2002). 
Prior studies use AT as a theoretical basis with which to investigate the factors influencing 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure in different corporate settings.  
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3.1.2 Resource Dependence Theory  
Resource dependence theory (RDT) provides another view to explain incentives for 
CG compliance and disclosure. It was mainly developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
who emphasise the influence of external actors (e.g., local communities, government and 
supplies) on firms’ behaviour (Hillman et al., 2009). In particular, RDT has drawn 
attention to the link between CG and different organisational environments, where firms 
respond to the demands of external actors whose have resources (e.g., locations, 
infrastructures, and materials) that firms are largely dependent on in operating their 
activities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Firms’ resources have been suggested as valuable, 
rare, cannot be absolutely imitated, and it is difficult to find equivalent subsititutes for the 
needed resources (Barney, 1991). This makes corporate directors to develop and 
implement strategies that enable them to control the critical resources in order for firms’ 
activities can be carried out (Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Mathews, 2003). Similarly, since 
firms are dependent on external actors for obtaining resources, this reliance may result in 
uncertainty because external actors may withhold resources which in trun force firms to 
reduce the uncertainty by attempting to control the external actors (Berman et al., 2005). 
Among strategies available to firms, RDT suggests that firms are motivated to use CG 
disclosure as a useful strategy to provide information on CG practices in order to gain their 
own goals (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). It assumes that firms enjoy unique competitive 
advantages by obtaining access to the needed resources when they commit to provide high 
levels of transparent information in the form of CG disclosure (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These advantages include, but not limited to: (i) build 
community ties with corporate stakeholders; (ii) build reputational capital and improve 
corporate image; and (iiii) reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Fombrun et al, 2000; 
Mallin, 2002; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Thus, firms may be expected to provide 
additional information on CG practices in order to generate more commitment and 
involvement from external actors, which can be helpful in the provision of resources, 
leading to increased firm value (Ntim et al., 2012b). For instance, firms may be able to 
enhance employees’ productivity by disclosing information on remuneration and 
nomination committees that may allow employees to determine the extent to which their 
firms are commitment to issues like fair wages and better working place (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006). Similarly, providing additional information on firms’ boards’ 
composition (e.g., Non-executive directors and independent directors) may allow firms to 
mitigate external actors’ concerns about the lack of directors’ ability to adopt appropriate 
strategies (Castanias, and Helfat, 2001). Due to their expertise, prestige and contracts, non-
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executive directors and independent directors are considered by RDT as having a resource 
role that contributes to the firm value (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). For example, a firm with 
executives who are also directors of financial firms and/or partners in law firm are 
expected to help in obtaining lower cost of capital and/or get legal advice that otherwise 
would be costly for the firm (Daily et al., 2003). To sum up, RDT considers CG 
compliance and disclosure as an important strategy for firms to control external actors and 
obtain needed resources, and failure to provide adequate disclosure of CG practices may 
limit a firm’s ability to secure resources.  
3.1.3 Legitimacy Theory  
Legitimacy theory (LT) is mainly built on the work of Parsons (1960) and Weber 
(1978), which addresses the driving forces that constrain, construct and empower firms in 
performing their operations (Suchman, 1995; Asforth and Gibbs, 1990; Soobaroyen and 
Ntim, 2013). It introduces the concept that firms operate in the society through a social 
contract, where they agree to perform a range of socially desired actions in order to 
legitimise their objectives (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Firms tend to protect their image of 
legitimacy by responding to society’s norms and values. Thus, failure to meet societal 
expectations may lead to a legitimacy gap, where the values of the firm are different from 
those of society (Sethi, 1979).  
According to its logical conceptual basis, LT assumes that firms are motivated to 
voluntarily disclose information on CG practices in order to communicate with society 
(e.g., shareholders, investors, and local authorities) (Watson et al., 2002). Lindblom (1994) 
suggests that firms can adopt one of three legitimacy strategies to secure their survival and 
growth. First, firms may tend to use additional information in order to educate and inform 
their stakeholders about any changes in their performance. Second, they may adopt 
voluntary disclosure in order to deflect attention away from critical issues. Finally, 
providing more information on CG practices may help firms change stakeholders’ 
perceptions and expectations related to their performance without making any serious 
attempts to improve the performance itself.  
These legitimacy strategies suggest that firms have two main incentives to engage 
in CG disclosure. First, providing information on CG practices is expected to result in good 
relations with society (stakeholders), which leads to establishing valuable intangible assets 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Firms consider these assets as a source of competitive 
advantage, which can help them distinguish themselves from other competitors (Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2008). Second, firms disclose further information on CG practices in order 
to demonstrate their acceptance of social norms and expectations of how firms should act 
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(Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Hence, LT relies on social legitimacy to theorise firms’ 
motivations for providing CG information. 
3.1.4 Signalling/Stakeholder Theory  
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) are regarded as the main contributors of 
signalling theory (SGT), which is fundamentally concerned with the problem of 
information asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders). SGT 
recognises that managers have an advantage by being better informed than stakeholders, 
and introduces the concept that firms must find ways to credibly signal information to 
stakeholder or outsiders in order to reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, the SGT 
model suggests that insiders should rely on voluntary disclosure as a means to minimise 
information asymmetry, so that outsiders can better evaluate firms and make optimal 
investment decisions. According to this theory, providing transparent information on CG 
practices, especially in annual reports, will positively affect stakeholders’ perceptions. In 
contrast, not disclosing information on CG practices may suggest to outsiders either that 
the firm does not engage in good CG practices or that it has negative information; both 
possibilities may discourage potential investors from investing. 
Thus, firms are motivated to disclose information on CG practices to differentiate 
themselves from those with less disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). For instance, 
indicating the presence of independent non-executive directors on the board can be 
interpreted by stakeholders as a positive signal of a better investment protection policy, 
which may encourage potential investors to invest in. Similarly, providing detailed 
information on ownership structures will be interpreted by outsiders as an indicator of firm 
quality (Ross, 1977; Core, 2001). In particular, disclosing information on managerial 
ownership can be interpreted as a positive signal, because outsiders expect that managers 
have optimistic information about the firm’s future financial prospects (Ross, 1977). 
Managers in poor-quality firms will not choose such costly signals to inform outsiders 
about their firms.  
Firms may also tend to send out signals in order to achieve managerial benefits. For 
instance, managers are motivated to provide information on CG practices in order to avoid 
the risk of losing their jobs and the cost of litigation resulting from poor performance 
(Skinner, 1994; Healy and Palepu, 2001). They may use voluntary disclosure to justify that 
poor firm performance is not due to poor governance, but to other issues that are beyond 
managers’ control. Therefore, by providing additional information on CG practices, SGT 
suggests that firms signal to stakeholders that they are highly committed to good CG 
practices and accountability (Certo et al., 2001).  
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Stakeholder theory (SKT), however, which mainly was introduced by Freeman 
(1984), provides similar view to SGT to explain incentives for CG compliance and 
disclosure (Solomon, 2010). It suggests that firms’ roles and responsibilities should include 
all stakeholders (e.g., coustomers, employees, creditors, suppliers and stat) (Freeman, 
1984). The essential element of this theory regarding CG disclosure is that because 
different stakeholders can affect firms’ profitability and competitiveness, firms need the 
support of multiple stakeholders (Letza et al., 2004). In this regard, SKT argues that firms 
are motivated to voluntarily disclose CG information in order to gain the competitive 
advantage. Using voluntary CG disclosure has been suggested by SKS as a communication 
between stakeholders and firms that may offer a window for stakeholder to evelute issues 
that impact negatively on their utilities. For instance, employees may use CG information 
provided by firms to investigate the extent to which CG systems adopted by firms are able 
to prevent managers from engaging in earnings management, which may lead to reduce 
labour costs (D’Souza et al., 2000). Hence, SKT emphasises the importance of voluntary 
CG disclosure as the way of deeling with a broad range of stakeholders with multible 
conflcting interests (Prior et al., 2008).  
3.2 PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES  
            As indicated earlier, past studies sought to examine firms’ voluntary compliance 
with CG codes and investigate the factors that determine such compliance, because of the 
voluntary nature of those codes (Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wymeersch, 
2006). These studies choose different CG attributes and firm characteristics to conduct 
such examinations, and obtained mixed results. The present study draws from the 
theoretical, empirical literature and the Omani context to identify the key factors that may 
directly influence firm-level voluntary CG disclosure among the Omani listed firms. These 
factors are classified into two types. First, ownership structure variables, consisting of 
government ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block ownership 
are employed in the regression analysis. Second, board/audit characteristics variables, 
made up of board size, audit firm size, board diversity in terms of gender and nationality, 
and the presence of a CG committee are used in the regression analysis.  
3.2.1 Ownership Structures Variables   
         It has been argued that corporate ownership structure is a key determinant of 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Ntim et al., 2012a). While most previous studies focus on limited types of 
ownership, the Omani context offers the current study a great opportunity to examine four 
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different types of ownership structures in order to determine the relationship between those 
structures and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. These structures include government, 
institutional, foreign and block ownership. The following subsections will briefly set out 
the central theoretical arguments and extant empirical literature relevant to each type, as 
well as its relation to voluntary CG compliance and disclosure.  
3.2.1.1 Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 
           In many emerging countries where firms are not fully privatised and the state tends 
to invest heavily in listed firms, for mainly political reasons, government ownership can be 
considered as an influential factor that affects firm decisions in general and CG disclosure 
in particular (Laidroo, 2009). Theoretically, Eng and Mak (2003) suggest that firms in 
which the government holds many shares have profit and non-profit goals; hence, 
shareholders’ interests may not be a primary objective. This may suggest that agency costs 
would be higher in such firms due to the conflict of interest where firms need to voluntarily 
disclose more information on CG compliance in order to reduce the divergence of interests 
between them and shareholders. Similarly, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) argue that the 
government may pressure firms to provide more information since the state is accountable 
to stakeholders at large. Hence, political control by government shareholders and the 
conflict between its interests and shareholders’ interests are expected to motivate firms to 
disclose more information about CG compliance.  
In contrast, from an RDT perspective, firms with many government-held shares 
have easier access to the resources they need, especially those related to financing needs, 
because they primarily rely on the state when seeking additional financing (Eng and Mak, 
2003). Firms take advantage of the government being a major investor and easily raise 
external funds from local providers at a preferred rate, which may not encourage them to 
provide high levels of CG disclosure. Similarly, associated political interference in 
appointing managers and directors may make the market for corporate control less 
effective in disciplining them, as the government is expected to be a major long-term 
investor. Thus, a negative relationship is expected between government ownership and 
voluntary CG disclosure.  
Empirically, government ownership has not been widely studied in prior empirical 
literature to examine its influence on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure (Ntim et al., 
2012a). This suggests that the investigation of such a relationship by the current study can 
contribute to the extant literature. The results in a few prior studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 
2003; Ntim et al., 2012a) are consistent with the positive theoretical predictions regarding 
this association. For instance, using a sample of 169 firms listed on the Johannesburg 
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Securities Exchange from 2002 to 2006, Ntim et al. (2012a) report empirical evidence that 
government ownership has a significant positive relationship with CG voluntary 
compliance and disclosure. Similarly, Eng and Mak (2003) examine the effect of 
government ownership on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure in a sample of 158 firms 
listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. They document empirical evidence that 
government ownership is associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, 
some studies (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2011) report no significant relationship between the two variables. For instance, 
using a sample of 100 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange, Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011) report empirical evidence that government ownership does not have a significant 
effect on CG voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) use a sample of 
87 Malaysian listed firms in 2001 to investigate the factors influencing Malaysian firms to 
engage in greater transparency. Among those factors, they report empirical evidence that 
government ownership is insignificantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
In Oman, the government has a considerable number of shares in listed firms in 
different industries, such as basic materials, telecommunications, oil and gas, and financial 
services, amongst others (Abdulla, 1998). In this view, and in line with the positive 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, Omani firms with large portion of 
government ownership are expected to be motivated to provide additional voluntary CG 
disclosure because Omani government has keen interest in improving CG practices. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is that:    
 
3.2.1.2 Institutional Ownership (INSOWN)   
It has been suggested that institutional investors holding many shares act as an 
important CG mechanism for a number of reasons (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). First, they have the ability and resources to obtain more 
information than small shareholders (Smith, 1976). Second, they have superior knowledge 
and expertise when it comes to evaluating a firm’s decisions and interpreting the 
information disclosed in a firm’s annual reports (Chung et al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 
2004). Finally, their voting power allows them to take action when necessary (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008). Hence, institutional investors are strongly motivated to demand 
detailed information and monitor corporate disclosure policies (Barako et al., 2006a). 
Healy et al. (1999) suggest that firms with more external financing needs tend to disclose 
H1: There is a statistically significant positive association between government 
                 ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
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more information in order to attract institutional investors and meet and satisfy their 
expectations. In turn, institutional shareholders prefer to invest in firms with higher levels 
of CG disclosure in order to reduce monitoring costs (Bushee et al., 2010).  
Prior empirical evidence is generally consistent with a positive association between 
the percentage of ownership held by institutional investors and firm-level CG disclosure 
(e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006a; Laidroo, 2009; Chung and Zhang, 
2011; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a). For instance, using a sample of 12,093 
firm-year observations from 2001 to 2006, Chung and Zhang (2011) report US evidence 
that institutional ownership is positively associated with voluntary governance disclosure. 
Similarly, using a sample of 43 firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange for the period 
1992-2001, Barako et al. (2006a) report empirical evidence that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is significantly and positively influenced by institutional ownership.  
Nevertheless, some studies have obtained different results. For instance, Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) found no significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
voluntary CG disclosure in a sample of 51 Irish listed firms.  
However, in line with the positive theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, 
institutional ownership is anticipated to encourage Omani firms to provide greater 
voluntary CG disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry and monitoring costs. 
Accordingly, the second hypothesis proposed in this study is:   
 
3.2.1.3 Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 
Foreign shareholders are more likely to face higher levels of information 
asymmetry because of distance and language obstacles (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). This 
may suggest that they require greater disclosure in order to reduce asymmetric information 
and monitor management’s actions (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In this view, domestic 
firms with foreign investors are motivated to disclose more information in order to meet 
foreign investors’ expectations. This may be especially true in emerging markets where 
countries open their stock markets to foreign investors to enhance the efficiency of their 
capital markets (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Elsayed, 2010). Support for this argument is 
given by Leuz et al. (2010), who report evidence that US investors do not invest 
significantly in countries with weaker disclosure requirements. Further, Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) suggest that foreign institutional investors are regarded as the main exporters and 
H2: There is a statistically significant positive association between  institutional 
                 ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
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promoters of good CG practices around the world. They contend that foreign investors help 
non-US firms improve their levels of CG disclosure.   
However, there is no substantial body of international evidence evaluating the 
influence of foreign ownership on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure (Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007). Previous studies (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006a; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) report evidence that foreign 
ownership impacts positively on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. For instance, Huafang 
and Jianguo (2007) report a positive association between increased voluntary disclosure 
and foreign ownership for a sample of 599 Chinese listed firms. Similarly, using a sample 
of 167 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
provide empirical evidence that foreign ownership impacts significantly and positively on 
voluntary disclosure among Malaysian listed firms. Given the positive predictions of the 
theoretical and empirical literature, foreign shareholders are expected to positively 
influence CG disclosure practices in Oman. Therefore, the third hypothesis of this study is: 
 
3.2.1.4 Block Ownership (BLKOWN) 
A common feature in most emerging countries is concentration of ownership, and 
thereby potentially increasing the severity of agency problems. Agency conflicts can occur 
when there is separation between ownership and control, as predicted by AT (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Firms with diffuse ownership structures would potentially have greater 
conflicts of interest between agent and principal, because extra monitoring is required 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Under these circumstances, the demand for information would 
be very high in order to alleviate agency costs. In contrast, firms with concentrated 
ownership are more likely to disclose less information because block holders can more 
easily access information, and they may use their power to influence management to 
provide less disclosure to shareholders, as their interests may not coincide with minority 
shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Laidroo, 2009).   
In fact, the influence of ownership concentration on firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure has received considerable attention in previous empirical studies, with mixed 
evidence. In line with the negative perspective of the theoretical literature, a considerable 
number of past studies report a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; 
Barako et al., 2006a; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Laidroo, 2009; Samaha and 
H3: There is a statistically significant positive association between  foreign 
                 ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
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Dahawy, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). For instance, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) examine the relationship between block ownership and disclosure using a sample of 
167 Malaysian firms in 1995. They report empirical evidence that ownership concentration 
is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Similarly, empirical evidence reported 
by Ntim et al. (2012a) is consistent with prior evidence that ownership concentration is 
negatively associated with the level of voluntary CG disclosure provided by South African 
listed firms.  
In contrast to the negative perspective of the theoretical literature, limited studies 
offer evidence that ownership concentration impacts positively on voluntary CG 
disclosure. For example, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) employ 559 firm-year observations 
in 2002 to investigate the effect of different factors on voluntary disclosure. They report 
empirical evidence that block ownership, among other examined variables, has a 
significant positive relationship with Chinese listed firms’ voluntary disclosure. Limited 
studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Konijn et al., 2011) report no significant association 
between the two variables. For instance, using a sample of 3,722 firm-year observations 
during the period 1996-2001, Konijn et al. (2011) report US empirical evidence that the 
presence of block ownership has no statistically significant association with shareholders’ 
rights as measured by a governance disclosure index.  
Given the Omani context, where firms have high levels of concentrated ownership 
and both managers and block shareholders are anticipated to be highly influenced by 
informal rules, as well as prior studies with negative results, block ownership is anticipated 
to have a negative influence on voluntary CG disclosure. Accordingly, the fourth 
hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
3.2.2 Board and Audit Characteristics  
In addition to ownership variables, past studies have examined how CG 
mechanisms influence CG disclosure, but restrict their investigations to limited CG 
variables. In contrast, the current study investigates a considerable number of CG 
variables, including board size, audit firm size, board diversity on the basis of gender and 
nationality, and the presence of a CG committee. The following subsections will briefly set 
out the central theoretical arguments and extant empirical literature around each variable 
and its association to voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. 
H4: There is a statistically significant negative association between  block 
                 ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
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3.2.2.1 Board Size (BSIZE)          
The board of directors, as a representative of shareholders’ interests, has been 
suggested to be one of the most effective CG mechanisms to monitor managerial behaviour 
and reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). This suggests that CG 
compliance and disclosure are expected to be significantly affected by the board of 
directors. Among board characteristics, board size has been examined by prior studies to 
determine its association with CG compliance and disclosure. Theoretically, the debate on 
whether boards should be large or small in order to impact positively on corporate 
disclosure is inconclusive. On the one hand, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argue that smaller boards are more effective than larger boards in mitigating agency 
conflicts. Jensen (1993) indicates that as board size becomes larger, it becomes easier for 
the Chief Executive Officer to dominate the board, causing the board to lose its managerial 
monitoring power and thus resulting in a negative influence on CG compliance and 
disclosure. Hence, small boards are expected to impact positively on firms’ disclosure 
because communication, co-ordination and interaction between directors are anticipated to 
be better than in large boards (Yermack, 1996).  
On the other hand, firms with larger boards can enjoy more diversity in terms of 
members’ experience and skills, which impacts positively on firm disclosure (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The increased experience 
and knowledge provided by large boards may suggest that the managerial monitoring 
power associated with such boards is expected to be greater than on smaller boards, 
positively influencing firms’ level of disclosure.   
Empirically, a positive relationship between board size and CG disclosure has been 
reported by a considerable number of studies (e.g., Lakhal, 2003; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Laksmana, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). For instance, using a sample of 
117 Italian listed firms in 2007, Allegrini and Greco (2013) report empirical evidence that 
a higher level of voluntary CG disclosure is correlated with larger boards. Ntim et al. 
(2012a) also find similar evidence using a sample of South African listed firms.  
In contrast, some past studies document no significant relationship between the two 
variables. For instance, using a sample of 91 larger Spanish listed firms in 1999, Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005) investigate the relationship between board size and voluntary CG 
disclosure and report empirical evidence that no significant association was found. 
Similarly, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) report empirical evidence that the level of 
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disclosure is not significantly associated with board size in a sample of 104 Singaporean 
public firms in 2000.  
The OCGC does not recommend any particular number of board members, but the 
1974 Omani Companies Act requires boards to have between five and twelve directors. 
This is expected to give Omani firms flexibility in composing their boards, which to a large 
extent, is consistent with international recommendations7 in relation to board size. This 
may suggest that Omani regulators recognise the importance of board size as an internal 
CG mechanism. Following the mixed empirical and theoretical suggestions, the study 
predicts a significant relationship between board size and firm-level CG disclosure without 
specifying the direction of the coefficient. Thus, the fifth hypothesis proposed in this study 
is:  
 
3.2.2.2 Audit Firm Size (BIG4) 
           It is widely noted that most national Companies Laws require firms to obtain a 
certificate from external auditors confirming that the information in their annual report is a 
true and fair view (Adelopo, 2011). From both AT and SGT perspectives, an external 
auditor can contribute to reducing information asymmetries that exist between managers 
and different types of stakeholders by requiring firms to disclose further information. The 
external auditor’s role in reducing asymmetric information can be expected to be 
influenced by the audit firm’s characteristics (e.g., size, fees, and tenure). In particular, 
audit firm size has been most investigated in the literature, as the amount of information 
disclosed in the annual report can significantly influence the external auditor’s quality 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). For instance, and based on SGT assumption, being audited by 
a large audit firm can be interpreted by stakeholders as a positive signal of a firm having 
good corporate disclosure policy. This may suggest that large audit firms have better 
auditing standards than small firms. Proponents of this view argue that larger audit firms 
are less sensitive to pressure from clients in conflict situations, as well as having superior 
resources and experience (DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998, Uang et al., 2006). 
Further, larger audit firms are more likely to be independent and subject to pressure to 
maintain their reputation and avoid litigation risk, motivating them to require additional 
disclosure from firms (DeAngelo, 1981; Uang et al., 2006).  
                                                 
7
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that boards should be between eight and nine members, with at least two being 
independent directors.  
H5: There is a statistically significant association between board size 
                 and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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A positive relationship, however, has been supported by a number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Bassett et al., 2007; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Adelopo, 2011; Omar and 
Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Nelson, 2014). For example, using a sample of 965 
Australian listed firms in 2004, Kent and Stewart (2008) report empirical evidence of a 
positive association between compliance with CG rules (governance quality) and larger 
audit firms. Similarly, using a sample of 121 firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange in 
2003, Omar and Simon (2011) report empirical evidence, consistent with prior studies, that 
a large audit firm is positively associated with the level of voluntary CG disclosure 
provided by Jordanian listed firms.  
In contrast to the positive findings observed in the above studies, there is other 
empirical evidence of no significant relationship between firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure and audit firm size (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 
2006a; Aly et al., 2010). For instance, using a sample of 158 Singaporean listed firms in 
1995, Eng and Mak (2003) report empirical evidence that the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure is not influenced by audit firm reputation, indicating no significant relationship. 
In similar vein, Aly et al. (2010) examine the potential impact of audit firm size on 
corporate internet reporting in Egypt. The authors report empirical evidence of no 
significant association between firms audited by one of the Big 4 international audit firms 
and the firm-level corporate internet reporting. However, the OCGC considers the external 
auditor to be one of the most important CG mechanisms in ensuring that its 
recommendations can be implemented (see Subsection 2.2.3.2). Therefore, in line with 
prior studies with positive findings, the sixth hypothesis in this study is:      
3.2.2.3 Board Diversity on the Basis of Gender (GNDR)  
AT and RDT have been used by researchers to explain how board diversity 
enhance CG practices and corporate disclosure (Bear et al., 2010). AT emphasises the 
board’s role in monitoring managers in order to protect shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This function involves a mix of experience and capabilities 
that enables the board to monitor managers and assess firm’s strategies which in turn 
impacts on firm’s disclosure (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). RDT highlights the important 
role of the board in ensuring the provision of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In 
particular, the board can provide channels for communicating information between the 
firm and stakeholders which are likely to impact corpoare disclosure (Hillman and Dalziel, 
H6: There is a statistically significant positive association between  audit firm size 
                 and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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2003). Consequently, researchers have been keen to examine the influence of different 
types of board diversity (e.g., age, race, occupation and education) on corporate disclosure. 
To the best of the current study’s knowledge, one type of board diversity, namely gender 
diversity, has not been examined by researchers. Specifically, whether or not the presence 
of women on a firm’s board could be a significant determinant of firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure is yet to be examined. This underlines the need to extend the literature to 
understand the effects of other types of board diversity in improving or impairing firm 
disclosure policy.  
Utilizing AT and RDT, prior studies examine different issues associated with 
board-gender diversity and report that women directors have influence on firms’ boards. 
Based on their findings, for example, Huse and Solberg (2006) identify five ways that 
female director may make contributions to corporate boards including: (i) creating 
alliances; (ii) preparation and involvement; (iii) attending the important decision-making 
arenas; (iv) taking leadership roles; and (v) being visible. This is supported by Admas and 
Ferreire (2009, pp.301) who conclude that “Boards with more female directors are 
characterized by the potential for greater participation of directors in decision making 
(through attendance and committee assignments), by tougher monitoring of the CEO 
(through greater turn-over-performance sensitivity), and by more alignment with the 
interests of shareholders (through equity-based compensation)”. Thus, it can be argued 
that female participation on firms’ boards is likely to improve CG disclosure. In particular, 
the presence of female directors has been reported to increase board discussions especially 
those of issues that are unpalatabley considered by male directors (e.g., Hus and Solberg, 
2006). In addition, the participation of female directors has been suggested to provide a 
greater oversight and monitoring of corporate disclosures (Peni and Vahamaa, 2010). This 
is further supported by the view that gender diversity on a firm’s board can potentially 
improve CG disclosure because differences in gender may lead to distinctive approaches to 
information disclosure (Terjesen et al., 2009; Cater et al., 2010). In contrast, the absence of 
females from boardroom means that firms are not able to benefit from talent pool, and are 
losing the opportunity to increase board skills, which reflects negatively on CG disclosure 
volume and quality (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Hence, the presence of women on a firm’s 
board is likely to result in smoother communication among board directors, leading to a 
greater flow of information to stakeholders (Gul et al., 2011).   
Empirically, much attention to gender has focused on its impact on firm 
performance, with mixed findings (e.g., Rose, 2007; Francoeur et al., 2008; Bqhren and 
Strqm, 2010; Carter et al., 2010; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Mahadeo, 2012; Vieito, 2012; 
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Ntim, 2014). Given the absence of empirical evidence on the relation between the presence 
of women on a firm’s board and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure, and in line with a 
number of studies that have offered evidence that gender presentation on board impacts 
positively on stock price informativeness (e.g., Gul et al., 2011) and corporate social 
reporting information (e.g., Barako and Brown, 2008), it can be hypothesised that female 
presence on corporate boards is likely to positively influence the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure. Hence, the seventh hypothesis in this study is:   
   
3.2.2.4 Board Diversity on the Basis of Nationality (BDIVN)  
         Relying on the theoretical perspectives used in developing the above hypothesis, 
firms are likely to gain competitive advantage by having directors from different 
nationalities. In this regard, foreign board membership has been suggested as one major 
approach that is available to emerging countries in order to enhance CG practices 
(Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). This is supported by Ramaswamy and Li (2001) who state 
that “For firms from emerging economies, there is also the advantage of strategy 
formulation insights foreign directors might bring along them ….. Foreign directors, 
having been involved in a variety of managerial positions and activities during various 
stages of their career, possess information and expertise about the intricacies of different 
strategic approaches, and may be in a unique position to influence strategic management 
processes in firms that they oversee”. The advantages associated with the existence of 
foreign directors on the board are clearly documented in literature. Based on their results, 
for instance, Choi and Hasan (2005) suggest that there are three main benefits that foreign 
board representation can offer to corporate boards including: (i) adapting advanced foreign 
corporate strategies; (ii) providing more independency to the board than local outside 
directors; and (iii) providing effective monitoring. Therefore, it can be argued that foreign 
directors’ participation on firms’ boards is likely to improve CG disclosure. In particular, it 
has been indicated that the presence of foreigners on the board promotes firms’ 
information disclosure practices (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Foreign board representation 
has been suggested to not only enhancing managerial monitoring, but can also assist firms 
to gain a better link with stakeholders by improving information disclosures (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013a).   
Empirically, CG literature does not provide international evidence examine the 
potential impact of foreign board membership on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. Most 
H7: There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of 
women on a firm’s board and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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past studies on corporate disclosure focus on the influence of foreign directors on corporate 
social responsibility (e.g., Khan, 2010; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a), 
indicating that firms with foreign directors on the board provide additional corporate social 
responsibility disclosures. However, there are a large number of individuals of different 
nationalities holding top leadership positions in the Omani listed firms (Kuehn and Al-
Busaidi, 2000). This suggests that the presence of directors of different backgrounds may 
have important implications for CG disclosure behaviour in Oman, because such 
individuals are expected to have distinctive values and incentives in adopting policies and 
making decisions. Therefore, it is anticipated that the presence of non-Omani directors on 
firms’ boards is more likely to motivate firms to provide additional information on CG 
compliance and disclosure than those with only Omani directors. Thus, the eighth 
hypothesis in this study is:    
 
3.2.2.5 Corporate Governance Committee (CGCOM) 
Board committees (e.g., remuneration, nomination, risk, audit and CG committees) 
have been suggested by CG codes in many countries as mechanisms to enhance CG 
practices. Among these committees, the establishment of a CG committee is regarded as an 
important step in raising CG standards. Particularly, the committee plays a key role in 
ensuring that CG recommendations adopted by a firm are both followed and regularly 
reviewed. Firms that voluntary establish CG committees may be interpreted by outsiders as 
having good CG disclosure practices. Arguably, firms with a CG committee are more 
likely to engage in desirable CG disclosure behaviour than those without such committees.   
Unlike other board committees, the empirical research on the relationship between 
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure and CG committees is scarce. This may suggest that 
investigating such a relationship would contribute to the literature, especially in Oman, 
where voluntary CG disclosure determinants have not yet been investigated. Despite the 
lack of research in this area, Ntim et al.’s (2012a) study examines the level and 
determinants of compliance with the 2002 South African code of CG among listed firms. 
Using a sample of 169 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006, they report empirical 
evidence that the presence of a CG committee is significantly and positively associated 
with firm-level voluntary CG disclosure.  
As indicated in Subsection 2.2.3.2, the OCGC does not require firms to establish a 
CG committee. A considerable number of Omani listed firms assign a CG committee’s 
H8: There is a statistically significant positive association between non-Omani 
directors on firm’s board and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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functions to their audit committee; this may imply that those firms recognise the 
importance of a CG committee even though the OCGC does not recommend it, and are 
willing to improve their CG quality. Accordingly, the ninth hypothesis proposed in this 
study is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H9: There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of a 
CG committee and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section describes the research design. It provides details on issues relating to 
data collection and research methodology. Subsection 4.1 describes the sample selection 
and data sources. Subsection 4.2 discusses the research methodology.  
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
           The sample used in this study was obtained from firms listed on the MSM in Oman. 
As of 31 December 2011, there were 168 listed firms on the MSM, whose annual reports 
can be found and accessed through the MSM’s official website, http://w.w.w.msm.gov.om, 
which was accessed in December 2011. Table 3 illustrates a summary of the sample 
selection procedure. It shows that the industrial composition of Omani listed firms is 
grouped into nine industries,8 including basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, financials, industrials, utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and gas. 
Panel A of Table 3 lists all the firms that were listed on the MSM, shown that 94% of the 
total MSM population is dominated by basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, financials and industrials sectors, while the remaining 6% is contributed by 
utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and gas sectors.  
4.1.1 The Criteria for Selecting the Sample 
           Two criteria were set in order for a particular firm to be included in the final sample. 
First, CG information had to be available for at least one financial year for the firm during 
the period 2001-2011. Second, financial and stock market information had to be available 
for at least one financial year during the eleven-year period. These criteria were applied to 
all listed firms for the following reasons. First, the financial year of 2001 is the first year 
when data was available to be collected from data sources. Second, the sample ends in the 
financial year of 2011 because it is the most recent year for which data was available at the 
time of the data collection. Third, the sample period covers two years before the OCGC 
was implemented. This helps the current study to ascertain the extent to which the 
introduction of the OCGC has enhanced CG practices by examining data from before and 
after 2002, the year of issuing the OCGC. Fourth, unlike many past studies that include 
only large firms in their samples, including all firms for which there is data available can 
enhance the generalisability of the current study’s results. Finally, the criteria allowed the 
study to use panel data analysis. The advantages for using such an approach include: (i) 
unlike time series or cross-sectional data, panel data enables the study to make a large 
                                                 
8
The industrial groupings are based on DataStream’s industrial classification, as the MSM’s classification includes only 
three sectors, namely industrial, financial and services.  
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number of observations,9 which increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the 
collinearity between dependent variables (Hsiao, 1985; Wooldridge, 2009); (ii) distinct 
from either time series or cross-sectional data, panel data permits the study to control for 
firm’s heterogeneity in individual variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009). In this 
regard, Hsiao (1985, pp.129) emphasises that “panel data allows us to construct and test 
more realistic behavioural models which could not be identified using cross-section or 
time series data alone”; and (iii) using panel data analysis is in line with prior studies (e.g., 
Barako et al., 2006a; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a), allowing the current study 
to make direct comparisons with their results.   
Under these criteria, and as Panel B of Table 3 shows, firms without significant 
missing data for the period 2001 to 2011 were selected. Specifically, 48 firms were 
excluded because they had no available annual reports, and four firms had to be excluded 
due to insufficient or missing CG or financial information. The final sample includes firms 
from all the industries (nine sectors) in the MSM’s database. Both financial and non-
financial firms are included in the sample. This is justified for the following reasons.  
First, prior studies exclude financial firms for theoretical reasons, such as the fact 
that they are subject to additional disclosure requirements; hence, financial firms have been 
expected to provide more information than firms with fewer regulatory requirements. 
Empirical evidence supporting the argument that financial firms disclose more information 
on CG compliance and disclosure is not yet provided in the literature. This may suggest 
that the current study can contribute to the extant literature by investigating whether there 
is a significant difference in terms of CG compliance and disclosure between financial and 
non-financial firms. To do so, the present study will conduct its main analysis on both 
financial and non-financial firms (1,152 firm years), and a robustness test only on non-
financial firms (858 firm years). Second, unlike previous studies conducted in developed 
countries where excluding financial firms from the dataset do not significantly affect the 
sample size, the current study’s dataset includes 29 financial firms; where excluding them 
would dramatically drop the sample size by 25%. Third, the inclusion of both financial and 
non-financial firms in the sample is consistent with a considerable number of prior studies 
(e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Kouwenberg, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009). Finally, all Omani listed firms, including financial firms, are subject to 
                                                 
9
The variables used across the three essays have data characteristics ranging from cross-sectional and time series, such as 
ownership structures and internal CG variables. Since these variables have relatively short number of time series 
observations and large cross-section observations, unbalanced panel data is ideally suitable for such data’s nature, 
enabling the researcher to gain the most use from the limited availability of data where the number of 
observations can be increased, as well as benefit from the advantages associated with panel data analysis.  
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similar CG requirements. The OCGC is applied to all listed firms, requiring them to 
disclose more information on CG compliance and disclosure.  
Therefore, the sampled firms in this study comprise 116 out of 168 firms listed on 
the MSM, which represents 69% of the total population. Efforts were made to obtain 
information for the remaining 52 firms; they were contacted by phone and email during the 
data collection period. They did not respond, leaving the current study with a sample of 
116 firms. Details of the names and sectors of these firms are provided in Appendix 1.    
Table 3: Summary of the sample selection procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the MSM 
available to be sampled as of 31/12/2011 
 No. of 
firms 
Percentage 
of firms 
 Basic materials    30    17.9 
 Consumer goods    25    14.9 
 Consumer services    24    14.3 
 Financial    53    31.5 
 Industrial    26    15.5 
 Utilities      5      2.9 
 Health care      2      1.2 
 Telecommunications      2      1.2 
 Oil & Gas      1      0.6 
Total firms   168  100.0 
   Less: Firms with no data available 48   
             Firms with missing data   4   
Total excluded firms    52   27.9 
Total  sampled firms with full data  116   69.0 
Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled  firms with full data    
 Basic materials    22   19.0 
 Consumer goods    21   18.1 
 Consumer services    21   18.1 
 Financial    29   25.0 
 Industrial    13   11.2 
 Utilities      5     4.3 
 Health care      2     1.7 
 Telecommunications      2     1.7 
 Oil & Gas      1     0.9 
Total  sampled firms with full data  116    100.0 
Source: Muscat Securities Market website    
 
In addition, the sample size of the present study is larger than those used by Omran 
et al. (2008) and Mohamed et al. (2009). For instance, in their cross-country study, Omran 
et al. (2008) consider only 70 Omani firms to investigate the association between 
ownership concentration and financial performance in three MENA countries, including 
Oman. Using unbalanced data from 116 firms with 1,152 firm-year observations was 
considered to be sufficient to make a significant contribution to the extant literature, taking 
into account the availability, accessibility, funding and time constraints (as the study had to 
be completed within the timeframe of a PhD registration period). 
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4.1.2 Data Sources 
As indicated above, and as explained further in Subsection 4.2.1.1, two types of 
data were used in order to conduct this study: CG and financial information. Using a 
content analysis approach, the current study manually extracted information from firms’ 
annual reports. Four different sources were used to collect the annual reports of sampled 
firms. These resources are Rest of World Filings of the perfect information Database, the 
MSM website, DataStream and firms’ websites.   
4.1.3 Sampling Limitation 
As with all research methods, the sample procedure adopted in this study seems to 
suffer from two main limitations. First, although a sample of 116 firms with 1,152 firm-
year observations is considered to be relatively large, using data from a greater number of 
years could improve the generalisability of the current study’s results. As explained earlier, 
employing more than 116 firms was not possible due to unavailability of data. Second, 
using other sources of data, such as interim reports and/or different methods of data 
collection, such as interviews, in addition to annual reports, could improve the quality and 
quantity of information. Other sources of data were extremely difficult to obtain due to 
issues of accessibility, funding and time.  
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This subsection discusses the research methodology employed in this study that 
will be used to answer the research questions. In particular, Subsection 4.2.1 will discuss 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure measurement. Subsection 4.2.2 will discuss 
explanatory variables’ measurements. Subsection 4.2.3 discusses the justification for 
choosing firm characteristics and their measurements. Subsection 4.2.4 will discuss the 
model specification. Finally, Subsection 4.2.5 will discuss a number of statistical tests 
performed before and after examining the study’s hypotheses.    
4.2.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Measurement 
(Dependent variable) 
As discussed in Section 1, the current study’s objectives are to examine the level 
and determinants of compliance with the OCGC among listed firms. Hence, the 
constructed Omani CG index (OCGI) is the independent variable used in this study to 
investigate the main determinants that drive voluntary CG disclosure among Omani listed 
firms. In this regard, adopting the CG index as a methodological approach is in line with 
recent studies (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) 
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that examine the level and determinants of CG compliance after many countries issued 
codes of good CG practice. Prior studies rely on either national (e.g., Dutch CG Code, 
1997; Portuguese of best Practice, 1999, King Report II, 2002) or international CG codes 
(e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Report 1999; 
Commonwealth principles, 1999) in constructing their CG indices (e.g., Cheung et al., 
2007; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a).  
As explained further in the following subsections, the current study constructs the 
OCGI in order to perform its analyses. The OCGI consists of 72 CG provisions that were 
mainly extracted from the 2002 OCGC, covering four broad topics: (i) board and directors; 
(ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; (iv) 
disclosure and transparency. Using the OCGC as a main data source is in line with recent 
studies (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a, Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013) that have used national CG codes in constructing CG disclosure indices. 
Some CG provisions were extracted from the 1974 Companies Act in order to achieve a 
comprehensive CG index. As discussed in Subsection 2.2, Omani listed firms are required 
to comply with the OCGC provisions or provide explanations in cases of non-compliance. 
Appendix 2 provides a definition and data sources for each provision incorporated in the 
OCGI.  
The next subsections will discuss the dependent variable’s measurement. 
Specifically, Subsection 4.2.1.1 will discuss the OCGI’s data sources. Subsection 4.2.1.2 
will discuss commonly used measures of CG disclosure indices and the rationale for 
adopting a self-constructed index. Subsection 4.2.1.3 will discuss how the OCGI was 
coded. Subsection 4.2.1.4 will discuss the reliability and validity of the OCGI. Finally, 
Subsection 4.2.1.5 will discuss the OCGI’s construction limitations.  
4.2.1.1 Data Sources for the Omani CG Index Information 
Although there are other means by which firms’ CG information can be obtained 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010), this study collects CG data from firms’ annual reports. The 
OCGI is selected as a tool to examine voluntary CG disclosure in Omani listed firms’ 
annual reports. The current study uses annual reports as an information source for three 
main reasons. First, it has been indicated that annual reports contain quantitative and 
qualitative data, and financial and non-financial information (Marston and Shrves, 1991). 
Second, it has been suggested that the level of disclosure provided by firms in annual 
reports is positively associated with the amount of disclosure reported via other media 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Finally, reliance on annual reports is in line with most 
previous studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), 
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allowing the current study to compare its results with earlier studies. Thus, annual reports 
can be considered a regular and reliable source of CG information (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Botosan, 1997). Omani firms’ annual reports are audited by external auditors, in 
accordance with the Omani Companies Act 1974, and contain financial and non-financial 
information. Furthermore, listed firms are required by the Capital Market Law of 1998 to 
obtain a certificate from an external auditor indicating whether they have complied with 
the 2002 Omani Code of CG or not. Arguably, a high degree of credibility can be 
adequately assured by extracting information from these reports. 
4.2.1.2 The Choice between Analysts’ Ratings and Self-Constructed Indices 
           The CG literature shows that there are two commonly used measures of CG 
disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006b; Bhagat et al., 2008, Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012). The first approach is CG disclosure indices developed by researchers that 
are based on codes of good CG practices; the second approach is CG disclosure rankings 
developed by independent professional organisations based on analysts’ assessments of CG 
disclosure. Both have strengths and shortcomings. Analysts’ CG rankings cover quarterly 
published information and investors relations in addition to annual reports, whereas 
researcher-constructed indices cover only annual reports (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts’ CG rankings are not labour-intensive and can be used 
for large samples of firms, while researcher-constructed indices are more labour-intensive 
and are suitable only for small numbers of firms (Botosan, 1997; Beattie and Thomson, 
2007). Analysts’ CG rankings are reliable, as they are designed by experts, while research-
constructed indices are subjected to researcher judgment, which can lead to potential errors 
(Core, 2001; Francis et al., 2008).   
Despite the disadvantages of researcher-constructed indices, the current study 
adopts this method as a proxy to measure firms’ CG disclosure for a number of contextual, 
theoretical and practical reasons. First, most analysts’ CG rankings are designed by 
international professional organisations; hence, they may not be applicable to the Omani 
context due to differences in CG regimes. Many of these rankings are out of date and 
cannot be used due to new regulatory changes (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Second, there 
are no national professional organisations in Oman, which offer ratings to measure CG 
disclosure; hence, the present study had to approach analysts directly (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Third, there is no theory offering criteria for which type of indices to adopt (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991; Hassan and Marston, 2010). Fourth, unlike analysts’ CG rankings, the 
researcher-constructed index is a direct measure of actual CG disclosure, and covers a wide 
range of internal CG disclosure items (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
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2008). Finally, this study follows the recent trend in the literature of employing researcher-
constructed indices (e.g., Cheung et al., 2007; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Price et al., 
2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), allowing the 
current study  to directly compare results.  
 As indicated in Subsection 4.2.1, and in line with previous studies (e.g., Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Akkermans et al., 2007; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a) that 
rely on national codes of CG in order to construct CG indices, the OCGI is constructed 
mainly based on the 2002 Omani code of CG. Specifically, and in order to capture the 
intensity of CG disclosure practices, the eight topics contained in the 2002 OCGC were 
categorised into four broad sections in order to extract CG provisions. This resulted in 72 
provisions under four sections: (i) board of directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) 
external auditors and internal control systems; and (iv) disclosure and transparency. The 
present study also includes additional CG provisions that are not contained in the OCGC. 
Some CG provisions contained in the 1974 Companies Act had to be added to the OCGI in 
order to achieve a comprehensive CG index.  
4.2.1.3 The Choice between Binary and Ordinal Coding Schemes 
           As Cooke (1989) explains, a voluntary CG disclosure index can be scored based on 
two approaches a: (i) simple binary coding scheme (un-weighted index); and (ii) complex 
ordinal coding scheme (weighted index). The first approach records the presence or 
absence of CG provisions by assigning a score of 1 if a particular CG provision is applied, 
and 0 otherwise, while the second approach records the degree of disclosure by applying a 
graduated scale, where CG provisions are assigned weightings (e.g., if a firm does not 
disclose any information it is assigned 0, if it discloses only qualitative information it is 
assigned a score of 1, and if it discloses quantified information it is assigned a score of 2). 
Choosing an approach is not easy, because each has advantages and disadvantages. Unlike 
the complex ordinal coding approach, the simple binary coding scheme neither measures 
the quality of CG disclosure nor reflects the relative importance associated with each CG 
provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2004). The use of a simple binary coding 
scheme results in the major problem that firms are penalised for non-disclosure of 
irrelevant CG provisions.  
Despite these limitations, this study adopts an un-weighted coding scheme to 
examine the level of voluntary CG disclosure for a number of reasons. First, this approach 
is considered appropriate because the OCGI is designed in a way that enables researcher to 
check whether its provisions are applied or not. The current study neither measures the 
quality of CG disclosures, nor the relative impacts of different CG provisions. Instead, it 
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measures only the presence or absence of voluntary CG disclosure. For instance, a CG 
provision related to role duality necessitates only assigning a score of 1 if the roles of 
Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer are split, and 0 otherwise. Second, there is no 
theoretical framework on which approach should be adopted. The absence of a theoretical 
framework on which weights can be accurately assigned to different CG provisions makes 
the un-weighted coding scheme preferable because the present study can avoid making a 
bias towards one or a set of CG provisions as the case in using of weighted coding scheme 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosa, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Third, unlike the 
weighted coding scheme, this approach enables the current study to avoid making 
judgement to assign a particular provision because it assumes that all provisions are 
equally important (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). This suggests that the un-weighted coding 
scheme enables the present study to avoid a situation where the same provision could be 
weighted differently by different user groups (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Tsipouri et al., 2004). 
Arguably, this can increase the reliability of the scoring system because it can be easily 
replicated by another user group. Fourth, the literature suggests that both schemes lead to 
similar results (Choi, 1973; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Barako et al., 2006a). Finally, 
the un-weighted coding scheme has been used in recent studies; hence, it is advisable that 
the current study uses this approach in order to enable direct comparison with those studies 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ammann et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013).     
Following prior studies, a CG disclosure score-sheet was designed to code firms on 
their level of CG disclosure, and the annual reports of the 116 firms were analysed and 
compared with the OCGI’s provisions (see Appendix 3). A score of 1 was assigned if a 
particular CG provision was applied, and 0 otherwise. To mitigate the problem of 
penalising firms for not disclosing an item, each firm’s annual reports were thoroughly 
read before starting the coding in order to ensure that all firms disclosed the main items 
(Cook, 1989; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Naser et al., 2002). The degree of CG disclosure for 
each firm was computed and aggregated with the others firms’ scores in order to calculate 
the overall level of disclosure.  
4.2.1.4 The Reliability and Validity of the Constructed CG Index 
Two important issues around the construction of indices are often questionable, 
namely reliability and validity. The OCGI must be a reliable and valid instrument in order 
to be able to measure CG disclosure amongst Omani listed firms. Thus, certain required 
steps were carried out in order to improve the OCGI’s reliability and validity. Marston and 
Shrives (1991, pp.197) states that “The index scores awarded to companies can be 
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considered to be reliable if the results can be replicated by another researcher. Since the 
scores are extracted from printed annual reports which remain constant over time there is 
no obstacle to repetition”. This suggests that reliability is largely related to two important 
issues, namely stability and consistency.  
Stability refers to the extent to which the measuring procedure allows the 
researcher to achieve the same results over time (Beattie et al., 2004). Three types of 
reliability have been suggested: inter-coder reliability, test-retest reliability and internal 
consistency reliability (Sekran, 2003). The inter-coder reliability cannot be measured here, 
as the coding was performed by only one researcher whereas the other two types of 
reliability were tested for. In particular, the test-retest reliability was measured by 
performing the same measuring procedure used by past studies (e.g., Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012). First, the entire 
contents of the sampled firms’ annual reports were read before coding their CG 
disclosures. This allowed the researcher to become familiar with the firms’ activities, 
which in turn was helpful in identifying whether a particular CG provision is applicable to 
the firm or not (Omar and Simon, 2011). Hence, the problem of penalising firms for not 
disclosing an item was mitigated, as the researcher made sure that the OCGI’s provisions 
are applicable to all firms. Second, the coding was performed for the whole period (11 
years) for each sampled firm before moving to the next firm. This allowed the researcher to 
ensure consistency in reading annual reports, which in turn was helpful in assisting him to 
code the CG disclosures accurately. Finally, each firm’s annual reports were coded twice. 
The coding of firms was done over a 12-month period, in which the first round of coding 
lasted eight months (from April 2011 to November 2011) and the second round lasted four 
months (from December 2011 to March 2012). In the first round of coding, all sampled 
firms’ annual reports were coded (1,152 firm-year observations) under supervision of the 
researcher’s supervisors.10 All sampled firms’ annual reports had to be coded in the second 
round in order to improve the coding accuracy by identifying and correcting any mistakes 
or inconsistencies made during the first round of coding. The results of the second round of 
coding were largely similar to those of the first round of coding; few mistakes and 
inconsistencies were found. This suggests that stability between the first and second rounds 
of coding was achieved.   
Consistency, however, refers to a situation where the same results can be achieved 
by another researcher (Beattie et al., 2004). The internal consistency was measured to 
confirm the OCGI’s consistency. The CG literature shows that Cronbach’s alpha test is the 
                                                 
10
The researcher’s supervisors are experts in CG and have published extensively in reputable journals, such as Corporate 
Governance: An International Review.   
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most popular and used test of CG disclosure indices’ reliability. Thus, consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Gul and Leung, 2004; Dey, 2008; Sharma, 2014), the internal consistency of 
the OCGI was examined by using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha test. Pallant (2010) 
indicates that a disclosure index is considered to be reliable if Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
is between 0.7 and 0.8. As illustrated in Table 4, the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the 
four categories in the OCGI is 0.78, suggesting that a random measurement error is less 
likely to reduce the power of the empirical tests. The value of Cronbach’s alpha indicates 
that the various CG provisions in the OCGI complement each other well in measuring 
several features of the same variable (Litwin, 1995). Thus, the measuring procedure 
applied in this study allowed it to achieve the stability and consistency required to consider 
the OCGI a reliable instrument. 
 
 
 
 
The second issue related to the construction of indices is the validity. Marston and 
Shrives (1991, pp.198) define validity as “The index scores can be considered to be valid if 
they mean what the researchers intended. That is to say, do the index scores have any 
meaning as a measure of information disclosure?” This means that the constructed index 
can be considered a valid instrument if it reflects the purpose of researcher to examin a 
particular issue. Two main types of validity have been suggested: content validity and 
construct validity.  
Content validity means that the index must include adequate governance provisions 
that enable the researcher to conduct his/her examination, whereas construct validity refers 
to a situation where the items included in the index must be totally related to what the 
researcher attends to examine (Saunders et al., 2007). The following measures were 
applied in order to measure both content validity and construct validity associated with the 
OCGI. First, as has been indicated in Subsection 4.2.1.2, the OCGI includes considerable 
number of CG provisions because its construction was built on the 2002 Omani Code of 
CG; hence, the content validity is achieved (Beattie et al., 2004). Second, the construction 
of the OCGI was done under the supervision and guidance of the researcher’s supervisors. 
This involved weekly meetings with the supervisors to discuss related issues, during which 
constructive criticism and suggestions were used to refine the OCGI. Third, the 
construction was guided by CG literature, and the present study covers all areas that have 
been focused on in prior studies. For instance, in line with most past studies that have paid 
Table 4: Reliability statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
No. of Items 
0.781 0.691 4 
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close attention to the board of directors and disclosure provisions in constructing their CG 
indices, 54% and 31% of the OCGI’s provisions cover issues related to board and 
directors, and disclosure and transparency, respectively. Finally, the validity of the OCGI 
was further enhanced by presenting the first draft of the OCGI at doctoral conferences, 
where the researcher benefitted from useful suggestions from academics and experienced 
researchers, which were helpful in revising the OCGI. The above measures allowed the 
current study to achieve both content validity and construct validity, and the OCGI can be 
considered a valid instrument.  
4.2.1.5 The Limitations of the Constructed CG Index 
Some limitations appear to be associated with the construction of the OCGI, 
although great efforts were made to improve its reliability and validity. First, as indicated 
in Subsection 4.2.1.3, the present study constructed an un-weighted index, where CG 
provisions are assumed to have equal importance. Constructing a weighted index through 
consulting an independent professional organisation could improve the OCGI’s reliability 
and validity. To the best of the current study’s knowledge, there is no Omani professional 
organisation available to assign weights for the OCGI’s provisions.11 Second, the inter-
coder reliability of the OCGI could be measured if the coding was performed by the 
researcher and another coder. Finally, despite the measures taken in this study to ensure 
high levels of reliability and validity, the coding processes may result in some inherent 
subjectivity (Beattie et al., 2004). As discussed in Subsection 4.2.1.4, the coding processes 
were performed carefully, and a high level of reliability was achieved, as indicated by 
Cronbach’s alpha test. Hence, the OCGI is considered a reliable and valid instrument to be 
used as a proxy to measure CG disclosure among Omani listed firms.  
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables’ Measurements   
As indicated in Subsection 3.2, two types of CG variables have been drawn from 
CG literature to examine their influence on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
among Omani listed firms. These variables include ownership structures and board and 
audit characteristics variables. The data on these independent explanatory variables were 
hand-collected from the firms’ annual reports. Table 5 presents summary definitions of the 
dependent (OCGI), independent (explanatory) and control (general) variables employed in 
this study. How each variable was measured is briefly discussed below.  
                                                 
11
Efforts have been made to contact a regional independent professional organisation called Hawkamah: The Institute for 
Corporate Governance located in Dubai in this regard, but no response was received.  
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The choice of measures related to ownership structures and board and audit 
characteristics variables is motivated by two main reasons: Firstly, these measures are in 
line with considerable number of past studies. Second, these measures are subject to the 
availability of data. As Table 5 shows, government (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), institutional (e.g., Donnelly and Mulcahy; 2008; Omar and 
Simon, 2011) and foreign (e.g., Liang et al., 2012) ownerships were measured as a 
percentage of each type of ownership out of total firm shareholdings, while block 
ownership (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012) was measured as a percentage 
of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. With 
respect to the second type of variable, board size was measured in a similar manner to prior 
studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) as the total number of 
directors on the firm’s board. Audit firm size (e.g., Bassett et al., 2007; Aly et al., 2010), 
the presence of a CG committee (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a), board diversity on the basis of 
gender (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009) were measured as dummy variables. A firm scored 
1 if it was audited by one of the Big-4 audit firms (e.g., Deloittes and Touche, Erns & 
Young, KPMG and PWC), had a CG committee, had at least one woman on its board. If 
not, a score of 0 was assigned. Board diversity on the basis of nationality was measured as 
percentage of non-Omani directors to total number of firm’s board directors (e.g., Khan, 
2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a).   
4.2.3 Justification for Control Variables  
              In line with prior disclosure studies, which find that voluntary corporate disclosure 
is associated with some firm characteristics, the current study also includes a number of 
control variables. This is expected to mitigate the potential statistical problems associated 
with omitted variables, such as endogeneity problems. These control variables include firm 
size, leverage, growth, profitability, year dummy and industry dummy. The choice of these 
variables was based on theoretical predictions, prior disclosure studies and the availability 
of data. Table 5 shows how these variables are defined and measured. The following 
subsections will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments and extant empirical 
literature around each variable and its relation with voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure.  
4.2.3.1 Firm Size (LNTA) 
            It is generally accepted that firm size is positively associated with corporate 
voluntary disclosure. A number of theoretical predictions support the notion that larger 
firms are more likely to engage in voluntary disclosure than smaller ones. Firth (1979) 
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identifies three possible reasons for this. First, large firms disclose more information 
because they can afford the costs associated with collecting and disseminating information, 
whereas small firms consider such practices costly. Second, because they rely on the stock 
market for capital finance more than smaller firms, larger firms may have an interest in 
disclosing information in order to raise capital at a lower cost. Third, smaller firms may 
prefer to disclose less information, as they may consider that more disclosure will affect 
their competitiveness with larger firms. In addition, AT predicts a positive relationship 
between firm size and CG disclosure. Greater agency problems and higher political costs 
associated with large firms are expected to motivate such firms to provide additional 
information on CG compliance and disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987). Similar support is found in RDT and LT, where large firms are 
predicted to be motivated to voluntarily engage in CG disclosure in order to secure needed 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and legitimise their activities (Guthrie and Parker, 
1989).  
A positive relationship between firm size and voluntary CG disclosure has been 
reported by a considerable number of studies (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Hossain et al., 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Florou and Galarniotis, 2007; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Omar and Simon, 2011; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). For 
instance, Allegrini and Greco (2013) have constructed disclosure index on a number of CG 
measures in order to examine the factors that may have an effect on voluntary CG 
disclosure. Using a sample of 177 firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 2007, they 
report empirical evidence that firm size has a significant and positive association with 
voluntary CG disclosure. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) examine CG voluntary disclosure 
determinants in Egypt by considering a set of variables, including firm size. Using a 
sample of 100 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in 2009, they report empirical 
evidence that larger firms appear to have higher degrees of CG disclosure, suggesting a 
significant and positive relationship between CG disclosure index and firm size. In this 
study, as in prior studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), firm size is 
labelled as LNTA and calculated as the natural log of total assets.  
4.2.3.2 Growth (GROWTH) 
             Firm growth has been considered by prior studies as an influential factor in 
corporate disclosure. There are several arguments relating to the potential link between CG 
disclosure and growth. AT and SGT suggest that firms with higher investment and growth 
opportunities are expected to suffer considerably from information asymmetry and agency 
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costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1993). This may suggest that firms with higher growth are expected to reduce information 
asymmetry by providing more information on CG compliance and disclosure. Similarly, 
according to LT, due to a higher demand for funds, high-growth firms may tend to disclose 
additional information on CG compliance and disclosure in order to deflect attention away 
from the high bankruptcy risk associated with their activities. Thus, increased voluntary 
CG disclosure by such firms is expected in order to attract more investors and enhance 
their ability to access financing at lower cost (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Hossain et al., 
2005, Khurana et al., 2006). A positive relationship is theoretically predicted between 
growth and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure.   
Empirical support for the above arguments is found in a number of studies (e.g., 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2005; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b) that offer 
evidence that firms with higher growth opportunities tend to disclose more governance 
information. For instance, using a sample of 1,549 Finnish listed and non-listed firms in 
1997, Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) examine the association between firm-level 
disclosure quality and availability of external financing. They report empirical evidence 
that external financing is significantly correlated with firm-level disclosure. Similarly, 
using a sample of 52 firms listed in three European Stock Exchanges over the period 2000-
2005, Laidroo (2009) reports empirical evidence that sales growth has a statistically 
significant positive relationship with total disclosure score. In this study growth is 
measured as in prior studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a), labelled as GROWTH and calculated 
as current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales.  
4.2.3.3 Profitability (ROA)  
             It has been demonstrated theoretically in the literature that profitable firms tend to 
disclose more information than less profitable firms. In this regard, both AT and SGT 
indicate that profitability reflects performance; hence, managers in profitable firms have an 
incentive to provide more detailed information to maintain and justify their position and 
compensation. Further, profitable firms are motivated to use voluntary CG disclosure to 
distinguish themselves from less profitable firms (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). The positive prediction is 
also supported by LT, where managers in profitable firms tend to adopt a voluntary 
disclosure policy in order to legitimise their continued presence as stewards (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In contrast, profitable firms may not engage in voluntary CG 
disclosure, because less engagement permits them to avoid some legal costs (e.g., Tax) and 
protect their competitiveness (Prencipe, 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007).      
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The positive theoretical prediction has been supported by a number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009; Aly et al., 2010; Omar and Simon, 2011; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Nelson, 2014). For instance, using a sample of 87 firms listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in 2001, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) report 
empirical evidence that profitability is statistically significantly associated with disclosure 
index. In contrast, a group of studies report that the relationship between voluntary CG 
disclosure and profitability is not significant (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006a; Barako et al., 2006b; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012). For example, using a sample of 559 firm-year observations for firms listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2002, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) construct an index 
including financial and non-financial information to investigate voluntary corporate 
disclosure in China. They report empirical evidence suggesting that profitability is not a 
significant predictor for voluntary CG disclosure. In this study, profitability is measured in 
line with prior studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a), labelled as ROA and calculated as the ratio 
of operating profit to total assets.     
4.2.3.4 Leverage (LVRG) 
It is widely recognised that leverage has a significant impact on various aspects of 
corporate policy decisions. This suggests that leverage can significantly affect corporate 
disclosure policy. According to AT, debt financing is affected by agency costs, such as 
bankruptcy costs, residual loss, and monitoring and bonding expenditures. Firms with high 
debt in their capital structures face higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
has important implications mainly for two different stakeholder groups, namely 
shareholders and debt holders. Equity capital providers will need to collect costly private 
information to ensure that managers do not expropriate wealth from shareholders by 
investing in non-profitable projects.  
Similarly, creditors will tend to more closely monitor firms in order to ensure they 
can meet their debt obligations (Smith and Warner, 1979). Arguably, to mitigate these 
concerns, firms are motivated to provide transparent information on CG compliance and 
disclosure to enable shareholders to continuously monitor their performance, and assure 
them that they are not harming their wealth by investing in wasteful projects. Through 
increased disclosure, firms signal to creditors that they are less likely to circumvent their 
covenanted payments, and assure them that they can meet debt covenant requirements 
(Ross, 1977; Schipper, 1981).  
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Further, highly leveraged firms are inclined to disclose additional information even 
when they cannot avoid defaulting on debt covenants. This is because more disclosure can 
improve firms’ ability to bargain with creditors in cases of renegotiation where more 
financing is urgently needed. Support is found in LT and RDT, which suggest that highly 
leveraged firms are expected to engage in active disclosure practices as a legitimacy 
strategy to inform debt holders about their performance, and as a response to the demands 
of external capital providers in order to secure their resources. Based on these theoretical 
arguments, firms with higher levels of leverage are expected to disclose more detailed 
information on CG compliance than lower-leveraged firms.  
The empirical literature, however, on the relationship between firm-level voluntary 
CG disclosure and leverage is mixed. Prior empirical studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; 
Barako et al., 2006b; Alsaeed, 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011) report evidence that leverage 
impacts significantly and positively on firm-level CG voluntary disclosure. For instance, 
using a sample of 121 firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange in 2003, Omar and 
Simon (2011) investigate the disclosure behaviour of Jordanian listed firms. They report 
empirical evidence that leverage has a significant positive relationship with the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. Similarly, Barako et al. (2006a) examine the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants in Kenya by employing a sample of 54 firms listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange over 1992-2001. Among those determinants, they report empirical 
evidence that leverage is significantly and positively associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
In contrast, a limited number of studies (e.g., Adelopo, 2011; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 
2012) provide empirical evidence of a significant negative relationship. For example, using 
a sample of 63 listed firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2006, Adelopo (2011) 
examines voluntary disclosure practices amongst listed firms. He reports empirical 
evidence that leverage is significantly and negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. 
Some studies (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Alkhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012a) report an insignificant and positive relationship, while others (e.g., Ho and Wong, 
2001; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) 
report evidence of an insignificant and negative association between the two variables. For 
instance, using a sample of 105 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia at the end of 2002, 
Alkhtaruddin et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that the relation between the extent 
of CG and voluntary disclosure and leverage is positive, but not statistically significant. In 
this study, leverage is measured consistently with past studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; 
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Henry, 2010), labelled as LVRG and calculated as the ratio of total debt divided by total 
assets.  
            In addition, due to differences in capital structure, business nature and ownership 
structure, among others, voluntary CG compliance and disclosure are not expected to be 
identical throughout all industries and financial years (Cook, 1992; Conyon, 1994; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2006). With regard to industrial factors, several arguments have been put 
forward to explain why the level of disclosure differs from one industry sector to another. 
Firms operating in highly regulated sectors, such as banks and utilities firms, are subjected 
to rigorous regulations (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) that require them to provide additional 
disclosure. Similarly, according to LT, firms operating in certain industries, such as gas, oil 
and consumer goods, may be inclined to disclose further information in order to legitimise 
their activities (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
Table 5: Definition of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variable 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index consisting of 72 governance provisions that take a 
value of 1 if a particular provision is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables 
  BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm 
shareholdings. 
  GOVOWN Percentage of government ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  INSOWN Percentage of institutional ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  FOROWN Percentage of foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  BSIZE The total number of directors on the firm’s board. 
  BIG4 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  CGCOM 
  GNDR 
1 if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
1 if a firm has a female director on its board, 0 otherwise. 
  BDIVN Number of non-Omani directors divided by total number of board members. 
Control variables 
  LNTA Natural log of total assets. 
  ROA (%) Operating profit to total assets. 
  GROWTH (%) Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVRG (%) Book total debt scaled by total assets of a firm.  
  INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the eight industries. 
  YEAR Dummies for each of the ten years. 
 
In a similar vein, based on SGT, firms operating in some industries may tend to 
follow dominant firms by providing similar levels of disclosure in order to signal that they 
are not hiding bad news (Cooke, 1989; Craven and Marston, 1999). Empirical evidence of 
the impact of industrial factors on voluntary CG disclosure is mixed. Prior studies (e.g., 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006) report no significant 
relationship between firm-level voluntary CG disclosure and industrial factors. In contrast, 
other studies (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) provide empirical 
evidence that CG compliance and disclosure are affected by industry.  
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With respect to the financial year factor, firms may voluntarily disclose more 
information on CG compliance and disclosure in some years compared to others. This can 
be attributed to firms’ willingness to engage in voluntary disclosure and their reactions to 
the environment in which they operate. For instance, firms affected by the global recession 
some years ago (i.e., the 2007-2008 global financial crisis) tended to disclose more 
information in order to correct any misunderstanding regarding their performance. Hence, 
firms’ desire to voluntarily disclose CG information is expected to be different across 
financial years. This is supported empirically by a number of previous studies (e.g., Barako 
et al., 2006a; Ntim et al., 2012a). Following past studies, the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure among Omani listed firms is predicted to be influenced by industrial and 
financial year factors. Thus, industry and year dummies are included in the model to 
control for potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity over the eleven-year period from 
2001 to 2011. Specifically, eight industry dummies out of nine industries, along with ten 
year dummies out of eleven years, are included in all equations used in this study to avoid 
a dummy-variable trap. 
 
4.2.4 Model Specification 
As referred in Subsection 4.1.3, due to a number of issues, such as accessibility, 
funding and time, a quantitative rather than either qualitative or mixed approach is adopted 
in this study. However, the hypotheses developed in Subsection 3.2 that will be examined 
in this study are summarised below.  
 
  H1 There is a statistically significant positive association between government 
ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
  H2 
 
There is a statistically significant positive association between institutional 
ownership and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
  H3 There is a statistically significant positive association between foreign ownership and 
the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
 
  H4 There is a statistically significant negative association between ownership 
concentration and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
  H5 There is a statistically significant association between board size and the level 
of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
  H6 There is a statistically significant positive association between audit firm size and the 
level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
 H7 There is a statistically significant positive association between board diversity on the 
basis of gender and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
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  H8 
 
There is a statistically significant positive association between board diversity on the 
basis of nationality and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
  H9 
 
There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of a CG 
committee and the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
 
The study employs multiple linear regression analysis and uses Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) as estimation method, where the OCGI was regressed on explanatory 
variables to examine the above hypotheses. Following past studies and assuming that all 
the predicted relations are linear, the OLS regression equation is specified as follows:   
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            (1)      
Where:  
  OCGI Un-weighted Omani Corporate Governance Index 
  α Constant term 
  GOVOWN Government ownership 
  INSOWN Institutional ownership 
  FOROWN Foreign ownership 
  BLKOWN Block ownership 
  BSIZE Board size 
  BIG4   Audit firm size 
  GNDR Board diversity on the basis of gender 
  BDIVN Board diversity on the basis of nationality 
  CGCOM Presence of a CG committee 
  CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability, (ROA), 
leverage (LVRG), industry, and year dummies. 
  ε Error term 
 
4.2.5 Statistical Analyses 
This study conducted a number of statistical analyses in addition to the main 
analysis in order to take account of various statistical and theoretical issues. These analyses 
are classified into two types. First, diagnostic analyses were performed before conducting 
the main analysis, where diverse statistical methods were applied to examine the OLS 
assumptions. This ensured that the OLS assumptions, namely linearity, normality, 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, were met, and demonstrate that 
OLS is an appropriate estimation method to conduct the main analysis. Second, robustness 
analyses were conducted after performing the main analysis, where the reported findings 
87 
 
 
 
from the main analysis were checked by employing different measures and estimations. 
This permitted the study to respond to calls in the literature on the extent to which the main 
findings are robust or sensitive to the use of alternative CG index, random effects model, 
the inclusion of financial firms and the effect of endogeneity problem. All these analyses 
will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Specifically, the OLS assumptions will 
be discussed in the next section, whereas the main and robustness tests will be discussed in 
Sections 6 and 7.  
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5 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ASSUMPTIONS AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
As indicated in Subsection 4.2.5, the OLS assumptions must be met before 
performing the current study’s analyses, in order to ensure that OLS is an appropriate 
estimation method to conduct the analyses. Hence, this section discusses a number of 
statistical tests and procedures that have been conducted to address the OLS assumptions, 
namely, linearity, normality, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity; it also presents the 
descriptive statistics. Subsection 5.1 discusses the OLS assumptions, while descriptive 
statistics are discussed in Subsection 5.2.   
5.1 TESTS OF THE OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
Because this study uses panel data, it must first check whether series have unit 
roots or not (Cizek et al., 2005). It is crucial to determine whether a series is stationary12 or 
not, because employing non-stationary data can result in spurious results; stationarity can 
significantly affect series behaviour and properties (Brooks, 2007). As a result, this study 
tests for a unit root of each used variable by performing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test. The results of this test are presented in Table 6, and indicate that the levels of 
the series of all variables are non-stationary. Hence, the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
accepted at the 1% level of significance.   
Table 6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
Variables ADF Unit Root Test 
  OCGI   -5.7541
***
 
  GOVOWN   -9.2763
***
 
  INSOWN   -9.5214
***
 
  FOROWN -10.4960
***
 
  BLKOWN -10.5810
***
 
  BSIZE   -9.5512
***
 
  BIG4   -12.7914
***
 
  CGCOM -12.3361
***
 
  GNDR -10.4234
***
 
  BDIVN -11.6302
***
 
  GROWTH -13.0767
***
 
  LVRG -10.1540
***
 
  ROA -12.6456
***
 
  LNTA   -7.8817
***
 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN 
denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE 
denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the 
corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of gender, BDIVN denotes board diversity 
on the basis of nationality, GROWT denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on asset the 
measure of profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level, respectively.  
 
                                                 
12Brooks (2007, pp.318) defined a stationary series as “one with a constant mean, constant variance and constant 
autocovariances for each given lag”. 
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Further to the unit root test, the study carried out a raft of statistical tests to examine 
OLS assumptions. First, because the study sample includes small, medium, and large 
firms, it was expected that some control variables may have extreme values. This can 
seriously violate OLS assumptions and lead to spurious results. The effects of outliers were 
minimized by winsorising all control variables at 5% and 95% levels.13  
Second, in the case of time series regressions, it has been suggested that the issue of 
serial correlation can critically violate the standard assumption of OLS, where OLS 
standard error estimates will be biased downwards relative to the true standard errors 
(Brooks, 2007). Thus, it was necessary to detect it and find appropriate estimation method 
to take account of its existence. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test was used 
to test for autocorrelation. The results in Table 7 indicate the presence of autocorrelation, 
where the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at the 1% level of significance, 
as the F-statistics and Chi-Square values suggest. As a result, the study had to adopt the 
first-order autoregressive model in order to take account of serial correlation (Brooks, 
2007). 
Table 7: Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation 
F-Statistics 203.8811*** 
Obs*R-squared 307.8082*** 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
Third, Table 8 reports the results of the White general test. They suggest that the 
model suffers from heteroskedasticity, as both the F-statistics and Chi-Square accept the 
alternative hypothesis that the model is heteroskedastic at the 1% significance level.  
Table 8: Heteroskedasticity test: White test 
F-Statistics      3.0983
***
 
Obs*R-squared 720.1588
***
 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level 
 
Fourth, the study checked whether the explanatory variables were highly correlated 
(multicollinearity problem). This involved a number of statistical techniques that have been 
                                                 
13
The choice of percentiles of winsorization is motivated by two compelling reasons: Firstly, under low levels of 
alternate percentiles the data fails to satisfy the normality assumption of OLS regression. In this sense, the 
regression analysis was conducted before winsoring and after (at 5% and 95% levels) and the findings were 
largely similar. Hence, the winsorization is used across the three essays in order to meet OLS assumptions. 
Secondly, the main variables (CG variables), that are examined across the three essays, were not winsorised 
because they have less extreme values whereas only capital structure’ measurements, earnings management’s 
measurements and control variables’measurements were winsorised because they have large extreme values as a 
result of including small, medium and large firms in the dataset. Finally, there is substantial literature in both 
statistical and financial field that address outlier problems using this 90 percentile winsorization control. In this 
regard, Ghosh and Vogt (2012) stat that “A common procedure has been to replace any data value above the 
ninety-fifth percentile of the sample data by the ninety-fifth percentile and any value below the fifth percentile by 
the fifth percentile”. 
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proposed and used in literature, namely Tolerance statistic (TOL), Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF), Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients and Spearman’s non-parametric 
correlation coefficients. Gujarati (2003) indicates that if TOL is near zero, VIF exceeds 10 
and the correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 0.80, then 
multicollinearity can be expected to be a serious problem. Table 9 shows that the 
maximum value of VIF is 2.149 and the closer value of TOL is 0.934, indicating no serious 
problem of multicollinearity. In the same vein, Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients and Pearson’s parametric coefficients (Table 10) indicate no serious problem 
of multicollinearity, as the highest coefficient is between board size and firm size, which 
are (0.455) and (0.391), respectively. These statistical techniques suggest no major 
violation of the OLS assumptions due to multicollinearity.  
Table 9: Multicollinearity test: Tolerance statistic and Variance Inflation Factor 
Variables TOL VIF 
  GOVOWN 0.684 1.461 
  INSOWN 0.714 1.401 
  FOROWN 0.691 1.448 
  BLKOWN 0.549 1.823 
  BSIZE 0.675 1.482 
  BIG4   0.784 1.275 
  CGCOM 0.860 1.163 
  GNDR 0.934 1.071 
  BDIVN 0.829 1.206 
  GROWTH 0.875 1.143 
  LVRG 0.673 1.486 
  ROA 0.688 1.454 
  LNTA 0.465 2.149 
Notes: GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents 
foreign ownership, BLKOWN, denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of 
board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GNDR and BDIVN 
denote board diversity on the basis of gender and nationality, GROWT denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, 
ROA denotes return on asset the measure of profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size.  
 
Finally, it has been suggested that the normality assumption has to be met in order 
to test single or joint hypotheses using multivariate OLS regression analyses; hence, the 
study had to test for departures from normality and reduce non-normalities in the variables. 
In this regard, the study relies on the Jarque-Bera (JB) test of normality, which computes 
the skewness and skurtosis statistics in order to investigate the extent to which the used 
variables are normally distributed (Gujarati, 2003).14 The results of the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics are presented in Table 14, and indicate that the variables deviate from a 
normal distribution; hence, the current study acceptss the null hypothesis of non-normality 
(the rejections are relatively mild compared to the critical values). The study has attempted 
                                                 
14
Gujarati (2003) indicates that the critical values for accepting kewness and kurtosis are three and zero, respectively.  
91 
 
 
 
to reduce non-normalities in the variables by applying different kinds of transformations, 
such as square root, rank and natural log. The distributions of the transformed variables did 
not produce better skewness and kurtosis statistics, indicating that the actual variables are 
more normally distributed than the transformed variables. In such a case, Brooks (2007) 
suggests that it is desirable to stick with the OLS rather than employ another estimation 
method that does not require a normality assumption, because OLS’s behaviour has been 
well researched in a variety of circumstances. He also indicates that some types of 
heteroskedasticity can lead to non-normality in financial data. This may suggest that the 
effects of non-normality are expected to be less severe because the White test has been 
used in this study to correct for heteroskedasticity. Further, the study employs a 
sufficiently large sample, where violation of the normality assumption is expected to be 
virtually inconsequential (Brooks, 2007). Overall, the statistical tests and procedures imply 
that any remaining non-linearities, serial correlations, heteroskedasticities, 
multicollinearities and non-normalities in the used variables are not going to seriously 
violate the OLS assumptions. This suggests that OLS is an appropriate statistical 
estimation to conduct the study’s analyses.   
 
92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of the dependent and explanatory variables 
  OCGI GOVOWN INSOWN FOROWN BLKOWN BSIZE BIG4 CGCOM GNDR BDIVN GROWTH LVRG ROA LNTA 
OCGI  0.136*** 0.029 0.072** 0.068** 0.038 0.030 0.279*** 0.079*** 0.026 -0.006 -0.092*** 0.180*** 0.275*** 
GOVOWN 0.105***  -0.138*** -0.064** 0.115*** 0.081*** -0.004 -0.010 0.052* -0.136*** -0.066** -0.105*** 0.217*** 0.154*** 
INSOWN 0.015 -0.025  -0.150*** 0.314*** -0.053* -0.011 0.016 -0.019 0.066** -0.043 0.059* 0.024 -0.187*** 
FOROWN 0.076*** 0.022 -0.029  0.355*** -0.038 -0.007 0.019 0.057* 0.150***  -0.096*** 0.046 -0.041 0.087*** 
BLKOWN -0.007 0.089*** 0.226*** 0.339***  -0.273*** -0.160*** -0.009  0.051* 0.168*** 0.044 0.084*** -0.114*** -0.206*** 
BSIZE 0.088*** 0.082*** -0.001 0.008 -0.266***  0.258*** -0.053* 0.006  -0.202*** -0.081*** -0.014 0.079*** 0.455*** 
BIG4 0.100*** 0.041 0.000 0.020 -0.161*** 0.252***  0.110*** 0.056* 0.038 -0.073** -0.034 0.101*** 0.369*** 
CGCOM 0.299*** 0.010 0.010 0.000 -0.013 -0.055* 0.110***  0.022  -0.097*** -0.004 -0.193*** 0.064** 0.069** 
GNDR 0.086*** 0.078*** -0.050 0.067** 0.054 0.013 0.056* 0.022  0.087*** 0.014 0.046 0.057* 0.113*** 
BDIVN 0.052* 0.067** 0.042 0.138*** 0.179*** -0.305*** -0.003 -0.084*** 0.081***  0.011 0.238*** -0.099*** -0.048 
GROWTH 0.006 -0.109*** -0.036 -0.128*** 0.053* -0.111*** -0.072** 0.012 0.017 0.012  -0.055* -0.193*** -0.176*** 
LVRG -0.077*** -0.110*** 0.044 0.021 0.094*** -0.032 -0.039 -0.177*** 0.057* 0.243*** -0.043  -0.355*** 0.086*** 
ROA 0.173*** 0.215*** 0.035 0.005 -0.128*** 0.054* 0.098*** 0.069** 0.045 -0.103*** -0.197*** -0.346***  0.170*** 
LNTA 0.347*** 0.136*** -0.163*** 0.140*** -0.223*** 0.391*** 0.377***  0.092*** 0.110*** -0.091*** -0.149*** 0.044 0.179***  
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficient, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients. OCGI 
denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN denotes block 
ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GNDR and  BDIVN denote board 
diversity on the basis of gender and nationality, GROWT denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on asset the measure of profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. The correlation 
matrix depicts the strength and sign of the relationship amongst the variables. ***, ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This subsection presents descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the model, 
including the OCGI and the explanatory and control variables. Specifically, Subsection 5.2.1 
presents the levels of compliance with the OCGI based on the full sample. Subsection 5.2.2 
reports the levels of compliance with the OCGI based on industry type. Subsection 5.2.3 presents 
a statistical summary of the explanatory variables, while Subsection 5.2.4 reports those related to 
the control variables.  
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Levels of Disclosure and Compliance with 
the OCGI (Full Sample) 
The current study investigates the levels of compliance among the sampled firms with 
each of 72 internal CG provisions that constitute the OCGI. It does this in order to examine the 
improvement in compliance, and identify the CG provisions and sub-indices that contribute most 
to the variability in the levels of compliance. This enables it to answer its first research question: 
What is the level of compliance with the 2002 OCGC, and to what extent has the introduction of 
the 2002 OCGC improved CG practices in Omani listed firms? Table 11 reports the levels of 
compliance for each CG provision across the eleven firm years. Two important findings can be 
concluded from the table.  
First, the findings in Row 3 of Table 11 indicate that the aggregate mean scores of the 
OCGI are substantially varied among Omani listed firms across firm years. Similarly, the levels 
of compliance with each CG provision in each of the eleven years are considerably varied. The 
level of compliance ranges from 98.6% compliance with the CG provision of whether there is a 
narrative on financial transactions that may have a conflict of interest, to 0% compliance with the 
provision of whether an external auditor reports on frauds and firm’s compliance with its internal 
control system. The higher compliance with the party transactions provision may be due to the 
fact that the Omani Companies Act mandates every firm to report on any activity that involves a 
conflict of interests. The total non-compliance with the provision of fraud and internal control 
system may be due to one of three reasons: (i) audit firms may have found no evidence of fraud; 
(ii) they may intentionally avoid reporting on such an issue in order to retain their clients, being 
influenced by informal rules, such as family’s, tribe’s and personal’s relationships; and (iii) audit 
firms may consider such reporting as additional services requiring additional payment beyond 
audit fees; they tend to not report without getting paid. Table 11 also reports that 85% or more of 
the sampled firms show comparatively higher compliance levels with 3 (4%) provisions (e.g., 
establishment of audit committee). In contrast, 50% or less of the sampled firms show relatively 
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lower compliance levels with 35 (49%) provisions (e.g., disclosing the top five officers’ 
remuneration). Firms also show intermediate compliance levels with the 34 (47%) remaining 
provisions (e.g., classification of board directors), ranging between 53% and 82%. 
Second, Table 11 shows that aggregate compliance levels increased from 6.78% in 2001 
to 60.93% in 2009, with a slight decrease after 2009, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Akkermans et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a) that compliance with CG provisions improves over 
time. It is clearly observed that firms reported on their CG structures in much more detail than 
they did before the issuing of the 2002 OCGC. This is further supported by Figure 2, which 
shows a comparison of the levels of compliance with the OCGI using computed means and 
yearly increases/decreases expressed as a percentage. The aggregated CG score of the OCGI was 
relatively low in 2001 and 2002, whereas 2003 witnessed a dramatic increase after the 2002 
OCGC was effectively implemented. Panel A of Table 11 shows that the increasing levels of 
compliance continue in the following years, reaching 47.89% on average over the eleven years. 
This finding is consistent with past studies conducted in similar emerging countries that report 
low levels of compliance. For instance, an average level of 52% is reported by Tsamenyi et al. 
(2007), who examine the level of voluntary CG compliance among Ghanaian listed firms. 
Similarly, Adelopo (2011) reports evidence that the average level of CG compliance was 44% 
among Nigerian listed firms. Albu and Girbina (2015) report empirical evidence that there are a 
modest percentage of Romanian listed firms that provide high levels of CG disclosure. 
 
 
            Figure 2: The levels of compliance with the OCGI based on the full sample 
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Table 11: The level of compliance with the OCGC provisions among the Omani sampled firms (%)  
 
                                                                                                                        Pre-2003                                                              Post-2003 (after OCGC was issued)                              
Omani corporate governance index (72 Provisions) 2001 2002 
   
Average  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Avg. of 
11 Years 
                                 Yearly average of the level of compliance 6.8 17.4        12.1 
 
33.6 47.2 54.0 55.4 58.6 59.6 60.9 61.1 60.2     54.44                47.89 
 1. Board and Directors  
  1 The board of directors’  number 1.1 31.3 16.2  61.9 87.3 97.9 95.2 98.2 98.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.2 79.2 
  2 Directors’ Classification. 0.0 22.9 11.5  50.5 74.5 84.2 83.7 86.5 86.0 87.7 87.8 94.5 81.7 68.9 
  3 Role Duality 2.1 30.2 16.2  59.8 87.3 97.9 96.2 98.2 97.4 99.1 99.1 99.1 92.7 78.8 
  4 Board’s independence 0.0 27.1 13.5  58.8 85.3 95.8 96.2 96.4 94.7 95.6 96.5 97.3 90.7 76.7 
  5 Majority of board’s directors 0.0 29.2 14.6  55.7 87.3 96.8 97.1 99.1 98.2 99.1 99.1 100.0 92.5 78.3 
  6 Membership of directors on other firms’ boards 0.0 13.5 6.8  43.3 72.5 82.1 86.5 83.8 85.1 90.4 90.4 89.1 80.4 67.0 
  7 Membership of directors on other firms’ boards 0.0 15.6 7.8  43.3 73.5 83.2 87.5 85.6 86.0 91.2 91.3 90.0 81.3 67.9 
  8 Frequency of board meetings 0.0 28.1 14.1  58.8 87.3 94.7 95.2 98.2 97.4 100.0 98.3 98.2 92.0 77.8 
  9 Board meetings’ dates 0.0 22.9 11.5  59.8 87.3 94.7 95.2 98.2 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 92.4 77.7 
10 Individual directors’ meetings attendance  0.0 24.0 12.0  59.8 87.3 96.8 95.2 99.1 99.1 100.0 98.3 100.0 92.8 78.1 
11 Directors’ meetings at general  assembly 0.0 20.8 10.4  50.5 75.5 89.5 87.5 92.8 95.6 94.7 94.8 90.0 85.7 72.0 
12 Board of directors’ remuneration 0.0 8.3 4.2  20.6 36.3 48.4 53.8 60.4 62.3 65.8 67.0 64.5 53.2 44.3 
13 Top five officers’ remuneration 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.0 2.9 3.2 1.9 5.4 3.5 1.8 1.7 2.7 2.7   2.2 
14 Board service contracts 0.0 3.1 1.6  12.4 14.7 14.7 19.2 30.6 33.3 35.1 37.4 50.9 27.6 22.9 
15 Approving financial statement 41.5 47.9 44.7  61.9 58.8 73.7 65.4 91.9 92.1 96.5 95.7 96.4 81.4 74.7 
16 Going concern 11.7 17.7 14.7  17.5 17.6 24.2 24.0 59.5 80.7 94.7 95.7 87.3 55.7 48.2 
17 Review of internal control systems 1.1 8.3 4.7  34.0 48.0 58.9 59.6 81.1 86.0 87.7 87.8 90.0 70.4 58.4 
18 Directors’ nomination 1.1 14.6 7.8  38.1 62.7 67.4 70.2 77.5 82.5 80.7 80.9 76.4 70.7 59.3 
19 Remuneration committee’s existence 0.0 0.0 0.0  4.1 3.9 6.3 8.7 10.8 10.5 11.4 12.2 11.8 8.9   7.2 
20 Remuneration committee’s terms &   reference 0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 3.9 6.3 7.7 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.4 10.9 8.1   6.6 
21 Remuneration committee’s composition 0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 3.9 6.3 7.7 9.9 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.9 8.0   6.5 
22 Remuneration committee’s chairperson 0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 3.9 6.3 7.7 9.9 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.1 7.7   6.3 
23 Remuneration committee’s majority of its members 0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 3.9 5.3 6.7 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.2 6.9   5.7 
24 Remuneration committee’s remuneration 0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 3.9 4.2 5.8 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.8 5.5 5.7   4.7 
25 Remuneration committee’s  directors meetings  0.0 0.0 0.0  3.1 4.9 6.3 6.7 8.1 7.9 10.5 11.3 10.0 7.7   6.3 
26 Nomination committee’s existence 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.9 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 6.4 2.9   2.4 
27 Nomination committee’s terms &   reference 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 6.4 2.8   2.3 
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Continuation: Table 11 2001 2002  Average  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Avg. of 
11 Years 
28 Nomination committee’s composition 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 6.4 2.8   2.3 
29 Nomination committee’s chairperson 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 6.4 2.8   2.3 
30 Nomination committee’s majority of its members 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 6.4 2.8   2.3 
31 Nomination committee’s remuneration 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.6 3.5 3.5 4.5 1.9   1.5 
32 Nomination committee’s  directors meetings  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.3 4.5 2.4   1.9 
33 Risk Committee’s existence 0.0 10.4 5.2  20.6 38.2 47.4 50.0 49.5 50.0 53.5 54.8 57.3 46.8 39.3 
34 Risk Committee’s terms &   reference 0.0 9.4 4.7  20.6 38.2 47.4 49.0 48.6 50.0 53.5 54.8 56.4 46.5 38.9 
35 Risk Committee’s composition 0.0 9.4 4.7  20.6 38.2 46.3 49.0 48.6 49.1 52.6 53.9 56.4 46.1 38.6 
36 Risk Committee’s chairperson 0.0 9.4 4.7  20.6 38.2 46.3 49.0 48.6 49.1 52.6 53.9 56.4 46.1 38.6 
37 Risk Committee’s majority of its members 0.0 8.3 4.2  20.6 37.3 47.4 49.0 49.5 50.0 53.5 53.9 55.5 46.3 38.6 
38 Risk Committee’s remuneration 0.0 9.4 4.7  20.6 37.3 46.3 49.0 48.6 48.2 51.8 53.9 54.5 45.6 38.2 
39 Risk Committee’s individual directors meetings  0.0 9.4 4.7  21.6 38.2 47.4 49.0 48.6 49.1 52.6 53.9 55.5 46.2 38.7 
  Section 2: Accounting and Auditing 
40 Audit Committee’s existence 0.0 31.3 15.6  62.9 85.3 96.8 97.1 97.3 97.4 98.2 98.3 99.1 92.5 78.5 
41 Audit Committee’s terms &   reference 0.0 20.8 10.4  52.6 76.5 89.5 88.5 88.3 89.5 90.4 90.4 90.9 84.0 70.7 
42 Audit Committee’s composition 0.0 21.9 10.9  51.5 79.4 86.3 91.3 89.2 90.4 91.2 92.2 92.7 84.9 71.5 
43 Audit Committee’s chairperson 0.0 22.9 11.5  53.6 81.4 92.6 95.2 93.7 93.9 94.7 96.5 96.4 88.7 74.6 
44 Audit Committee’s majority of its members 0.0 21.9 10.9  54.6 79.4 93.7 95.2 93.7 93.9 95.6 94.8 93.6 88.3 74.2 
45 Audit Committee’s remuneration 0.0 9.4 4.7  47.4 77.5 92.6 90.4 93.7 87.7 95.6 96.5 91.8 85.9 71.1 
46 Audit Committee’s individual directors meetings  0.0 16.7 8.3  52.6 79.4 93.7 93.3 92.8 92.1 98.2 96.5 93.6 88.0 73.5 
 3 Section 3: External Auditors & Internal Control Systems 
47 Internal control systems 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.5   0.4 
48 Compliance with internal control systems 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
49 Ability of the firm to carry out its activities 8.5 9.4 8.9  13.4 7.8 5.3 10.6 9.0 8.8 7.9 8.7 11.8 9.3   9.2 
50 Frauds  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
 Section 4: Disclosure & Transparency 
51 Ownership structure  84.0 89.6 86.8  92.8 97.1 98.9 100.0 99.1 98.2 99.1 99.1 99.1 98.2 96.1 
52 Industry structure and development 14.9 28.1 21.5  48.5 71.6 76.8 83.7 85.6 85.1 89.5 86.1 77.3 78.2 67.9 
53 Investment opportunities 7.4 22.9 15.2  47.4 67.6 68.4 83.7 82.0 80.7 84.2 80.9 76.4 74.6 63.8 
54 Financial and operational performance 42.6 53.1 47.8  74.2 86.3 96.8 98.1 98.2 95.6 99.1 97.4 99.1 93.9 85.5 
55 Risks and concerns 5.3 20.8 13.1  46.4 68.6 70.5 84.6 89.2 90.4 90.4 87.0 85.5 79.2 67.1 
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Continuation: Table 11 2001 2002  Average  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Avg. of 
11 Years 
56 General performance 0.0 9.4 4.7  30.9 48.0 58.9 62.5 66.7 67.5 68.4 70.4 65.5 59.9 49.8 
57 Certificate from external auditor 1.1 3.1 2.1  29.9 45.1 89.5 95.2 98.2 98.2 100.0 100.0 98.2 83.8 69.0 
58 Chapter on CG 0.0 28.1 14.1  60.8 87.3 97.9 98.1 100.0 99.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.7 79.2 
59 Compliance/non-compliance 1.1 22.9 12.0  46.4 72.5 88.4 86.5 85.6 87.7 87.7 87.8 79.1 80.2 67.8 
60 Penalties and strictures 1.1 24.0 12.5  48.5 78.4 84.2 84.6 90.1 87.7 87.7 89.6 84.5 81.7 69.1 
61 Related party transactions 93.6 97.9 95.8  97.9 98.0 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.1 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.3 98.6 
62 Market price data 0.0 16.7 8.3  50.5 78.4 90.5 88.5 90.1 93.0 93.0 93.9 92.7 85.6 71.6 
63 External auditor’s profile 0.0 21.9 10.9  51.5 84.3 97.9 96.2 100.0 98.2 99.1 100.0 100.0 91.9 77.2 
64 Dividend Policy  40.4 54.2 47.3  53.6 61.8 61.1 67.3 69.4 69.3 71.1 72.2 69.1 66.1 62.7 
65 Firm’s loan 78.7 81.3 80.0  82.5 84.3 82.1 83.7 85.6 80.7 83.3 81.7 76.4 82.3 81.8 
66 Publishing results online 0.0 1.0 0.5  11.3 21.6 28.4 32.7 36.9 36.0 36.0 37.4 40.9 31.2 25.7 
67 Convertible instruments 0.0 2.1 1.0  9.3 20.6 21.1 21.2 25.2 28.1 29.8 27.8 28.2 23.5 19.4 
68 Sending half- yearly results to shareholders 0.0 6.3 3.1  17.5 29.4 35.8 33.7 32.4 33.3 32.5 33.0 6.4 28.2 23.7 
69 Firm’s analysis of products 17.0 24.0 20.5  43.3 52.0 64.2 59.6 59.5 60.5 61.4 57.4 37.3 55.0 48.7 
70 Outlook future 28.7 44.8 36.8  62.9 81.4 88.4 88.5 94.6 89.5 93.0 92.2 89.1 86.6 77.5 
71 Management discussion & analysis 0.0 16.7 8.3  35.1 53.9 61.1 64.4 69.4 64.9 70.2 71.3 73.6 62.6 52.8 
72 Disclosure of directors’ biography 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 36.0 50.0 56.1 61.7 67.3 30.5 24.9 
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Similarly, the statistics in Panels B, C, D and E of Table 12 suggest that there is a 
substantial degree of dispersion in the distribution of each sub-index. For instance, the board and 
directors’ sub-index ranges from 0% to 97.44%, with an average of 38.59%. Further, Omani 
firms appear to have on average: (i) higher compliance with both accounting and auditing 
provisions (75.37%) and disclosure and transparency provisions (64.04%); (ii) an intermediate 
level of compliance with board and directors provisions (38.59%); and (iii) a lower level of 
compliance with external auditors and internal control systems provisions (2.43%). Although 
Omani listed firms have shown some degree of compliance, the findings in Table 12 make clear 
that compliance with the 2002 OCGC is generally low. However, the current study further 
investigates the extent to which the levels of compliance before and after the implementation of 
the 2002 OCGC are significantly different. This was achieved by using t-test technique, where 
these levels were examined before and after 2003. Panel F of Table 12 reports the results of this 
test. These results reject the null hypothesis that the levels of compliance before and after 
implementing the OCGC have equal means at the 1% level of significance. Rather, these results 
lead the current study to accept the alternative hypothesis that the introduction of the 2002 OCGC 
has had some positive impact in encouraging Omani firms to engage in more CG practices, as the 
average OCGI scores for the period 2001 to 2002 are significantly lower than for the later period. 
In addition, the findings in Panel A of Table 14 show wide variability in compliance levels. The 
aggregate mean scores range from 1.3900 to 88.8900, with an average of 47.89 complying with 
72 CG provisions for the period 2001 to 2011. The standard deviation of the OCGI is 21.7746, 
indicating that there is relative variation in compliance with the OCGI provisions among the 
sampled firms. The wide variability in the levels of compliance is expected to result from three 
main factors. 
 First, the high scores for particular provisions are influenced by other governance 
regulations, such as the Omani Companies Act and the Capital Market Law. For instance, in 
order to ensure effective board supervision, the Companies Act requires firms to have a minimum 
of five directors on their boards. Thus, a considerable number of sampled firms comply with the 
provision regarding the number of directors (79.2%). Second, as reported by previous studies, 
firms take time to comply with all CG provisions. This can be observed from Tables 11 and 12, 
which show the levels of compliance gradually improve from one year to the next. For instance, 
the average level of compliance with the provision of directors’ classification from 2001 to 2011 
is 0%, 22.9%, 50.5%, 74.5%, 84.2%, 83.7%, 86.5%, 86.0%, 87.7%, 87.8% and 94.5%. Third, 
compliance was lower for 35 out of 72 provisions. These lower levels could be related to the 
weakness of the Omani external CG framework, including the CAM and MSM, in encouraging 
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firms to engage in better CG practices. Further, some CG provisions, such as convertible 
instruments, may not be applicable to all firms, as is suggested by prior studies (e.g., Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012). External CG mechanisms, such as market for corporate control, seem to have 
no/less of a role (because of high ownership concentration) in encouraging Omani managers and 
directors to voluntarily disclose additional information on CG practices.   
The skewness (-0.9200) and kurtosis (2.6976) statistics show that the OCGI is not 
normally distributed, rejecting the null hypothesis that the OCGI is symmetrically and 
mesokurtically distributed. However, the non-normality of the OCGI is relatively mild and not 
expected to harm the OLS assumptions, as the statistics of both skewness and kurtosis are close 
to accepted values (i.e., 0 and 3 respectively). As discussed in Subsection 5.1, Gujarati (2003) 
indicates that a variable with perfectly normal distribution is unlikely to be found in the real 
world, and as long as a variable is close to the critical value, then the OLS will not be seriously 
violated. The Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients and Pearson’s parametric 
coefficients presented in Table 10 show the statistical correlation between the OCGI and the 
independent variables. For instance, the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients indicate that 
the OCGI is positively and significantly associated with government ownership, foreign 
ownership, board size, audit firm size, CG committee, board diversity on the basis of gender and 
nationality, profitability and firm size. In contrast, the OCGI has a negative significant 
relationship with leverage, and no significant relationship with institutional ownership, block 
ownership and growth. The present study finds similar results using Spearman’s non-parametric 
correlation. This indicates that Omani firms with the following characteristics are motivated to 
comply with the OCGC and provide information about their CG structures: large government 
ownership, foreign ownership, large board size, having an established CG committee, having 
female directors, having non-Omani directors, being more profitable, being large and being 
audited by one of the big four audit firms.  
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Table 12: Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with corporate governance disclosure index (OCGI) and sub-indices (%) 
 
All 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Panel A: All provisions contained in the Omani corporate governance index (OCGI) 
Mean 47.8974 6.7819 17.4190 33.6627 47.2222 54.0351 55.3686 58.6336 59.6248 60.9284 61.0749 60.1768 
Median 54.1667 5.5556   8.3333 41.6667 50.0000 54.1667 55.5556 58.3333 59.0278 59.7222 59.7222 59.7222 
STD 21.7747 2.3565 16.7201 21.7550 17.4887 11.5620 10.9602 10.7947   9.9774   9.9513   9.9535   9.2303 
Min   1.3889 1.3889   2.7778   1.3889   1.3889  4.1667   6.9444 34.7222 34.7222 34.7222 30.5556 33.3333 
Max 88.8889   12.5000 62.5000 73.6111 75.0000 77.7778 77.7778 88.8889 87.5000 88.8889 87.5000 84.7222 
Panel B: Board & Directors 
Mean 38.5884 1.5276 11.0577 25.0330 37.0538 43.0499 43.8856 48.0480 49.4602 50.9447 51.2821 51.9114 
Median 41.0256 1.2821  2.5641 28.2051 35.8974 38.4615 41.0256 46.1538 48.7179 51.2821 53.8462 53.8462 
STD 21.8379 1.7362 16.1583 20.4284 17.4004 13.9938 13.3751 14.8256 13.8301 14.2274 14.4050 13.6839 
Min 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 20.5128 25.6410 25.6410 17.9487 20.5128 
Max  97.4359 7.6923 58.9744   71.7949 74.3590 79.4872 76.9231 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 
Panel C: Accounting & Auditing 
Mean   75.3720 0.0000 20.6845 54.6392 79.8319 92.1805 92.9945 92.6641 92.9825 94.8622 95.0311 94.0260 
Median 100.0000 0.0000   0.0000 71.4286  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000 100.0000 
STD   38.9407 0.0000 34.8000 44.4166 35.9808 17.4053 17.0077 18.1587 16.3762 14.6141 14.2912 13.3202 
Min     0.0000 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 28.5714 
Max 100.0000 0.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000 100.0000 
Panel D: External Auditors & Internal Control Systems 
Mean 2.4300 2.3900 2.3400 3.3500 1.9600 1.3200 2.8800 2.4800 2.4100 2.1900 2.3900 2.9500 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD 7.7670 7.3950 7.3250 8.5610 6.7540 5.6120 8.7490 8.2260 8.1260 7.8430 8.0930 8.1080 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max   50.0000   25.0000   25.0000   25.0000   25.0000   25.0000   50.0000   50.0000   50.0000   50.0000   50.0000  25.0000 
Panel E: Disclosure & Transparency 
Mean 64.0349 19.0522 30.3977 47.7976 63.1462 71.0048 73.3392 76.9451 77.5917 78.7081 78.4980 74.7521 
Median 72.7273 18.1818 22.7273 54.5455 68.1818 72.7273 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 
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Continuation: Table 12 
 All 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
STD 24.3873   6.6750 18.4114 24.4262 20.7058 13.5908 12.8886 11.3299 11.6433 11.6212 11.8488 11.1949 
Min  4.5455   4.5455   9.0909   4.5455   4.5455 13.6364 18.1818 40.9091 36.3636 36.3636 36.3636 40.9091 
Max 100.0000 40.9091 81.8182 86.3636  100.0000 95.4545 95.4545 95.4545  100.0000  100.0000  100.0000 95.4545 
Panel F: Corporate governance compliance before and after releasing the Omani code 
 Years 01-02 Years 03-05 Years 06-08 Years 09-11  Years 03-11 
Mean 12.156 44.950 57.945 60.734  54.956 
T-test     20.521***    43.201***    48.538***      36.198*** 
     STD 13.103                19.342                10.693                  9.703  15.221 
     Min   1.389  1.389 6.944                30.556    1.389 
     Max 62.500                77.778               88.889                88.889  88.889 
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In sum, the key conclusion is that despite the initial theoretical prediction that the OCGC 
would effectively encourage firms to adopt better CG measures, CG compliance among Omani 
listed firms is still low. Further, evidence from the above discussion suggests that, contrary to the 
expectation that the OCGC’s reliance on an Anglo-American model may not lead to improved 
CG standards in Oman due to the large differences between Omani and developed countries, the 
voluntary OCGC was able to promote CG practices of Omani listed firms to some extent. 
Further, these findings are consistent with prior studies showing that, contrary to general 
concerns about the ability of voluntary codes to improve CG standards in a particular setting, 
Omani firms have shown some positive response to the voluntary OCGC’s recommendations. In 
this regard, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pp.376) state that “Despite the criticisms that 
the codes’ voluntary nature limits their ability to improve governance practices, codes of good 
governance appear to have generally improved the governance of countries that have adopted 
them, although there is the need for additional reforms”. Thus, the current study’s findings are in 
line with theoretical and empirical literature claiming that the aim of promoting high standards of 
corporate behaviour can be achieved through adopting voluntary CG codes of good practices.  
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Levels of Discolsure and Compliance with 
the OCGI (Industry Type) 
Corporate governance compliance and disclosure have been suggested to differ across 
different industry groups (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). As discussed in 
Subsection 4.1.1, most prior studies exclude financial firms from their datasets, arguing that such 
firms are subject to more disclosure requirements than non-financial firms. The current study 
seeks to ascertain whether industry groups can explain the variability in the levels of compliance 
with the OCGI. In particular, following the suggestion in the literature that financial firms tend to 
have a high degree of CG compliance and disclosure, the current study seeks to understand the 
extent to which this suggestion applies to emerging countries like Oman, where financial and 
non-financial firms seem to behave identically due to weak enforcement. In this regard, Table 
13 shows describtive statistics of the levels of disclosure and compliance with the OCGI  based 
on industry type. Generally, the statistics in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of this table 
suggest that the aggregate mean scores of the OCGI are substantially varied among Omani listed 
firms across firm industry. These findings are further discussed in below. 
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics of levels of compliance based on industrial groups 
 Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Basic Materials (BM) 48.680 0.271 20.680 2.780 76.390 
2001   6.945 4.114
***
   1.961   4.170 11.110 
2002 21.783 1.101 19.178   2.780 62.500 
2003 39.197 0.382 21.307   4.170 65.280 
2004 51.242 1.168 14.275   4.170 75.000 
2005 54.551 0.797   9.795 37.500 73.610 
2006 55.820 0.505   8.987 45.830 75.000 
2007 57.513 0.603 10.229 38.890 76.390 
2008 58.712 0.417   9.925 37.500 75.000 
2009 60.227 0.835   9.684 37.500 75.000 
2010 60.037 1.375   9.649 36.110 75.000 
2011 59.722 1.229   9.820 37.500 76.390 
Panel B: Consumer Goods (CG) 46.149 0.970 20.987   2.780 77.780 
2001 34.504 0.238 28.861   2.780 77.870 
2002 30.069 0.014 25.127   2.780 65.280 
2003 44.299 1.112 19.547   4.170 68.060 
2004 48.819 0.756 16.971   6.940 68.060 
2005 49.227 0.111 17.104   4.170 65.280 
2006 49.338 0.633 16.893   4.170 66.670 
2007 47.600 1.191 21.586   5.560 73.610 
2008 47.410 1.742
*
 21.174   6.940 73.610 
2009 50.190 1.223 20.317   4.170 73.610 
2010 51.830 0.255 17.627   5.560 76.390 
2011 52.924 0.140 13.842   6.940 69.440 
Panel C: Consumer Services (CS) 49.342 0.589 20.016 1.390 88.890 
2001 33.255 0.369 29.108 4.170 88.890 
2002 33.563 0.398 25.849 4.170 87.500 
2003 41.912 0.747 19.685 5.560 66.670 
2004 46.219 0.324 18.006 5.560 66.670 
2005 52.205 0.366 13.002 8.330 66.670 
2006 54.028 0.159 12.567 5.560 68.060 
2007 52.181 0.446 17.588 6.940 75.000 
2008 54.894 0.436 14.119 4.170 70.830 
2009 55.903 0.175 14.766 2.780 76.390 
2010 57.916 0.814 16.378 1.390 88.890 
2011 57.272 0.610 17.482 1.390 87.500 
Panel D: Financials (FI) 48.128  24.428 1.390 84.720 
2001 36.666  30.500 1.390 84.720 
2002 30.183  28.868 4.170 80.560 
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Continuation: Table 13      
Panel D: Financials (FI) Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
2003 36.333  26.149 4.170 81.940 
2004 44.069  23.787 5.560 80.560 
2005 49.942  23.034 6.940 83.330 
2006 53.124  23.138 4.170 77.780 
2007 54.645  20.396 5.560 75.000 
2008 56.944  17.863 4.170 76.390 
2009 56.745  17.543 6.940 76.390 
2010 53.272  21.392 5.560 84.720 
2011 53.666  19.657 5.560 84.720 
Panel E: Health Care (HE) 38.160 1.821 21.112 5.560 63.890 
2001   6.250 1.385   0.975   5.560   6.940 
2002 31.945 0.083 33.396   8.330 55.560 
2003 28.470 0.408 28.482   8.330 48.610 
2004 25.690 1.048 26.516   6.940 44.440 
2005 31.250 1.093 28.482 11.110 51.390 
2006 47.220 0.353 13.746 37.500 56.940 
2007 46.525 0.549 14.729 36.110 56.940 
2008 50.000 0.537 11.780 41.670 58.330 
2009 48.610 0.640 11.781 40.280 56.940 
2010 53.475 0.013 14.729 43.060 63.890 
2011 62.500 0.441   0.000 62.500 62.500 
Panel F: Industrials (IN)  48.853 0.291 22.233 2.780 80.560 
2001 21.475 1.568 23.389   2.780 68.060 
2002 21.794 0.913 22.760   4.170 69.440 
2003 45.406 1.059 22.718   5.560 73.610 
2004 49.884 0.736 19.753   8.330 75.000 
2005 51.966 0.268 17.741 11.110 77.780 
2006 54.281 0.160 13.996 36.110 77.780 
2007 56.018 0.209 15.391 34.720 80.560 
2008 59.606 0.470 12.416 47.220 80.560 
2009 60.880 0.745 11.709 47.220 80.560 
2010 61.575 1.250 12.554 38.890 80.560 
2011 62.807 1.313 11.149 45.830 76.390 
Panel G: Oil and Gas (OG)  36.362 1.583 16.372 8.330 51.390 
2001   8.330 0.911 0.000   8.330   8.330 
2002 15.280 0.507 0.000 15.280 15.280 
2003 11.110 0.946 0.000 11.110 11.110 
2004 40.280 0.156 0.000 40.280 40.280 
2005 38.890 0.471 0.000 38.890 38.890 
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Continuation: Table 13      
Panel G: Oil and Gas (OG) Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
2006 45.830 0.310 0.000 45.830 45.830 
2007 45.830 0.425 0.000 45.830 45.830 
2008 47.220 0.535 0.000 47.220 47.220 
2009 47.220 0.534 0.000 47.220 47.220 
2010 48.610 0.214 0.000 48.610 48.610 
2011 51.390 0.114 0.000 51.390 51.390 
Panel H: Telecommunications (TE)  63.117 1.836 6.772 48.610 69.440 
2001   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
2002   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
2003   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
2004   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
2005 63.888 0.594 0.000 63.890 63.890 
2006 59.720 0.280 0.000 59.720 59.720 
2007 59.722 0.713 0.000 59.722 59.722 
2008 69.444 0.688 0.000 69.440 69.440 
2009 68.055 0.633 0.000 68.060 68.060 
2010 54.166 0.304 7.856 48.610 59.720 
2011 64.583 0.770 4.910 61.110 68.060 
Panel I: Utilities (UT) 45.547 0.591 20.954 2.780 65.280 
2001 29.512 0.442 26.383   5.560 56.940 
2002 35.646 0.313 25.015   6.940 52.780 
2003 35.647 0.044 21.260 11.110 48.610 
2004 54.166 0.723   2.401 52.780 56.940 
2005 58.336 0.619   6.053 54.170 65.280 
2006 57.406 0.316   2.118 55.560 59.720 
2007 57.870 0.269   4.242 54.170 62.500 
2008 55.556 0.132   6.364 50.000 62.500 
2009 39.816 1.479 31.492   4.170 63.890 
2010 40.743 0.921 33.139   2.780 63.743 
2011 41.666 0.938 32.658   4.170 63.890 
Notes: The t-test in Column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in Panels A, 
B, C, E, F, G, H and I test for equality means between basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, 
health care, industrials, oil and gas, telecommunications, utilities and financial firms, respectively. A mean difference 
with (***), (**) and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Std. Dev denotes standard deviation. 
 
Panels A to I of Table 13 illustrate descriptive statistics for each industry group across the 
eleven years, with the eight industrial groups compared to the financial group. Specifically, the t-
test in Column 3 examines whether financial firms’ average levels of CG compliance are 
significantly different from the other eight industries. This enables the current study to either 
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reject or accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between financial and 
non-financial firms in terms of complying with CG standards. Further, in order to account for the 
suggestion in the literature that CG compliance is improving over time, the current study 
computes compliance levels for each industry group for each sampled year. This allows it to 
confirm its descriptive statistics based on full data; the findings indicate that CG compliance has 
improved over time.  
  
     
            Figure 3: The levels of corporate governance compliance by industry group 
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from Table 13 and Figure 3. First, both show that 
basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, health care, industrials, oil and 
gas, telecommunications and utilities firms complied with 48.68%, 46.15%, 49.34%, 48.13%, 
38.16%, 48.85%, 36.36%, 63.12% and 45.55% of the OCGI, respectively. This indicates that 
firms in telecommunication and consumer services industries tend to comply more with the 
OCGI’s provisions than those in the other industry groups. In contrast, health care and oil and gas 
groups appear to have lower levels of CG compliance. This is contrary to the LT’s prediction that 
firms in certain industries, such as oil and gas, may be more motivated to comply with CG 
standards than other firms in order to legitimise their activities (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005). Second, similar to the results for the full sample, Table 13 and Figure 3 show 
that the level of compliance for each industry group has increased over time, confirming the 
suggestion in the literature that CG compliance takes time to improve. For instance, the average 
compliance of consumer goods firms increased from 34.50% in 2001 to 52.92% in 2011, and the 
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aggregate mean scores range from 2.78 to 77.78, with an average of 46.15 complying with 72 CG 
provisions for the period 2001 to 2011. Third, Column 3 of Table 13 reports t-test statistics 
indicating that the means of the nine industrial groups are not statistically significantly different 
from the financial industrial group. This suggests that the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between financial and non-financial firms is accepted. In conclusion, the 
findings based on industry group are in line with theoretical expectations and prior empirical 
evidence that firms operating in different industries tend to have different levels of CG 
compliance and disclosure.  
 
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Panel B of Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The 
current study makes a number of observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the mean of government ownership is 5.517, revealing that the Omani state hold 
shares in almost 6% of sampled firms. This percentage is relatively high and is expected to have 
an impact on the willingness of firms to comply with CG standards and provide additional 
information on their CG structures. In this regard, both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric correlation coefficients presented in Table 10 indicate that firms with significant 
government ownership tend to comply more with the OCGI than those with no government 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of the dependent, explanatory and control variables  
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
  OCGI 47.8973 54.1667 21.7746  -0.9200   2.6976   1.3900 88.8900 
Panel B: Explanatory variables 
  GOVOWN   5.5173   0.0000 13.4804   3.1670 13.2821   0.0000 75.2558 
  INSOWN 20.3921 12.4205 22.6782   1.0529   3.2718   0.0000 90.8500 
  FOROWN 10.4591   0.0000 20.0972   2.0946   6.8656   0.0000 90.1300 
  BLKOWN 54.8402 56.5927 24.3699  -0.3106   2.4292   0.0000 99.4700 
  BSIZE   7.3437   7.0000   1.7885   0.7651   3.1554   4.0000 13.0000 
  BIG4   0.7100   1.0000   0.4539  -0.9259   1.8574   0.0000   1.0000 
  CGCOM   0.1588   0.0000   0.3656   1.8665   4.4839   0.0000   1.0000 
  GNDR   0.1770   0.0000   0.3819   1.6918   3.8622   0.0000   1.0000 
  BDIVN   0.0858   0.1111   0.0738 -0.0795   1.4452   0.0000   0.2500 
Panel C: Control variables 
  GROWTH   0.7858   0.6735   0.4408   0.9024   3.0564   0.1990   1.8570 
  LVRG   0.3300   0.2678   0.2937   0.6378   2.2736   0.0001   0.9530 
  ROA   0.0573   0.0504   0.0980   0.0161   2.7295  -0.1368   0.2500 
  LNTA 16.6222 16.4242   1.4732   0.5497   2.6375 14.4500 19.9400 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN 
denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE 
denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the 
corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of gender, BDIVN denotes board 
diversity on the basis of nationality, GROWT denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on 
asset the measure of profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. Std.Dev denotes standard deviation. The skewness and 
kurtosis are used as measures to test for normality assumption. 
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ownership. Second, the institutional ownership variable ranges from 0.0000 to 0.9085, with 
average of 20.3921. The standard deviation of institutional ownership is 22.6782, suggesting that 
there is significant variation in this variable.  
Third, foreign ownership has a mean of 10.4591 and ranges from 0.0000 to 0.9013, with a 
standard deviation of 20.0972. This may suggest that the presence of foreign ownership may have 
a crucial role in encouraging local firms to comply with CG requirements. This is supported by 
both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients presented 
in Table 10, indicating that foreign ownership is significantly and positively correlated with the 
OCGI.  
Fourth, the mean percentage of block ownership is about 55%, indicating a higher level of 
ownership concentration. Over the 1,152 firm-year observations, block ownership ranges from 
0.0000 to 0.9947, with a standard deviation of 24.3699. The high average of block ownership 
may suggest that low voluntary CG compliance is expected, as the market for control will not be 
working effectively in firms with a large portion of block investors compared with those with 
diffuse ownership.  
Fifth, board size ranges from 4 to 13 directors, with an average of 7. This meets the 
OCGI’s provision that a firm’s board should have at least five directors. It is also in line with the 
Omani Companies Act requirement, but contrary to Lipton and Lorsch’s (1992) recommendation 
that boards should have between eight and nine members in order to work efficiently. This may 
suggest that board size seems to have less of an effect on firms’ CG disclosure. The board size 
average is in line with some prior studies in emerging countries. For example, Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) investigate CG compliance in Malaysia and report empirical evidence that board size 
ranges from 3 to 14 directors, with an average of 7.97.  
Sixth, most firms (71%) use the services of the big audit firms. This finding is consistent 
with some past studies conducted in emerging countries. For instance, Barako et al. (2006a) 
report that 75% of Kenyan firms are audited by one of the big international audit firms. Both 
Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation matrices indicate that the 
association between audit firm size and the OCGI is significant and positive.  
Seventh, the average percentage of 0.1588 suggests that about 16% of Omani listed firms 
have a CG committee. This may imply that firms with CG committees are more likely to engage 
in CG practices than those with no CG committees. The Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric correlation coefficients presented in Table 10 support this finding by showing that 
CG committee has a significant and positive relationship with the OCGI. This finding is 
consistent with Ntim et al. (2012a), who find that the presence of a CG committee is significantly 
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and positively associated with South African CG index, as indicated by both Pearson and 
Spearman statistics.  
Finally, gender and nationality as measures of board diversity have average of 17% and 
8%, respectively. These statistics may suggest that the presence of both female and non-Omani 
directors on firms’ boards can increase the level of disclosure provided by these firms. This is 
supported by both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients presented in Table 10 indicating that gender and nationality have a significant and 
positive association with the OCGI.  
5.2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
Summary descriptive statistics of control variables, namely growth, leverage, profitability 
and firm size, are presented in Panel C of Table 14. First, Omani firms appear to have: (i) 
superior investment and growth opportunities, as indicated by average sales growth of 78%, with 
a minimum value of 19% and a maximum value of 185.7%; (ii) an intermediate level of debt in 
their capital structures, as suggested by average leverage of 33%, with a minimum value of 0% 
and a maximum value of 95%; (iii) a lower level of profitability, with an overall mean for the 
entire sample period of 5.7%, a minimum value of -13.7% and a maximum value of 25%; and 
(iv) an average firm size of 16.6%, with a minimum value of 14.5% and a maximum value of 
19.9%. Second, each control variable has a relatively large standard deviation and its skewness 
and kutosis statistics are relatively mild compared to the critical values. The Pearson’s parametric 
and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients presented in Table 10 show that 
profitable and large firms have a significant and positive relationship with the OCGI, whereas 
growth firms appear to have no significant association with the OCGI. In contrast, leveraged 
firms seem to have a significant and negative relationship with the OCGI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
 
 
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents the empirical results of the determinants of CG disclosure and 
discusses whether the observed cross-sectional differences in voluntary CG disclosures can be 
explained by ownership structure and board/audit characteristics. In particular, Table 16 reports 
the OLS results of the OCGI on explanatory and control variables, while Table 15 provides a 
summary of all hypotheses and findings to facilitate comparison. Table 16 includes three 
analyses. First, in order to examine only the effect of ownership structure, separate from other 
explanatory variables, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 16 report the results of multivariate regression 
of the OCGI on ownership structure and control variables alone. The probability of F-Stat is 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of ownership variables in addition to control variables are equal to zero is rejected. 
The adjusted R
2 
is 0.77, suggesting that approximately 78% of variability in the OCGI is jointly 
explained by these variables. The coefficients on these variables indicate that government, 
institutional and foreign ownership, and firm size, have a positive relationship with the OCGI at 
least at the 10% significance level. In contrast, block ownership and leverage are significant and 
negatively associated with the OCGI, whereas growth has no significant effect on the OCGI.  
Second, only board and audit characteristics, in addition to control variables, were 
examined in order to see their effects on the OCGI separately from the rest of the explanatory 
variables: these results are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 15. The null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients of board features, audit firm size and control variables are equal to zero is 
rejected, as reported by the F-Stat, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The adjusted 
R
2 
indicates that about of 78% of the changes in the OCGI are explained by this model. Among 
these variables, only board size, presence of a CG committee and firm size are significant and 
positively related to the OCGI at least at the 5% level of significance.  
Third, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 16 report the results of multivariate regression of the 
OCGI on nine CG variables and the control variables to see the joint effect of all variables on the 
OCGI. The F-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, suggesting that 
ownership, board characteristics and control variables are not equal to zero. This means that the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between these variable and the OCGI is rejected. The 
adjusted R
2 
is 0.78, indicating that 78% of variability in the OCGI is jointly explained by these 
variables. The signs of all the coefficients remain unchanged for the complete sample, with few 
changes in the level of significance and magnitude. In particular, block ownership, which was 
significant at 1%, is now statistically significant at 5%. Board size, which was statistically 
significant at 5%, is now significant at 10%. Leverage, which was statistically significant at 5%, 
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is now no longer statistically significant. Board diversity on the basis of nationality, which was 
statistically insignificant, is now significant at the 10% level of significance. Despite these 
changes, all the remaining variables still have a statistically significant relationship with the 
OCGI. These changes may be caused by the interrelated relationships between the nine 
explanatory and four control variables, in addition to year and industry dummies.  
Overall, the analysis of the explanatory variables suggests that government ownership, 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership, board size, presence of a CG committee and board 
diversity on the basis of nationality have significant and positive relationships with the OCGI, 
while block ownership is significantly and negatively associated with the OCGI. In contrast, audit 
firm size and board diversity on the basis of gender have no significant association with the 
OCGI. These results are further discussed in the following subsections. Specifically, Subsection 
5.1 discusses the empirical results of the explanatory variables, and Subsection 5.2 discusses the 
empirical results of the control variables. 
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Table 15: A summary of all hypotheses and findings for the voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
Dependent variable                                                                      The Omani Corporate Governance Index (OCGI) 
Explanatory variables Ownership variables Board/Audit variables All 
Governance Variables 
Hyp
. No 
Expe-
cted 
sign 
Finding 
sign  
Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign  
Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign  
Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status 
Government ownership 1 + + 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted - - - + 
Significant 
(1%) Accepted 
Institutional ownership 2 + + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted - - - + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Foreign ownership 3 + + 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted - - - + 
Significant      
(10%) Accepted 
Block ownership 4 - - 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted - - - - 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Board size 5 -/+ + - - + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted + 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Audit firm size     6 + + - - + Insignificant  Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
Board diversity on the basis 
of gender 
7 + - - - - Insignificant  Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Board diversity on the basis 
of nationality 
8 + + - - + Insignificant  Rejected + 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Presence of a CG committee 9 + + - - + 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted 
+ 
 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted 
Note: Column 1 presents the ninth variables that are represented the ninth tested hypotheses. Columns 2 to 12 present information relating to hypotheses one to nine with regard to the 
Omani corporate governance index.  
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Table 16: The OLS regression findings of the voluntary corporate governance compliance determinants 
  Ownership variables Board/Audit variables                         All 
Independent variables                  Ex.Sig Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign 
Panel A: CG variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1192 0.0028
***
      -       - 0.1134 0.0034
***
 
  INSOWN + 0.0561 0.0116
**
      -       - 0.0483 0.0222
**
 
  FOROWN + 0.0533 0.0625
*
      -       - 0.0534 0.0570
*
 
  BLKOWN - -0.0684 0.0054
***
      -       -   -0.0581 0.0139
**
 
  BSIZE -/+     -     - 0.6396 0.0389
**
 0.5482 0.0761
*
 
  BIG4 +     -     - 0.5042 0.5822 0.4672 0.6109 
  CGCOM +     -     - 8.3165 0.0000
***
 8.0640 0.0000
***
 
  GNDR +     -     - -1.0181 0.3764 -0.9215 0.4313 
  BDIVN +     -     - 8.8042 0.1032 10.1850 0.0640
*
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.8069 0.3367 0.5601 0.5013 0.5519 0.5011 
  LVRG  -2.9407 0.0570
*
 -2.2006 0.1509 -2.1052 0.1712 
  ROA  1.7809 0.6379 2.8460 0.4423 1.5133 0.6848 
  LNTA  1.9879 0.0000
***
 1.8592 0.0003
***
 1.7430 0.0006
***
 
  2001  -45.3556 0.0000
***
 -43.8104 0.0000
***
 -44.1863 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -35.9472 0.0000
***
 -34.6664 0.0000
***
 -34.9676 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -20.5132 0.0000
***
 -19.7059 0.0000
***
 -19.8645 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.7457 0.0000
***
 -6.3876 0.0000
***
 -6.4359 0.0000
***
 
  2006  2.2123 0.0143
**
 2.3264 0.0088
***
 2.2984 0.0104
***
 
  2007  4.6645 0.0002
***
 4.8656 0.0001
***
 4.8892 0.0001
***
 
  2008  5.5705 0.0001
***
 5.4663 0.0001
***
 5.5015 0.0001
***
 
  2009  6.3483 0.0002
***
 6.3448 0.0001
***
 6.3311 0.0001
***
 
  2010  6.7663 0.0000
***
 6.6069 0.0000
***
 6.5364 0.0000
***
 
  2011  7.4169 0.0000
***
 6.5076 0.0002
***
 7.0290 0.0001
***
 
  Basic materials 11.2711 0.0096
***
 10.6286 0.0114
**
 10.4629 0.0157
**
 
  Consumer services 11.9094 0.0071
***
 9.4404 0.0262
**
 10.2129 0.0204
**
 
  Consumer goods 12.6755 0.0036
***
 9.8332 0.0201
**
 11.2096 0.0098
***
 
  Financials 9.3048 0.0340
**
 6.2185 0.1464 7.1416 0.1034 
  Health care 0.3994 0.9505 0.8756 0.8908 0.7232 0.9097 
  Industrials 13.7723 0.0019
***
 10.4353 0.0138
**
 11.6719 0.0080
***
 
  Telecommunications 4.5210 0.3970 4.1133 0.4986 2.6096 0.6476 
  Utilities 2.4751 0.6469 -0.4762 0.9281 -0.4840 0.9265 
Constant 11.4095  0.1771 7.3147     0.3684 10.1784 0.2220 
Adj. R
2
 0.7746 0.7797                      0.7823 
F-Stat 147.3170
***
 146.4208
***
                  130.0811
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.0849 2.0966                      2.0926 
Number  of observations 1152 1152                        1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN) and foreign ownership 
(FOROWN) are measured as percentage of government, institutional and foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. Block 
ownership (BLKOWN) is measured as percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. Board size 
(BSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors on the firm’s board. Audit firm size (BIG4) is measured as dummy variable where a firm 
takes 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 
otherwise. The presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM)  is measured as dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm has set 
up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. Board diversity on the basis of gender (GNDR) is measured as dummy variable where a 
firm takes 1 if a firm has a female director on its board, 0 otherwise. Board diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN) is measured as 
number of non-Omani directors divided by total number of board members. Growth (GROWTH) is measured by current year’s sales minus last 
year’s sales to last year’s sales. Leverage (LVRG) is measured as book total debt scaled by total assets of a firm. Profitability (ROA) is 
measured as operating profit to total assets. Firm size (LNTA) is measured by natural log of total assets. In order to avoid the dummy variable 
trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics.  
114 
 
 
6.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES   
Panel A of Table 16 reports the empirical results of the ownership variables and board and 
audit characteristics. First, the coefficient on government ownership is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. This means that H1, that there is a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between government ownership and the level of CG 
disclosure, is supported. This finding suggests that, contrary to the view that Omani firms with 
large portion of government ownership may be less motivated to provide additional voluntary CG 
disclosure because they are anticipated to be strongly politically connected as the case in many 
emerging countries (Samaha and Dahawy, 2011), Omani firms where large stakes of shares are 
held by the government disclose more CG information than those with non-government 
ownership. Theoretically, the significant and positive coefficient on government ownership is 
consistent with the prediction that because agency costs would be higher in such firms, as the 
state has interests in both profit and non-profit projects, firms with state ownership need to 
voluntarily disclose more information in order to reduce the divergence of interests between the 
government and shareholders. The highly significant effect of government ownership is further 
supported by the view that the government as a shareholder considers itself as accountable to 
stakeholders at large, and is thus expected to place pressure on firms to provide additional CG 
information (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The positive effect of government ownership 
indicates that state ownership serves as a substitute CG mechanism that motivates firms to 
disclose information on their CG practices. Empirically, however, this finding is consistent with 
limited studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a). This finding is also inconsistent 
with other studies (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2011) that report evidence of no significant effect of government ownership on 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure.  
Second, there is a statistically significant and positive association between institutional 
ownership and the OCGI at the 5% level of significance, which means that H2 is supported. This 
finding implies that Omani firms with institutional investors tend to disclose more CG 
information than those with no institutional ownership. This finding in line with the theoretical 
prediction that institutional shareholders ensure high levels of CG disclosure, as they are 
motivated to demand more information in order to monitor managers (Barako et al., 2006a). The 
positive effect of institutional ownership is further supported by the expectation that institutional 
shareholders do not prefer to invest in firms with lower levels of disclosure, as this will increase 
monitoring costs (Bushee et al., 2010). Empirically, this finding is in line with a considerable 
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number of past studies (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006a; Laidroo, 2009; 
Chung and Zhang, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a), and contrary to Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008), who report no significant association between institutional ownership and the 
level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
Third, the coefficient on foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 
10 % level of significance. The H3 that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure is empirically supported. This 
finding indicates that foreign investors help local firms to improve their levels of CG disclosure. 
Theoretically, this finding is in line with the prediction that because foreign investors face a 
higher level of information asymmetry compared with domestic firms, as a result of distance and 
language obstacles, they require more information in order to reduce asymmetric information, 
which motivates local firms to provide additional information to attract such investors (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). This is also consistent with the view that foreign 
investors do not prefer to invest in countries with weaker disclosure requirements (Leuz et al., 
2010). Despite limited studies on foreign ownership, this finding is consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006a; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007).  
Fourth, unlike the three ownership structures examined in this study, block ownership has 
a significant and negative relationship with firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. In particular, the 
coefficient on block ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance, suggesting that H4 is empirically supported. This finding shows that firms with 
block holders tend to disclose less CG information than those with no concentration of 
ownership. This finding in line with the theoretical prediction that block holders do not encourage 
firms to provide additional information as this affects their ability to expropriate minority 
shareholders. This is what usually happens in emerging countries where the conflict of interest 
tends to be between block holders and minority shareholders rather than between managers and 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aleves, 2012). This finding also supports the current 
study’s argument that the high level of ownership concentration (55%) in Oman, predominantly 
through institutions with highly complicated cross-holdings, has a crucial impact on CG 
compliance and disclosure. The negative effect of block ownership is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Laidroo, 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). In contrast, this finding is different from prior studies that 
report evidence of a positive effect (e.g., Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) and no significant effect 
(e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Konijn et al., 2011).  
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Fifth, board characteristics, including board size, CG committee and board diversity on 
the basis of nationality, are found to be statistically significant and positively associated with the 
OCGI. The coefficient on board size is statistically positive at the 10% level of significance, 
indicating that larger boards tend to impact positively on firm disclosure. This is in line with the 
theoretical expectation that larger boards enjoy a greater diversity of experience and skills than 
smaller boards, which enables them to encourage firms to provide additional information on their 
CG compliance. The positive finding lends empirical support to previous studies (e.g., Laksmana, 
2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 
2013). In contrast, it does not lend empirical support to the results of Arcay and Vazquez (2005) 
and Cheng and Courtenay (2006), who report empirical evidence that the level of disclosure is 
not statistically significantly associated with board size.  
The model finds a statistically significant and positive association between the presence of 
a CG committee and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure at the 1% significance level. The 
statistically significant and positive finding indicates that H9 is empirically supported. This 
finding suggests that firms with CG committees appear to disclose more CG information than 
those with no CG committees. It offers support to the theoretical prediction that a CG committee 
encourages firms to adopt good CG disclosure practices. Empirically, it supports the results of 
Ntim et al. (2012a), who find that South African listed firms significantly enhance their CG 
disclosure by establishing CG committees.  
The statistically significant and positive (at the 10% level of significance) coefficient on 
board diversity on the basis of nationality lends empirical support to H8, that the presence of non-
Omani directors on firms’ boards impacts positively on the OCGI. This finding implies that firms 
who have non-Omani directors tend to provide more CG information than those who have only 
Omani directors. Theoretically, this finding is in line with the prediction that having directors of 
different nationalities, with distinctive values and incentives in adopting policies and making 
decisions, can improve CG disclosure. Empirically, the significant and positive finding does not 
lend empirical support to the results of Adelopo (2011), who report empirical evidence that CG 
disclosure by Nigerian firms is not significantly associated with the presence of non-Nigerian 
directors.    
Finally, unlike the above explanatory variables, audit firm size and board diversity on the 
basis of gender have no explanatory power in explaining the variations in firm-level voluntary 
CG disclosure. Although the coefficient on audit firm size is positive, it is not statistically 
significant, so H6 is rejected, that audit firm size impacts significantly and positively on the level 
of voluntary CG disclosure. This finding lends empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Eng and 
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Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006a; Aly et al., 2010). Similarly, the insignificant 
relationship between board diversity on the basis of gender and the OCGI leads the present study 
to reject H7, that there is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of 
women on a firm’s board and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. This finding suggests that the 
presence of female directors on firms’ boards does not contribute to Omani firms’ disclosure 
policies.  
6.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES  
Panel B of Table 16 reports the empirical results of the control variables. First, the model 
finds a statistically insignificant association between growth, leverage and profitability, and the 
level of voluntary CG disclosure. The coefficient on growth is positive and insignificant, 
indicating that firms with superior investment and growth opportunities do not provide additional 
information on their CG practices. This finding lends empirical support to past studies (e.g., Ntim 
et al., 2012a). The result for leverage shows that leverage is negatively and insignificantly 
correlated with the OCGI. This is in line with previous studies (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). The coefficient on 
profitability suggests an insignificant impact of profitability on firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006a; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
Second, unlike the above control variables, firm size has a significant and positive 
relationship with firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. In particular, the coefficient on firm size is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This finding indicates that 
larger firms appear to disclose more information on CG practices than smaller firms. The 
significant positive finding is in line with past studies (e.g Florou and Galarniotis, 2007; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Omar and Simon, 2011; Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).   `
 Finally, the estimated coefficients for the year and industry variables show that all firm 
year dummies and most industry dummies are significantly associated with the OCGI.  
Specifically, years 2001 to 2004 have a significant and negative relationship with the level of 
voluntary CG disclosure, whereas years 2006 to 2011, basic material sector, consumer goods 
sector, consumer services sector, and industrial sector are significantly and positively associated 
with the OCGI. These findings lend support to previous studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) claiming that CG compliance and disclosure 
differ across years and industries.   
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 To conclude, this section has discussed the results of the explanatory and control 
variables in order to investigate their abilities in explaining the variations in firm-level voluntary 
CG disclosure. Tables 15 and 16 show the findings of the nine hypotheses examined in this study 
in addition to those related to control variables. The findings are consistent with theoretical and 
empirical literature. They indicate that ownership structure has a significant impact on firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure. Government, institutional and foreign ownership are significantly and 
positively associated with the OCGI whereas block ownership has a significant and negative 
relationship with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. These findings are in line with literature 
suggesting that ownership structures can either encourage or discourage firms from engaging in 
CG compliance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988). As argued in this study, 
ownership concentration in the Omani context limits firms’ willingness to voluntarily provide 
transparent information on CG compliance. The findings also suggest that board characteristics 
impact significantly and positively on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. Board features 
including board size, the presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of 
nationality have a significant and positive association with the OCGI, whereas board diversity on 
the basis of gender has an insignificant relationship. Unlike most explanatory variables examined 
in this study, audit firm size has no power in explaining the variability in the OCGI.  
Overall, this study provides empirical evidence related to its second research question: 
What are the major factors that influence voluntary CG disclosure behaviour among Omani listed 
firms? It examines variables that are often considered in literature (e.g., block ownership, 
institutional ownership, board size, audit firm size), as well as variables that have not been widely 
investigated in the CG literature, such as board diversity on the basis of nationality and gender, 
foreign and government ownership and the presence of a CG committee.  
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7 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
This section discusses whether the results reported in Section 6 are robust or sensitive to 
alternative models and estimations. Specifically, as mentioned in Subsection 4.2.5, the current 
study carried out a number of robustness analyses in order to check the extent to which its main 
results are robust or sensitive to: (i) the use of an alternative CG index; (ii) omitted variables that 
differ across firms but do not change over time; (iii) financial firms; and (iv) endogeneity 
problem. Subsection 7.1 reports results based on a weighted CG index. Subsection 7.2 reports 
results based on the random-effects model. Subsection 7.3 reports results based only on non-
financial firms. Subsection 7.4 reports results based on a lagged structure model. Subsection 7.5 
reports results based on a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. To facilitate comparison, both 
the main results and the robustness tests’ results are presented in the same table. Despite 
observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of the coefficient and the level of significance, all 
tests suggest that the main results are robust. Further discussion on these analyses is provided 
below.  
7.1 RESULTS BASED ON AN ALTERNATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PROXY 
As indicated in Subsection 4.2.1.3, the CG index used in this study to measure CG 
disclosure among Omani listed firms consists of 72 CG provisions divided into four sub-indices, 
which are equally weighted, but the number of provisions differ across the four sub-indices, 
leading to different weights being assigned to each sub-index: board and directors (54%); 
accounting and auditing (10%); external auditors and internal control systems (6%); and 
disclosure and transparency (30%). Thus, to check whether the main results are robust or 
sensitive to the weighting of the four sub-indices, the current study follows prior studies’ 
procedure in constructing a weighted CG index (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a). An 
alternative CG index, called WOCGI, was constructed, in which each sub-index was awarded 
equal weight of 20%. The un-weighted OCGI in equation (1) was replaced by the WOCGI, and 
the findings are reported in Table 17.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 17 report the results of the weighted CG index along with the 
main results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same table. Overall, the statistical results of both 
analyses are generally similar. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the nine CG variables 
and the control variables are equal to zero is rejected, as the F-Stat is statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 77% of variability in the 
WOCGI is jointly explained by this model. The model predicts that ownership structure, board 
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size, CG committee and firm size are significantly associated with the OCGI. These results are 
discussed below, with particular focus on the main sensitivities of this analysis.    
7.1.1 Empirical Results of Ownership Structure  
The direction of the coefficients on ownership variables has not changed from the un-
weighted CG index, while the statistical level of significance of a few variables has changed. In 
particular, the coefficient on block ownership, which was statistically significant at 5%, is now 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
7.1.2 Empirical Results of Board and Audit Characteristics   
Consistent with the results of the main model, board features show similar direction and 
level of significance, except that board diversity on the basis of nationality, which was 
statistically significant, is now no longer statistically significant.  
7.1.3 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
Similar to the results of the main model, the direction and significance level of the 
coefficients on growth, leverage and profitability are insignificantly associated with the WOCGI. 
The coefficient on year 2006, which was statistically significant at 1%, is now statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficients on basic materials and consumer goods sectors, 
which were satistically significant at 5%, are now significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the 
coefficients on consumer services and industrial sectors, which were statistically significant at the 
1% level, are now statistically significant at the 5%  and 10% , respectively.  
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Table 17: The results based on weighted corporate governance index 
 Un-weighted  index          Weighted  index 
Independent variables Exp. sign      Coefficients P-values    Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: Explanatory variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1134 0.0034
***
 0.0953 0.0090
***
 
  INSOWN + 0.0483 0.0222
**
 0.0435 0.0319
**
 
  FOROWN + 0.0534 0.0570
*
 0.0394 0.0753
*
 
  BLKOWN - -0.0581 0.0139
**
 -0.0540 0.0091
***
 
  BSIZE -/+ 0.5482 0.0761
*
 0.4565 0.0934
*
 
  BIG4 + 0.4672 0.6109 0.1503 0.8694 
  CGCOM + 8.0640 0.0000
***
 6.4323 0.0000
***
 
  GNDR + -0.9215 0.4313 -1.0467 0.3447 
  BDIVN + 10.1850 0.0640
*
 8.3673 0.1431 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.5519 0.5011 0.4445 0.5789 
  LVRG  -2.1052 0.1712 -1.3880 0.3490 
  ROA  1.5133 0.6848 0.2505 0.9474 
  LNTA  1.7430 0.0006
***
 1.0748 0.0092
***
 
  2001  -44.1863 0.0000
***
 -43.8392 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -34.9676 0.0000
***
 -34.5881 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -19.8645 0.0000
***
 -19.0690 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.4359 0.0000
***
 -6.2853 0.0000
***
 
  2006  2.2984 0.0104
***
 2.0690 0.0640
*
 
  2007  4.8892 0.0001
***
 3.4337 0.0084
***
 
  2008  5.5015 0.0001
***
 3.6913 0.0072
***
 
  2009  6.3311 0.0001
***
 4.4806 0.0012
***
 
  2010  6.5364 0.0000
***
 4.5988 0.0010
***
 
  2011  7.0290 0.0001
***
 5.0412 0.0004
***
 
  Basic materials  10.4629 0.0157
**
 8.9448 0.0650
*
 
  Consumer goods  10.2129 0.0204
**
 8.5707 0.0792
*
 
  Consumer services  11.2096 0.0098
***
 9.8793 0.0419
**
 
  Financials  7.1416 0.1034 4.5954 0.3438 
  Health care  0.7232 0.9097 -0.9434 0.8742 
  Industrials  11.6719 0.0080
***
 9.2456 0.0602
*
 
 Telecommunications  2.6096 0.6476 1.5228 0.8227 
  Utilities  -0.4840 0.9265 0.6185 0.9117 
Constant              10.1784     0.2220           22.4387     0.0034
***
 
Adj. R
2
                       0.7823 0.7714 
F-Stat                   130.0811
***
 122.2312
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                       2.0926 2.0439 
Number of observations                         1152 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence 
of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), board diversity on the  basis of gender (GNDR), board diversity on the 
basis of nationality (BDIVN), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA). In order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. The parameter 
estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.2 RESULTS BASED ON THE RANDOM-EFFECTS MODEL  
The second robustness check is derived from the concern that unobserved firm-level 
characteristics may impact on voluntary CG disclosure due to differences in the opportunities and 
challenges that firms face (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a), which simple OLS 
regression may not be able to control for (Gujarati, 2003). The Hausman test was performed to 
identify which model is most suitable to use (fixed or random effects model). The Hausman test’s 
result (not reported here) accepts the null hypothesis that the random-effects model is appropriate. 
Thus, the main analysis was replicated using a random-effects model, as specified in equation (1). 
The results of this analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 18, in addition to the results 
of the main analysis reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same table. These results remain 
essentially unchanged. The F-Stat suggests that the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between observed and predicted values is rejected. The adjusted R
2
 test is 0.75, 
indicating that 75% of the variability in the OCGI is explained by this model. Generally, 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 18 show that ownership structure and board features remain significant 
determinants of variation in the OCGI. The key differences between the results based on the main 
model and those of the random-effects model are discussed below. 
7.2.1 Empirical Results of Ownership Structure  
Most ownership variables that have been predicted to be significantly associated with the 
OCGI in the main model still show a significant relationship, except foreign ownership, which 
was statistically significant at the 10% level and is now no longer statistically significant. The 
level of significance of governance and institutional ownership remain unchanged, whereas block 
ownership, which was statistically significant at 5%, is now statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance. 
7.2.2 Empirical Results of Board and Audit Characteristics    
The sign on the coefficients of board size, audit firm size, CG committee and board 
diversity on the basis of gender and nationality have not changed, but the level of significance of 
some variables has changed. Specifically, the coefficients on board size and board diversity on 
the basis of nationality, which were statistically significant at the 10% level, are now statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively.  
7.2.3 Empirical Results of Control Variables    
Panel B of Columns 5 to 6 of Table 18 shows that growth, leverage, profitability and firm 
size remain unchanged, whereas a limited number of sensitivities is observed related to year and 
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industry dummies. First, all year dummies remain statistically significant at the same level of 
significance found by the main model, except the coefficient on year 2006, which was 
statistically significant at 1%, is now no longer statistically significant. Second, the coefficients 
on basic materials and consumer goods, which were statistically significant at 5%, are now 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, the coefficients on consumer services and 
industrials sectors, which were statistically significant at 1%, are now statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: The results of the random-effects model 
 Simple  OLS Random-effects 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: Explanatory variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1134 0.0034
***
 0.0973 0.0077
***
 
  INSOWN + 0.0483 0.0222
**
 0.0516 0.0167
**
 
  FOROWN + 0.0534 0.0570
*
 0.0149 0.5132 
  BLKOWN - -0.0581 0.0139
**
 -0.0553 0.0096
***
 
  BSIZE -/+ 0.5482 0.0761
*
 0.8526 0.0015
***
 
  BIG4 + 0.4672 0.6109 0.4419 0.6199 
  CGCOM + 8.0640 0.0000
***
 7.1108 0.0000
***
 
  GNDR + -0.9215 0.4313 -0.1515 0.8872 
  BDIVN + 10.1850 0.0640
*
 14.3472 0.0139
**
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.5519 0.5011 -0.1874 0.8304 
  LVRG  -2.1052 0.1712 -0.2394 0.8776 
  ROA  1.5133 0.6848 3.9356 0.3471 
  LNTA  1.7430 0.0006
***
 1.6354 0.0001
***
 
  2001  -44.1863 0.0000
***
 -45.3246 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -34.9676 0.0000
***
 -35.5446 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -19.8645 0.0000
***
 -19.5252 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.4359 0.0000
***
 -6.2671 0.0000
***
 
  2006  2.2984 0.0104
***
 1.5036 0.2974 
  2007  4.8892 0.0001
***
 4.5533 0.0016
***
 
  2008  5.5015 0.0001
***
 5.5846 0.0001
***
 
  2009  6.3311 0.0001
***
 6.5183 0.0000
***
 
  2010  6.5364 0.0000
***
 6.3050 0.0000
***
 
  2011  7.0290 0.0001
***
 6.0026 0.0001
***
 
  Basic materials  10.4629 0.0157
**
 10.4743 0.0492
*
 
  Consumer goods  10.2129 0.0204
**
 10.5915 0.0475
*
 
  Consumer services  11.2096 0.0098
***
 10.7424 0.0431
**
 
  Financials  7.1416 0.1034 6.5278 0.2166 
  Health care  0.7232 0.9097 -0.6409 0.9234 
  Industrials  11.6719 0.0080
***
 12.1545 0.0206
**
 
 Telecommunications  2.6096 0.6476 4.2673 0.5116 
  Utilities  -0.4840 0.9265 0.3749 0.9504 
Constant          10.1784     0.2220              9.9356     0.2150 
Adj. R
2
                    0.7823  0.7526 
F-Stat                130.0811
***
  113.8605
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                    2.0926  1.2299 
Number of observations                      1152 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the 
presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), board diversity on the  basis of gender (GNDR), board 
diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA), firm size 
(LNTA). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. 
The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.3 RESULTS BASED ON NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS  
Although a number of past studies include both financial and non-financial firms in their 
analyses, most past studies exclude financial firms, arguing that they are subject to additional 
disclosure requirements. As discussed in Subsection 4.1.1, the main analysis was based on both 
financial and non-financial firms (1,152 firm years); therefore, in order to account for the 
suggestion in the literature that financial firms should be excluded from in the current study’s 
data set as the inclusion of them may lead to different results, the present study re-runs the main 
regression specified in equation (1) using only non-financial firms (858 firm years). This enables 
the current study to accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in terms of 
CG disclosure between Omani financial and non-financial listed firms, as shown in Table 19. 
This may be attributed to weak corporate regulations and enforcement, as the case in most 
emerging countries, where both types of firms behave largely the same. The F-Stat is significant 
at the 1% level of significance, so the null hypothesis that the coefficients of nine CG and control 
variables are not different from zero is rejected. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 78% of the 
variability in the OCGI is jointly predicted by the model. Overall, Columns 5 to 6 of Table 19 
report the results of this analysis, indicating that the main results remain essentially unchanged. 
Government, foreign and block ownership, board size, presence of a CG committee and board 
diversity on the basis of nationality remain statistically significant in predicting the OCGI. These 
results suggest several conclusions, which are discussed below.   
7.3.1 Empirical Results of Ownership Structure   
Two cases of sensitivities have been observed. First, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on government ownership, which was statistically significant at 1%, is now 
statistically significant at 5%. Second, the coefficient on institutional ownership, which was 
statistically significant at 5%, is now no longer statistically significant. Despite these sensitivities, 
the sign and the level of significance of block ownership is remains unchanged.  
7.3.2 Empirical Results of Board and Audit Characteristics     
The coefficients on board features and audit firm size are in line with those reported by 
the main model; except for limited number of sensitivities regarding the level of significance. 
Specifically, the coefficients on board size and board diversity on the basis of nationality, which 
were statistically significant at 10%, are now statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
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7.3.3 Empirical Results of Control Variables    
         Limited cases of sensitivities have been found. The coefficients on firm size, which was 
statistically significant at 1%, is now statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficients on 
consumer services and industrial sectors, which were statistically significant at 1%, are now 
statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient on year 2006, which was statistically 
significant at 1%, is now no longer statistically significant. 
Table 19: The results based only on non-financial firms 
 Financial and non-financial Non-financial 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: Explanatory variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1134 0.0034
***
 0.0894 0.0332
**
 
  INSOWN + 0.0483 0.0222
**
 0.0326 0.1917 
  FOROWN + 0.0534 0.0570
*
 0.0483 0.0794
*
 
  BLKOWN - -0.0581 0.0139
**
 -0.0630 0.0137
**
 
  BSIZE -/+ 0.5482 0.0761
*
 0.7335 0.0388
**
 
  BIG4 + 0.4672 0.6109 0.8572 0.4075 
  CGCOM + 8.0640 0.0000
***
 6.9388 0.0000
***
 
  GNDR + -0.9215 0.4313 -1.8207 0.2199 
  BDIVN + 10.1850 0.0640
*
 15.0437 0.0358
**
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.5519 0.5011 0.2349 0.7981 
  LVRG  -2.1052 0.1712 -2.9159 0.1330 
  ROA  1.5133 0.6848 6.2307 0.1938 
  LNTA  1.7430 0.0006
***
 1.1924 0.0323
**
 
  2001  -44.1863 0.0000
***
 -43.7971 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -34.9676 0.0000
***
 -32.3843 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -19.8645 0.0000
***
 -16.0912 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.4359 0.0000
***
 -5.2493 0.0001
***
 
  2006  2.2984 0.0104
***
 1.9150 0.1369 
  2007  4.8892 0.0001
***
 4.3876 0.0045
***
 
  2008  5.5015 0.0001
***
 5.5055 0.0008
***
 
  2009  6.3311 0.0001
***
 6.7596 0.0001
***
 
  2010  6.5364 0.0000
***
 6.3127 0.0002
***
 
  2011  7.0290 0.0001
***
 6.7671 0.0001
***
 
  Basic materials  10.4629 0.0157
**
 12.5855 0.0255
**
 
  Consumer goods  10.2129 0.0204
**
 12.3604 0.0296
**
 
  Consumer services  11.2096 0.0098
***
 12.8406 0.0227
**
 
  Financials  7.1416 0.1034            -      - 
  Health care  0.7232 0.9097 3.6657 0.5982 
  Industrials  11.6719 0.0080
***
 13.8831 0.0149
**
 
  Telecommunications  2.6096 0.6476 6.6418 0.3908 
  Utilities  -0.4840 0.9265 2.3459 0.7202 
Constant            10.1784      0.2220            15.8907     0.1193 
Adj. R
2
                       0.7823                       0.7752 
F-Stat                   130.0811
***
 96.1266
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                       2.0926                       2.1332 
Number of observations                         1152   858 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the 
presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), board diversity on the  basis of gender (GNDR), board 
diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA), firm size 
(LNTA). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. 
The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
126 
 
 
7.4 RESULTS BASED ON THE LAGGED STRUCTURE MODEL  
The presence of endogenity has been suggested as a serious problem that can affect 
empirical results (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). This problem occurs when one or more variables 
are associated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2009). Three expected causes have been 
suggested, namely measurement errors, omitted variables and simultaneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010). Researchers are advised to address this problem by checking the extent to which their 
results are affected by the presence of endogenity. Following such recommendations, the current 
study uses alternative econometric models and statistical approaches in order to check how far its 
empirical results are influenced by endogenity problems. First, panel data was used instead of 
cross-sectional or time-series data in order to mitigate the simultaneity problem (Borsch-Supan 
and Koke, 2002). Second, the OCGI as a measurement of CG was constructed by the researcher 
rather than using analysts’ CG rankings in order to mitigate the problem of measurement errors 
(Larcker et al., 2005). Finally, lagged structure and 2SLS models were used to address some 
concerns associated with endogenity, such as omitted variables and simultaneity. The analyses 
related to lagged structure and 2SLS models are further discussed below.  
Following past studies (e.g., Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012b; Ntim et al., 
2013), the current study addresses simultaneity problems that may arise from lagged CG 
disclosure practices. The lagged structure model as an alternative estimation method is adopted in 
which all explanatory and control variables are lagged by one period, as specified in the 
following equation. 
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           (2) 
Where all variables remain the same as in equation (1), except that a one-year lag was introduced 
for each variable. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 20, and the key conclusions 
from this analysis are discussed below.  
Columns 5 to 6 of Table 20 report the results based on the estimated lagged OCGI-CG 
structure. The F-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the 
alternative hypothesis that the coefficients of the included variables are not equal to zero is 
accepted. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 66% of the variability in the OCGI is explained by 
this model. Overall, the results predicted by the lagged structure model are largely consistent with 
those reported by the un-lagged structure model. The relationships between the OCGI and 
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ownership and board and audit characteristics remain essentially unchanged. These results are 
further discussed below, with a particular focus on the sensitive results.   
7.4.1 Empirical Results of Ownership Structure    
Two main cases of sensitivities can be observed. First, the statistical significance level of 
the coefficients on government and institutional ownership has changed. Specifically, the 
coefficients on government and institutional ownership, which were statistically significant at 1% 
and 5%, are now statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. Second, the coefficient on 
foreign ownership, which was statistically significant at 10%, is now no longer statistically 
significant. 
7.4.2 Empirical Results of Board and Audit Characteristics     
Although the direction of the coefficients on board size, audit firm size, CG committee 
and board diversity on the basis of gender and nationality has not changed, there are some 
sensitivities related to the level of significance. In particular, the coefficients on board size and 
board diversity on the basis of nationality, which were statistically significant at10% level, are 
now statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
7.4.3 Empirical Results of Control variables    
The significance level on the coefficients of growth, leverage, profitability and firm size 
remain the same as those based on the un-lagged structure model, whereas year and industry 
dummies show changes, but remain largely similar to those reported by the un-lagged structure 
model. Specifically, the coefficients on year 2004 and year 2010, which were statistically 
significant at 1%, are now no longer statistically significant. The coefficients on years 2006 to 
2008, which were statistically significant at 1%, are now statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 
5% levels, respectively. The coefficient on basic materials, which was statistically significant at 
5% level, is now no longer statistically significant. The coefficients on consumer goods, 
consumer service and industrial sectors, which were statistically significant at 5%, 1% and 1% 
levels, are now statistically significant at10% levels, respectively.  
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7.5 RESULTS BASED ON THE 2SLS MODEL 
In order to further account for potential endogeneities that may arise as a result of omitted 
variables, the current study adopts 2SLS methodology, which has been used by past studies (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2013). Following recommendations in the literature (Beiner et al., 2006), the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman exogeneity test was conducted in order to test for the presence of endogeneity, 
which involves two stages (the results of both stages are not reported here). In the first stage, and 
Table 20: The results of the lagged structure model 
 Un-lagged structure Lagged structure 
Independent variables Exp. 
Sign 
Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: Explanatory variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1134 0.0034
***
 0.0722 0.0338
**
 
  INSOWN + 0.0483 0.0222
**
 0.0883 0.0000
***
 
  FOROWN + 0.0534 0.0570
*
 0.0197 0.3866 
  BLKOWN - -0.0581 0.0139
**
 -0.0519 0.0139
**
 
  BSIZE -/+ 0.5482 0.0761
*
 0.5280 0.0398
**
 
  BIG4 + 0.4672 0.6109 0.9841 0.2946 
  CGCOM + 8.0640 0.0000
***
 3.9228 0.0004
***
 
  GNDR + -0.9215 0.4313 -0.4522 0.6574 
  BDIVN + 10.1850 0.0640
*
 16.4919 0.0035
***
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.5519 0.5011 -0.4103 0.6526 
  LVRG  -2.1052 0.1712 -2.5423 0.1038 
  ROA  1.5133 0.6848 2.9617 0.5217 
  LNTA  1.7430 0.0006
***
 1.9107 0.0000
***
 
  2001  -44.1863 0.0000
***
 -35.7732 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -34.9676 0.0000
***
 -20.6602 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -19.8645 0.0000
***
 -6.0398 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.4359 0.0000
***
 -1.1233 0.5300 
  2006  2.2984 0.0104
***
 3.2320 0.0705
*
 
  2007  4.8892 0.0001
***
 3.6126 0.0412
**
 
  2008  5.5015 0.0001
***
 4.4980 0.0108
**
 
  2009  6.3311 0.0001
***
 4.7978 0.0060
***
 
  2010  6.5364 0.0000
***
 1.3536 0.4441 
  2011  7.0290 0.0001
***
 -45.2071 0.0000
***
 
  Basic materials  10.4629 0.0157
**
 6.3588 0.1145 
  Consumer goods  10.2129 0.0204
**
 7.0395 0.0835
*
 
  Consumer services  11.2096 0.0098
***
 6.9982 0.0839
*
 
  Financials  7.1416 0.1034 3.2519 0.4213 
  Health care  0.7232 0.9097 -3.7999 0.4407 
  Industrials  11.6719 0.0080
***
 7.7441 0.0607
*
 
  Telecommunications  2.6096 0.6476 5.0573 0.4058 
  Utilities  -0.4840 0.9265 -1.4432 0.7542 
Constant             10.1784     0.2220               13.4511     0.0468
*
 
Adj. R
2
                       0.7823    0.6558 
F-Stat                   130.0811
***
      71.6850
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                       2.0926   1.2035 
Number of observations                         1152 1036 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the 
presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), board diversity on the  basis of gender (GNDR), board 
diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA), firm size 
(LNTA). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. 
The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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as specified in equation (3), the OCGI is regressed on control variables where its predicted value 
is saved as P-OCGI.  
 
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0                                                                     (3) 
Where the OCGI and CONTROLS remain the same as defined in equation (1).  
 
In the second stage, the OCGI is regressed on P-OCGI and control variables as follows:  

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The test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity problem, as P-OCGI is statistically 
significantly (0.009) associated with the OCGI, indicating the presence of endogeneity (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010). Therefore, following Ntim et al.’s (2013) procedure, the 2SLS was 
conducted to check the extent to which the main results are affected by endogeneity. In the first 
stage, the nine CG variables are expected to be determined by all control variables. Thus, each of 
the nine CG variables was regressed on control variables and the predicted value of each CG 
variable is saved. In the second stage, the equation (1) is re-estimated by replacing the nine CG 
variables with their predicted values as follows:   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(5)  
         
 
Where all variables remain the same as defined in equation (1), except that the predicted values 
from the first stage for the nine CG variables are included in the model instead of their actual 
values. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 21; they show that the results provided 
by the OLS model are robust to potential endogeneities that may arise due to omitted variables. 
Columns 5 to 6 of Table 20 indicate that the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the included 
variables are equal to zero is rejected, as the F-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance. The adjusted R
2 
shows that about 78% of variability in the OCGI is driven by CG 
and control variables. Overall, the 2SLS’s results suggest that ownership structure, board size, 
CG committee, board diversity on the basis of nationality and firm size are significant 
determinants of the OCGI. The results of 2SLS are discussed below, with more focus on sensitive 
results.   
 =  +   +   +   +   +  
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7.5.1 Empirical Results of Ownership Structure     
The signs on the coefficients related to ownership are the same as those reported by the 
OLS model. The statistical significance levels of the coefficients on the four variables show some 
changes, but remain statistically significant at least at 5% level of significance. Specifically, the 
coefficients on institutional ownership and block ownership, which were statistically significant 
at 5% level, are now statistically significant at 1% level of significance. Similarly, the coefficient 
on foreign ownership, which was statistically significant at 10%, is now statistically significant at 
5% level of significance. 
7.5.2 Empirical Results of Board and Audit Characteristics     
The direction on the coefficients of this group of variables is consistent with those of the 
OLS model, except for audit firm size, which was positive and is now negative, but remains 
statistically insignificant. Limited sensitive cases related to the level of significance can be 
observed. The coefficients on board size and board diversity on the basis of nationality, which 
were statistically significant at 10%, are now statistically significant at 1% level.  
7.5.3 Empirical Results of Control variables     
Consisting with the OLS results, the 2SLS model predicts that growth, leverage and 
profitability are insignificant determinants of the OCGI, whereas firm size is still a significantly 
positive determinant. Limited cases of sensitivities can be observed from the 2SLS’s results. 
First, the coefficient on year 2006, which was statistically significant at 1%, is now no longer 
statistically significant. Second, the coefficient on financials sector, which was statistically 
insignificant, is now statistically significant at 10% level. Finally, the coefficients on year 2007, 
basic materials sector and consumer goods sector, which were statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 5%, are now statistically significant at 5%, 1% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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 Table 21: The results of the two stage least squares model 
 OLS 2SLS 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: Explanatory variables   
  GOVOWN + 0.1134 0.0034
***
 0.1481 0.0067
***
 
  INSOWN + 0.0483 0.0222
**
 0.0890 0.0001
***
 
  FOROWN + 0.0534 0.0570
*
 0.0801 0.0202
**
 
  BLKOWN - -0.0581 0.0139
**
 -0.0994 0.0001
***
 
  BSIZE -/+ 0.5482 0.0761
*
 0.8185 0.0071
***
 
  BIG4 + 0.4672 0.6109 -1.1854 0.2154 
  CGCOM + 8.0640 0.0000
***
 7.7668 0.0000
***
 
  GNDR + -0.9215 0.4313 -1.0327 0.3027 
  BDIVN + 10.1850 0.0640
*
 17.8880 0.0042
***
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.5519 0.5011 0.5192 0.5499 
  LVRG  -2.1052 0.1712 -1.9824 0.1849 
  ROA  1.5133 0.6848 2.1603 0.6246 
  LNTA  1.7430 0.0006
***
 1.7612 0.0000
***
 
  2001  -44.1863 0.0000
***
 -45.1239 0.0000
***
 
  2002  -34.9676 0.0000
***
 -35.2596 0.0000
***
 
  2003  -19.8645 0.0000
***
 -19.5439 0.0000
***
 
  2004  -6.4359 0.0000
***
 -6.5715 0.0001
***
 
  2006  2.2984 0.0104
***
 1.0314 0.5377 
  2007  4.8892 0.0001
***
 3.8823 0.0194
**
 
  2008  5.5015 0.0001
***
 4.6331 0.0051
***
 
  2009  6.3311 0.0001
***
 5.4569 0.0009
***
 
  2010  6.5364 0.0000
***
 5.4921 0.0010
***
 
  2011  7.0290 0.0001
***
 5.8915 0.0007
***
 
  Basic materials  10.4629 0.0157
**
 10.7017 0.0048
***
 
  Consumer goods  10.2129 0.0204
**
 10.9629 0.0043
***
 
  Consumer services  11.2096 0.0098
***
 11.7219 0.0023
***
 
  Financials  7.1416 0.1034 7.6733 0.0451
*
 
  Health care  0.7232 0.9097 1.6079 0.7304 
  Industrials  11.6719 0.0080
***
 12.3460 0.0016
***
 
  Telecommunications  2.6096 0.6476 2.2478 0.7028 
  Utilities  -0.4840 0.9265 -0.7040 0.8716 
Constant             10.1784     0.2220                 9.5969     0.1386 
Adj. R
2
                       0.7823 0.7799 
F-Stat                   130.0811
***
 104.7816
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                       2.0926 2.0883 
Number of observations                         1152 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence 
of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), board diversity on the  basis of gender (GNDR), board diversity on the 
basis of nationality (BDIVN), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA). In order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. The parameter 
estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
As discussed in Section 2, Oman started efforts at promoting CG practices earlier than 
other countries in the MENA region. These attempts began with a number of legislative 
instruments issued by the CMA, such as the Related Party Transactions circular and another 
circular of CG rules. More importantly, Oman issued its voluntary code of CG for listed firms in 
2002, which is considered the most advanced CG policy regime in Oman. By issuing this code, 
the Omani government has sought to establish a CG system as a remedy for corporate failures, 
such as those during the 1997 Asian crisis. The CG regime was designed to provide greater 
protection for all stakeholders by promoting a culture of compliance, quality disclosure and 
accountability (Omani Code 2002). Like many CG codes around the world, the OCGC is built 
upon the Anglo-American model, where firms’ compliance is voluntary and based on a ‘comply 
or explain’ rule. Given its voluntary nature, the ability of the OCGC to enhance CG practices is 
subject to Omani firms’ desire to comply with its provisions (Core, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). A considerable number of its proposals are drawn 
from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, primarily those relating to the composition and functions of 
the board of directors. This study examines the extent to which adopting this code can provide 
high standards of CG practices, given the nature of the Omani corporate setting. In this context, 
Omani managers and directors are expected to be influenced by informal rules, such as family, 
Arabic custom and tribalism.  
Similarly, the high concentration of ownership seems to prevent compliance with the 
OCGC’s provisions. Thus, examining the level and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure in 
the Omani context becomes an important empirical issue, requiring investigation in order to 
understand firm voluntary CG compliance and disclosure behaviour. The Omani context is 
characterised by religous notions, informal rules and concentrated ownership, which may suggest 
that its CG practices are different from those in developed countries. Unlike past studies looking 
at Oman (e.g., Mohamed et al., 2009; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014), the current study has constructed 
a CG index based on the 2002 Omani CG Code, and uses a large sample of Omani listed firms to 
empirically conduct its investigation. In a similar vein, and distinct from most prior studies 
examining the determinants of CG compliance (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), the 
present study examines a number of determinants which have not been extensively examined in 
the CG literature, such as foreign ownership and board diversity on the basis of gender and 
nationality.   
A summary of the study’s results, which have been discussed in Sections 5, 6 and 7, is 
provided in this section. Specifically, Subsection 8.1 provides a summary of the empirical results 
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related to the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure with the 2002 OCGC. Subsection 8.2 
summarises the empirical results of determinants of voluntary CG disclosure with the 2002 
OCGC, whereas Subsection 8.3 provides a summary of these results based on sensitivity 
analyses. Subsection 8.4 discusses the policy implications and recommendations coming out of 
these results. Subsection 8.5 discusses the contributions of this study. The study’s limitations and 
suggestions for further research are highlighted in Subsections 8.6.   
8.1 RESULTS RELATED TO THE LEVEL OF VOLUNTARY 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE 
This subsection provides a summary of the empirical results related to the level of 
voluntary compliance and disclosure with the 2002 OCGC that are discussed in Subsections 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2. In these subsections, the study seeks to answer its first research question; namely, what 
is the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure with the 2002 OCGC among Omani listed 
firms? It also attempts to answer four sub-questions: (i) To what extent did the introduction of the 
2002 OCGC improve CG practices among Omani listed firms?; (ii) Which CG provisions do 
Omani firms comply with most?; (iii) Is there a significant difference between financial and non-
financial firms in terms of providing CG disclosure?; and (iv) To what extent does reliance on the 
Anglo-American model lead to improved CG standards in Oman?. The answer of these questions 
are summarised below. 
First, the study finds that aggregate compliance levels increased from 6.78% in 2001 to 
60.17% in 2011, which is in line with past studies (e.g., Akkermans et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 
2012a) that found that compliance with CG provisions improved over time. The aggregate mean 
scores range from a minimum of 1.39 % to a maximum of 88.89%, with an average of 47.89% 
complying with 72 CG provisions examined in this study over 2001 to 2011. On the one hand, 
the results suggest that, contrary to general concerns about the ability of voluntary codes to 
improve CG standards in a particular setting, Omani firms have shown some positive response to 
the OCGC’s recommendations. On the other hand, and in spite of the initial theoretical prediction 
that the OCGC would promote a culture of compliance, quality disclosure and accountability, the 
results clearly indicate that CG compliance and disclosure among Omani listed firms is generally 
low. Second, the results suggest that the introduction of the 2002 OCGC has had some positive 
impact in enhancing good CG practices among Omani firms, as the levels of compliance and 
disclosure after its implementation are significantly higher than before the code was effectively 
implemented. The level of compliance and disclosure was relatively low in 2001 and 2002, 
whereas 2003 witnessed a dramatic increase as the OCGC was effectively implemented, and 
compliance increased in the following years.  
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Third, the results indicate that firms have shown higher compliance and disclosure levels 
(85% or more) with 3 out of 72 CG provisions that constitute the OCGI. Based on the four sub-
indices, the level of compliance and disclosure appears to be higher in accounting and auditing 
sub-index (75.37%) followed by disclosure and transparency (64.04%) and board and directors 
(38.59%) whereas external auditors and internal control systems sub-index shows lower level of 
compliance and disclosure (2.43%). Fourth, the results imply that financial firms do not provide 
more CG information than non-financial firms. The results based on industry group suggest that 
firms operating in the telecommunication and consumer services industries provide more 
information on CG compliance and disclosure than firms in all other industries. Finally, contrary 
to the expectation that the OCGC’s reliance on an Anglo-American model may not improve CG 
practices due to the large differences between Oman and developed countries, the results show 
that the OCGC was able to promote CG practices of Omani listed firms to some extent.  
8.2 RESULTS RELATED TO VOLUNTARY CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE 
DETERMINANTS 
The results relate to the nine hypotheses tested for the factors that may affect voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure that were discussed in section 6 are summarised in this Subsection. 
The first hypothesis was examining whether there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between government ownership and firm-level of voluntary CG disclosure. The coefficient on 
government ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, 
indicating that Omani firms with large proportion of government ownership seemed to disclose 
more CG information than those with non-government ownership. Theoretically, this result is 
consistent with the prediction that firms with state ownership need to voluntarily disclose more 
information in order to reduce the divergence of interests between the government and 
shareholders. Further, it suggests that state ownership serves as a substitute CG mechanism that 
motivates firms to disclose information on their CG structures. Empirically, this result in line 
with some prior studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a) and contrasts with others 
(e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011).   
The second hypothesis was testing whether there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and level of voluntary CG disclosure. The model 
predicted a statistically significant and positive association between institutional ownership and 
level of voluntary CG disclosure at the 5% level of significance. This result implies that Omani 
firms with institutional investors tend to disclose more CG information compared to those with 
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no institutional ownership. This is in line with the theoretical prediction that institutional 
shareholders ensure high levels of CG disclosure, as they are motivated to demand information as 
a way to monitor managers. This result supports the empirical evidence provided by prior studies 
(e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; Laidroo, 2009; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2011), but 
not Donnelly and Mulcahy’s (2008) study, which reports no significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
The third hypothesis was examining whether there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and level of voluntary CG disclosure. The coefficient on 
foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, 
indicating that foreign investors investing in local firms assisted Omani firms in improving their 
levels of CG disclosure. Theoretically, this result in line with the prediction that local firms are 
motivated to provide additional information in order to attract foreign investors, who require 
extra information in order to reduce asymmetric information as a result of distance and language 
obstacles. Empirically, this result is consistent with some past studies (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Barako et al., 2006a; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007).   
The fourth hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between block ownership and level of voluntary CG disclosure. The coefficient on 
block ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This 
result suggests that, unlike other ownership structures, firms with block holders tended to disclose 
less CG information than those without ownership concentration. This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that block holders tend to discourage firms from disclosing additional CG 
information, as this improves their ability to expropriate minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Aleves, 2012). It also supports the current study’s argument that the level of CG 
compliance and disclosure is expected to be significantly affected by high levels of concentration 
ownership (55%), predominantly through institutions with highly complicated cross-holdings. 
Empirically, this result is in line with some prior studies (e.g., Laidroo, 2009; Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012) and inconsistent with others (e.g., Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Konijn et al., 2011).  
 The fifth hypothesis tested whether there is statistically significant relationship between 
board size and level of voluntary CG disclosure. The coefficient on this determinant is 
statistically positive at the 10% level of significance, indicating that firms with larger boards 
appear to disclose more CG information than those with smaller boards. The positive relation is 
in line with the theoretical prediction that greater diversity in terms of directors’ experience and 
skills increases firms’ CG compliance and disclosure. This result lends empirical support to some 
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past studies (e.g., Laksmana, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 
2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), but not those conducted by Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), who report empirical evidence that board size has no significant 
influence on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
The sixth hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between audit firm size and level of voluntary CG disclosure. Although the 
coefficient on this determinant is positive, the model predicted that audit firm size has no power 
in explaining variations in firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. Theoretically, this result is 
inconsistent with the theoretical prediction that firms audited by a large audit firm disclose more 
CG information than those audited by a small audit firm. This result is similar to those reported 
by prior studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006a; Aly et al., 2010). 
The seventh hypothesis hypothesis tested whether there is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between board diversity on the basis of gender and level of voluntary CG 
disclosure. The coefficient on this factor is negative and statistically insignificant, rejecting the 
theoretical prediction that the presence of female board directors can contribute to the level of 
voluntary CG disclosure.  
The eighth hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between board diversity on the basis of nationality and level of voluntary CG 
disclosure. There is a statistically significant and positive coefficient on board diversity on the 
basis of nationality, at the 10% level of significance. This implies that firms that appoint non-
Omani directors to their boards appear to disclose more CG information than those with only 
Omani directors. Theoretically, this result is consistent with the prediction that CG disclosure can 
be increased by having directors from different ethnicities, with distinctive values and incentives. 
Empirically, this result is inconsistent with Adelopo (2011), who report empirical evidence that 
board diversity on the basis of nationality does not have a significant impact on the level of 
voluntary CG disclosure 
The final hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the presence of a CG committee and the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
The coefficient on CG committee is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that firms with CG committees provide more information on CG 
compliance and disclosure than those with no CG committees. This result is in line with the 
theoretical prediction that CG committees can help firms comply with good CG practices, for 
example by providing more CG information. This result lends empirical support to the results of 
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Ntim et al. (2012a), who report empirical evidence that CG committees impact significantly and 
positively on South African listed firms’ disclosures. 
8.3 RESULTS BASED ON THE ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES  
As discussed in Section 7, a number of sensitivity analyses have been carried out to check 
the extent to which the main results are robust or sensitive to different measures and estimations. 
These analyses include the use of an alternative CG index, a random-effects model, as well as 
analyses examine the possibility that the inclusion of financial firms in the main study’s analysis 
may lead to different results, and analyses examine different endogeneity problems. Overall, the 
results of these analyses suggest that the study’s results are robust. These results are summarised 
below.  
First, in order to account for the likelihood that using a weighted CG index may result in 
misleading results, an alternative CG index was constructed, in which each sub-index in OCGI 
was scored by awarding similar weight of 20 per cent. The results of this analysis indicate that the 
main model’s results are not sensitive to the CG weighted index. Second, in order to account for 
unobserved firm-level features that may affect firms’ voluntary CG disclosure, the main analysis 
was replicated using a random-effects model. The results of this analysis are essentially 
consistent with those reported by the main model. Third, in order to account for the possibility 
that the inclusion of financial firms in the current study’s data set may lead to different results, 
the main equation was re-regressed using only non-financial firms (858 firm years). The results 
remain similar to the results based on financial and non-financial firms (1,152 firm years). 
Fourth, to check the extent to which the main results are affected by the presence of endogenity 
problems, lagged structure as an alternative estimation was used to address some concerns 
associated with endogenity, such as simultaneity that may arise from lagged CG disclosure 
practices. The results predicted by the lagged structure model are largely consistent with those 
reported by the un-lagged structure model. Finally, in addition to lagged structure, the widely 
used 2SLS technique was employed to further check the possibility of endogenity problems that 
may arise as a result of omitted variables. The results imply that the main results are not 
significantly sensitive to endogenity problems.  
8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS    
Given the unique aspects of the Omani corporate setting and the absence of empirical 
evidence, the main purpose of this study is to investigate whether and to what extent publicly 
listed Omani firms voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good CG practices, and 
examine whether the observed cross-sectional differences in such voluntary CG disclosures can 
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be explained by traditional ownership structures and board and audit characteristics. The results 
indicate that although Omani listed firms show some degree of compliance, CG disclosure and 
compliance with the 2002 OCGC is generally low. In addition, the results suggest that firms with 
higher government ownership, larger boards, institutional ownership, a CG committee, higher 
foreign ownership and non-Omani directors disclose considerably more than others. In contrast, 
the results suggest that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces voluntary CG 
disclosure. These results have a number of policy implications and suggest some 
recommendations for policy makers, firms, investors and regulatory authorities in emerging 
countries in general and Oman in particular. These implications and recommendations are 
discussed in the following subsections. Specifically, Subsection 8.4.1 discusses the policy 
implications and recommendations related to compliance with the OCGC, whereas those related 
to determinants of compliance with the OCGC are discussed in Subsection 8.4.2.  
8.4.1 Compliance with the OCGC: Implications and Recommendations 
Three important policy implications and recommendations can be concluded from the 
results reported in Subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
First, evidence that CG standards in Omani listed firms are generally improving imply 
that efforts by the various stakeholders of CG, such as the CMA and the MSM, have had a 
positive influence on CG practices. The relatively low and limited convergence in CG practices 
among Omani listed firms, however, suggests that there is a need for the CMA and MSM to 
further enhance compliance and enforcement. Establishing a ‘compliance and enforcement’ unit 
to that will continuously monitor corporate disclosures, including those relating to CG practices, 
may be a step in the right direction. The evidence implying that the OCGC has improved CG 
practices and thus firm value offers shareholders, especially government, foreign and institutional 
shareholders, a strong impetus to actively monitor CG standards to improve their firms. Second, 
the improvement in CG voluntary disclosure suggests that adopting high standards of CG in the 
form of code can improve CG practices in emerging countries, even when legal enforcement is 
weaker. Emerging countries who have not yet issued CG codes, such as Libya, are encouraged to 
adopt one in order to improve firms’ compliance and disclosure. Third, firms have shown lower 
or zero compliance with 35 out of 72 provisions, where only 50% or less of sampled firms 
complied with these provisions. For instance, firms rarely provide information on directors’ 
biography, experience and responsibilities. Similarly, and among the four sub-indices, the lower 
level of compliance was with external auditors and internal control systems sub-index (2.43%). 
This seems to suggest that either there is low compliance with these provisions or these 
provisions are inappropriate or irrelevant to many firms. Unlike larger firms, smaller firms may 
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not be able to afford the costs involved in implementing CG provisions. Smaller and newly listed 
firms may also find that some CG provisions are not relevant to their activities. For instance, 
firms are recommended by the OCGC to disclose information on their convertible Instruments. 
Thus, one way for Omani policy makers and regulatory authorities to increase overall compliance 
is to work on these provisions. They may need to differentiate between large and small firms in 
determining applicability of CG provisions when they revise the OCGC, as this can allow small 
firms to have CG structures that fit with their activities. Further, more effective co-operation and 
co-ordination among the key financial regulatory and enforcement bodies that constitute the 
external Omani CG system can enhance legal enforcement, which in turn improves compliance.  
 
8.4.2 Determinants of Compliance with the OCGC: Implications and 
Recommendations 
A number of policy implications and recommendations can be drawn from the results 
associated with examining the determinants of compliance with the OCGC. First, the level of CG 
compliance and disclosure increases in firms with relatively many shares held by the government, 
indicating a significant effect of government ownership. This is contrary to concerns that firms 
with state ownership do not disclose additional CG information because they are highly 
politically connected. The result implies that state ownership serves as a substitute CG 
mechanism that motivates firms to provide further information on their CG structures, with the 
state considering itself to be accountable to stakeholders at large. This may encourage individual 
investors to invest in such firms, as they can expect more information to help them make optimal 
investment decisions. In contrast, the absence of the state as a major investor in firms is expected 
to be seen as an indication of poor CG practices, which may not motivate investors to invest in 
such firms.   
Second, Omani firms with institutional ownership have higher levels of CG compliance 
and disclosure than those with no institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors 
have a strong impetus to actively monitor CG standards, which in turn enhances CG practices 
within firms. This result implies that outsiders may consider firms with institutional ownership as 
having higher levels of CG standards. This is because they aware that institutional shareholders 
do not prefer to invest in firms with lower levels of disclosure, as this will increase monitoring 
costs (Bushee et al., 2010). In this regard, one way to ensure high levels of CG disclosure is that 
Omani policy makers may encourage investors to invest through institutions instead of making 
individual investments.  
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Third, voluntary disclosure increases with foreign ownership, indicating that foreign 
investors can assist domestic firms to improve their levels of CG disclosure. This finding 
suggests that, consistent with the expectation that foreign investors face higher levels of 
information asymmetry because of distance and language obstacles, local firms provide 
additional information in order to attract foreign investors. Unlike other countries in which there 
are restrictions on foreign ownership, Oman provides an example of how allowing foreign 
investment can lead to improved CG practices in general and CG compliance and disclosure in 
particular. Policy makers in other emerging countries, such as Saudi Arabia, may be encouraged 
to relax restrictions on foreign investors in order to benefit from resulting high CG standards.  
Fourth, firm-level voluntary CG disclosure is lower in firms with block ownership, 
indicating that block holders do not encourage firms to provide additional information on CG 
compliance and disclosure. This result suggests that the concentration of ownership (55%) in 
Oman, mainly through institutions with highly complicated cross-holdings, does not perform its 
function as a substitute for good CG practices. Instead, it serves as an obstruction to compliance 
with the OCGC in general and disclosure in particular. Evidence of decreasing compliance with 
the OCGC implies that enforcement needs to be further strengthened. For instance, one way in 
enhance compliance might be for the CMA to establish a compliance and enforcement unit.  
Fifth, firms with larger boards provide more CG information than those with smaller 
boards. This means that increased managerial monitoring associated with larger boards results in 
additional voluntary disclosure, which is contrary to the view that larger boards are often 
characterised by poor monitoring. In this sense, Omani policy makers may be motivated to 
introduce CG provisions that encourage firms to have large boards in order to improve their 
levels of CG disclosure.  
Sixth, the insignificant relationship between audit firm size and firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure indicates that external auditors have no influence in ensuring that Omani listed firms 
voluntarily comply with the OCGC. This is contrary to the theoretical prediction that the level of 
disclosure in annual reports can be considerably influenced by audit firm size. The finding may 
result from the fact that the OCGC recommends external auditors report on limited governance 
issues (see Appendix 1, provisions 47 to 50). Hence, Omani policy makers may be encouraged to 
introduce additional CG provisions that grant external auditors greater monitoring powers to 
require firms to disclose more information on their CG compliance.  
Seventh, the insignificant relationship between board diversity on the basis of gender and 
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure suggests that the presence of women on firm boards has no 
significant impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. This is inconsistent with the 
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theoretical prediction that firms with women on their boards engage more in voluntary CG 
disclosure than those with no female directors. The insignificant effect of gender on CG 
compliance may be due to poor representation of female directors, as many of the sampled firms 
have no women on their boards. Thus, Omani policy makers may suggest CG provisions that 
facilitate the participation of female directors in order to benefit from a wide pool of talent 
bringing different skills and experience into the boardroom. For instance, a CG recommendation 
that requires firms to have a boardroom diversity policy may be a step in this direction.  
Eighth, the relationship between board diversity on the basis of nationality and firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure is significant, indicating that the presence of non-Omani directors on 
firms’ boards impacts positively on firm compliance levels. This is in line with the theoretical 
prediction that having directors of different nationalities, with distinctive values and incentives, 
can improve CG disclosure. Omani policy makers may be motivated to introduce CG provisions 
that regulate board directors’ appointment procedures in order to remove all employment barriers 
restricting non-Omani directors from being appointed.  
Finally, firm-level voluntary CG disclosure increases with the presence of a CG 
committee. This suggests that firms willing to monitor their compliance with the OCGC by 
voluntarily setting up CG committees disclose more than firms that do not establish CG 
committees. The significant effect of a CG committee is consistent with the theoretical 
expectation that firms with CG committees engage in good CG practices in general and exhibit a 
higher propensity to engage in desirable CG disclosure behaviour in particular. In this regard, and 
in order to continuously monitor compliance with the OCGC, Omani policy makers may be 
motivated to introduce a CG recommendation requiring firms to set-up CG committees.   
8.5 CONTRIBUTIONS  
As discussed in section 1, previous cross-country studies that include some Omani listed 
firms in their samples either investigate firm-level CG reporting (e.g., Mohamed et al., 2009) or 
use a CG index based on international codes, such the 2004 OECD code, to examine the level of 
CG compliance (e.g., Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). These studies do not examine whether and to 
what extent Omani firms voluntarily comply with CG recommendations proposed by the 2002 
OCGC, nor do they investigate factors that drive such compliance. Distinctively, the current 
study uses a self-constructed CG index based on the 2002 OCGC as a proxy to measure firm-
level CG compliance and disclosure among Omani listed firms. In this regard, a review of 
literature suggests that a considerable number of studies investigating the effectiveness of 
voluntary CG codes in improving governance standards are concentrated on developed countries. 
Thus, examining voluntary CG compliance and disclosure in different cultural, regulatory, CG 
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and institutional contexts is essential, as voluntary compliance with CG codes can be expected to 
vary across cultural contexts.  
Similarly, a large number of prior studies investigating voluntary compliance 
determinants have been conducted in developed countries, where institutional structures and 
corporate settings are largely similar, whereas limited evidence is reported from emerging 
countries in general and Oman in particular. Hence, investigating the factors driving voluntary 
compliance and disclosure in a non-developed country like Oman, where empirical evidence is 
rare, is crucial in providing a broader picture of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
behaviour. As a result, empirical evidence on whether and to what extent Omani listed firms 
voluntarily comply with OCGC provisions, and the factors that might influence their compliance, 
can offer a more understanding of recent Omani CG reforms. This study thus makes a number of 
distinct and new contributions to the extant literature.  
First, by employing one of the largest and most extensive hand-collected data sets to date 
on CG compliance and disclosure in emerging countries (i.e., a sample of 116 Omani listed firms 
from 2001 to 2011, with 1,152 firm year observations), the current study offers the first empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of CG reforms in Oman. Specifically, it provides detailed evidence 
on the level of compliance with the 2002 OCGC by listed firms. Unlike several prior studies that 
include only large firms in their samples, this study includes all firms with sufficient data, in 
order to enhance the generalisability of the results and avoid size bias. Similarly, distinct from 
many past studies that rely on either time series or cross-sectional data, this study uses panel data 
in order to mitigate the effect of multicollinearity, control unobserved heterogeneity among 
variables and increase the degree of freedom. In line with a limited number of past studies in 
emerging countries, the current study’s results indicate that compliance with the 2002 OCGC is 
relatively low. Despite the expectation that the introduction of the 2002 OCGC would facilitate 
uniformity and convergence of CG practices, the results suggest that CG standards in Omani 
listed firms still differ widely over the eleven years investigated. 
Second, this study provides evidence that adopting commonly accepted standards of CG, 
such as those proposed by the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, can improve CG practices in emerging 
countries. Although legal enforcement in Oman is weaker as the case in many emerging states, 
the evidence suggests that Omani listed firms have complied voluntarily, to some extent, with the 
OCGC, whose provisions are mainly drawn from the 1992 UK code. Therefore, concerns that 
emerging countries’ reliance on an Anglo-American model of CG regimes may not promote CG 
standards are unjustified, at least in the case of Oman.  
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Third, following the suggestion that CG can be better examined by a composite CG index, 
this study provides a self-constructed CG index consisting of 72 CG provisions divided into four 
broad categories, namely board of directors, accounting and auditing, external auditors and 
internal control systems, and disclosure and transparency, through which various issues 
associated with CG in the Omani corporate setting can be examined. This can assist Omani 
researchers, policy makers and others who prefer to use a self-constructed index, largely due to 
the questionable applicability of analysts’ CG indices in different CG regimes.  
Fourth, consistent with literature suggesting that different ownership structures can either 
encourage or discourage firms from CG compliance, this study provides empirical evidence on 
why and how a traditional ownership structure influences the level of CG compliance and 
disclosure in Omani listed firms. It fills a gap in the existing literature by offering evidence on the 
influence of government and foreign ownership on firm-level CG compliance and disclosure 
(which has not been widely examined in literature) along with institutional and block ownership. 
Specifically, it shows that while government, institutional and foreign ownership affects firm-
level CG compliance and disclosure positively, firms with block ownership disclose considerably 
less than others.   
Fifth, unlike many past studies that restrict their investigation to limited CG variables, this 
study offers evidence on how and why board characteristics affect the level of CG compliance 
and disclosure among Omani listed firms. In particular, it fills a gap in the existing literature by 
offering evidence on the effects of board diversity on the basis of gender and nationality, and the 
presence of a CG committee, on the level of CG compliance and disclosure. Consistent with 
theoretical expectations, the results suggest that compliance with the OCGC is higher in firms 
with non-Omani directors and those with CG committees, whereas board diversity on the basis of 
gender has no significant influence on firm-level CG compliance and disclosure.   
Sixth, the study contributes to literature in order to arrive at uniform theoretical 
framework that can be used to explain firms’ motivations to voluntarily comply with CG 
standards by articulating a multi-theoretical framework that includes most related theories, 
namely agency, recourse dependence, legitimacy and signalling/stakeholder theories. This 
methodology is useful in predicting hypotheses and interpreting results, especially in complex 
corporate contexts like Oman, whose distinctive features are expected to result in mixed 
predictions on voluntary codes’ ability to encourage firms to increase their disclosure.  
Seventh, while most studies exclude financial firms because they are subject to additional 
disclosure requirements, the study offers empirical evidence that there is no significant difference 
in CG compliance and disclosure between financial and non-financial Omani listed firms. This 
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may lead researchers to reconsider excluding financial firms from their data sets, especially 
researchers who conduct their studies in emerging countries, where corporate regulations and 
enforcements are anticipated to be weaker.   
Finally, distinct from a considerable number of previous studies, this study offers 
empirical evidence on whether the observed cross-sectional differences in voluntary CG 
disclosures can be explained by ownership structure and board and audit characteristics using 
alternative models and estimations. A number of analyses conducted to check the extent to which 
the main results are robust or sensitive to alternative CG index, omitted variables that differ 
across firms, but do not change over time, financial firms and endogeneity problems.   
8.6 LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Similar to any other empirical study, this study has a number of limitations that must be 
acknowledged. First, although the study has sought to avoid survivorship bias by limiting its 
analysis to unbalanced panel data, there may be a problem associated with the sample size; 52 
firms were excluded because of unavailable data, which may limit the generalisability of the 
results. Further, although the study has made great efforts to increase the sample size by 
approaching four different data sources, namely Rest of World Filings of the perfect information 
Database, MSM website, Database and firms’ websites, approaching other sources, such as 
government sources, may be helpful to obtain more information for firms with missing or 
unavailable data. However, as indicated in Subsection 4.1.1, the sampled firms in this study are 
116 firms out of 168 listed on the MSM, which represents 69% of the total population. The 
useable sample is comparatively larger than those used by prior studies conducted in Oman, and 
large enough to make a significant contribution to the literature. The study also takes into 
consideration the availability, accessibility, funding and time constraints, as it had to be 
completed within the timeframe of a PhD registration period. Second, although the study has 
sought to gain a high degree of credibility by relying on annual reports, using other sources of 
information, such as analyst reports, could assist in overcoming the unavailability of data. Third, 
although great efforts were made to improve the reliability and validity of the OCGI, as indicated 
in Subsection 4.2.1.5, the OCGI was coded by the researcher, whose subjectivity may have 
influenced the coding of the index. Fourth, while the study was motivated by Omani contextual 
issues relating to Islamic religious, societal and cultural values, due to lack of appropriate data, it 
fails to empirically examine how and why Omani context-specific factors can impact on the level 
of disclosure and compliance with the OCGI. It does, however, examine some of the most 
influential explanatory variables, including four types of ownership, especially concentrated 
ownership and board/audit characteristics. Further, although the study includes a number of 
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control variables, it is acknowledged that other factors may have impact on firms’ disclosure, 
which due to lack of data might have been inadvertently omitted. Fifth, the study relies only on 
quantitative analysis in examining its hypotheses; using both quantitative and qualitative analyses 
may be more helpful in interpreting the results. Finally, although a sample of 116 listed firms and 
1,152 firm-year observations is considered large enough to generalise the results, including both 
listed and non-listed firms could have improved the generalisability of the findings. Given the 
above limitations, future studies could consider one or more of the following suggestions. First, 
searching for additional sources of data and using other media sources are expected to enhance 
the generalisability of the results. Second, examining some explanatory variables related to 
Omani contextual, societal and cultural especially the impact of Islamic religious values, in 
addition to other control variables, may offer a more understanding of how they may affect recent 
CG reforms. Third, using mixed-methods research, namely quantitative and qualitative, may 
eliminate some of the limitations of quantitative research. Finally, including both listed and non-
listed firms in the sample is expected to improve the generalisability of the results. 
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ABSTRACT 
This essay empirically examines the impact of corporate governance (CG) separately on: 
(i) capital structure (CS) decisions; and (ii) the choice of financing, namely equity issuance 
(EISSUE) in subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by listed firms. Employing one of the 
largest and extensive dataset to-date on CG and CS in an emerging economy (i.e., a sample of 
116 Omani listed firms from 2001 to 2011 and 1,152 firm year observations) and a broad CG 
index consisting of 72 CG provisions, the study finds that, on average, better CG firms tend to 
employ lower levels of leverage, but tend to issue equity over debt than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. First, the results suggest that CG index, government ownership, institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership, board size, audit firm size and CG committee are negatively 
related to CS, whereas block ownership and CS are positively associated. Second, the results 
indicate that CG index, institiutional ownership and audit firm size impact positively on EISSUE, 
while government ownership, foreign ownership, block ownership, board size and CG committee 
are negatively related to EISSUE. The study’s results are fairly robust across a number of 
econometric models that sufficiently account for alternative CG and CS proxies, as well as 
different endogeneity problems. Overall, its findings are generally consistent with the predictions 
of a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from irrelevance, trade-off, pecking 
order, signalling, market timing and agency theories. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; capital structure; equity issuance; multi-theoretical approach; 
emerging economies; Oman; endogeneity.   
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1 INTRODUCTION   
1.1 Background  
A considerable number of firms have been exposed to financial distress and even 
bankruptcy following the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Adams, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; 
Greenglass et al., 2014). This situation has directed more attention to the importance of CS 
decisions15 and effectiveness of CG mechanisms16 (Ellili and Farouk, 2011; Essen et al., 2013). 
CS decisions are crucial to firms because they can impact directly on their operational and 
financial performance (Abor and Biekpe, 2005). In other words, the choice between debt, equity 
and a mixture of both is essential, and as such a decision may have either positive or negative 
effects on a firm’s value. Managers often face a trade off between the use of debt and equity to 
meet their external financing needs, as well as employing different levels of debt in order to 
arrive at an optimal CS. Thus, poor CS can lead firms to suffer financially or go bankrupt, while 
better CS may enhance firm value. Consequently, researchers have been keen to investigate the 
factors that drive CS decisions.    
Weak CG structures on the other hand, have been commonly suggested as one of the 
possible causes of the financial distress because it has direct influence on corporate policy 
decisions (Miglani et al., 2015). In particular, and because CS involves a number of agency 
problems amongst stakeholders, CG has been suggested as mechanisms that can reduce agency 
problems that are often associated with CS (Essen et al., 2013). A large number of studies have 
investigated the association between CG and firm performance (e.g., Bozec and Bozec, 2012; 
Renders and Gaeramynck, 2012). In contrast, studies analysing the extent to which firm-level CG 
drives CS and the choice of financing are limited. In addition, most of prior studies have been 
undertaken in developed countries that share similar institutional characteristics (e.g., Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003; Mande et al., 2012), with little empirical research on firms listed in emerging 
countries in general, and the MENA region  in particular (e.g., Abor, 2007; Hussainey and Aljifri, 
2012). As a result, and in the light of continuing debate in the literature on CG as an influential 
factor of corporate policy decisions, this essay sets out to examine two important issues, namely 
the determinants of: (i) CS; and (ii) the choice of financing in Oman.    
Since the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), a number of theories have 
emerged to answer the question of what determines CS. These include theories based mainly on 
tax considerations (Modigliani-Miller theorem 1963 and trade-off theories) and non-tax driven 
theories (pecking order, signalling, market timing and agency theories). For instance, pecking 
                                                 
15
 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for an overview of the different definitions of capital structure.   
16
 See Gillan (2006) for a detailed overview of corporate governance structures.  
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order theory predicts that firms prefer to use their internal funds to finance new projects, and tend 
to use external sources only if the need for additional financing cannot be avoided. Similarly, 
signalling theory argues that firms tend to use more debt to send a signal to outsiders that they 
have good future financial prospects; otherwise, they would not use additional debt, as this may 
lead to the risk of bankruptcy. Agency theory suggests that CG is a significant determinant of CS 
and the choice of financing. Specifically, it predicts that poorly governed firms tend to use a 
higher level of debt as a substitute mechanism for weaker governance mechanisms. This suggests 
that debt can be used as a governance device in mitigating the conflict of interest amongst 
different stakeholders and reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow available to 
managers. In addition, and unlike pecking order and signalling theories, agency theory offers 
support for the concept that better governed firms are more likely to issue equity rather than debt 
in financing their investment opportunities. Based on its assumptions, it can be argued that better 
governed firms may be targeted by equity investors who are willing to pay more for such firms’ 
shares because the cost of equity is reduced by effective CG in place, while the effect of CG on 
the cost of debt is assumed to be relatively small because debt holders would not entirely rely on 
CG mechanisms to protect themselves from agency risk, as they have more direct protective 
mechanisms like debt covenants and collateral. This can increases the willingness of firms to 
issue equity rather than debt in meeting their external financing needs. More recently, market 
timing theory has also challenged traditional theories by providing an explanation for equity 
issuance. It predicts that firms tend to issue equity when their firms’ value appears to be 
overvalued by irrational investors.  
These theories offer researchers different theoretical predictions and explanations with 
which to examine the effect of different determinants on CS and the choice of financing (e.g., 
Degryse et al., 2012; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013; Dang, 2013). Most of these studies focus on 
firms’ characteristics, with little research investigating whether CG has a role to play in CS and 
the selecting of financing (e.g., Rijal and Bahadur, 2010; Haque et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 
2012). Despite the lack of international evidence on the effect of CG on CS, differences in 
institutional features, CG structures and a country’s financial system, among other factors, 
corporate policy decisions in general and CS and the choice of financing in particular may be 
expected to differ from what is reported in developed countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth 
et al., 2001, Boateng, 2004). As a result, examining the influence of CG mechanisms on CS and 
the choice of financing in emerging countries, where empirical studies are scarce, may be 
fundamental in expanding our understanding of firms’ financial decision-making behaviour.   
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Therefore, this study aims to investigate various aspects of corporate financial behaviour 
in an emerging country – Oman. As has been mentioned in the first essay, and in line with 
international CG developments, the Omani government initiated a series of major economic 
reforms aimed at making its economy less vulnerable to financial crises. CG reforms were a 
major part of those reforms, which are intended to protect investors, creditors and shareholders, 
amongst other stakeholders (Dry, 2003). In this regard, Oman started its CG reforms by 
introducing a new Capital Market Law in 1998, as well as amending the Companies Act several 
times (Fleety, 2010). The establishment of Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 1998 as the main 
regulatory body played a vital role in issuing a number of legislative instruments. Among those, 
the voluntary code of good CG was issued in 2002 for listed firms, and is regarded as a major CG 
reform aimed at improving CG practices in Oman. This code contains a considerable number of 
CG recommendations (e.g., board of directors, CG disclosure and external auditors) that were 
introduced to help Omani firms reduce agency problems, including those associated with CS and 
the choice of financing. Thus, firms with greater compliance with the code are expected to have 
different CS patterns than those of firms with poor compliance.  
1.2 Motivation 
This study focuses on Oman due to its unique characteristics, which distinguish it from 
other developed countries. These features are: religious notions, informal rules and concentration 
of ownership.17  
First, and as opposed to firms that operate in developed countries, Omani firms operate in 
a context where business activities are influenced by Shariah law18 (Rahman, 1998; Kamla et al., 
2006, Safieddine, 2009; Judge, 2010; Hearn et al., 2012). In this regard, it is expected that CS and 
the choice of financing made by Omani firms might be different from those in other countries 
where religion has no role in business. For example, CS in conventional firms is more likely to be 
in favour of shareholders because firms follow the goal of maximisation of the shareholders’ 
wealth (Crnigoj and Mramor, 2009). In contrast, managers, shareholders and capital providers in 
Oman may influence firms to make their CSs in line with Shariah principles (Maali et al., 2006; 
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012; Hassan et al., 2012). It has been suggested that Shariah Law 
has clear principles on corporate decision-making processes in general, and how CS should be 
constructed in particular (Lewis, 2005). For instance, Shariah Law prohibits interest (Riba) on 
                                                 
17As indicated in Essay 1, although religious notions and informal rules are normatively relied on as part of the motivation for this 
study, they are not empirically tested due to data limitation. 
18
Shariah Law is based on the Qur'an and the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings, which serve as guidance for Muslims in all aspects 
of life (Kamla et al., 2006).    
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loans and deposits, and offers alternative approaches of financing, such as “Mudaraba”19 (profit-
sharing) and “Musyarakah” (joint-ventures), amongst others20 (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009, Khaldi and 
Hamdouni, 2011; Hassan et al., 2012). This may have important implications for CS. For 
example, Omani firms may not employ high levels of debt in their CSs, and may instead engage 
in the Musyarakah system. This may permit them to gain a lower cost of capital because both 
capital provider and the firm share risk, profit and loss. Firms may also be motivated to adopt this 
system as it enables them to reduce the likelihood that the capital provider can push them into 
bankruptcy if they fail to make profits. Further, greater monitoring power often associated with 
capital providers is expected to play a crucial role in reducing managers’ ability to engage in 
excessive perquisite consumption. This suggests that a capital provider can serve as a substitute 
governance mechanism to debt financing in reducing the conflict of interest between agents and 
principals. Arguably, and based on Islamic teachings, Muslim managers are expected to have 
different views from those of non-Muslim managers in making CS decisions.  
Second, unlike developed business environments, the Omani corporate setting is 
characterised by social aspects, where managers’ incentives are anticipated to be driven by 
informal networks. Managers in these firms have greater support from family, tribe and personal 
relationships, and they use this power to protect themselves from employment risk (Chahine and 
Tohme, 2009; Boytsun et al., 2011). This may suggest that informal networks may affect the 
relationship between CG and CS, which in turn may have important implications for CS. For 
instance, managers in such firms may tend to carry debt at a sub-optimal level in order to enjoy 
free cash, as they do not worry about employment risk, because their positions are guaranteed by 
informal networks. Arguably, it is expected that Omani firms may not tend to employ debt 
financing as a useful governance mechanism in mitigating the conflict of interest between agent 
and principal. This may be because the additional risk generated by the use of debt is not 
expected to serve as further motivation for managers to maximise shareholders’ interests in order 
to reduce their employment risk as managers protect themselves by informal networks. In 
addition, informal networks can have important implications for the choice of financing. For 
example, managers often have close relationships with political leaders and bank officers 
(Abdulla, 1998; Fan et al., 2011; Haque et al., 2011). This may motivate them to issue debt over 
equity, as they can easily obtain loans from local providers at favourable rates by taking 
advantage of informal networks, as well as use close relationships with political leaders to borrow 
                                                 
19
The Mudaraba system (profit-sharing) is where firms and the capital provider share the profit, but only the capital provider bears 
all losses.  
20
There are other financing forms that are offered by Shariah Law, such as Murabaha (deferred payment sale), Bai’ Salam 
(forward sale) and Istina (contract manufacturing). See Chong and Liu (2009) for a detailed overview of these Islamic 
financing forms.  
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from the government at lower rates (Friend and Lang, 1988; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). 
Arguably, it is expected that informal networks may render CG weak, which can limit its ability 
to enhance corporate policy decisions in general and impact negatively on its role in influencing 
CS and the selection of financing in particular.  
Finally, distinct from developed countries, the Omani corporate setting is further 
characterised by high ownership concentration (Omran et al., 2008, Bishara, 2011). Prior 
empirical evidence is generally consistent with a positive perspective of the theoretical literature 
in relation to the impact of block ownership on CS. In this sense, Oman offers a good setting to 
examine the extent to which ownership concentration drives CS and the choice of financing. This 
is due to the fact that Omani block holders are also expected to be influenced by informal 
networks which assign more importance to family, tribal and personal relationships than to CG 
mechanisms. For instance, and unlike agency theory predictions, Omani firms with large block 
holders might not tend to use debt financing as a governance mechanism in order to discipline 
managers. This may be attributed to block holders’ powerful role in appointing managers, which 
gives them a greater ability to monitor managers to act in line with their interests, as well as to 
eliminate those with poor performance and replace them. Thus, Omani large block holders’ role 
in influencing CS is expected to be different from that predicted by CS theories and found by past 
empirical results in developed countries.    
Arguably, the combination of characteristics indicated above may suggest that the impact 
of CG on CS and the choice of financing in the Omani context may be different from that 
observed in developed countries. Therefore, analysing the extent to which firm-level CG drives 
CS and the choice of financing becomes empirical issue.  
There is, however, an apparent lack of empirical studies examining CS determinants. For 
instance, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) indicate that analysis of the influence of CG on CS is 
limited in emerging countries in general and Gulf Cooperation Council countries21 (GCC) in 
particular.  There are a few studies on CS in Oman that need to be acknowledged. Abdulla (1998) 
was the first study to shed light on the determinants of CS policy followed by Omani listed firms. 
Using a survey approach to investigate the factors that managers in 58 Omani listed firms 
considered the most significant in influencing CS, he reported evidence that the majority 
identified risk, liquidity, cash outflow commitments and active management as important factors 
of CS. Omet and Mashharawe (2002) examined the determinants of CS for four countries, 
including Oman. Using a sample of 38 Omani listed firms, they provide evidence that firm size, 
profitability and growth are significant factors of CS. Similarly, Sbeiti (2010) investigated the 
                                                 
21
Gulf Cooperation Council countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
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determinants of CS in three countries, including Oman. He reported empirical evidence that firm 
size, profitability and tangibility were found to be the most significant determinants of CS in 
Omani listed firms.  
It can be clearly observed that prior studies in Oman have been limited in both number 
and scope. In this regard, the current study differs from the above studies in a number of ways. 
First, while this study seeks to specifically examine the impact of CG on CS and the choice of 
financing, existing studies examine general CS determinants, which is a different focus from the 
present study. Second, despite differences in focus, existing studies use smaller sample sizes than 
the current study, arguably limiting generalizability of their findings. Finally, the period under 
investigation in this study is more recent and relatively longer (2001-2011) than the periods 
examined in existing studies, which arguably strengthens the generalizability of the current 
study’s results. To the best of the study’s knowledge, there is no published study in Oman that 
examines the relationship between CG mechanisms and both CS and the selection of financing.  
1.3 Research questions and contributions 
The main purpose of this study is to examine two important issues, namely the 
determinants of: (i) CS; and (ii) the choice of financing. It investigates how effective the CG 
measures suggested by the Omani voluntary code in addition to other CG mechanisms proposed 
by other laws, such as Companies Act are in mitigating agency problems associated with CS. 
Specifically, using a one of largest and extensive sample of Omani listed firms from 2001 to 
2011, the study empirically examines the extent to which firm-level CG, ownership structures 
and board and audit characteristics influence CS, as well as the corporate decision (choice) to 
issue equity or debt in SEOs firms. In doing so, the study seeks to extend the growing body of 
literature on the impact of CG on managerial decision-making behaviour, and make new 
contributions to the admittedly limited literature on the nature of the association between CG and 
each of CS and the choice of financing. First, the study provides empirical evidence of the 
influence of firm-level CG on CS, and whether public firms with better governance structures 
will choose equity or debt in meeting their financing needs. Finally, it provides insights into the 
extent to which board and audit characteristics and traditional ownership structures influence CS 
and the choice of financing. Arguably, this can expand our understanding of Omani firms’ CS, 
and the role that CG reforms is expected to play in this regard.   
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1.4 Structure of the essay  
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The next section addresses the institutional 
framework for the Omani financial system. Section 3 reviews CS theories and prior literature, and 
develops hypotheses. Research design is presented in the section 4. The OLS assumptions and 
descriptive statistics are reported in section 5. The empirical results are reported in section 6. 
Robustness tests are presented in section 7. The final section reports a summary conclusion.   
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2 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE OMANI FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
This section discusses the institutional framework relating to the Omani financial system. 
As indicated earlier, the choice between debt, equity or a mixture of both is a crucial financial 
decision for firms in financing their activities. A country’s financing system allows firms to select 
from among a number of CS’ alternatives, such as arranging lease financing, using warrants, 
issuing convertible bonds, signing forward contracts and trading bond swaps (Abor, 2007). Thus, 
differences between countries’ financing systems may lead to different ways of constructing firm 
CS.  
In Oman, the banking sector is the key component of the financing system, where lenders 
and borrowers can exchange funds (Sangeetha, 2012, Rath et al., 2014). Importantly, the Omani 
banking system is different from systems in developed countries in two main ways which are 
expected to have important implications on firms’ financing choices. First, it consists of 
conventional commercial banks and Islamic banks; the credit policies of both types are different. 
Islamic banks offer alternative financing approaches, such as “Mudaraba” (profit-sharing), 
“Musyarakah” (joint-ventures), “Murabaha” (deferred payment sale), “Bai’ Salam” (forward 
sale) and “Istina” (contract manufacturing) (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009, Khaldi and Hamdouni, 2011; 
Hassan et al., 2012). Second, bond markets and mutual funds markets are less developed which 
renders conventional commercial banks play the important role in the Omani corporate financial 
system (Sbeiti, 2010). The Omani banking system will be briefly discussed below.    
Figure 4 depicts the Omani banking system. The Central Bank of Oman (CBO) is the 
foremost institution of the country’s monetary and banking system. Thus, the institutional 
framework of the Omani banking system falls under the jurisdiction of the CBO. The CBO was 
established in 1974, when Sultan Qaboos bin Said signed the Banking Law and it was amended 
in 2002 in accordance with national and international economic developments (The Central Bank 
of Oman’s official website). Similar to other central banks around the world, the CBO performs 
traditional functions (e.g., acts as a depository agency for the Omani state; issues national 
currency; grants licenses to new banks) that have significant impact on the economy in general 
and the corporate sector in particular. Specifically, it regulates different types of banks that 
supply firms with needed funds. These banks are classified into four groups: commercial banks, 
specialised banks, non-bank finance and Islamic banks (Central Bank of Oman, 2014). As of 31 
December 2013, there were sixteen commercial banks, of which seven were local (e.g., Bank 
Muscat; Bank Sohar) and nine were branches of foreign banks (e.g., Standard Chartered bank; 
Bank of Baroda) (Central Bank of Oman, 2014). These banks provide funds to firms through 493 
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branches operating in the country (Central Bank of Oman, 2014). Importantly, of the seven local 
banks, six offer Islamic services through dedicated windows (Central Bank of Oman, 2014).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Banking System of Oman. Source: Researcher’s construction. 
 
 
In addition to the commercial banks, there are two specialised banks, six non-bank 
finance institutions and two Islamic banks. The two specialised banks are the Oman Housing 
Bank and the Oman Development Bank, which provide small and medium-sized firms with new 
or additional financing, whereas the six non-bank finance institutions are either savings or 
investment institutions engaged in leasing, hire purchase, debt factoring and similar asset-based 
financing activities (Central Bank of Oman, 2014). The two Islamic banks, namely Bank Nizwa 
and Al lzz Islamic Bank offer fully Shariah-complaint services; firms may be encouraged to 
finance their investment opportunities through these banks in order to signal to outsiders that their 
financing policies are aligned with Shariah principles.   
Furthermore, the Omani firms may finance their investment opportunities by issuing 
shares. In this regard, the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) offers a place where stocks can be 
bought or sold by listed firms and investors. Since its establishment in 1988, the MSM has been 
the only formal stock market in Oman that oversees the trade of shares and bonds. By December 
2014, the number of listed firms had reached 117. This suggests that Oman has a small capital 
market. To sum up, the Omani financing system offers several sources of financing for firms, 
although they are not as organised as they may be available in advanced economies.   
 
 
Sultan Qaboos bin Said 
Central Bank 
Commercial 
Banks 
Specialised 
Banks 
Non-bank financial 
Institutions 
Islamic Banks 
157 
 
 
3 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES, LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical and empirical literature will be reviewed in this section. Specifically, this 
section will be divided into two main subsections. In the first subsection, a number of theories 
that have been developed to explain CS and the choice of financing will be discussed. The second 
subsection will set out the central theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature that 
attempts to link CG mechanisms with CS and the selection of financing. The second subsection 
will be further divided into two main parts. The first part will focus on the impact of CG 
mechanisms on CS, whereas the influence of CG structures on the choice of financing will be the 
focus of the second part.   
3.1 CAPITAL STRUCTURE: REVIEW OF TRADITIONAL THEORIES 
Academic research on CS determinants has existed for more than five decades, and this 
topic remains one of the most debated issues in the financial literature. The pioneering work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) is regarded as the basis for the major theories that have been 
advanced by scholars to answer the question of what determines CS. These theories propose 
different predictions and explanations for a considerable number of factors claimed to have a 
potential impact on CS, as well as how firms choose their financing in order to fund their 
investment opportunities. Accordingly, a large number of empirical studies have emerged to 
examine the ability of these theories to explain CS and the choice of financing.  
Despite the existence of CS theories, the empirical literature suggests that no single theory 
can provide a full explanation of CS behaviour (Myers, 2001). Hence, researchers tend to adopt a 
multi-theory approach in conducting their empirical studies.22 In line with prior studies, the 
current study seeks to benefit from theoretical insights provided by available theories to 
investigate the extent to which firm-level CG, internal CG structures and ownership structures 
drive both CS and the selection of financing. Following Harris and Raviv (1991), theories related 
to CS can be grouped into two broad categories. First, theories based mainly on tax 
considerations include Modigliani-Miller theorem 1958, Modigliani-Miller theorem 1963 and 
trade-off theory. Second, non-tax driven theories consist of pecking order, signalling, market 
timing and agency theories. It should be emphasised that these theories are not mutually 
exclusive and each one assists the current study to provide answers to the research questions. In 
the next subsections, both categories will be discussed in order to determine the relative 
                                                 
22
See subsection 3.1 of Essay 1 for more overview of the advantages associated with multi-theoretical approach.  
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importance of these theories and identify different aspects of CS and the choice of financing as 
proposed by each theory.   
3.1.1 Theories Based on Tax Considerations 
Taxes and bankruptcy costs have been used by researchers as major explanations for 
firms’ use of leverage23 and choice of financing. The following subsections review CS theories 
that are based on these proposed factors.   
3.1.1.1 Modigliani-Miller Theorem 1958: The Irrelevance of Capital Structure 
The theoretical research on CS determinants started with the theory proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). They introduced their irrelevance proposition indicating that there 
is no advantage associated with debt financing for a firm; hence, firm financing decisions are not 
relevant to firm value. This proposition was proved under efficient and perfect market 
assumptions of no tax, transaction cost, information asymmetry or bankruptcy cost, but its 
validity would not hold in the real world, where all these elements exist. This proposition has 
been criticised. One line of criticism has been that how changes in CS would be irrelevant to firm 
value. Despite criticism, the theory opened the door for researchers to utilise its conceptual basis 
to develop other CS theories. Indeed, the scope of CS determinants has been extended by 
researchers to include other factors, such as tax debt benefits, non-debt tax shields, bankruptcy 
costs and more recently CG.  
3.1.1.2 Modigliani-Miller Theorem 1963: The Impact of Tax Debt Benefits 
Due to irrelevance theory imperfections, Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected the 
assumption related to tax in their earlier model of 1958, ceteris paribus. They acknowledged that, 
as debt interest payments are tax deductible, tax benefits associated with debt can lead to an 
increase in firm value. This suggests that firms are encouraged to increase their value by 
employing high levels of debt in order to enjoy a tax shield. This model was also criticised for 
overestimating of benefits associated with debt in the sense that debt financing shapes almost all 
firms’ CS, with no role of equity financing. In addition, it has been argued that tax benefits 
associated with debt can be challenged and may not have a very significant value to firms. For 
instance, Miller (1977) argues that due to firms paying out a large amount of their income to the 
owners in the form of taxable interest payments, the personal income tax disadvantage is offset 
by tax advantages. This implies that the gain from leverage would completely vanish or even 
                                                 
23
The terms “leverage” and “capital structure” are used interchangeably. They refers to the mix of different types of securities 
(e.g., long-term debt, common stock, preferred stock) issued by a firm in order to finance its assets.  
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become negative. Thus, Miller (1977) concludes that the value of a firm and its CS are 
independent from each other, which is in line with the CS irrelevance theory proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
In contrast to the debt tax advantages argument, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduce 
non-debt corporate tax shields that imply the existence of optimal CS for all firms. They argue 
that firms may not need to use more debt in order to enjoy debt tax shields because the benefits of 
non-debt tax shields (e.g., depreciation, investment tax credit) can substitute tax benefits 
associated with debt. This suggests that the benefits associated with debt financing would be 
reduced when depreciation and/or investment tax credits are available to firms. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) conclude that the presence of non-debt tax shields will result in a market 
equilibrium in which all firms have internal optimal CS because of the interaction of personal and 
corporate tax treatment of both debt and equity. This may have important implications for firms. 
For instance, firms with a high proportion of tangible assets are expected to employ lower levels 
of leverage because depreciation deductions can be used as a substitute for debt to obtain 
attractive tax shields.  
3.1.1.3 Trade-off Theory: The Impact of Tax Debt Benefits and Bankruptcy Costs 
Subsequent studies (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Kim, 1978) have 
argued that employing high levels of leverage in order to enjoy debt tax shields is unrealistic 
because such assumption fails to take into account the detrimental effects of increased use of debt 
on firm value. These studies introduce the concept of bankruptcy cost and its role for CS. For 
instance, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) argue that firm value and CS can only be independent in 
complete and perfect markets. They conclude that because bankruptcy is a market imperfection, 
more debt may lead firms to bankruptcy when their debt obligation exceeds their earnings. In 
contrast to the assumption of zero bankruptcy, Scott (1976) also suggests that optimal CS exists 
and that firms can issue high levels of debt as long as they have enough assets to use as 
collaterals in the case of liquidation to secure debt. Obviously, this implies that firms would not 
be able to use infinite levels of debt because more debt increases the probability that they will 
face bankruptcy costs.  
In addition, Kim (1978) argues that optimal CS is achieved when firm optimal debt is less 
than firm debt capacity. Particularly, and due to firms being subject to different types of 
bankruptcy costs, including both indirect (e.g., reduction in sales, higher production costs, 
difficulty in accessing capital markets) and direct (lawyers’, accountants’ and other professionals’ 
fees, and time lost) (Baxter, 1967; Kim,1978; Warner, 1977; Haugen and Senbet, 1978), 
maximum debt capacity, defined as the maximum level of debt that a firm can borrow from 
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capital markets, can be reached by firms well before 100% debt financing is used. Kim (1978) 
concludes that optimal CS can be achieved by balancing the benefits of debt tax shields and the 
potential costs of bankruptcy. 
The role of tax benefits and bankruptcy for the relevance of CS is central to the static 
trade-off theory. This theory assumes that optimal CS is determined by trading off corporate tax 
benefits of debt against bankruptcy costs, ceteris paribus (Myers, 1984). Based on this theory, a 
firm with higher potential bankruptcy costs compared to its expected debt benefits should not 
employ higher levels of debt, and vice versa. In this sense, risky firms, and firms with large 
intangible assets and higher growth opportunities, among others, are more likely to borrow less 
because the probability of bankruptcy costs is expected to be higher in such firms. The theory, 
however, has different implications for optimal CS. For instance, firms ought to set a target debt-
to-value in order to achieve optimal CS, and gradually move closer towards this ratio until they 
arrive at their set targets (Myers, 1984). Another implication is that small firms are more likely to 
move away from their optimal ratios because of adjustment costs associated with reverting 
towards their optimal ratios (Barclay and Smith, 1999).  
Despite its logical conceptual basis, the theory has been criticised over a number of issues. 
First, it has been indicated that the theory does not take into account the costs involved in 
adjusting to the optimal debt ratio, which may prevent firms from achieving their targets or 
optimal debt ratios (Myers, 1984). Second, it has been argued that it is difficult for firms to offset 
between debt benefits and bankruptcy costs because they would not completely be able to 
determine and measure the indirect type of bankruptcy costs (Baxter, 1967; Warner, 1977). Third, 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that it is not accurate to suppose that tax subsidy is offset 
against bankruptcy costs to reach optimal CS because firms can avoid bankruptcy costs through 
informal reorganisation. Building on the empirical findings of Higgins and Schall (1975) and Van 
Horne (1976), who argue that bankruptcy costs do not exist in the presence of perfect markets, 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) propose that transaction cost, instead of bankruptcy cost, should be 
offset with tax subsidy because bankruptcy costs are trivial relative to tax subsidies, and because 
bankruptcy can be avoided by purchasing outstanding debt through selling new shares. Finally, 
although dividends are not tax deductible whereas interest payments are, the theory does not 
consider equity financing along with debt in its model. Firms are only encouraged to issue debt, 
which is inconsistent with the real world, where firms tend to issue debt, equity or a mixture of 
both.  
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3.1.2 Non-Tax Driven Theories  
In addition to taxes and bankruptcy costs, other researchers consider information 
asymmetry and agency conflict as the main explanations for both a firm’s use of debt and its 
choice of financing. The following subsections review CS theories that are based on these 
proposed factors.   
3.1.2.1 Pecking Order Theory  
Pecking order theory (POT) has sought to explain CS and the selection of financing by 
focusing on one of the frictions omitted in the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model. Thus, the 
central friction in POT is the asymmetric information between managers and new investors. 
Considering the fact that managers have more information than investors, POT has attempted to 
offer an alternative model that would be better able to describe firms’ financing behaviour. This 
model was mainly developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majuf (1984), who argue that debt 
and free cash flow are negatively associated because retained earnings (internal finance) are the 
most preferred source of financing by firms. They have built their model based on the empirical 
findings of Donaldson (1961), who argues that firms prefer to use their internal funds to finance 
new projects and tend to use external sources only if the need for additional financing cannot be 
avoided. POT introduced the notion that asymmetric information has relative importance in 
shaping firms’ financing hierarchy. Therefore, it supposes that firms would follow a pecking 
order in making their CSs. The first choice is to use internal sources of financing; if internal 
sources are unavailable or insufficient then they tend to issue debt. The second choice is to issue 
equity if there is a greater need for additional external financing and if the use of more debt can 
be considered riskier for the firm. POT justifies this order by arguing that debt financing has 
lower information costs compared with equity financing, where new investors and managers have 
asymmetric knowledge about the firm. Specifically, POT assumes that new investors who are less 
informed believe that managers tend to issue equity when their firms are overvalued. Prior studies 
(e.g., Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; DeAngelo et al., 2010; Dong et al., 2012) support this 
assumption by reporting empirical evidence that stock prices decline when firms announce the 
issuing of new shares. Therefore, POT predicts that managers tend to avoid issuing equity 
because they recognise that new investors may under-price their firms’ shares due to a lack of 
information with which to assess a firm’s risk (Myers, 1984); hence, issuing equity should be the 
last choice in raising external funds in order to protect old shareholders’ interests.  
Overall, and according to the financing hierarchy predicted by POT, firms are more likely 
to rely initially and primarily on debt financing in seeking additional financing when their 
internal source of financing is not sufficient in order to minimise asymmetric information costs 
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(Myers, 1984). In this view, POT has a number of implications for firms. For instance, firms with 
high profitability and/or dividend payout ratios are not expected to rely on debt to fund their 
investment projects because they have substantial internal funds and their demand for additional 
financing is limited. However, firms with higher growth opportunities and risky firms are 
anticipated to depend on debt in financing their investment opportunities because their retained 
earnings are not sufficient to meet their external financing needs.  
In spite of its attempt to provide a new model in explaining firms’ financing behaviour, 
POT has a number of limitations (Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). For instance, 
unlike trade-off theory, it does not consider the optimal CS for the firm; hence, no optimal debt 
ratio is suggested (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Another concern is that its logical conceptual basis 
restricts the analysis to the impact of information asymmetry between managers and new 
investors on firm’s CS and choice of financing, and ignores the implications of asymmetric 
information between managers and old shareholders. Arguably, the existence of asymmetric 
information between managers and old shareholders may also influence managers’ decisions to 
issue equity or debt. For example, old shareholders may force managers to issue debt. Debt 
financing can be used by old shareholders as governance mechanism to force managers to engage 
in acts that maximise their wealth where managers become less able to control for free cash 
available (Jensen, 1986).   
3.1.2.2 Signalling Theory  
Similar to POT, signalling theory (SGT) is based on information asymmetry, where 
outside investors, among others, can rely on a firm’s actions in order to minimise such problem. 
The theory introduced the concept that CS is one way in which a firm’s actions can provide 
information about the firm to outsiders. It was mainly developed by Leland and Pyle (1977) and 
Ross (1977), who argue that managers take advantage of being better informed regarding their 
firms’ value to signal their firms’ information to outsiders.  
In Ross’ (1977) model, debt is suggested to act as a signal to outsiders about firms’ 
financial prospects that are known only to insiders. In this view, outsiders consider a firm that 
does not take on more debt as a firm with no good future financial prospects, because they 
recognise that managers have unfavourable information about the firm, and taking on more debt 
can lead them to bankruptcy risks. A firm’s decision to take on more debt will be interpreted by 
outsiders as the firm having good future financial prospects. Further, debt issuance may signal to 
outsiders that the firm does not want additional shareholders to share potential profit with (Ryen 
et al., 1997; Koch and Shenoy, 1999). Therefore, this model formalised the notion that a firm’s 
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debt level allows outsiders to distinguish between high and low quality firms, where low quality 
firms cannot adopt more debt as this will expose them to bankruptcy risks.  
In addition, the Leland and Pyle’s (1977) model argues that CS can also be affected by 
information asymmetry through managerial ownership or percentage of shares held by insiders. 
They assume that managerial ownership level can also act as a signal to outsiders about a firm’s 
quality and its true value. In this regard, firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely 
to be good quality firms, as managers are expected to have positive information about the firm’s 
future financial prospects, and outsiders respond accordingly. In contrast, managers in poor 
quality firms will not imitate their counterparts in good quality firms by choosing such costly 
signals to transfer information to outsiders. This implies that good quality firms are more likely to 
have high managerial ownership. The proportion of ownership held by insiders also indicates that 
such firms are more likely to have larger debt capacity. Unlike poorly managed firms, these firms 
tend to employ higher levels of leverage in order to meet their external financing needs because 
insiders have positive information regarding the firms’ future financial prospects.  
The common conclusion from these two models that present signalling theory is that any 
meaningful changes in CS will be seriously considered by outsiders as a signal of future firm 
performance, and they will respond accordingly (Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012). Regardless of its 
attempt to shed more theoretical insights into CS and the choice of financing, SGT does not 
consider a number of issues, including: (i) optimal leverage ratio; and (ii) the role of information 
asymmetry regarding existing shareholders and the impact of this on both CS and capital 
issuance. More importantly, and even though it is costly, there is a probability that managers in 
poorly managed firms may tend to imitate other managers in good firms by holding a high 
percentage of shares to signal their firms’ quality to outsiders, especially in family and initial 
public offerings firms. Arguably, the assumption that the proportion of managerial ownership acts 
as signal of a firm’s quality, and hence the firm can employ more debt in its CS, may not apply 
for all firms.  
3.1.2.3 Market Timing Theory  
Market timing theory (MTT) is regarded as the most recent theory developed to explain 
how firms make their CSs. MTT has challenged the traditional theories, trade-off and POT, by 
introducing the concept that links equity issuance with stock market performance. It was 
formalised by Baker and Wurgler (2002), who argue that managers tend to issue equity when 
their firms’ value appear to be overvalued by irrational investors. Their hypothesis is built on the 
empirical findings of four different types of studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), including: (i) 
studies of actual financing decisions, which report evidence that managers tend to issue equity 
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over debt when their firms’ market value is high and repurchase equity when the market value of 
their firms appears to be low; (ii) studies of long-run stock returns following CS, which provide 
evidence that managers tend to issue equity when their firms’ cost of equity becomes relatively 
low and repurchase equity when the cost of equity becomes high; (iii) studies of earnings 
forecasts, which report evidence that managers are more likely to issue equity when they 
recognise that investors are too enthusiastic about their firms’ future financial prospects; and (iv) 
survey studies, which provide evidence that managers consider equity market prices as the most 
important factor in making their decisions to issue equity or debt. This evidence of market timing 
has motivated Baker and Wurgler (2002) to provide an alternative hypothesis that explains how 
CS and financing choices are made by firms.   
Baker and Wurgler (2002) not only present their theory, but also test it within a US 
setting. In their empirical analysis, they use market-to-book ratio as a proxy for weighted average 
of past stock performance to test their hypothesis. They report evidence which is in line with their 
assumption that market-to-book ratio and leverage are negatively correlated. Specifically, firms 
with low debt tend to raise their funds when their market values are high whereas firms with high 
debt tend to the adverse. In this regard, the major implication of MTT is that firms choose the 
form of financing depending on their historical stock market performance (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Further, firms with a large proportion of financing deficit are anticipated to issue equity 
when the cost of equity is low and issue debt if the cost of equity is high (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Another implication is that firms with higher growth opportunities, which have high 
market valuation, are more likely to reduce their levels of leverage in order to retain their 
financial flexibility (Myers, 1977). In contrast, firms with low market valuation would repurchase 
equity or issue debt in order to increase their levels of leverage (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
This theory has inspired a number of studies (e.g., Welch, 2004; Leary and Rober, 2005; 
Alti, 2006; Hovakimian, 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2009) examining the consequences of equity 
market timing on CS, with mixed results. Despite its modernity, and like the other CS theories, 
MTT has a number of limitations (Mahajan and Tartaroglu, 2008). First, unlike trade-off theory, 
but similar to POT, this theory does not predict optimal CS. Second, a number of studies (e.g., 
Leary and Rober, 2005; Alti, 2006; Mahajan and Tartaroglu, 2008) report evidence that its 
explanatory power to explain firms’ propensity to issue equity is limited to the short-run. Finally, 
other studies argue that there is no negative relationship between the weighted average of a firm’s 
past stock performance and its CS. For instance, Hovakimian (2006) argues that the effect of 
market timing on CS is not persistent and that there is no negative relationship between market-
to-book ratio and CS, and what Baker and Wurgler (2002) found resulted from the dual role of 
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market-to-book ratio as a proxy for weighted average which also reflects firms’ growth 
opportunities.  
3.1.2.4 Agency Theory  
Agency theory (AT) presents agency costs as another important determinant for CS and 
the choice of financing that arises from a divergence of stakeholders’ interests. The theory was 
mainly developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who argue that firms can arrive at an optimal 
CS by trading off agency costs against the benefits of debt. Further, it predicts that firms can 
choose between equity and debt by trading off between agency costs of debt and equity.  
With respect to CS, Jensen and Meckling (1976) built their theory on the assumption that 
debt financing can be affected by agency costs, such as bankruptcy costs, residual loss, and 
monitoring and bonding expenditures. The theory assumes that these costs are mainly derived 
from two types of conflict – either between managers and shareholders or between shareholders 
and debt holders.  
The first agency problem arises when managers’ stake in the residual claims is smaller 
than that of shareholders. In this case, managers are expected to increase their wealth at the 
expense of shareholders by engaging in excessive perquisite consumption. The theory offers two 
ways to reduce this problem: (i) increasing the percentage of equity owned by managers in the 
firm, which may motivate managers to align their self-managerial interests with shareholders’ 
interests, especially with regard to investment decisions; and (ii) the use of debt financing. 
Specifically, debt financing can be used by firms to mitigate agency problems and reduce agency 
costs in two ways. First, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that the use of debt may increase the 
risk of bankruptcy. The additional risk may serve as further motivation for managers to maximise 
shareholders’ interests in order to reduce their employment risk. Second, Jensen (1986) suggests 
that debt financing can be used by firms as a useful CG mechanism to mitigate such conflict. In 
this sense, employing high levels of debt can result in less free cash available for managers to 
control because debt commits them to making fixed interest payments.  
Unlike prior theories, AT shows that CG is a significant determinant of CS and the choice 
of financing. In particular, Jensen (1986) introduced the concept that links CG to CS. According 
to his assumption, managers may tend to employ sub-optimal levels of leverage that allow them 
to expropriate wealth from shareholders because more debt imposes constraints on their 
managerial discretion. Arguably, managers’ use of a sub-optimal level of leverage will largely be 
dependent on the strength of their firms’ CG, because CG mechanisms have been designed to 
minimise agency conflicts (Jiraporn et al., 2012). Specifically, AT assumes that managers in poor 
CG firms, which are expected to suffer more from agency problems, are motivated to employ 
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sub-optimal levels of leverage in order to enjoy free cash flow. It posits that higher levels of 
leverage can serve as a substitute mechanism for weaker governance mechanisms. This implies 
that leverage and governance quality are inversely associated where firms with poor CG are more 
in need of employing high levels of leverage in order to alleviate agency costs and align 
managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests.  
Due to debt financing, however, the second agency problem can arise. In particular, 
shareholders expropriate wealth from debt holders by investing in very risky projects with high 
expected returns. In this case, most of the gains will be captured by diversified shareholders, 
whereas the cost will be borne by debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This leads debt 
holders to protect themselves through restrictive covenants and monitoring devices which at the 
same time help create another type of agency cost related to debt (Smith and Warner, 1979).  
 
With regard to the choice of financing, AT assumes that a firm’s choice of financing can 
be affected by two types of agency costs: those of equity and debt. Thus, firms can make their 
decisions by trading off costs of debt against costs of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this 
regard, firms are expected to choose debt over equity in financing their investment opportunities 
when agency costs of debt are lower than agency costs of equity, and vice versa. The theory 
supposes that agency costs related to equity financing are mainly derived from the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders, whereas debt financing results from the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and debt holders.  
The former conflict can occur when a firm decides to raise capital from equity finance in 
order to finance its project. Managers recognise that benefits associated with equity financing will 
largely go to diversified shareholders if the investment succeeds, and they bear the cost 
otherwise. In this case, managers may tend to misuse the funds offered by shareholders in order 
to achieve their interests at the expense of shareholders. Hence, the cost of attempts to minimise 
such behaviour, such as management compensation, share option and management ownership, 
among others, are regarded as agency costs of equity financing.  As indicated earlier, the latter 
conflict takes place in situations where firms choose debt financing to raise capital in order to 
meet their external financing needs. As shareholders diversify their portfolios, they prefer to 
invest in risky investments with high expected returns that may not be consistent with debt 
holders’ interests. In this regard, debt holders are aware that the benefits related to debt financing 
will mostly go to diversified shareholders if the investment succeeds, and they bear the cost if the 
investment goes bad. Therefore, the cost of efforts to align shareholders’ interests with those of 
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debt holders, such as restrictive covenants and convertibility options, are a fraction of agency 
costs of debt (Smith and Warner, 1979).  
To sum up, AT addresses CS through its assumption, that CS is determined by agency 
costs due to the divergence of interests between different stakeholders. It suggests that agency 
costs associated with debt (e.g., monitoring, bonding and residual loss), which derive from both 
types of agency conflict, should be traded off against the benefits of debt (e.g., debt tax shields 
and lower information costs) in order to achieve optimal CS. Further, it predicts that a firm’s 
choice of financing can be made by trading off costs of debt (e.g., restrictive covenants and 
convertibility options) against the costs of equity (e.g., management compensation, share option 
and management ownership). In addition, the theory draws attention to the role that CG can play 
in influencing firms’ choice of financing, as CG has been designed to mitigate agency problems 
and in turn reduce agency costs. It is argued in the literature that CG is able to reduce agency 
costs related to both equity and debt, but its influence on equity financing is more direct 
compared to its influence on debt financing for a number of reasons (Mande et al., 2012). First, 
shareholders’ interests can be better protected from opportunistic actions taken by managers 
through good CG (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Second, CG reduces monitoring costs associated 
with providing credible financial information to equity holders (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Finally, 
debt holders are not in need of CG as much as shareholders are, because they have effective 
protective devices to protect their interest (Chava et al., 2010). Thus, CG minimises agency costs 
to a degree where firms prefer equity issuance over debt financing (Mande et al., 2012). 
However, researchers have been motivated by AT to link internal CG structures along with 
traditional ownership structures with both CS and the choice of financing.  
 
The following subsections will develop the current study’s hypotheses. Specifically, 
hypotheses related to ownership structures, firm-level CG and internal CG mechanisms will be 
developed in order to conduct the empirical part of this study. In doing so, the present study relies 
on the above theories and a considerable number of empirical studies to set out the central 
theoretical arguments that link CG with both CS and the choice of financing. In particular, 
subsection 3.2.1 reviews the literature on CS, whereas literature on the choice of financing is 
reviewed in subsection 3.2.2.    
3.2 PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES  
As previously explained, few studies (e.g., Abdulla, 1998; Omet and Mashharawe, 2002; 
Sbeiti, 2010) has investigated the determinants of CS in Omani listed firms. To the best of the 
study’s knowledge, there is no published study analysing the extent to which firm-level CG 
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drives CS and the choice of financing among Omani listed firms. However, past studies 
conducted in other corporate settings (e.g., Haque et al., 2011; Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki, 
2012; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Mande et al., 2012) investigate a considerable number of 
factors that different CS theories suggest may impact on CS and the choice of financing. Despite 
an extensive body of empirical research, studies analysing the extent to which CG drives CS and 
the choice of financing are limited. A small number of studies have investigated the association 
between CG and CS, and they report evidence that some CG attributes play a role in influencing 
firms to employ lower or higher levels of debt, as well as issuing equity or debt in seeking new or 
additional financing (e.g., Jong et al., 2008; Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Delcoure, 2007, Mande et 
al., 2012).  
3.2.1 Prior Empirical Literature and Hypotheses: Capital Structure  
In line with the literature, the current study draws from CS theories, previous studies and 
Omani context to identify factors, especially CG mechanisms, which may have a direct impact on 
CS among Omani listed firms. In particular, the selected explanatory variables that are 
investigated in this study are chosen for two main reasons. First, CS theories and prior studies 
have shown that these factors are the most closely correlated with CS. Second, data limitations 
force the present study to not include other CG factors that have been examined in the literature. 
In this study, the following determinants will be used to develop the study’s hypotheses. These 
determinants are classified into two main themes. First, ownership variables, including: (i) 
government ownership; (ii) institutional ownership; (iii) foreign ownership; and (iv) block 
ownership. Second, CG variables, including: (i) firm-level CG; (ii) board size; (iii) the presence 
of a CG committee; and (iv) audit firm size. The two themes are discussed in the following 
subsections.   
3.2.1.1 Ownership Variables   
Prior studies have examined the effect that ownership structures have on firms’ financial 
behaviour. In particular, it is often argued that shareholders’ rights can affect CS (Friend and 
Lang, 1988; Berger, 1997). In this view, ownership structures are suggested to play an important 
role in mitigating asymmetric information and agency costs associated with CS (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the relationship between 
ownership structures and CS has been investigated by a number of studies. The next subsections 
will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments regarding the link between the ownership 
variables and CS, as well as reviewing empirical studies and subsequently developing hypotheses 
for each type of ownership structure.   
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(i) Government ownership (GOVOWN) 
Asymmetric information is expected to be higher in firms with government ownership 
than those with non-government ownership. This is justified by the fact that government interests 
are not always in line with shareholders’ interests. Managers who are usually appointed by the 
government have interests in profit and non-profit goals, whereas shareholders have interests only 
in maximising their wealth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003). In this view, 
managers in these firms have greater support from the government and use this power to entrench 
themselves from a variety of risks. For instance, managers are motivated to use more leverage, as 
they are not worried about their employment risk or bankruptcy if they fail to make profits 
because the government guarantees their positions, as well as bearing a large portion of potential 
losses. In contrast, and in order to enjoy free available cash, managers in such firms may engage 
in excessive perquisite consumption by carrying debt at a sub-optimal level because their 
positions are guaranteed by the government, and the market for corporate control will not be 
effective in disciplining them as the government is expected to be the major long-term investor.    
However, the existing literature has presented limited evidence of the effect of 
government ownership on CS. Prior empirical evidence is generally consistent with the positive 
association between government ownership and CS (e.g., Gul, 1999; Al-Sakran, 2001; Dewenter 
and Malatesta, 2001; Li et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011; Alipour et al., 2015). For instance, using 
pooled cross-sectional observations of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1990 to 
1995, Gul (1999) provides empirical evidence that government ownership is positively correlated 
with debt ratio. Similarly, using a sample of 1,111 Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 2009, Liu et 
al. (2011) report a positive impact of government ownership on CS. In contrast to the positive 
findings observed in the above studies, there is less empirical evidence of no significant 
relationship between government ownership and CS. For example, using a sample of 71 UAE 
listed firms in 2006, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) report empirical evidence that government 
ownership has no significant effect on CS. In Oman, the government, as in many emerging 
countries, has a considerable number of shares in listed firms. Therefore, analysing the extent to 
which government ownership drives CS becomes empirical. In line with the positive perspective 
of the above argument and consistent with the positive empirical evidence, the first hypothesis is 
that: 
 
 
 
H1. There is a statistically significant positive association between government 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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(ii) Institutional ownership (INSOWN) 
The greater monitoring power usually associated with institutional investors has been 
suggested to play a crucial role in reducing managers’ ability to engage in excessive perquisite 
consumption and forcing managers to make decisions in line with shareholders’ interests 
(Shliefer and Vishny, 1986). This may suggest that institutional investors with a large stake of 
shares can have an impact on CS (Crutchley et al., 1999). Theoretically, it has been argued that 
large institutional investors have the ability and resources to obtain more information than 
individual investors, as well as having knowledgeable experts whose can professionally evaluate 
firms’ CSs (Smith, 1976; Lev, 1988; Chung et al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 2004). More 
importantly, large institutional investors can use their voting power against harmful amendments 
that could lead to reduce shareholder wealth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008). In this regard, firms with large institutional ownership may tend to employ lower levels of 
leverage because their higher communication and monitoring dispense of them the use debt 
financing to reduce agency problems (Hsu and Wang, 2013). In contrast, it can be argued that 
large institutional investors may force managers to use higher levels of debt because the higher 
level of leverage will convince institutional investors that managers have less free cash to control 
as debt commits them to paying fixed interest payments, and hence they will be less able to 
engage in excessive perquisite consumption.  
Empirically, limited research has been conducted to investigate the relationship between 
firm-level CS and institutional ownership. Previous empirical evidence is generally consistent 
with a negative association between the percentage of ownership held by institutional investors 
and firm-level CS (e.g., Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Bathala et al., 1994; Grier and 
Zychowicz, 1994; Crutchley and Jensen, 1996; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Hussainey and 
Aljifri, 2012; Michaely and Vincent, 2012; Hsu and Wang, 2013). For instance, Hsu and Wang 
(2013) examined the relationship between institutional ownership and CS using a sample of 624 
listed firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 2005 to 2011. They report evidence 
that institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm-level CS. Similarly, Michaely and 
Vincent (2012) report US evidence that firms with large institutional investors, on average, have 
relatively low leverage ratios. There has been little evidence of different results. For example, 
using US data from two-year periods (1983-1987; 1989-1993), Crutchley et al. (1999) report 
evidence that institutional ownership impacted positively on debt only in the 1983-1987 period. 
Using a sample of 41 Jordanian listed firms over 2001 to 2005, Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed 
(2009) also report evidence that institutional ownership is positively, but not significantly related 
to CS. In consistent with the negative theoretical prediction and in line with negative empirical 
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evidence, however, it can be hypothesised that institutional ownership is more likely to influence 
negatively on CS as follows:  
 
 
 
 
(iii) Foreign ownership (FOROWN) 
Due to the increase in international trade, foreign investors are expected to play an 
important role in corporate policy decisions. In particular, it has been suggested that foreign 
ownership can affect CS. Theoretically, prior literature provides both positive and negative 
predictions regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and firm-level CS. On the one 
hand, foreign shareholders may tend to force firms to employ higher levels of leverage as a 
governance device to control managerial self-interest, because they face higher levels of 
information asymmetry compared with domestic shareholders, resulting from distance and 
language obstacles (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Further, firms with 
a large proportion of foreign ownership may tend to use more debt because they can rely on 
foreign shareholders’ reputation and relationships to have access to international markets (Le and 
Phung, 2013). More importantly, and despite many countries in emerging markets opening their 
stock markets to foreign investors, considerable number of them do not allow foreign investors to 
own more than 49%, which may limit the monitoring role of foreign ownership (Le and Phung, 
2013). This may mean that foreign ownership may not be a substitute for debt (Jensen, 1986; 
Kochhar, 1996; Jiraporn et al., 2012). Thus, firms with many foreign investors may need to use 
debt financing to increase their monitoring of managers. On the other hand, firms with large 
foreign ownership are anticipated to have good CG practices in order to meet the expectations of 
foreign investors (Leuz et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Arguably, foreign ownership can 
serve as a substitute mechanism for debt in reducing the conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Hence, firms with a large proportion of foreign ownership might 
not need to use more debt as governance mechanism as managers are monitored through different 
CG measures.  
However, there is no substantial body of international evidence evaluating the influence 
of foreign ownership on firm-level CS. In line with the negative perspective of the theoretical 
literature, a number of empirical studies (e.g., Suto, 2003; Li et al., 2009; Gurunlu and Gursoy, 
2010, Anwar and Sun, 2015) report a negative relation between firm-level CS and foreign 
ownership. For instance, using a sample of 417,068 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2004, Li 
H2. There is a statistically significant negative association between institutional 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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et al. (2009) report evidence that foreign ownership in non-listed Chinese firms is negatively 
related to different measures of leverage. Similarly, using data from Turkish firms, Gurunlu and 
Gursoy (2010) provide evidence that foreign ownership impacts negatively on CS. In contrast, Le 
and Phung (2013) document empirical evidence showing a positive effect of foreign ownership 
on Vietnamese listed firms’ CS. Their finding does not support the monitoring role of foreign 
ownership. In contrast to both the positive and negative findings observed in the above studies, 
Zou and Xiao (2006) report evidence that foreign ownership does not have important influences 
on the CS of Chinese firms. In Oman, firms with large portion of shares held by foreign investors 
are likely to use lower levels of leverage because foreign ownership is expected to be considered 
as alternative governance mechanism that enables local firms to mitigate the critical influence of 
informal networks where managers and directors are anticipated to be driven by family, tribe and 
personal relationships, leading to avoid the additional risk that could be resulted from employ 
higher levels of leverage. Hence, in line with the negative theoretical and empirical literature, the 
third hypothesis proposed in this study is:  
 
 
 
 
 
(iv) Block ownership (BLKOWN) 
Previous studies indicate that concentration of ownership can play an important role in 
improving CG by increasing the level of monitoring of managers. For instance, Berger et al. 
(1997) report evidence that agency conflicts are reduced when there are increases in block 
ownership. Roberts and Yuan (2006) suggest that managerial efficiency can be enhanced by large 
shareholders. Thus, the ownership of block holders can be expected to determine the level of 
leverage. Large shareholders are more motivated than dispersed shareholders to monitor and 
discipline managers in order to protect their investments (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mehran, 1992). 
Corporate debt can be used by block holders as additional governance mechanism to prevent 
managers from engaging in managerial self-interest. In particular, the voting power of block 
holders gives them greater ability to act as an internal CG device in order to prevent managers 
from adjusting the level of debt finance to meet their own interests (Brailsford et al., 2002). In 
this view, managers in firms with high concentrated ownership may be forced by block holders to 
use higher debt levels in order to act in line with block holders’ interests. This does not conflict 
with the fact that adopting more debt may result in bankruptcy risk because large shareholders 
diversify their investments (Sheikh and Wang, 2012). An inverse relation, however, between the 
level of debt ratio and block ownership can also be expected. Large shareholders have both the 
H3. There is a statistically significant negative association between foreign 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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motivation and the voting power to monitor and discipline managers. For example, block holders 
can eliminate and replace poorly performing managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Arguably, 
the presence of large shareholders serves as a signal to outsiders that the managerial self-interest 
problem is mitigated (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). Thus, firms with high concentrated ownership 
might not need to adopt high levels of leverage because the presence of block ownership seems to 
be a substitute for the function of debt in disciplining and monitoring managers. In this view, the 
relationship between block ownership and debt ratio is expected to be negative.   
  In line with a positive expectation of the theoretical literature, a number of studies have 
offered evidence that ownership concentration impacts positively on CS (e.g., Mehran, 1992; 
Brailsford et al., 2002; Fosberg, 2004; Cespedes et al., 2010; Sheikh and Wang, 2012; Ganguli, 
2013). For instance, using a sample of 124 manufacturing firms over 1973 to 1983, Mehran 
(1992) provides empirical evidence that block ownership and CS are positively correlated. 
Similarly, Brailsford et al. (2002) examined the relation between the presence of block 
shareholders and CS by using 49 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and report that 
block ownership has a positive impact on Australian firms’ CSs. Sheikh and Wang (2012) use 
155 non-financial listed firms on the Karachi Stock Exchange during 2004 to 2008 to provide 
empirical evidence that block ownership is significantly and positively correlated to both total 
and long-term debt ratios. In contrast, prior studies that found negative evidence are very rare. 
For instance, using a sample of 694 Western Europe firms during the period 2002-2006, Santos et 
al. (2014) report evidence that block ownership and debt ratio are negatively correlated. Using a 
sample of 375 Malaysian listed firms during 1995 to 1999, Suto (2003) provides empirical 
evidence consistent with the notion that a higher concentration of ownership mitigates agency 
conflict by solving managerial self-interest, and shows that block ownership is negatively related 
to debt ratio.  
In Oman, due to block holders are expected to assign more importance to family, tribe and 
personal connections than to CG measures, they may use their powers to discipline managers, by 
eliminating those with poor performance and replace them, instead of relying on higher levels of 
leverage. In the meantime, managers are expected to use sub-optimal level of debt in order to 
enjoy free cash where block holders may not be able to force managers to employ higher levels of 
leverage because managers entrench themselves by informal networks that guarantee their 
positions. Both cases suggest that the effect of ownership concentration on CS is expected to be 
negative. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis of this study is:   
 H4. There is a statistically significant negative association between block 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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3.2.1.2 Corporate Governance Variables   
          A limited number of prior studies have investigated how CG mechanisms can influence 
firms’ financing patterns (Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012). The next subsections will briefly set out 
the central theoretical arguments that link CG variables and corporate financial behaviour. The 
empirical evidence is also reviewed in order to develop the study’s hypotheses. Due to data 
limitations, the study limits its hypotheses to the following CG variables, including CG index, 
board size, a presence of a CG committee and audit firm size. 
(i) Firm-level composite corporate governance index (OCGI) 
          Despite the limited number of studies on the relationship between CG and CS, most prior 
empirical literature has examined individual CG mechanisms rather than firm-level CG (Haque et 
al., 2011). This may suggest that the association between CG and CS is still not entirely clear 
(Jiraporn et al., 2012). Previous studies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Cyert et al., 2002; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008) argue that it is imperative to examine CG 
mechanisms as an integrated system instead of testing them independently because some of them 
can complement or substitute each other. In response to these calls, the present study measures 
CG by employing the CG index (OCGI) based on the 2002 Omani code of CG in order to 
investigate how CS is influenced by aggregated CG quality. As predicted by AT, debt financing 
can be used as CG mechanism in mitigating agency conflicts between ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Specifically, managers will be less able to engage in excessive 
perquisite consumption because debt commits them to paying fixed interest payments, leaving 
less free cash available for them to control (Jensen, 1986). Arguably, managers are more likely to 
carry debt at a sub-optimal level because they can enjoy available free cash and protect 
themselves from additional constraints (Jiraporn et al., 2012). In this view, poor CG firms need 
more debt to act as a CG mechanism compared with firms with better CG. Therefore, leverage is 
expected to be higher in poor CG firms (i.e., higher leverage substitutes for weaker CG 
structures) in order to alleviate agency costs and align managers’ interests with shareholders. As a 
result, the association between CS and CG is anticipated to be negative.  
          Prior limited empirical evidence (e.g., Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Florackis and Ozkan, 
2009; Rijal and Bahadur, 2010; Haque et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2012) is generally consistent 
with the negative expectation of the theoretical literature in examining the association between 
CG and leverage. For instance, Jiraporn et al. (2012) investigate the link between CG and 
leverage and report evidence that leverage and governance quality are inversely related. 
Similarly, Haque et al. (2011) examine the relationship between firm-level CG and the CS pattern 
of Bangladeshi listed firms. They provide evidence that poor CG firms have higher levels of debt 
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financing. Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) draw similar conclusions that the strength of 
shareholders’ rights impacts negatively on CS. Given the negative predictions of the theoretical 
and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that firm CG is more likely to negatively influence 
CS. Hence, the fifth hypothesis of this study is:   
 
 
 
 
(ii) Board size (BSIZE) 
It is widely accepted that the board of directors is one of the most effective internal CG 
mechanisms, with an effective role in alleviating different types of agency problems and ensuring 
that firms operate efficiently and competitively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). In 
particular, the board is viewed as the highest decision-making body responsible for providing 
clear strategies to guide managers in structuring CS (Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Sheikh and 
Wang, 2012). Due to its importance, the relation between a firm’s board size and its CS has been 
investigated in the literature to explore whether firms with large boards tend to have higher or 
lower levels of leverage, and the results are inconclusive. Theoretically, firms with larger boards 
can enjoy more diversity in experience and skills than firms with smaller boards, which allows 
them to effectively mitigate agency conflicts between ownership and control (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Klein, 2002). Further, Berger et al. (1997) argue that firms with 
larger boards of directors are more likely to put more pressure on managers to improve firm 
performance. This suggests that such firms may not need to use more debt in order to monitor 
managers to act in line with shareholders’ interests. Arguably, firms with larger boards are 
expected to follow low leverage policies, reflecting a negative relationship between larger board 
size and leverage. In contrast, larger boards are more vulnerable to being dominated by managers 
where managers can exert pressure on boards of directors (Jensen, 1993). This suggests that firms 
with larger boards may need to employ higher levels of leverage in order to mitigate such 
pressure and align agents’ interests with those of principals’ interests.    
          Empirically, the negative relationship has been reported by a number of studies (e.g., 
Mehran, 1992; Berger et al. 1997; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011). For example, using a sample 
of 379 UK listed firms around the period 1991 to 2002, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) report a 
negative association between board size and CS. In contrast, and in line with the positive 
expectation of the theoretical literature, other studies (e.g., Wen et al., 2002; Abor, 2007; Sheikh 
and Wang, 2012) have offered empirical evidence that board size is positively related to CS. For 
H5. There is a statistically significant negative association between firm-level 
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instance, using a sample of 155 Pakistani public firms during 2004 to 2008, Sheikh and Wang 
(2012) report evidence indicating that the coefficient of board size is statistically significant and 
positively related to both total debt and long-term debt ratios. However, and in contrast to the 
negative and positive findings observed in the above studies, there exists other empirical evidence 
of no significant relationship between board size and CS. For example, using a sample of 71 UAE 
listed firms in 2006, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) report evidence that board size has no 
significant effect on CS. Hence, and in view of mixed theoretical and empirical literature, the 
sixth hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
 
 
 
(iii)Corporate governance committee (CGCOM) 
          Board committees (e.g., remuneration, nomination, risk, audit and CG committees) are 
considered to be good internal CG mechanisms that assist the board in performing its duties and 
making decisions that lead to improvement in the firm’s value. In particular, a CG committee can 
play a very important role in ensuring that CG recommendations adopted by the firm are both 
followed and regularly reviewed. In this sense, it has been argued that firms that establish CG 
committees are expected to have better CG practices than those that do not set up CG committees 
(Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). In light of continuing debate in the CS literature on the 
determinants of CS, one element of board committees, namely the presence of a CG committee, 
has not been examined by researchers. Specifically, whether or not the presence of a CG 
committee could be a significant determinant of firm-level CS is yet to be examined. AT assumes 
that poorly governed firms are anticipated to have higher levels of leverage because this leverage 
is used to discipline managers to engage in less excessive perquisite consumption and act in line 
with shareholders’ interests, as they will have less free cash free available to control. In this view, 
firms with CG committees are more likely to exhibit fewer propensities to engage in higher levels 
of leverage compared with those that do not establish CG committees. This is because these firms 
consider the presence of a CG committee as a substitute for debt that can align managers’ 
interests to be in line with shareholders’ interests. Arguably, a CG committee-CS relation is more 
likely to be negative.  
          Given the fact that no empirical studies on the relationship between the presence of a CG 
committee and CS exist, Oman provides a good setting to examine this relation. In particular, the 
2002 Omani code of good CG requires listed firms to only establish audit committees, but several 
listed firms have recognised the CG committee’s importance by either setting up a CG committee 
H6. There is a statistically significant association between board size and the 
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or assigning a CG committee’s functions to an audit committee. However, considering the 
negative predictions of the theoretical literature and the absence of empirical evidence, it can be 
hypothesised that the presence of a CG committee is more likely to negatively influence CS as 
follows:  
 
 
 
(iv) Audit firm size (BIG4) 
          The external auditor has been suggested to be one of the most effective CG mechanisms to 
reduce information asymmetries that exist between managers and shareholders, hence reducing 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). One important issue 
related to the role of the external auditor in mitigating information asymmetry is the external 
auditor’s quality, which can be significantly influenced by audit firm size (DeAngelo, 1981). In 
this view, larger audit firms are more likely to provide higher audit quality than smaller firms 
because they have more resources and experience, and care very much about their reputation as 
providers of quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Uang et al., 2006). The 
experience, knowledge and financial strength that larger audit firms have improves their 
independence and ability to reduce information asymmetries, as well as moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, which may well be greater for firms audited by smaller audit firms. This 
suggests that audit firm size can be considered a significant CG determinant of firm-level CS. 
Theoretically, and as predicted by POT, firms whose suffer from information asymmetry are 
expected to have higher levels of leverage because of lower agency costs associated with debt 
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is further supported by SGT, which assumes that 
managers will use more leverage when the level of asymmetric information is greater in order to 
signal that their firms are in a good financial position. Arguably, firms audited by larger audit 
firms are more likely to be less affected by the problem of information asymmetry; hence, they 
are expected to have lower levels of leverage.  
          Empirically, the relationship between audit firm size and CS is not widely investigated in 
the literature. For instance, using a sample of 71 UAE listed firms in 2006, Hussainey and Aljifri 
(2012) report evidence that audit firm size has no significant effect on CS. Given the limited 
international evidence on the effect of audit firm size on CS, Oman also provides a good context 
to examine this effect. In particular, the 2002 Omani code of good CG recognises the importance 
of external auditors by requiring listed firms to obtain a certificate from them indicating a number 
of governance issues, including: (i) adequacy and efficacy of a firm’s internal control systems; 
(ii) whether a firm has the ability to carry out its business; and (iii) the firm’s ability to comply 
H7. There is a statistically significant negative association between the presence 
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with its internal control systems. Further, Omani listed firms are required by Capital Market Law 
to obtain a certificate from external auditor on their CG practices. However, it can be 
hypothesised that audit firm size is more likely to negatively influence CS as follows:   
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Prior Empirical Literature and Hypotheses: The Choice of Financing 
          While previous studies have examined certain factors that explain a firm’s choice between 
equity and debt (e.g., Marsh, 1982; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2008), the impact of 
CG structures on the choice of financing has received little attention from researchers. Thus, and 
similar to subsection 3.2.1, this subsection is divided into two parts. The first part addresses 
ownership variables, including: (i) government ownership; (ii) institutional ownership; (iii) 
foreign ownership; and (iv) block ownership. The second part addresses CG variables including: 
(i) firm-level CG; (ii) board size; (iii) the presence of a CG committee; and (iv) audit firm size.  
3.2.2.1 Ownership Variables  
          The influence and monitoring power of different types of shareholders have been suggested 
to play an important role in improving CG (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Leuz et al., 2010; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011), which in turn affects corporate policy decisions in general and the choice 
of financing in particular. The next subsections will briefly set out the central theoretical 
arguments and empirical literature regarding the link between a number of ownership structures 
and equity issuance (the choice of financing).  
(i) Government ownership (GOVOWN) 
        The CS literature on the determinants of a firm’s choice to issue equity or debt shows that 
one type of ownership structure, namely government ownership, has not been examined by 
previous studies. Specifically, whether or not the existence of large government ownership could 
be a significant determinant of a firm’s choice is yet to be examined. Firms with greater 
government ownership are expected to suffer more from asymmetric information. This is because 
the government has interests in profit and non-profit goals; thus, shareholders’ interests may not 
be the primary objective for the government (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Agency costs would be higher in such firms due to the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers, who are usually appointed by the government. As predicted by AT, these firms are 
expected to use debt financing in order to reduce the conflict of interest. Managers of these firms 
H8. There is a statistically significant negative association between audit firm 
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are also motivated to issue debt over equity for the following reasons: (i) they can easily obtain 
loans from local providers at favourable rates by taking advantage of the government being a 
major investor in these firms (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001); (ii) they can borrow from the 
government itself at lower rates (Friend and Lang, 1988); (iii) information costs associated with 
debt are lower (Myers, 1984); and (iv) because these firms are interested in profit and non-profit 
goals, they recognise that new investors may consider them less attractive; hence, issuing equity 
will not be a good decision to obtain external financial sources. Empirically, CS literature does 
not provide international evidence examine the potential impact of government ownership on the 
choice of financing. Despite the luck of evidence, the ninth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Institutional ownership (INSOWN) 
          It is widely recognised that institutional ownership has influence and monitoring power to 
improve CG and reduce agency costs. Using a sample of 1,005 industrial bond issues over 1991 
to 1996, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) report evidence that institutional ownership plays a crucial 
role in reducing managers’ opportunism and hence promoting CG. Thus, it can be argued that 
institutional investors are more able to influence firms to issue equity or debt in order to finance 
their activities compared with individual investors, for the following reasons.  
First, institutional holdings have the ability and resources to obtain more information than 
other small investors (Smith, 1976). Second, they have superior knowledge and expertise with 
which to interpret and evaluate firms’ decisions (Chung et al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 2004). 
Finally, their voting power allows them to monitor management decisions (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). This suggests that agency costs would be lower in firms with a large stake of 
institutional investors because institutional investors can serve as a useful governance device to 
reduce agency costs and align managerial interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Bathala et al., 1994). In this view, and unlike POT’s predication, 
equity issuance would be less costly in the presence of institutional investors, which may 
motivate firms to issue equity over debt in order to attract new equity capital providers who will 
not need to collect costly private information, as institutional holdings reduce information 
asymmetry. In contrast, firms with large institutional ownership may tend to issue debt in place of 
equity because institutional investors might force firms to issue debt finance in order to increase 
their monitoring. Issuance of debt can offer institutional investors the opportunity to ensure that 
managers have less free cash to control because debt commits managers to paying fixed interest 
H9. There is a statistically significant negative association between government 
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payments, as well as preventing managers from being able to engage in excessive perquisite 
consumption.  
However, there is no substantial body of international evidence evaluating the influence 
of institutional ownership on firms’ choice to issue equity capital or debt finance. For instance, 
using 379 listed firms on the American Stock Exchange from 1976 to 1985, Brous and Kini 
(1994) report evidence that firms with large institutional investors tend to take equity issuance 
decisions. Similar evidence reported by Mande et al. (2012) indicates that firms issuing equity 
tend to have large institutional investors. Given the positive theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence, the next hypothesis is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
(iii) Foreign ownership (FOROWN) 
          As they are becoming prominent shareholders in firms around the world, foreign investors 
are expected to affect corporate policy decisions. In particular, a firm’s choice to issue equity or 
debt in order to finance its activities can be also influenced by foreign ownership. Theoretically, 
higher information asymmetry associated with foreign ownership because of distance and 
language obstacles results in foreign investors especially needing to monitor managerial self-
interest (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). As predicted by AT, large foreign shareholders may tend to 
use debt as a governance device, hence forcing firms to issue debt over equity (Le and Phung, 
2013). In addition, firms may prefer to issue debt as opposed to equity because they take 
advantage of foreign investors’ reputation and relationships to have easy access to international 
capital markets.  
           However, previous studies (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Leuz et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 
2011) suggest that foreign institutional investors are more willing to invest in firms with good CG 
practices. Consequently, firms with large foreign ownership are more likely than domestic firms 
to engage in good CG practices in order to meet foreign investors’ expectations. In this view, 
firms may tend to issue equity in place of debt because they recognise that potential investors 
consider them a good investment opportunity compared with poorly governed firms. Potential 
investors are expected to pay a premium for well governed firms, which motivate such firms to 
issue equity instead of debt. Moreover, firms with large foreign ownership perform relatively 
better than other domestic firms, which can raise their market share. This may encourage such 
firms to issue equity over debt, as they expect additional investors to invest in their firms. 
Empirically, the relationship between foreign ownership and firm’s choice of finance has not 
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been yet examined by previous studies. Hence, in view of mixed theoretical literature and the 
absence of empirical evidence, the next hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
 
 
(iv) Block ownership (BLKOWN) 
          Block ownership has been documented by both theoretical and empirical studies to impact 
on managers’ actions (e.g., Berger et al., 1997; Roberts and Yuan, 2006). This suggests that block 
ownership can significantly affect firms’ choice between equity and debt. Block holders have 
easier access to information, and they may use their voting power to influence management to 
issue equity or debt when firms seek new or additional financing. Further, block holders can lose 
more from managerial self-interest than small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Cyert et 
al., 2002); hence, they have greater incentives to monitor and discipline managers. In this view, 
block holders have been suggested to improve the quality of governance in order to protect their 
investments (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mehran, 1992). Theoretically, debt financing can be used by 
block holders to reduce opportunistic managerial actions and increase their monitoring of 
managers. Thus, firms may be forced by block holders to issue debt over equity in financing their 
investment opportunities. This may result in block holders facing a high level of bankruptcy risk, 
but this can be mitigated by diversifying their portfolio of investments (Sheikh and Wang, 2012). 
The influence of block ownership on firms in terms of issuing debt over equity is also supported 
by the possibility that block holders do not prefer to share potential profits (Ryen et al., 1997; 
Koch and Shenoy, 1999) or control rights (Cespedes et al., 2010) with new shareholders. Further, 
and in cases where many shares owned by banks, firms may be forced to borrow from banks and 
issue debt in order to obtain new or additional financing (Cespedes et al., 2010).   
In contrast, firms with large shareholders may tend to issue equity as opposed to debt. 
Arguably, the presence of block holders is considered as an internal CG mechanism that can be 
used to monitor and discipline managers. Thus, it is expected that block holders are more likely to 
encourage firms to engage in good CG practices in order to protect their investments (Mande et 
al., 2012). In this view, firms with large shareholders can be seen as attractive investments by 
outsiders whose are willing to pay high share prices in order to invest in such firms. Hence, firms 
may take advantage of block ownership by issuing equity in place of debt in order to signal that 
the adverse selection problems are reduced as a result of the presence of block holders.   
          However, there is no international evidence examining the influence of block ownership on 
the choice of finance. Therefore, the current study contributes to the continuing theoretical and 
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empirical debate on how firms select between financing instruments in meeting their external 
financing needs. In Oman, because block holders are expected to be influenced by informal rules, 
debt financing may not be used by them as governance mechanism. Instead, they are expected to 
use their powers in appointing managers to monitor and discipline managers. Further, the high 
concentration of ownership renders some external CG mechanisms, such as the market for 
corporate control, ineffective in motivating managers to engage in better CG practices. This may 
discourage new investors to buy shares in such firms, which in turn does not motivate firms to 
issue equity. Considering these expectations, the relationship between ownership concentration 
and the choice of financing is needed to be investigated. Thus, the next hypothesis in this study 
is:  
3.2.2.2 Corporate Governance Variables   
          Good internal CG structures can be expected to influence debt or equity issuance when a 
firm seeks new or additional financing. The evidence regarding the relationship between CG 
structures and debt or equity financing is rare. For instance, Mande et al. (2012) argue that better-
governed firms are more likely to issue equity over debt in meeting their external financing 
needs. The next subsections will briefly present the theoretical basis that links internal CG 
structures with firms’ choice of financing, along with empirical evidence.  
(i) Firm-level composite corporate governance index (OCGI) 
          Since the separation between ownership and control, managers are motivated to act at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Related literature suggests that 
CG is able to mitigate different sorts of agency conflicts. In particular, whether firms should issue 
debt or equity in order to finance their investments can raise a potential conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders among others. In this view, CG has been suggested to reduce 
agency costs associated with both equity and debt issuances. On the one hand, Mande et al. 
(2012) argue that CG can mitigate agency conflict of interest to a level where firms can choose 
equity issuance over debt issuance. CG frameworks protect equity investors from opportunistic 
managers by providing good mechanisms to monitor managers in order to ensure that they make 
efficient investment decisions. Thus, equity capital providers will not need to collect costly 
private information because CG reduces information asymmetry by encouraging managers to 
disclose financial and non-financial information to equity investors, in addition to other 
stakeholders (Cohen et al., 2004).  
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On the other hand, effective CG can also protect debt holders from adverse selection and 
moral hazard of managers as managers may tend to make decisions that conflict with debt 
holders’ interests. In this regard, debt holders are expected to offer firms a lower cost of debt 
when CG is present, which reduces the possibility of default risk and bankruptcy (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003). Thus, better governed firms may tend to issue debt in place of equity. Arguably, 
the influence of CG on firms in terms of issuing equity capital is more direct compared to its 
impact on debt finance. This may be justified by the fact that the effect of CG on the cost of debt 
is assumed to be relatively small because debt holders would not entirely rely on CG mechanisms 
to protect themselves from agency risk, as they have more direct protective mechanisms, like debt 
covenants and collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Chava et al., 2010; Mande et al., 2012). In 
contrast, equity holders utilise more CG mechanisms (e.g., board of directors, CG disclosure and 
external auditors) to protect their investments, as they have no other protective devices 
comparable to debt holders. Effective CG can assist firms in reducing the cost of equity, which in 
turn increases their willingness to issue equity rather than debt, as well as increasing the 
willingness of investors to supply funds (Cohen et al., 2004; Mande et al., 2012). Further, better 
governed firms may tend to issue equity as they recognise that equity investors prefer to invest in 
such firms and are willing to pay more for shares of firms that are better governed (Leuz et al., 
2010). However, the empirical literature relating to the association between CG and firms’ choice 
is rare. For instance, using a sample of 2,049 firm-year observations, Mande et al. (2012) report 
US empirical evidence that firms with good CG tend to choose equity over debt. In line with 
positive theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, the next hypothesis is as follows:   
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Board size (BSIZE)  
          As indicated earlier, there is consensus in the literature that the board of directors is 
essential to ensuring good governance. This is due to the fact that an effective board is expected 
to mitigate agency problems and improve firm performance. In this sense, the board is expected 
to play a crucial role in alleviating potential conflict between managers and shareholders over a 
firm’s choice of external financial resources. Theoretically, the debate over whether the size of 
the board should be larger or smaller in order to ensure good governance, which may arguably 
affect firms’ choice to issue equity or debt, is still ongoing. A number of studies (e.g., Jensen, 
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008) argue that small boards are more 
connected with strong governance, whereas other studies (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
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Goodstein et al., 1994; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) claim that larger boards are more closely 
associated with good governance. Despite the relative uniqueness of having larger boards with 
diverse experience and skills, firms with larger boards can easily be dominated by the Chief 
Executive Officer, as well as having problems related to coordination and communication 
compared with firms with smaller boards (Jensen, 1993;  Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Arguably, 
firms with small boards are more likely to issue equity capital over debt finance because they 
recognise that equity capital is attracted by good CG in place, which is presented by small boards.  
          Empirically, and in spite of Mande et al.’s (2012) study, individual studies investigating 
CS determinants have not considered board size as a potential factor influencing firms’ choice of 
financing. Using a sample of 2,049 US firm-year observations during the period 1998 to 2006, 
Mande et al. (2012) investigated the possible relationship between board size and issuing equity 
capital. Their univariate tests’ results indicate that firms issuing equity tend to have smaller 
boards. Hence, it can be hypothesised that board size is likely to influence firms’ choice to issue 
equity capital or debt finance as follows:  
 
 
 
 
(iii) Corporate governance committee (CGCOM) 
          The functions of the CG committee are mainly to assist the board to fulfil its 
responsibilities. Limited related literature (e.g., Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2012a) suggests that 
firms with CG committees are expected to be more able to reduce the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders by ensuring that CG provisions adopted by a firm are both followed 
and regularly reviewed. In this sense, and as has been argued in the literature that  the influence 
of CG on firms to issue equity capital is more direct compared to its impact on debt finance 
(Mande et al., 2012), it can be argued that the presence of a CG committee may result in firms 
tending to issue equity over debt. In contrast, AT suggests debt financing policy as governance 
mechanism in mitigating agency conflict between ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Arguably, a CG committee may encourage firms to use debt issuance as a useful 
governance mechanism in order to support other CG mechanisms already in place.  
          However, the empirical literature does not provide any international evidence identifying 
the presence of a CG committee as a factor determining a firm’s choice to issue equity capital or 
debt finance in order to finance their activities. In line with the view that the influence of CG on 
firms in terms of issuing equity capital is more direct compared to its impact on debt finance; 
hence, the next hypothesis in this study is:  
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(iv)  Audit firm size (BIG4) 
          It is widely accepted that high-quality auditors play a crucial role in protecting shareholders 
from opportunistic managers by providing better monitoring of firms’ financial statements 
(Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Arguably, firms audited by large audit firms are 
expected to have less asymmetric information than those audited by small audit firms. This may 
be explained by the fact that larger audit firms require more disclosure than smaller firms because 
they are concerned about their reputation as providers of quality audits, and are less sensitive to 
clients’ pressure in conflict situations (DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Uang et al., 2006). 
Further, the higher audit quality provided by large audit firms is expected to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between managers and suppliers of capital. In this view, audit firm size 
can be suggested to have an impact on a firm’s decisions between equity and debt. Arguably, 
audit firm size can influence both equity and debt issuances, but its effect on equity issuance is 
more direct compared to its impact on debt finance. Creditors consider external auditors’ reports 
to be useful and crucial information when they evaluate firms, as well as the amount of 
investment or loans that are going to be granted to firms (Gomez-Guillamon, 2003). Unlike debt 
holders, and despite the market for corporate control, equity holders utilise more external auditors 
to protect their investments, as they have no external protective devices. Thus, firms audited by 
larger audit firms are considered by equity investors as having better CG. Because these firms are 
aware that investors are willing to pay more for better governed firms’ shares, they are more 
likely to issue equity over debt in order to raise part or all of the finance required to undertake 
investment projects.   
          However, and despite Chang et al.’s (2009) study, individual studies investigating the 
choice of security issuance determinants have not considered audit firm size as a potential CG 
factor influencing firm’s choice of financing. Chang et al. (2009) report evidence that firms 
audited by Big Six audit firms are more likely to issue equity over debt than those audited by 
non-Big six firms. Given the lack of empirical evidence, the next hypothesis proposed in this 
study is: 
 
 
 
 
H15. There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence 
of a CG committee and equity issuance.  
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
          This section considers the research design. It will discuss a number of issues related to data 
and research methodology, including the rationale for methodological choices. Specifically, this 
section is divided into main subsections. Subsection 4.1 describes the sample selection and data 
sources. Subsection 4.2 discusses the research methodology.  
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
          The main objective of this subsection is to describe the sample selection procedure, the 
types of data employed and the sources of data used in order to answer the research questions. 
Specifically, this subsection is further divided into three subsections. Subsection 4.1.1 describes 
the sample selection procedure. Subsection 4.1.1.1 explains the criteria for selecting the sample. 
Subsection 4.1.2 addresses data sources.  
4.1.1 Sample Selection 
          As discussed in Section 1, the main objective of this study is to empirically investigate the 
determinants of CS and the choice of finance among Omani listed firms. The selected sample 
used to undertake this study was obtained from firms listed on MSM, Oman. As of 31 December 
2011, there were 168 listed firms on the MSM, whose annual reports can be found and accessed 
through the MSM’s official website. Table 22 presents a summary of the sample selection 
procedure. Panel B of Table 22 shows that the industrial composition of Omani listed firms is 
based on nine industries,24 including basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, 
financial, industrial, utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and gas. It displays all the 
firms that were listed on the MSM and indicates that 94% of the total MSM population is 
dominated by basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials and industrials 
industries whereas about 6% of the total MSM population is contributed by utilities, health care, 
telecommunications, and oil and gas.  
4.1.1.1  The Criteria for Selecting the Sample  
          In selecting firms, the current study has set specific criteria in order for a particular firm to 
be included in the final sample. First, a firm must have the required CG data for at least one year 
during the period 2001 to 2011, inclusive. Second, financial accounting information must be 
available for at least one year during the period 2001 to 2011, inclusive. This criterion was set for 
the following reasons; first, the financial year of 2001 is the first year when data was available to 
                                                 
24
See Appendix 1 for a full list of all Omani listed firms employed in this study.  
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be collected from the sources used. Second, the sample ends in the financial year 2011 because it 
is the most recent year for which data was available. Finally, using a 11 year data set 
distinguishes the current study from those that use one year cross-sectional data, which may help 
in ascertaining whether the CG frameworks-CS link holds over time.   
          Under these criteria, and as Panel A of Table 22 shows, firms without significant missing 
data for the period 2001 to 2011 were selected. Specifically, 48 firms were excluded because they 
had no annual reports available, and four firms had to be excluded due to insufficient or missing 
CG or accounting information. The sampled firms in this study are 116 firms out of 168 listed on 
the MSM, which represents 69% of the total population.  
Prior studies exclude financial firms from their samples for theoretical reasons, such as 
those firms are heavily regulated and their leverage may not be interpreted like those of non-
financial firms. The prior studies do not provide empirical evidence to support this argument. In 
emerging country like Oman where its corporate setting is characterised by concentrated 
ownership and weak enforcement of corporate regulations (Albu and Girbina, 2015), it is 
expected that financial firms do not behave significantly differently from non-financial firms. 
Therefore, the current study seeks to investigate whether there is a significant difference in CG’ 
influence on CS and the choice of financing between financial and non-financial firms in a non-
developed country like Oman. This will allow the present study to contribute to the extant 
literature by providing empirical evidence to confirm or reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in terms of the influence of CG on each of CS and the choice of financing 
between financial and non-financial among Omani listed firms. In doing so, the study relies on 
116 non-financial and financial firms in order to examine its hypotheses, and then uses 87 non-
financial firms to check the extent to which the reported results (based on all firms) are robust or 
sensitive to financial firms.  
The sample of 116 firms is large enough to perform the empirical part of this study. In 
particular, a sample of 116 firms is larger than the samples of previous Omani studies. Omet and 
Mashharawe (2002) employed a sample of 38 Omani listed firms over the period 1996 to 2001, 
whereas Sbeiti (2010) used only 42 listed firms for the period 1998-2005 to investigate CS 
determinants. Due to availability, accessibility, funding and time constraints (as the study had to 
be completed within the timeframe of a PhD), unbalanced data from 116 firms with 1,152 firm-
year observations was considered to be sufficient to make a significant contribution to the extant 
literature.  
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Table 22: A summary of sample selection and distribution of sampled firms by industry 
Panel A:  Sample selection process 
Criteria No. of firms 
Total listed firms on the MSM as of 31/12/2011                                           168 
         Less: Firms have no data available                                           (48) 
                   Firms have missing data                                              (4) 
Final sample used                                           116 
Panel B: Distribution of firms by industry 
Sector No. of firms 
  Basic materials   22 
  Consumer goods   21 
  Consumer services   21 
  Financial   29 
  Industrial   13 
  Utilities    5 
  Health care    2 
  Telecommunications    2 
  Oil & Gas    1 
Total                                           116 
Source: Muscat Securities Market’s website  
 
4.1.2 Data Sources 
          This study employs two categories of data. These include CG, and both financial and 
accounting information. Although firms may use other media to disclose their information, this 
study relies mainly on firms’ annual reports25 as a source of data for the same reasons that have 
been indicated in essay 1 (see Subsection 4.2.1.1). These reports are audited by external auditors 
in accordance with the Omani Companies Act, and contain financial and non-financial 
information. Furthermore, listed firms are required by the Capital Market Law to obtain a 
certificate from an external auditor indicating whether they complied with the 2002 Omani code 
of CG or not. Arguably, a high degree of credibility can be adequately assured by relying on 
these reports to extract the required information. Therefore, CG and ownership variables were 
manually extracted from the sampled firms’ annual reports whereas financial information was 
obtained from Database. The required information was obtained from four main sources: (i) the 
Rest of World Filings of the Perfect Information Database, (ii) DataStream, (iii) firms’ websites 
and (iv) MSM’s website. Firms with missing reports were contacted by telephone and/or e-mail 
in order to obtain their missing reports.  
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
          This subsection discusses the research methodology. Specifically, subsection 4.2.1 will 
define the dependent variables for the two research questions. The issues that will be covered 
include the proxies used to measure Omani listed firms’ CS and whether these measurements 
                                                 
25
Omani listed firms are required to provide annual reports containing the following: (i) balance sheet; (ii) profit and loss; (iii) 
cash flow statement; (iv) CG chapter; (v) auditor report on financial statement; (vi) auditor report on CG; (vii) 
management discussion and analysis; (viii) notes of financial statement; and (ix) chairman’s report.  
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should be based on book or market values. Further, equity issuance as a dependent variable for 
the choice of financing will be discussed. Subsection 4.2.2 will discuss CG and ownership 
structures proxies used as independent variables. Subsection 4.2.3 will discuss the justification 
for control variables. Subsection 4.2.4 will discuss the model specification for both CS and the 
choice of financing. Subsection 4.2.5 will refer to the issues that need to be tested before and after 
examining the study’s hypotheses.    
4.2.1 Definition of Dependent Variables  
         The study uses two dependent variables to answer the two research questions. Capital 
structure is used as the first dependent variable to examine CS determinants (the first research 
question), whereas equity issuance is the second dependent variable used to investigate the choice 
of financing determinants (the second research question). This subsection defines the dependent 
variables and explains how they were measured. It is further divided into two subsections. 
Subsection 4.2.1.1 defines the dependent variable of CS. Subsection 4.2.1.2 defines the 
dependent variable of choice of financing.  
4.2.1.1 The Dependent Variable: Capital Structure  
          As mentioned above, the first dependent variable in this study is firm capital structure 
(FCS). There are two methodological issues that need to be addressed in relation to the FCS as a 
dependent variable, including: (i) the choice of the FCS measurement; and (ii) book or market 
values to be used for the FCS measurement.     
(i) Capital Structure Measurement 
          The literature shows that different measures have been designed to measure the FCS. Three 
measures are used in this study to examine the FCS. These measures are: (i) total debt (main 
measure); (ii) short-term debt; and (iii) long-term debt (robustness analyses). The main measure 
has been chosen for three main reasons. First, there is no theoretical framework on which 
measurement should be used to calculate the FCS. Second, there is no consensus within the 
literature on a particular measurement being the best proxy for the FCS. Third, the current study 
’s main objective is to examine the extent to which CG has influence on the impact of debt 
financing on shareholders’ equity. The use of debt-to-equity ratio is believed to aid the current 
study to better understand to what extent good CG structures are helpful in assisting shareholders 
with respect to debt financing. In this regard, Rajan and Zingles (1995) suggest that the objective 
of the CS’s analysis is regarded as the basis on which researchers can select a particular measure 
of CS. Arguably, this measure is considered as a good measurement in the CG context where 
managers may tend to employ higher levels of debt that lead to seriously damage shareholders’ 
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equity. Further, Gilligan and Wright (2008) stat that “The ratio of total bank debt to equity 
invested is an approximate measure of this risk. Since the detailed structure of the loan package 
in any particular transaction is not usually publicly available at the time of a transaction, the 
ratio of total debt total equity is used by many commentators as a measure of the aggregate 
financial risk in the buy-out market”. Third, the choice of this measure in line with considerable 
number of prior studies in general and CG literature in particular (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Jordan et al., 1998; Gul and Kealey, 1999; Brailaford et al., 2002; 
Zeitun and Tian, 2007; Hasan and Butt, 2009; Lazarides and Pitoska, 2009; Cheung et al., 2010; 
Saad, 2010; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Uddin and Hassan, 
2013, Agyei and Owusu, 2014; Tuncay, 2014). Thus, the total debt ratio will be used as a main 
measurement of CS whereas long and short-term ratios will be used as alternative measurements 
in order to check whether using alternative definitions of CS may result in different results.   
(ii) Book or Market Values for Capital Structure Measurement 
          The second methodological issue is whether the FCS measures should be based on book or 
market values. Despite the fact that CS theories are mostly based on market values of debt 
(Sweeney et al., 1997; Bowman, 1980; Arnold, 2005), a considerable number of empirical studies 
use book debt ratio to measure the FCS, as well as to examine those theories (e.g., Friend and 
Lang, 1988; Rajan and Zingles, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Firm’s CS 
measures are defined based on book values in this study rather than market values, for the 
following reasons. First, data limitations force the current study to measure the FCS based on 
book values rather than market values. Second, prior evidence (e.g., Sweeney et al., 1997; 
Bowman, 1980) indicates that the high correlation between book and market values indicates that 
misspecification due to book value of debt is usually very small. Hence, the reliance on book 
leverage instead of market leverage would not be a serious limitation (Fama and French, 2002; 
Leary and Roberts, 2005). Third, unlike firms in developed countries, commercial banks are 
regarded as the main external sources of finance for Omani firms because bond market is inactive 
(Sbeiti, 2010). Thus, firms must provide guarantees in the form of fixed assets in order to obtain 
loans. Arguably, fixed assets are usually priced at book value; hence, book-value measures of 
leverage are considered to be more appropriate than market values. Finally, in line with prior 
studies (e.g., Al-Ajimi et al., 2009; Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012), the FCS measures are 
defined based on book value, which can assist in comparing the findings of the current study with 
those of prior studies. Therefore, the dependent variable, FCS, is measured by book total debt 
(main analysis), short-term debt and long-term debt (robustness analyses) scaled by the total 
equity of a firm.  
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4.2.1.2 The Dependent Variable: The Choice of Financing  
          The second dependent variable in this study is the choice of financing. Based on the 
concept that, on average, firms with better CG tend to issue equity over debt and following 
Mande et al. (2012), equity issuance (EISSUE) represents the choice of financing in this study, 
and it is measured as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm issues equity, and a value 
of 0 if a firm issues debt. Further, and in line with prior studies (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Chang et al., 2009), the current study adopts a cash flow approach in 
order to measure the EISSUE because cash flow accounts could yield less noise in constructs 
compared to the balance sheet approach (Kayhan and Titman, 2007).  
4.2.2 Corporate Governance Measurements  
          As discussed in essay 1 (see Subsection 4.2.1) and as illustrated in Table 2, firm-level CG 
is measured by the OCGI (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012; Mande et al., 2012), whereas board size 
(BSIZE) is the number of board members at the end of the financial year (e.g., Barako et al, 
2006a; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012). Similarly, and consistent with past 
studies (e.g., Aly et al., 2010; Chau and Gray, 2010; Mande et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a), CG 
committee (CGCOM) and audit firm26 (BIG4) were measured as dummy variables taking a value 
of 1 if the firm has a CG committee, and 0 otherwise, as well as a value of 1 if a firm is audited 
by one of the big four auditing firms, and 0 otherwise. In addition to firm-level CG and internal 
CG variables, prior studies consider the impact of different types of ownership structure on the 
FCS and the EISSUE. As indicated in Subsections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2.1 and due to data limitations, 
this study focuses on four types of ownership structure: government ownership, institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership and block ownership. In this regard, ownership variables were 
measured in line with previous studies. Specifically, and as presented in Table 23, government 
ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) 
were measured in as a percentage of each type of ownership, out of total firm shareholdings (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012a). Block ownership (BLKOWN) is measured by the total number of shares held by large 
owners who have at least 5% of the total firm’s shares (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 
2006a; Samaha et al., 2012).  
                                                 
26
A big audit firm is defined as one of the following audit firms: Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
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4.2.3 Justification for Control Variables  
          In addition to both CG and ownership variables, the current study includes a number of 
control variables in order to reduce omitted variables. Specifically, this subsection is further 
divided into three parts. The first part justifies the inclusion of control variables that are related to 
the FCS, whereas the second part justifies those that are linked to the EISSUE. The final part 
defines the control variables.  
4.2.3.1 Justification for Control Variables: Capital Structure  
          Following prior research and due to data limitations, firm size, growth, profitability, 
tangible assets, dividend policy and business risk are considered the FCS’s control determinants. 
(i) Firm size (LNTA) 
          There is general consensus in prior studies on the influence of firm size on the FCS (e.g., 
Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Dang, 2013), but the nature of the relation is not yet clear. Different 
theoretical explanations have been offered to clarify whether large firms tend to employ higher or 
lower levels of leverage in making their CSs. On the one hand, large firms are expected to use 
more leverage because they are relatively more diversified and less subject to bankruptcy risk 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This is also supported by the fact that 
large firms can enjoy better access to credit markets, as well as a lower cost of debt because of 
their reputation, and relatively large tangible assets can be used as guarantees to capital suppliers 
in order to obtain new or additional financing (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009; 
Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012). Further, and as predicted by tax benefits theory, large firms are 
anticipated to employ higher levels of leverage because they are encouraged to fully benefit from 
tax shields more than small firms (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977). On the other hand, 
and as predicted by POT, firms who suffer from information asymmetry are expected to have 
higher levels of leverage because of lower agency costs associated with debt (Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this view, large firms are more likely to be less subject to the 
problem of information asymmetry, because they provide more disclosure to outsiders than 
smaller firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012). Arguably, large firms may tend to employ lower levels of leverage in making 
their CSs. Further, and as predicted by SGT, large firms are more closely observed by outsiders, 
possibly resulting in using less leverage in order to signal to potential investors, among others, 
that they have good financial prospects (Ellili and Farouk, 2011).    
          However, a positive relationship between firm size and the FCS has been reported by a 
considerable number of studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Omet and Mashharawe, 2002; 
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Sbeiti, 2010; Noulas and Genimakis, 2011; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011; Xu, 2012; Hussainey 
and Aljifri, 2012; Dang, 2013). For instance, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) report evidence that 
firm size is one among only three factors driving the financing decisions of UAE listed firms. In 
the same vein, Dang (2013) reports evidence that target leverage is significantly and positively 
related to firm size by using a panel of firms in three countries, namely the UK, France and 
Germany over the period 1980 to 2007. Within GCC context, using a cross-country sample of 
142 firms from three countries, including 42 non-financial Omani listed firms, Sbeiti (2010) 
reports evidence that firm size is significantly and positively related to leverage among Omani 
listed firms. In contrast, support for a negative relationship is found in a few studies which 
provide empirical evidence that large firms may tend to employ lower levels of leverage in 
making their CSs. For instance, Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) report evidence that long-term debt 
ratio is negatively associated with firm size. Within Omani context, Omet and Mashharawe 
(2002) report Omani evidence that firm size is negatively and significantly related to long-term 
debt ratio. A limited number of studies report no significant relationship between firm size and 
FCS (e.g., Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Barton and Gordon, 1988). Using a sample of 279 US firms, 
for example, Barton and Gordon (1988) report evidence that firm size had no significant 
influence in explaining the FCS, although this could be a result of the fact that they restrict their 
sample to only the largest firms.   
(ii) Growth (GROWT) 
          Because internal sources of finance are often insufficient to assist firms to fund their 
investment opportunities, managers have to find new or additional financing in order to enable 
their firms to grow. This suggests that growth can be considered an influential factor in firms’ 
decisions to employ higher or lower levels of leverage. Theoretically, and as assumed by POT, 
high-growth firms may tend to use higher levels of leverage because of a higher demand for 
funds; they may also be able to generate enough earnings to allow them to afford greater debt 
ratios (Noulas and Genimakis, 2011). In contrast, firms with growth opportunities may employ 
lower levels of leverage because they take into consideration the high probability of bankruptcy 
risk associated with debt (Myers, 1977; Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Hence, it can 
be argued that firms with growth opportunities would tend to use lower leverage ratios (Bevan 
and Danbolt, 2002). As a result, the association between firm growth and CS is anticipated to be 
negative.  
          The empirical evidence, however, on the relationship between firm growth and the FCS is 
mixed. Support for a positive predication is found in a number of prior studies which provide 
empirical evidence that firms with higher growth opportunities tend to employ higher levels of 
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leverage (e.g., Bhaduri, 2002; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Al-Najjar, 2011; Hussainey and Aljifri, 
2012; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013). For instance, using a sample of 86 non-financial Jordanian 
firms for the period 1994 to 2003, Al-Najjar (2011) provides evidence that firm growth and 
leverage have a positive and significant relationship. Similarly, using 2,222 firm-year 
observations of French listed firms over the period 2003 to 2006, Benkraiem and Gurau (2013) 
provide empirical evidence that growth is positively and significantly associated with long-term 
debt ratio. Empirical evidence provided by Sbeiti (2010), who examined CS determinants in the 
CGC context, is also in line with the above studies and shows that Omani growth firms employ 
higher levels of leverage. Omet and Mashharawe (2002) confirm the above finding by conducting 
a cross-country sample of 148 firms from four Arab countries, including 38 Omani quoted firms, 
indicating that Omani firms tend to have high leverage ratios. In contrast, a group of studies 
report an adverse relation between growth and the FCS (e.g., Rajan and Zingles, 1995; Ozkan, 
2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; Nunkoo and Boateng, 2010; Sbeiti, 2010; Xu, 2012; Dang, 2013). 
For example, using a sample of 390 UK firms over 1984 to 1996, Ozkan (2001) reports evidence 
that the coefficient of growth as measured by market-to-book ratio is negative and statistically 
significant in examining its influence on leverage. Also, using a sample of 2,102 firms in the UK, 
France and Germany over 1980 to 2007, Dang (2013) provides evidence that both firm growth 
and leverage are negatively and significantly related across the three countries. Contrary to the 
positive and negative findings observed in the above studies, other studies find mixed evidence 
(e.g., Jordan et al., 1998; Chittenden et al., 1996; Ellili and Farouk, 2011; Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-
Zaluki, 2012). For instance, using a sample of 3,480 UK listed and unlisted firms over 1989 to 
1993, Chittenden et al. (1996) provide evidence that growth is related to both long-term and total 
debt ratios, but does not relate to short-term debt ratio.  
(iii) Profitability (ROA) 
          Profitability has been suggested by prior studies to influence the financial behaviour of 
firms. In particular, researchers have used different theories to investigate whether profitable 
firms employ more or less leverage in making their CSs. From a POT’s perspective, and due to 
asymmetric information, firms prefer to use internal financial sources generated from corporate 
operations as the first financial option in financing their investment opportunities (Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consequently, profitable firms are expected to employ less leverage 
because they have more retained earnings that can be used to finance large portions of their 
investments. In contrast, AT and trade-off theories provide opposing predictions of profitable 
firms’ financing behaviour. AT assumes that firms with excess cash flow are more likely to face a 
situation where managers may engage in excessive perquisite consumption in order to enjoy 
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available free cash (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). In this view, profitable firms may 
tend to employ high levels of leverage as a governance device in order to ensure that managers 
have less free cash to control, as debt commits managers to making fixed interest payments and 
hence they will be less able to engage in excessive perquisite consumption (Jensen, 1986). In the 
same vein, trade-off theory argues that firms may use more leverage in order to exploit the tax 
deductibility of interest payments (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Accordingly, firms with excess 
earnings may be induced to have more debt in their CSs in order to enjoy tax shields. The 
positive relation between profitability and leverage is also supported by the fact that profitable 
firms can easily obtain loans with better terms because debt holders consider them as better able 
to repay their financial obligations on time, which gives them preferability in lenders (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Elliott et al., 2008). Thus, profitable firms may be encouraged more than less 
profitable firms to add more debt in their CSs in financing their investment opportunities.   
         However, prior empirical studies (e.g., Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Feidakis and Rovolis, 
2007; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009; Noulas and Genimarkis, 2011; Degryse et al., 2012; Hussainey and 
Aljifri, 2012; Xu, 2012; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013; Dang, 2013; Wagner, 2015) are largely 
consistent with POT’s predication that profitable firms are more likely to employ lower levels of 
leverage in their CSs. For instance, using a sample of manufacturing firms over the period 1989 
to 2004, Xu (2012) reports US evidence that profitability and leverage are significantly and 
negatively related. Similarly, using an unbalanced panel of 5,171 US firms from 1987 through 
2003, Wald and Long (2007) provide evidence that US profitable firms have a significant and 
negative relationship with leverage. Consistent with the above studies, using a sample of 142 
firms from four Arab countries operating in GCC countries over the period 1998 to 2005, 
including 42 Omani quoted firms, Sbeiti (2010) provides Omani evidence that profitable Omani 
firms tend to employ less leverage. Similarly, using a cross-country sample of 148 firms from 
four Arab countries during the six-year period (1996-2001), including 38 non-financial Omani 
listed firms, Omet and Mashharawe (2002) report additional evidence that profitability has a 
negative and significant sign for Omani listed firms.  
(iv) Tangible assets (TNGAS) 
          It has been demonstrated in the literature that firms with a high proportion of tangible 
assets are more likely to employ further leverage in making their CSs. According to AT, 
shareholders of leveraged firms are willing to make risky investments because they diversify their 
investments and desire to maximise their wealth, which creates a conflict of interest with debt 
holders, who may lose their capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this situation, debt holders 
use tangible assets as collateral, among other protective devices, to mitigate such opportunistic 
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behaviour and protect their capital in the case of bankruptcy. Thus, corporate managers can be 
forced to use debt funds for safe investments in order to avoid losing firm assets, in addition to 
their jobs. This suggests that tangible assets increase a firm’s capacity to employ higher levels of 
leverage because lenders can secure their capital against a firm’s assets. In addition, and based on 
trade-off theory, firms with more tangibility are more able to have more leverage because the cost 
of bankruptcy is relatively lower compared to the benefits of debt, as tangible assets will lose 
only a small portion of their value (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). In contrast to the positive 
prediction, tangibility and leverage have been suggested to be negatively rather than positively 
associated. It is argued that firms are expected to benefit from corporate tax shields by employing 
higher levels of leverage (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Equally, firms may use other types of 
corporate tax code to enjoy corporate tax shields. In this view, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
argue that firms with a high proportion of tangible assets may tend to employ lower levels of 
leverage because depreciation deductions can be used as a substitute for debt to obtain attractive 
tax shields.  
         Support for the positive prediction, however, is found in a considerable number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Nunkoo and Boateng, 2010; 
Xu, 2012; Drobetz et al., 2013; Dang, 2013), while other studies (e.g., Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; 
Noulas and Genimakis, 2011; Degryse et al., 2012; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013; Campenhout 
and Caneghem, 2013) report mixed relationships. For instance, using a sample of 7098 firm-year 
observations during the period 1996 to 2004, Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) investigate whether 
tangibility, among other factors, has an effect on the FCS. They report empirical evidence that 
tangibility has significant and positive influence on Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. Using an error correction model to examine the FCS, Dang (2013) tests the influence 
of tangibility on CS for firms operating in the UK, France and Germany. He reports evidence that 
the collateral value of assets has a positive effect on the FCS for the three countries under 
investigation. Within Omani context, Sbeiti (2010) finds a positive and insignificant relationship 
between tangibility and leverage among Omani listed firms while Omet and Mashharawe (2002) 
report evidence that tangibility has a positive and statistical significant influence on long-term 
debt ratio.  
With respect to mixed relationships, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) report evidence that 
tangibility is significantly associated with long-term debt ratio, but is significantly and negatively 
correlated with total and short-term debt ratios. Similarly, Benkraiem and Gurau (2013) provide 
French evidence that the influence of tangibility is significant and positive on long-term debt 
ratio, but negative on total and short-term debt ratios over the period 2003 to 2006. 
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(v) Dividend policy (DIVPO) 
        It is apparent that a firm’s dividend policy affects free cash flow, which in turn affects its 
investment decisions. Firms with more free cash flow may have to decide to use excess cash to 
pay out dividends and/or to finance new investments. Specifically, a firm’s tendency to employ 
lower or higher levels of leverage is expected to be influenced by its dividend policy. 
Theoretically, and as predicted by SGT, firms with higher dividend payments may tend to employ 
more leverage because dividend payments can be considered as a signal of better financial health 
(Bhaduri, 2002). This suggests that such firms can easily access capital markets, because higher 
dividend payments represent their capacity to meet future obligations (Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012). In contrast, and due to the agency problem, where shareholders 
seek to gain dividends while managers prefer not to declare dividends in order to enjoy free cash, 
a firm can use its dividend policy to reduce this problem (Jensen et al., 1992). In this view, firms 
with higher dividend payments may tend to use lower levels of leverage because dividend 
payments can serve as a substitute mechanism to debt financing in order to mitigate agency costs 
associated with free cash flow available to managers (Jensen et al., 1992; D’Souza, 1999; 
DeAngelo et al., 2004). Managers in such firms will be less able to engage in managerial self-
interest, as free cash flow is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends (Jensen, 1986). 
In addition, POT presumes that firms that suffer from higher information asymmetry would 
employ more leverage when internal sources are not sufficient, because of the lower information 
costs associated with debt (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this sense, firms have been 
suggested to use their dividend policy to deliver information about their future prospects to the 
market (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). Arguably, firms with higher dividend payments may not 
tend to use higher levels of leverage in their CSs because they are less sensitive to information 
asymmetry (John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985).  
         A limited number of studies have examined the empirical link between dividend policy and 
level of leverage. Prior literature (e.g., Jensen et al., 1992; Aivazian et al., 2003; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2012) supports the theoretical 
prediction of a negative relationship between dividend policy and leverage. For instance, using a 
sample of US firms for the period 1950 to 2003, Frank and Goyal (2009) report evidence that 
firms with higher dividend payments have lower levels of leverage. Similarly, Aivazian et al. 
(2003) use a sample of US and emerging markets firms to provide empirical evidence that 
dividends are inversely associated with debt. In contrast, Chang and Rhee (1990) report empirical 
evidence that dividend policy and leverage are strongly and positively related.  
 
198 
 
 
(vi) Business risk (BSRK) 
          Although there is consensus in the literature that business risk is one of the most important 
determinants of CS, existing theoretical studies offer mixed answers to the question of whether 
firms with higher business risk should employ lower levels of leverage in their CSs. According to 
trade-off theory, firms with more variable cash flows and higher business risk are expected to use 
less leverage for two main reasons. First, they face higher costs of financial distress, which 
increases the probability of bankruptcy (Kale et al., 1991). Prior studies (e.g., Bradley et al., 
1984; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Miguel and Pindado, 2001) report empirical evidence that financial 
distress cost and debt ratios are inversely associated. Second, risky firms would not be 
encouraged to use more debt in order to benefit from tax shields because more debt increases the 
risk of bankruptcy (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Frank and Goyal, 2009). In addition, the cost of 
debt is higher for firms with higher business risk as they are anticipated to suffer more from 
asymmetric information because creditors, among others, would not be able to accurately predict 
future earnings by using a firm’s available information (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Chang and 
Rhee, 1990).  
In contrast, POT predicts that high information asymmetry in firms with higher business 
risk leads to an increase in debt ratios because lower information costs are associated with debt 
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Moreover, firms with 
more variable cash flows are in need of external financial sources to periodically finance their 
activities (Frank and Goyal, 2009). This may suggest that managers in such firms tend to employ 
higher levels of leverage in making their CSs. Support to this argument is given by Myers (1977, 
pp.167), who concludes that “We have an interesting, perhaps surprising, conclusion. The impact 
of risky debt on the market value of the firm is less for firms holding investment options on assets 
that are risky relative to the firms’ present assets. In this sense we may observe risky firms 
borrowing more than safe ones”. 
However, the empirical literature on the influence of business risk on leverage has 
received considerable attention in prior studies, with mixed evidence. In line with the negative 
expectation of the theoretical literature, a number of empirical studies report a negative business 
risk-FCS relationship (e.g., Fried and Lang, 1988; Jensen et al., 1992; Abor, 2007; Akhtar and 
Oliver, 2009; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011; Ganguli, 2013). For instance, 
using a sample of 356 Japanese firms during the period 1992 to 2003, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) 
include business risk, among other factors, in their model to analyse CS determinants and report 
evidence that Japanese multinational firms with higher business risks have lower levels of 
leverage. In contrast, Kim and Sorensen (1986) provide evidence that firms with high operating 
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risk have more leverage. Further, an opinion-based survey conducted by Abdulla (1998) suggests 
that Omani managers regard risk as one of five factors that determine Omani firms’ leverage. 
Contradicting both negative and positive predictions, other previous empirical studies (e.g., Al-
Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013) report 
evidence of no significant relationship between business risk and leverage. For example, using 
2,222 firm-year observations, Benkraiem and Gurau (2013) report evidence that volatility of 
earnings does not influence the CS of French firms. Further, Kale et al. (1991) investigate the 
role of business risk in determining the FCS. They provide US evidence that the relationship 
between business risk and leverage is roughly U-shaped, which means that business risk has a 
differential effect on the level of leverage, initially decreasing and eventually rising.  
4.2.3.2 Justification for Control Variables: The Choice of Financing 
          Prior studies have found that a firm’s choice of financing is further influenced by a number 
of firm characteristics. The next subsections will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments 
and empirical literature regarding the relationship between certain specific firm attributes and a 
firm’s choice of financing. Similarly, these variables were selected based on theoretical 
predictions, data availability and consistent with prior studies.  
(i) Firm size (LNTA) 
          It is commonly recognised that large firms are more likely to employ more external 
financial (Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Dang, 2013) in financing their investment opportunities. 
Hence, firm size can be considered a crucial factor in explaining whether firms tend to choose 
equity or debt to meet their external financing needs. Theoretically, large firms may issue debt in 
place of equity for the following reasons: (i) a 1ower probability of bankruptcy as they diversify 
their portfolio of investments; hence, they can bear high debt ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995); (ii) a better reputation and relatively large tangible assets, which 
enable them to enjoy better access to credit markets and gain a lower cost of debt (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012); and (iii) they may desire to 
benefit from tax shields which permit them to reduce their taxable profit, whereas dividends are 
not deductible if they issue equity (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977). In contrast, large 
firms have been reported to be less sensitive to asymmetric information because they disclose 
more information to investors (e.g., Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). In this sense, large firms use disclosure policy as a 
useful internal governance mechanism to reduce agency costs and align managerial interests with 
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Bathala et al., 1994). Arguably, 
new investors may consider large firms to be attractive investments because they will not need to 
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collect costly private information. This can motivate such firms to issue equity over debt, as they 
expect that potential investors are willing to pay a premium for their shares. Further, large firms’ 
share prices are expected to be higher than small firms because they perform relatively better, 
which may encourage them to issue equity in place of debt, as new investors are expected to 
invest in better performing firms.  
          However, the influence of firm size on firms’ choice of financing has received little 
attention in previous empirical studies. For instance, Chang et al. (2006) employ 35,697 firm-
year observations over 1985 to 2000 and report evidence that larger firms are considered less 
risky and tend to issue more debt than equity. Similarly, Elliott et al. (2008) report evidence that 
larger firms choose debt over equity. Mande et al. (2012) examine the effect of firm size on a 
firm’s selection of financing by using a sample of 2,049 US firms. They report evidence that 
issuing equity is significantly and negatively related to firm size.  
(ii) Growth (GROWT) 
          Firms with greater opportunities for growth tend to seek new or additional financing to 
fund their investment opportunities because internal sources are often insufficient to meet the 
higher demand for funds. Hence, managers in such firms have to decide whether their external 
needs can be obtained by issuing equity or debt. Theoretically, it is argued that firms with higher 
growth are more sensitive to asymmetric information because managers, as insiders, have more 
information than shareholders in making investment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due 
to asymmetric information, such firms recognise that investors will discount the price of their 
shares if they issue equity, which makes debt financing more attractive for them than equity 
capital (Myers, 1984). This assumption is also supported by the argument that equity issuance 
will mean that new investors can acquire higher gains from new investments compared to actual 
shareholders, which may lead firms to issue debt rather than equity in order to please existing 
shareholders. Further, managers in such firms may engage in moral hazard situations by making 
risky investments, creating a conflict of interest between agents and different stakeholders, 
including both shareholders and lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984). Hence, debt 
issuance may be chosen by growth firms in order to reduce managers’ opportunism and align 
managerial interests with those of shareholders, among others (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986; Bathala et al., 1994).  
In addition, and as predicted by SGT, firms with higher growth may issue debt to signal 
that they are optimistic about their investment earnings and do not prefer new shareholders to 
share potential profits (Ross, 1977; Ryen et al., 1997; Koch and Shenoy, 1999). In contrast, firms 
with growth opportunities may avoid debt issuance to maintain their financial flexibility, as well 
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as to preserve their borrowing ability for the future (Kayhan and Titman, 2007). In addition, firms 
with higher growth appear to perform relatively better than non-growth firms. Due to their better 
performance, new investors may be encouraged to invest in such firms, which in turn motivate 
the firms to issue equity relative to debt.  
          However, previous empirical literature investigating the influence of firm growth on a 
firm’s selection of finance is limited (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; 
Elliott et al., 2008; Mande et al., 2012). Using a sample of 2,049 US firms during the period 1998 
to 2006, for instance, Mande et al. (2012) report evidence that growth is significantly and 
positively related to equity issuance.  
(iii) Profitability (ROA) 
          Profitability is a firm characteristic that has been identified by prior literature as 
influencing corporate policy decisions. Because profitable firms have sufficient internal 
resources, their financing behaviour may be different from that of less profitable firms. Hence, 
profitability can be considered as determinant of issuing debt or equity for firms when they 
seeking new or additional financing. Theoretically, more profitable firms are anticipated to issue 
debt rather than equity for the following reasons. First, in line with POT, firms with excess 
earnings tend to use their internal resources for capital investment, and, if they need additional 
financing, then debt capital will be issued as a second choice (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Second, based on AT, debt issuance provides profitable firms with a useful CG 
mechanism that allows them to reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flow available 
to managers (Jensen, 1986). Third, firms with excess earnings are more likely than less profitable 
firms to issue debt in order to benefit from tax shields (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Finally, due 
to their excess earnings that assist them in repaying their financial obligations on time, profitable 
firms are preferred by lenders, which motivate them to issue debt instead of equity (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Elliott et al., 2008).  
In contrast, firms with more profitability may tend to issue equity over debt. Prior studies 
report evidence that profitable firms provide more detailed information (e.g., Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). This suggests that profitable firms are less 
sensitive to asymmetric information, which may motivate them to issue equity over debt because 
they recognise that new investors would prefer to invest in firms where there is no need to collect 
costly information. Further, new investors can be induced to invest in firms with excess earnings 
because they expect high levels of dividends, which in turn encourage profitable firms to issue 
equity rather than debt when seeking new or additional financing.  
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          Empirically, the relation between profitability and capital issuance has not been extensively 
investigated in the literature. Using a sample of 3,781 public equity issues and 5,391 debt issues 
over the period 1980 to 1999, Elliott et al. (2008) report US evidence that profitable firms tend to 
issue debt over equity. Similarly, using 39,387 firm-year observations covering the period 1979-
1997, Hovakimian et al. (2001) provide US evidence that profitable firms issue debt rather than 
equity. In contrast to the above studies, Mande et al. (2012) provide evidence that profitability 
has statistical insignificant impact on equity issuance by examining 2,049 US equity and debt 
issuances over the period 1998 to 2006.   
(iv) Tangible assets (TNGAS) 
          The financing behaviour of firms has been studied by researchers in order to investigate the 
factors that may drive such behaviour. In particular, equity or debt issuance decisions can be 
influenced by tangible assets. Theoretical predictions have been offered to support the notion that 
firms with a high proportion of tangible assets can be expected to issue debt over equity. Due to 
the conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders, lenders use tangible assets as 
collateral to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of shareholders who are keen to make risky 
investments at the expense of debt holders. In this view, tangible assets can serve as a useful 
governance device to reduce agency costs and align debt holders’ interests with those of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). This implies that firms with a high 
proportion of tangible assets are more able to borrow at lower interest rates because lenders 
secure their capital against firms’ assets, which ultimately encourages such firms to issue debt 
rather than equity (Scott, 1977; Dang, 2013). In the same view, firms with more collateral are 
preferred by lenders because they face lower financial distress, and are less sensitive to 
bankruptcy (Dang, 2013). In contrast, firms with more tangible assets can arguably be considered 
by investors to be a good investment opportunity because they have lower financial distress and 
bankruptcy costs (Dang, 2013). This may motivate such firms to issue equity over debt in order to 
satisfy investors who desire to minimise their risks when making investment decisions. Further, 
firms with more tangible assets can be expected to issue equity over debt because they less need 
to debt tax shields as depreciation can be a substitute for debt advantage (Elliott et al., 2008). 
          However, the relationship between tangibility and equity or debt issuance decisions has not 
been extensively investigated in the literature. Prior studies are in line with the argument that 
firms with a high proportion of tangible assets are more likely to issue debt over equity (e.g., 
Chang et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2008). For instance, Chang et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
debt issuance is positively associated with tangibility only in smaller firms. Similarly, in their 
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investigation of a firm’s choice of financing, Elliott et al. (2008) report evidence that US firms 
with more tangibility tend to issue debt in place of equity. 
(v) Dividend policy (DIVPO) 
          Uncertainty surrounding the factors that drive a firm’s choice of financing directs 
researchers to examine different firm characteristics. Specifically, dividend policy can be 
expected to influence firms’ selection of equity or debt in meeting their external financing needs. 
On the one hand, SGT hypothesises that the likelihood of debt financing increases with higher 
dividend payments. In this sense, firms use dividends to signal that they are in better financial 
health and are capable of meeting future obligations (Bhaduri, 2002; Hussainey and Aljifri, 
2012). This may motivate them to issue debt over equity as they can easily have access to capital 
markets and obtain loans on more favourable terms. In addition, as firms with higher dividend 
payments are assumed to have excess cash, POT predicts that internal sources would be their first 
choice to finance their investment opportunities, and if the cash is not sufficient they will issue 
debt because it has lower information costs compared with equity issuance (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984).  
On the other hand, firms with higher dividend payments may tend to issue equity rather 
than debt. Potential investors who are willing to pay a premium price for firms with better CG 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Leuz et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011) may consider firms with 
higher dividend payments as less sensitive to the agency problem because such firms use 
dividends as a governance mechanism to reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow 
(Jensen et al., 1992; D’Souza, 1999; DeAngelo et al., 2004). Further, firms recognise that they 
are targeted by new investors because they are less sensitive to information asymmetry as they 
use dividend policy to transfer information about their future prospects to the market (Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009). Thus, the high premium for well governed firms paid by new investors may 
motivate firms with higher dividend payments to issue equity over debt.  
          Little empirical literature exists, however, relating to the association between dividend 
policy and firms’ choice of financing. Jensen et al. (1992) examine the determinants of cross-
sectional differences in insider ownership, debt and dividend policies and report evidence that 
equity financing is more attractive than debt financing for firms with higher dividend payments. 
On the contrary, Chang et al. (2006) provide evidence that only larger firms with high dividend 
payout ratios tend to adopt debt issuance in financing their investment opportunities. 
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(vi)  Business risk (BSRK) 
          Empirical literature shows that a firm’s characteristics play an important role in 
determining its policy decisions. In particular, a firm’s issuance choice can be expected to be 
driven by business risk when it seeks new or additional financing. Theoretically, firms with 
higher business risk are more likely to issue debt over equity for the following reasons. First, 
since they have insufficient internal sources, as well as suffering from high information 
asymmetry (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Chang and Rhee, 1990), debt issuance is predicted by 
POT as the best choice of financing due to the lower information costs associated with it 
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Second, because these 
firms suffer from variable cash flows, debt issuance would allow them to increase cash flows 
through tax shields as opposed to equity issuance, where dividends are not tax deductible 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Finally, since these firms are more likely 
to suffer from adverse selection (Frank and Goyal, 2009), AT assumes that such firms are 
expected to use debt financing in order to reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers, where the latter may engage in moral hazard situations by making risky investments 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Even though the likelihood of equity financing decreases with 
business risk because of higher costs of financial distress that increase the probability of 
bankruptcy (Kale et al., 1991), firms with higher business risk may be forced to issue equity in 
order to avoid paying fixed interest payments if they chose debt issuance as they suffering from 
volatile cash flows while dividend payments can be controlled in the case of chosen equity 
issuance.  
          The empirical literature, however, relating to the association between business risk and 
choice of financing is limited. Using a sample of 748 UK listed firms over the period 1959 to 
1970, Marsh (1982) investigated how firms select between financing instruments and reported 
evidence that risky firms tend to issue equity. In a similar vein, other studies (e.g., Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999; Chang et al., 2009; Mande et al., 2012) examine the relation between financial 
deficits and a firm’s issuance choice. They report evidence that firms with higher financial 
deficits tend to issue debt over equity when financing their investment opportunities. For 
example, using a sample of 2,049 US firms from 1998 to 2006, Mande et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that the probability of issuing equity is higher for firms with lower financial deficits.  
4.2.3.3 Definition of Control Variables 
          The control variables in this study are measured based on prior studies and the availability 
of data. As illustrated in Table 23, firm size (LNTA) is measured by computing a natural log of 
total assets (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Essen et al., 2013; Dang, 2013). Profitability (ROA) is 
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measured as a ratio of operating profit to total assets (e.g., Abor, 2007; Baglioni and Colombo, 
2013; Nakano and Nguyen, 2013). Growth (GROWTH)  is calculated by Tobin’s Q as the market 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the 
book value of total assets (e.g., Zeitun and Tian,2007, Jiraporn, 2012). Tangible assets (TNGAS) 
are measured as fixed assets divided by total assets (e.g., Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Haque et 
al., 2011; Noulas and Genimakis, 2011). Dividend policy (DIVPO) is measured as annual 
dividends per share divided by earnings per share (e.g., Crutchley et al., 1999; Al-Najjar and 
Taylor, 2008; Hussainey and Aljifiri, 2012). Business risk27 (BSRK) is measured as the ratio of 
standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; 
Delcoure, 2007Al-Ajmi et al., 2009).  
Table 23: Definition of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables 
  FCS Firm capital structure is measured by book total debt scaled by total equity. 
  EISSUE Equity issuance is measured as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm 
issues equity and a value of 0 if it issues debt. 
Independent variables 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index consisting of 72 provisions that take a value of 1 if 
a particular provision is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 
100%. 
  GOVOWN Percentage of government ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  INSOWN Percentage of institutional ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  FOROWN Percentage of foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  FOROWN Percentage of foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm 
shareholdings.  
  BSIZE Total number of directors on the board of a firm 
  BIG4 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  CGCOM 1 if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
  LNTA Natural log of total assets. 
  ROA (%) Operating profit to total assets. 
  GROWT (%) Tobin’s Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets.  
  TNGAS (%) Fixed assets divided by total assets. 
  DIVPO (%) Dividends per share divided by earnings per share 
  BSRK (%) Standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
  INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the nine industries: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, financial, industrial, utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and 
gas. 
  YEAR Dummies for each of the ten years from 2001 to 2011 inclusive. 
 
In addition, and in line with previous studies (e.g., Boateng, 2004; Ellili and Farouk, 
2011; Haque et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Wagner, 2015), an 
industry dummy is included as a control for differences in CS and the choice of financing across 
                                                 
27
 The present study was unable to measure business risk based on beta because of data limitations. According to trade-off theory, 
higher earnings variability increases the possibility of default. It suggests that examining the earnings volatility offers 
investors the ability to ascertain whether a firm goes to a default (riskier) or not. Thus, and given the data limitation, 
business risk is measured using the standard deviation of earnings scaled by the total assets. 
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different industries. Specifically, eight industry dummies out of nine major industries are 
included in any single equation in order to avoid a dummy-variable trap. Finally, it is indicated 
that CS and the choice of financing change over time. Therefore, and in line with prior studies 
(e.g., Song, 2005; Li et al., 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013), the current 
study controls for time in order to capture the potential changes in CS and the choice of financing 
over the eleven-year period. Similarly, ten dummies out of eleven are included in any single 
equation in order to avoid a dummy-variable trap. 
4.2.4 Model Specification 
          The current study conducts unbalanced panel data analysis to answer its research questions 
for the following reasons. First, in line with prior studies (e.g., Abor, 2007; Ba-Abbad and 
Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012) and because the determinants of CS change over time, panel data enables 
the study to capture the driving forces behind the financing decisions of firms more successfully 
than time series or cross-sectional techniques (Hsiao, 1985; Wooldridge, 2009). Second, panel 
data allows the study to improve the efficiency of econometric estimates by reducing the 
multicollinearity problem and increasing the degree of freedom (Hsiao, 1985; Gujarati, 2003; 
Antoniou et al., 2008). Further, unlike either time series or cross-sectional techniques, panel data 
permits the study to control for firm’s heterogeneity in individual variables (Gujarati, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2009). In this regard, Hsiao (1985, pp.129) emphasises that “panel data allows us to 
construct and test more realistic behavioural models which could not be identified using cross-
section or time series data alone”. Finally, the eleven-year data (1,152 firm-year observations) 
can ensure that sufficient series is achieved to conduct the study’s statistical and robustness 
analyses. In addition, and in line with prior studies (e.g., Haque et al., 2011; Hussainey and 
Aljifri, 2012; Mande et al., 2012), this study relies on quantitative analysis to investigate 
determinants of both CS and the choice of finance. In doing so, the study uses two different 
regression analyses. First, multiple linear regression analysis is applied in order to answer the first 
research question for two main reasons: (i) it allows the current study to examine the impact of 
more than one independent variable on the FCS; and (ii) it permits to control for many other 
determinants that simultaneously influence the FCS. Ordinary Least Squares estimation (OLS) 
will be used to test the FCS behaviour among Omani listed firms and the FCS will be regressed 
on a number of explanatory variables in order to test the following hypotheses.    
 
  H1 There is a statistically significant positive association between government 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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  H2 
 
There is a statistically significant negative association between institutional 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  H3 There is a statistically significant negative association between foreign 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  H4 There is a statistically significant negative association between block 
ownership and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  H5 There is a significant negative association between firm-level corporate 
governance and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  H6 There is statistically significant association between board size and the debt-
to-equity ratio.    
  H7 
 
There is a statistically significant negative association between the presence 
of a CG committee and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  H8 
 
There is a statistically significant negative association between audit firm size 
and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
  
          Examining these hypotheses will permit the current study to ascertain whether variations in 
the FCS can be explained by CG variables, as has been argued by theories and reported by prior 
empirical studies, assuming that all relationships are linear. The OLS regression equation (1) is 
indicated as follows: 
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Where: 
  FCS Firm capital structure 
  α Constant term 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index 
  GOVOWN Government ownership 
  INSOWN Institutional ownership 
  FOROWN Foreign ownership 
  BLKOWN Block ownership 
  BSIZE Board size 
  BIG4   Audit firm size 
  CGCOM Presence of a corporate governance committee 
  CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), tangible 
assets (TNGAS), dividend policy (DIVPO), business risk (BSRK), industry, and year 
dummies. 
  ε Error term 
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Second, due the nature of the second dependent variable and following Mande et al.’s 
(2012) methodology, the logistic regression analysis is applied in order to answer the second 
research question. Specifically, equity issuance, EISSUE, represents the choice of financing in 
this study, and it is measured as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm issues equity, 
and a value of 0 if a firm issues debt. Thus, the EISSUE as a binomial variable will be regressed 
on explanatory variables in order to test the following hypothesis.  
 
 H9 There is a statistically significant negative association between government 
ownership and equity issuance.  
 H10 There is a statistically significant positive association between institutional 
ownership and equity issuance.  
 H11 There is a statistically significant association between foreign ownership and 
equity issuance.  
 H12 There is a statistically significant association between block ownership and 
equity issuance.  
H13 There is a statistically significant positive association between firm-level 
corporate governance and equity issuance.  
H14 There is a statistically significant association between board size and equity 
issuance. 
H15 There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of 
a CG committee and equity issuance. 
H16 There is a statistically significant association between audit firm size and 
equity issuance. 
 
          Testing these hypotheses will allow the present study to determine whether or not the 
choice of financing can be driven by CG variables, as has been suggested by theories and found 
by previous empirical studies. The formula of this model is expressed by the following equation 
(2). 
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Where:  
  EISSUE Equity issuance 
  α Constant term 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index 
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  GOVOWN Government ownership 
  INSOWN Institutional ownership 
  FOROWN Foreign ownership 
  BLKOWN Block ownership 
  BSIZE Board size 
  BIG4   Audit firm size 
  CGCOM Presence of a corporate governance committee 
  CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), tangible 
assets (TNGAS), dividend policy (DIVPO), business risk (BSRK), industry, and year 
dummies. 
  ε Error term 
           
 
There is one methodological issue that needs to be addressed when including many 
variables in both models. It may be argued that having many variables might cause statistical 
problems, such as multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In this regard, Curwin 
and Slater (1994, pp.280) indicate that employing too many variables is better than using too few. 
They conclude that “it is prudent to build a model with too many variables rather than too few, 
since the problem of increased variance may be easier to deal with than with the problem of 
biased predictions”. Further, all variables included in the current study have central theoretical 
arguments linking them directly to the two issues under investigation, and ignoring one of them 
may limit the current study’s ability to analyse the extent to which firm-level CG drives CS and 
the EISSUE. In spite of limited studies investigating the effect of CG on the FCS and the 
EISSUE, the literature shows that prior studies (e.g., Haque et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2012; 
Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012) have examined a limited number of CG variables to investigate their 
effect on the FCS, arguably limiting our understanding of firms’ financial decision-making 
behaviour. For instance, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) include four CG mechanisms as 
explanatory variables in their model to examine CG’s impact on CS. Haque et al. (2011) employ 
CG index and concentration ownership as CG variables to investigate the influence of firm-level 
CG and ownership on CS. Similarly, Jiraporn et al. (2012) use only CG index as an explanatory 
variable to examine how the quality of CG can impact on CS. In contrast, more explanatory 
variables are included in this study (eight CG variables) than in prior studies, arguably expanding 
our understanding of the effect of CG on firms’ financial decision-making behaviour. As the 
present study relies on both theoretical and empirical literature in selecting its explanatory 
variables, and based on the above discussion, the inclusion of eight CG variables in addition to 
eight control variables in both models should not cause any serious problems.     
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4.2.5 Statistical Tests 
Briefly, and before examining the above hypotheses, various statistical analyses will be 
conducted, as will be discussed in the next Section, in order to assess different issues. The OLS 
assumptions will be tested in order to ensure that the OLS is statistically appropriate estimation to 
perform the current study’s analyses. After examining the present study’s hypotheses, several of 
sensitivity analyses, as will be discussed in Section seven, will be carried out to test the 
robustness of the obtained results. In this regard, the present study checks whether the reported 
findings are robust or sensitive to alternative measures and estimations including: the use of 
weighted CG index, the use of alternative measures of CS, financial firms, unobserved firm-level 
characteristics, whether there are differences in the main results with respect to the period of 
examination and endogeneity problem. 
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5 THE OLS ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
          This section focuses on the OLS assumptions and descriptive statistics. It explains how the 
OLS assumptions were met, and reports detailed descriptive statistics for dependent, explanatory 
and control variables of FCS and EISSUE models.   
5.1 TESTS OF THE OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
          As indicated earlier, the current study uses the OLS as the main estimation technique for 
the analysis of the determinants that drive CS. In doing so, all the assumptions regarding 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoskedasticity and linearity had to be tested 
before applying the model. Similar to Essay 1, a number of statistical procedures were followed 
in this study to check the validity of the OLS assumptions and perform other statistical 
procedures to resolve any problems associated with meeting these assumptions. Variables were 
tested for unit root or stationarity by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test in order to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis that a variable has a unit root. Table 24 reports the results of 
this test, suggesting that the null hypothesis is accepted at least at the 1% level of significance, as 
all variables have no unit root. 
Table 24: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
Variables ADF Unit Root Test 
  FCS -11.5472
***
 
  EISSUE -17.8929
***
 
  OCGI   -5.7541
***
 
  GOVOWN   -9.2719
***
 
  INSOWN   -9.5214
***
 
  FOROWN -10.4960
***
 
  BLKOWN -10.5810
***
 
  BSIZE   -9.5512
***
 
  BIG4   -12.7914
***
 
  CGCOM -12.3361
***
 
  GROWTH -13.0767
***
 
  ROA -12.6456
***
 
  LNTA   -7.8817
***
 
  TNGAS   -8.3101
***
 
  DIVPO -15.1862
***
 
  BSRK -10.9194
***
 
Notes: FCS denotes the firm-level capital structure, EISSUE denotes equity issuance, OCGI denotes the Oman corporate 
governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN 
represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the 
size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GROWTH 
denotes firm growth, ROA denotes return on asset the measure of profitability, LNTA denotes firm size, TNGAS denotes 
tangible assets, DIVPO denotes dividend policy, BSRK denotes business risk. The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 
1% level.  
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After determining stationarity, linearity, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, normality 
and multicollinearity were tested, and the results from these tests are reported below. First, FCS 
measures and control variables were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels in order to limit the 
effects of outliers, as their presence can violate the OLS assumptions.  
Second, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test was used to detect the presence 
of autocorrelation (serial correlation), and the results of this test are presented in Table 25. The 
results indicate the presence of serial correlation, as both the F-statistics and Chi-Square reject 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level of significance.  
 
Table 25: Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation 
F-Statistics   7.2732
***
 
Obs*R-squared 14.7962
***
 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
  Third, the White general test was performed to test for heteroskedasticity. Table 26 
reports the results of this test, indicating that the FCS model is heteroskedastic, as both the F-
statistics and Chi-Square reject the null hypothesis of no homoskedasticity at the 1% level of 
significance. 
 
Table 26: Heteroskedasticity test: White test 
F-Statistics     1.5477
***
 
Obs*R-squared 523.8164
***
 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level 
 
In order to avoid unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates as a result of serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity, the present study used the first-order autoregressive method in 
order to take account of serial correlation, and employ standard error estimate that has been 
modified to account for homoskedasticity following White test (Brooks, 2007). Thus, the current 
study can be confident that the issues of serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the FCS 
model have been resolved.  
Fourth, the present study tested the FCS model for normality using standardised skewness 
and kurtosis. As illustrated in Table 29, the results of skewness and kurtosis statistics reject the 
null hypothesis that the variables are symmetrically and mesokurtically distributed. As explained 
in Essay 1, efforts have been made to reduce non-normalities in the variables by using different 
types of transformation, such as rank, natural log and square root, but no transformation created 
better results than those based on the actual variables. Brooks (2007, PP.164) indicates that the 
violation of the normality assumption is ‘virtually inconsequential if sample sizes are sufficiently 
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large’. This means that any remaining non-normality would not be a major problem causing 
serious violation of the OLS assumptions, as the current study has one thousand one hundred and 
fifty-two (1,152) firm-year observations. Further, the skewness and kurtosis statistics for the FCS 
are similar to those reported by previous studies (e.g., Brailsford et al., 2002; Omet and 
Mashharawe, 2002; Mazur, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009, Sbeiti, 2010). 
Thus, any remaining non-normality would be statistically mild.  
Finally, the current study constructs a correlation matrix among all variables in order to 
test for multicollinearity. In particular, the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients and 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients were used to check for the relation among 
explanatory variables. Table 28 illustrates that there is no serious multicollinearity among 
variables, as the magnitude of both parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients is 
relatively low. The highest coefficient is between firm size and each of board size (0.455) and 
business risk (0.409), as indicated by Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric 
correlation coefficients, respectively. Further, multicollinearity was tested by computing the 
Tolerance (TOL) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics. The results from Table 27 reveal 
that the maximum Tolerance is 0.875 and the maximum VIF is 1.823, suggesting that there are no 
severe multicollinearity problems in the current study (Gujarati, 2003). Overall, the diagnostics 
for the OLS assumptions indicate that the OLS is statistically appropriate as a main estimation 
method to perform OLS regression analyses, despite any remaining linearity, auto-correlation, 
heteroskedasticity, normality and multicollinearity in the variables.  
Table 27: Multicollinearity test: Tolerance statistic and Variance Inflation Factor 
Variables TOL VIF 
  OCGI 0.789 1.267 
  GOVOWN 0.789 1.267 
  INSOWN 0.714 1.401 
  FOROWN 0.691 1.448 
  BLKOWN 0.549 1.823 
  BSIZE 0.675 1.482 
  BIG4   0.784 1.275 
  CGCOM 0.860 1.163 
  GROWTH 0.875 1.143 
  ROA 0.688 1.454 
  LNTA 0.465 2.149 
 TNGAS 0.574 1.742 
 DIVPO 0.817 1.223 
 BSRK 0.754 1.326 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes 
institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN, denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the size of board, 
BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GROWTH denotes firm growth, ROA denotes 
profitability, LNTA denotes firm size, TNGAS denotes tangible assets, DIVPO denotes dividend policy, BSRK denotes business risk. 
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Table 28: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of the dependent and explanatory variables 
  FCS EISSUE OCGI GOVOWN INSOWN FOROWN BLKOWN BSIZE BIG4 CGCOM GROWTH ROA LNTA TNGAS DIVPO BSRK 
FCS 
 
0.005 -0.095*** -0.127*** 0.049* 0.024 0.101*** -0.017 -0.039 -0.195*** 0.079*** -0.429*** 0.045 -0.034 -0.151*** -0.154*** 
EISSUE 0.000  0.206*** -0.008 0.049* 0.006 -0.084*** 0.087*** 0.062** 0.062** 0.017 0.076*** 0.210*** 0.204*** 0.046 -0.134*** 
OCGI -0.126*** 0.218**   0.155*** 0.015 0.076** -0.007 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.299*** 0.008 0.171*** 0.347*** 0.107*** 0.089*** -0.129*** 
GOVOWN -0.048 -0.008 0.154***  -0.031 0.047 0.109*** 0.085*** 0.062** 0.048 0.001 0.218*** 0.154*** -0.042 0.135*** -0.074** 
INSOWN 0.044 0.034 0.029 -0.062**  -0.029 0.226*** -0.001 0.000 0.010 0.044 0.037 -0.163*** 0.017 -0.032 0.041 
FOROWN 0.058** -0.023 0.072** 0.038 -0.150***  0.339*** 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.025 0.013 0.140*** -0.074** 0.047 0.026 
BLKOWN 0.082*** -0.074** 0.068** 0.118*** 0.314*** 0.355***  -0.266** -0.161*** -0.013 0.012 -0.124*** -0.223*** -0.242*** -0.155*** 0.126*** 
BSIZE 0.020 0.075** 0.038 0.094*** -0.053* -0.038 -0.273***  0.252*** -0.055* -0.026 0.058* 0.391*** 0.088*** 0.230*** -0.182*** 
BIG4 -0.026 0.087*** 0.030 0.062** -0.011 -0.007 -0.160*** 0.258***  0.110*** -0.057* 0.099*** 0.377*** 0.107*** 0.125*** -0.094*** 
CGCOM -0.209*** 0.062** 0.279*** 0.048 0.016 0.019 -0.009 -0.053* 0.110***  -0.046 0.070** 0.092*** 0.029 -0.029 0.052* 
GROWTH 0.081*** 0.002 -0.007 -0.009 0.044 0.024 0.013 -0.034 -0.047 -0.051*  0.183*** 0.023 0.019 -0.064** 0.036 
ROA -0.421*** 0.081*** 0.174*** 0.224*** 0.030 -0.035 -0.121*** 0.082*** 0.110*** 0.070** 0.171***  0.165*** 0.117*** 0.286*** -0.019 
LNTA 0.103*** 0.214*** 0.275*** 0.169*** -0.187*** 0.087*** -0.206*** 0.455*** 0.369*** 0.069** 0.004 0.162***  0.181*** 0.242*** -0.409*** 
TNGAS 0.009 0.200*** 0.049* -0.047 0.021 -0.095*** -0.226*** 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.029 0.016 0.120*** 0.210***  0.093*** -0.146*** 
DIVPO -0.124*** 0.026 0.050* 0.121*** -0.031 0.046 -0.148*** 0.200*** 0.136*** -0.002 -0.097*** 0.232*** 0.158*** 0.072**  -0.216*** 
BSRK -0.108*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.078*** 0.063** 0.037 0.124*** -0.151*** -0.065** 0.045 0.078*** -0.060** -0.387*** -0.069** -0.184***  
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. FCS denotes firm 
capital structure, EISSUE denotes equity issuance, OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN 
represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate 
governance committee, GROWTH denotes firm growth, ROA denotes firm profitability, LNTA denotes firm size, TNGAS denotes tangible assets, DIVPO denotes dividend policy,  BSRK denotes business risk. 
The correlation matrix depicts the strength and sign of the relationship amongst the variables. ***, ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This subsection provides and discusses the descriptive statistics. It is divided into two 
subsections. Descriptive statistics for the FCS model are presented in Subsection 5.2.1, while the 
EISSUE model’s descriptive statistics are presented in Subsection 5.2.2.  
5.2.1  Descriptive Statistics: Capital Structure  
Table 29 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. It 
shows that the total debt ranges from a minimum of 10.28% to a maximum of 353.97%, with an 
average of 103.64% for the period 2001 to 2011. This suggests that Omani firms are highly 
leveraged, which is in line with the same conclusions reported by Omet and Mashharawe (2002) 
and Sbeiti (2010). The higher mean value of the FCS  indicates that Omani listed firms tend to 
have a high degree of reliance on debt financing rather than equity capital. Such managerial 
preference for debt financing is possibly due to one or two of the following reasons. Managers 
are motivated to issue high levels of debt because they often have close relationships with 
political leaders and bank officers that allow them to easily obtain loans from local providers and 
from the government at favourable rates (Friend and Lang, 1988; Abdulla, 1998; Malatesta, 2001; 
Fan et al., 2011; Haque et al., 2011). Omani firms with large block holders might tend to use debt 
financing as a governance mechanism in order to discipline managers. The standard deviation of 
the FCS, however, is 115.17, indicating that there is a significant variation in the FCS among 
Omani listed firms. Figure 5 displays the average of the FCS over 11 years. It shows that the 
mean value of the FCS is relatively consistent among Omani listed firms over the sampled period, 
with a slight decline since 2009, but remaining above 85.09 until 2011. The Table 29 also shows 
describtive statistics for the other two measures of capital structure. The short-term-debt (SHD) 
ranges from a minimum of 3.8416% to a maximum of 171.2921%, with an average of 43.1467% 
whereas The long-term-debt (LND) ranges from a minimum of 6.9755% to a maximum of 
207.1330%, with an average of 55.1566%. This confirms the statistics provided by total debt ratio 
that Omani listed firms appear to relay on debt financing rather than equity capital in financing 
their activities.   
In addition, Tables 28 and 29 show the correlation matrix and skewness and kurtosis 
statistics of the FCS, respectively. For instance, the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients 
indicate that the FCS is positively and significantly associated with foreign ownership, block 
ownership, growth and firm size, while CG index, CG committee, profitability, dividend policy 
and business risk are negatively and significantly correlated with the FCS. This is preliminary 
evidence that better CG firms employ lower levels of leverage compared with those of weak CG 
structures as both the OCGI and CGCOM are significant and negative associated with the FCS. 
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Skewness (1.1419) and kurtosis (2.9210) statistics show that the FCS is not normally distributed, 
so the current study accepts the null hypothesis that the FCS is not symmetrically and 
mesokurtically distributed. The FCS appears to be right-skewed, where most observations are 
concentrated on the left of the mean, and shows platykurtic distribution, where the observations 
are more widely spread around the mean (the absolute critical values for accepting skewness and 
kurtosis are zero and three, respectively (Brooks, 2007)). Generally, the results of both skewness 
and kurtosis statistics are consistent with the reported results of prior studies that use the OLS 
estimation to examine CS determinants (e.g., Brailsford et al., 2002; Omet and Mashharawe, 
2002; Mazur, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009; Sbeiti, 2010).  
 
 
            Figure 5: Leverage levels based on Total Debt Ratio 
 
Panel B of Table 29 presents descriptive statistics for explanatory variables. First, it 
indicates that the OCGI ranges from a minimum of 1.39 to a maximum of 88.89, with an average 
of 47.89 for the sampled firms. There is a relatively large variation in CG compliance and 
disclosure between Omani listed firms, as indicated by a standard deviation of 21.77. This is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a) indicating that CG quality 
improves over time. Second, BLKOWN has the highest mean, with an average of 54.84, than 
INSOWN, FOROWN and GOVOWN, with averages of 20.39, 10.45 and 5.51, respectively. This is 
consistent with results provided by previous studies (e.g., Omran et al., 2008; Bishara, 2011), 
which report that the Omani corporate setting is characterised by high ownership concentration. 
This suggests that BLKOWN is expected to play an important role in monitoring and governing 
Omani firms’ corporate policy decisions in general and CS and the choice of financing in 
particular. Third, BSIZE ranges from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 13, with an average of 
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7.34, which is consistent with the Omani Companies Act requirement. Third, BIG4 ranges from 
0.00 to 1.00, with an average of 0.71 for the sample data. The standard deviation is 0.45, 
indicating that there is a substantial variation in BIG4 among Omani listed firms. A large number 
of Omani listed firms’ financial statements are audited by one of the big four audit firms; this 
may suggest that these firms use big audit firms as a governance mechanism to attract investors 
when seeking new or additional financing. Finally, CGCOM ranges from 0.00 to 1.00, with an 
average of 0.15 for the total sample. The standard deviation of 0.36 is substantially higher than 
the above CG variables, but is less than BIG4. Despite the low value of CGCOM’s mean, it 
indicates that there is awareness among Omani listed firms of the crucial role of CG committees 
in assisting firms to access capital markets in order to meet their external financing needs.  
Panel C of Table 29 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables. Growth 
measured by computing Tobin’s Q, ranges from 70.07 to 247.49, with a mean of 127.09, 
reflecting superior investment and growth opportunities. LNAT, measured by computing a natural 
log of total assets, ranges from 14.45 to 19.94, and has a mean of 16.62. The lowest mean values 
are given by BSRK and ROA, with averages of 0.03 and 0.05, respectively, while a mean value of 
TNGAS (0.46) indicates that Omani listed firms have large tangible assets. The standard deviation 
values for control variables are relatively large, which indicates that sufficient variation in the 
sample has been achieved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29: Summary descriptive statistics of capital structure model  
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
  FCS 103.6463 49.2632 115.1712   1.1419   2.9210 10.2814 353.9765 
  SHD 43.1467 16.1753 54.8377   1.4195   3.6273   3.8416 171.2921 
  LND 55.1566 19.3083 67.1795   1.3260   3.3383   6.9755 207.1330 
  EISSUE   0.2344   0.0000   0.4238   1.2541   2.5728   0.0000      1.0000 
Panel B: Explanatory variables 
  OCGI   47.8973 54.1667   21.7746  -0.9200   2.6976   1.3900   88.8900 
  GOVOWN     5.5173   0.0000   13.4804   3.1670 13.2821   0.0000   75.2558 
  INSOWN   20.3921 12.4205   22.6782   1.0529   3.2718   0.0000   90.8500 
  FOROWN   10.4591   0.0000   20.0972   2.0946   6.8656   0.0000   90.1300 
  BLKOWN   54.8402 56.5927   24.3699  -0.3106   2.4292   0.0000   99.4700 
  BSIZE     7.3437   7.0000     1.7885   0.7651   3.1554   4.0000   13.0000 
  BIG4     0.7100   1.0000     0.4539  -0.9259   1.8574   0.0000     1.0000 
  CGCOM     0.1588   0.0000     0.3656   1.8665   4.4839   0.0000     1.0000 
Panel C: Control variables 
  GROWTH 127.0870 114.3647   45.0085   1.2270   3.9172 70.0692 247.4900 
  ROA     0.0573     0.0504     0.0980   0.0161   2.7295  -0.1368      0.2500 
  LNTA   16.6222  16.4242     1.4732   0.5497   2.6375 14.4500    19.9400 
  TNGAS   53.6657  51.9413   29.5617   0.1227   1.6842 11.8700    98.0486 
  DIVPO     0.4635    0.3824     0.1444   1.5008   3.5961   0.3824      0.7961 
  BSRK     0.0334    0.0241     0.0289   0.8100   2.3871   0.0031      0.0912 
Notes: FCS, SHD and LND denote total debt, short-term debt and long-term debt, EISSUE denotes equity issuance, 
OCGI denotes the Oman CG index, GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN and BLKOWN denote government, institutional, 
foreign and block ownerships, BSIZE denotes the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes 
CG committee, GROWTH denotes firm growth, ROA denotes firm profitability, LNTA denotes firm size, TNGAS 
denotes tangible assets, DIVPO denotes dividend policy, BSRK denotes business risk. Std.Dev denotes standard 
deviation. The Skewness and Kurtosis are used as measures to test for normality assumption.  
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As discussed in Subsection 3.2.3.3, the CS literature (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; 
Jiraporn et al., 2012) suggests that CS differs across different industrial groups. Hence, it is 
useful to investigate whether variability in the levels of leverage among Omani listed firms can 
be explained by industrial groups. Following the suggestion in the CS literature that financial 
firms are heavily regulated and their leverages may not be interpreted like those of non-financial 
firms, the t-test in Column 3 of Table 30 tests whether the mean leverages of financial firms are 
significantly different from those of firms in the other eight industries.  
 
Table 30: Summary descriptive statistics for the levels of leverage based on industrial groups 
Total Debt Ratio (TDEBT)         Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Basic Materials (BM) 100.4434 2.811
***
 119.7968   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 104.2675 0.618 107.2636   10.2814 353.9765 
2002 96.7940 0.839 105.0091   10.2814 353.9765 
2003 90.6605 0.876 105.8695   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 97.7862 0.282 117.6826   10.2814 353.9765 
2005 63.4006 1.246   91.0897   10.2814 353.9765 
2006 98.5903 0.393 127.8805   10.2814 353.9765 
2007 77.9567 1.031 104.8863   10.2814 353.9765 
2008 74.8033 1.267 104.4743   10.2814 353.9765 
2009 69.1784 1.015 105.7226   10.2814 353.9765 
2010 69.1882 0.874 102.6820   10.2814 353.9765 
2011 80.1290 0.833 122.8097   10.2814 353.9765 
Panel B: Consumer Goods (CG) 135.8068 2.065
**
 118.6097   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 134.8718 0.139 122.0863   10.2814 353.9765 
2002 138.5354 0.229 121.9062   10.2814 353.9765 
2003 145.1781 0.548 117.6068   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 121.6989 0.400 105.0777   10.2814 353.9765 
2005 157.3041 1.341 122.2769   10.2814 353.9765 
2006 155.7504 1.049 134.6047   10.2814 353.9765 
2007 155.1578 1.116 130.3469   10.2814 353.9765 
2008 138.7359 0.616 113.5275   10.2814 353.9765 
2009 124.1379 0.665 118.1027   10.2814 353.9765 
2010 122.8767 0.755 126.5219   10.2814 353.9765 
2011 104.6841 0.167 109.6321   10.2814 353.9765 
Panel C: Consumer Services (CS) 71.2799 4.216
***
   78.6538   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 94.9197 0.849   89.5945   10.2814 353.9765 
2002 93.1498 0.886 100.3810   10.2814 353.9765 
2003 81.6344 1.079 100.4321   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 98.3267 0.277 101.0739   10.2814 353.9765 
2005 66.2434 1.174   88.4029   10.2814 353.9765 
2006 68.9778 1.266   89.7278   10.2814 353.9765 
2007 54.7456 1.869
*
   55.5939   10.2814 208.9642 
2008 62.8489 1.811
*
   58.7038   10.2814 190.7407 
2009 58.2182 1.553   57.1175   10.2814 188.1821 
2010 57.8851 1.404   55.5609   10.2814 174.5391 
2011 62.5690 1.611   69.8323   10.2814 224.1706 
Panel D: Financials (FI) 113.2087  126.9334   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 129.2053  143.6754   10.2814 353.9765 
2002 129.3486  142.1046   10.2814 353.9765 
2003 124.3886  136.3252   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 108.1000  123.6657   10.2814 353.9765 
2005 106.0815  120.7509   10.2814 353.9765 
2006 113.6129  133.7890   10.2814 353.9765 
2007 113.2050  131.7013   10.2814 353.9765 
2008 117.2003  127.8316   10.2814 353.9765 
2009 101.6202  118.2147   10.2814 353.9765 
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Continuation: Table 30          Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel D: Financials (FI)      
2010 96.6761  117.2127   10.2814 353.9765 
2011 110.3079  121.3421   10.2814 353.9765 
Panel E: Health Care (HE) 66.9857 1.631 101.6696   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 113.3614 0.108     0.0000 113.3614 113.3614 
2002 74.9808 0.527   91.4987   10.2814 139.6801 
2003 182.1290 0.553 243.0291   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 182.1290 0.774 243.0291   10.2814 353.9765 
Panel E: Health Care (HE)      
2005 31.1713 0.859   29.5428   10.2814    52.0613 
2006 31.3551 0.854   29.8028   10.2814   52.4289 
2007 27.0100 0.911   23.6578   10.2814   43.7386 
2008 30.3642 0.945   28.4013   10.2814   50.4469 
2009 32.2580 0.816   31.0797   10.2814   54.2347 
2010 29.8415 0.793   27.6621   10.2814   49.4015 
2011 25.4306 0.973   21.4242   10.2814   40.5798 
Panel F: Industrials (IN) 117.6374 0.339 119.3234   10.2814 353.9765 
2001 144.7249 0.317 127.6293   10.2814 353.9765 
2002 152.7256 0.452 145.1397   10.2814 353.9765 
2003 150.1722 0.529 144.1919   10.2814 353.9765 
2004 132.3374 0.555 128.4526   10.2814 353.9765 
2005 139.6725 0.746 127.1141   10.2814 332.6261 
2006 191.7362 1.525 165.1179   10.2814 353.9765 
2007 114.1200 0.021 114.2377   10.2814 305.2233 
2008 94.7738 0.575   85.8422   10.2814 263.2242 
2009 68.1724 0.930   77.8121   10.2814 280.9386 
2010 65.8213 0.885   65.3918   10.2814 241.3958 
2011 61.0357 1.302   73.5439   10.2814 276.8130 
Panel G: Oil and Gas (OG) 10.2814 2.685
***
     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2001 10.2814 0.811     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2002 10.2814 0.822     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2003 10.2814 0.821     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2004 10.2814 0.776     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2005 10.2814 0.777     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2006 10.2814 0.758     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2007 10.2814 0.768     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2008 10.2814 0.822     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2009 10.2814 0.760     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2010 10.2814 0.725     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2011 10.2814 0.810     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
Panel H: Telecommunications (TE)      23.0472 2.127
**
   13.4497   10.2814   49.4983 
2001           0.0000 0.000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
2002           0.0000 0.000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
2003           0.0000 0.000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
2004           0.0000 0.000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
2005 34.3780 0.581     0.0000   34.3780   34.3780 
2006 18.5154 0.698     0.0000   18.5154   18.5154 
2007 10.2814 0.768     0.0000   10.2814   10.2814 
2008 21.1068 0.739     0.0000   21.1068   21.1068 
2009 20.1577 0.678     0.0000   20.1577   20.1577 
2010 29.8898 0.792   27.7305   10.2814   49.4983 
2011 21.6030 1.017   16.0112   10.2814   32.9246 
Panel I: Utilities (UT) 157.1058 1.886
*
 141.5015 10.2814 353.9765 
2001 122.7292 0.062   40.9681 93.7603 151.6980 
2002 83.7225 0.446     9.4772 77.0212   90.4239 
2003 85.1984 0.399   32.5942 62.1508 108.2460 
2004 159.0428 0.654 170.0435 41.1943 353.9765 
2005 169.1482 0.822 165.2252 35.7676 353.9765 
2006 123.4821 0.122 123.6929 26.9004 262.8988 
2007 142.3548 0.354 183.9073 21.2440 353.9765 
2008 195.0500 1.086 184.3641 14.4459 353.9765 
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Continuation: Table 30          Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel I: Utilities (UT)      
2009 194.8495 1.385 184.9145 10.2814 353.9765 
2010 169.5615 1.110 168.1427 10.2814 353.9765 
2011 184.5919 1.063 195.6299 10.2814 353.9765 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panels A, B, C, E, F, G, H and I test for equality means between basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, telecommunications, utilities and financial firms, 
respectively. A mean difference with (***), (**) and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are 
equal is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Std. Dev denotes standard deviation. 
 
Table 30 presents descriptive statistics for the nine industries based on total debt ratio. It 
indicates that Omani firms in basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, 
health care, industrials, oil and gas, telecommunications and utilities firms use 100%, 135%, 
71%, 113%, 67%, 118%, 10%, 23% and 157% debt financing in their CSs. Furthermore, the 
independent samples t-test for equality of means between financial firms and firms operating in 
basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, oil and gas telecommunications and utilities 
industries rejects the null hybothesis that the means are equal at least at the 10% significance 
level. Figure 6 presents a comparison of the leverage levels across the nine industries using 
calculated means of the FCS. It shows that utilities firms tend to have higher levels of leverage, 
followed by consumer goods and industrials firms. This may be explained by the fact that utilities 
firms are involved in huge projects, especially in countries like Oman, which are still developing 
their infrastructure, which necessitates more debt financing than other firms. Consumer goods 
and industrials firms are also motivated by the Omani market to invest in large projects, as the 
country looks forward to becoming self-sufficient, which requires such firms to be highly 
leveraged in order to finance their investments.    
 
      
      Figure 6: Total Debt Levels by Industry  
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5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: The Choice of Financing  
As reported in Table 29, the EISSUE ranges from a minimum of 0.00 to a maximum of 
1.00, with an average of 0.23. The lower value of the EISSUE’s mean supports the CS descriptive 
statistics that Omani firms prefer to issue debt financing rather than equity capital. The standard 
deviation of the EISSUE is 0.42, indicating that there is substantial variation in the EISSUE 
among Omani listed firms. According to the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, the 
EISSUE is positively and significantly associated with the OCGI, board size, audit firm size, CG 
committee, profitability, firm size and tangible assets, whereas block ownership and business risk 
are negatively and significantly associated with the EISSUE. This is initial evidence that firms 
with better CG compliance tend to issue equity rather than debt, as both the OCGI and CGCOM 
show a significant and positive relationship with the EISSUE. Similar to CS, the skewness 
(1.2541) and kurtosis (2.5728) statistics suggest that the null hypothesis that the EISSUE is not 
symmetrically and mesokurtically distributed is accepted. In addition, Table 31 classifies Omani 
listed firms based on capital issuance. It illustrates that there are 1,152 firm-year observations 
over the period 2001 to 2011. A total of 103 firm-year observations (9%) had to be excluded as 
firms either issues both equity and debt or did not issue equity or debt. This leaves the sample 
with 1,049 firm-year observations over 11 years, with more concentrated in the year 2010 (115 
firm-year observations).   
 
Table 31: Classification of Omani listed firms based on capital issuance 
 Year  Equity issuance  Debt issuance Equity & Debt 
No Equity or 
Debt 
Total Firms 
  2001 9 78     95 
  2002 12 72     96 
  2003 4 84     97 
  2004 11 90   102 
  2005 11 80     94 
  2006 14 81   104 
  2007 16 84   112 
  2008 24 75   113 
  2009 12 93   114 
  2010 14 87   115 
  2011 13 85   110 
Total firms 140 909 67 36        1152 
   Less: Firms issuing equity and debt    (67) 
            Firms do not issue equity and debt   (36) 
Total Firm-year observations                                                                                                               1049 
 
 
Figure 7 exhibits the annual equity and debt issuances of Omani listed firms across all 
years. It is observed that the highest percentage of firms issuing equity was in 2008, with 21% 
(24 out of 113), and equity issuance was lowest in 2003, with 4% (4 out of 97). In contrast, debt 
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issuance was highest in 2009, with 82% (93 out of 114), and lowest in 2002, with 75% (72 out of 
96). This indicates that debt issuance is a more popular choice among Omani listed firms, as only 
13% of the firms (140 out of 1049) chose equity issuance, which is consistent with prior studies 
that report that firms tend to issue debt more than equity in financing their investments (e.g., 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Mande et al., 2012).   
 
       
       Figure 7: Annual Equity and Debt issuances among Omani listed Firms 
 
Table 32 presents a comparison between firms issuing equity and those who are issuing 
debt based on mean, standard deviations, minimum and maximum.   
 
Table 32: Summary descriptive statistics of equity issuance model 
Issuance Firms issuing equity (140) Firms issuing debt (909) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minim Maxi  Mean Std.Dev     Minim Maxi  
OCGI 50.00 20.00   1.00 85.00 47.00 22.00   1.00 89.00 
GOVOWN   0.03   0.08   0.00   1.00   0.06   0.14   0.00   1.00 
INSOWN 19.00 21.00   0.00 89.00 20.00 23.00   0.00 90.00 
FOROWN 12.00 20.00   0.00 75.00 10.00 20.00   0.00 99.00 
BLKOWN 56.00 50.00   0.00 74.00 55.00 30.00   0.00 99.00 
BSIZE   7.39   2.00   4.00 12.00   7.35   2.00   4.00 13.00 
BIG4   0.70   0.01   0.00   1.00   0.71   0.05   0.00   1.00 
CGCOM   0.17   0.01   0.00   1.00   0.16   0.04   0.00   1.00 
GROWTH   0.16   0.06   0.14   1.60   0.15   0.33 15.00   1.82 
ROA   0.05   0.06  -0.10   0.21   0.06   0.08  -0.10   0.21 
LNTA 17.00   2.00 14.45 19.86 16.00   2.00 13.00 19.86 
TNGAS 41.00 31.00 10.00 92.00 49.00 30.00 12.00 91.00 
DIVPO   0.05   0.01   0.23   0.75   0.06   0.01   0.31   0.79 
BSRK   0.03   0.04   0.00   0.06   0.04   0.03   0.00   0.09 
Notes: OCGI denote the Oman CG index, GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN and BLKOWN denote government, 
institutional, foreign and block ownerships, BSIZE denotes the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, 
CGCOM denotes CG committee, GROWTH denotes firm growth, ROA denotes firm profitability, LNTA denotes firm 
size, TNGAS denotes tangible assets, DIVPO denotes dividend policy, BSRK denotes business risk. 
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Table 32 shows that the OCGI is larger for firms issuing equity (mean value = 50.00) than 
for those issuing debt (mean value = 47.00). The OCGI’s mean value for firms issuing equity 
supports the hypothesis that firms with better CG tend to issue equity rather than debt in 
financing their investment opportunities (Mande et al., 2012). There are also relative differences 
in CG measures and other firm characteristics. First, firms issuing equity tend to have larger 
boards (7.39 versus 7.35), more CG committees (0.17 versus 0.16) and a lower ratio of 
government ownership (0.03 versus 0.06). Second, firms issuing debt have a higher ratio of 
institutional ownership (0.20 versus 0.19), a lower ratio of foreign ownership (0.10 versus 0.12) 
and are more likely to be audited by one of the big four audit firms (0.71 versus 0.70). Third, 
firms issuing equity are larger (17.00 versus 16.00), have higher growth prospects (16.00 versus 
15.00) and are less risky (0.03 versus 0.04). Finally, firms issuing debt have more tangible assets 
(0.49 versus 0.41), are more profitable (0.06 versus 0.05) and pay more dividends (0.06 versus 
0.05). Consistent with the above discussion, the descriptive statistics suggest that CG variables 
play a role in influencing Omani listed firms to issue equity or debt in order to meet their external 
financing needs.  
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the empirical results. It seeks to achieve two main objectives. First, 
it examines whether there is a statistically significant relationship between CG as measured by 
CG index and CS as measured by total debt ratio. Second, it investigates whether there is a 
statistically significant association between CG as measured by CG index and the choice of 
financing as proxied by equity issuance. Thus, this section is divided into two subsections. The 
results obtained from the OLS regression to test Hypotheses 1 through 8 are reported and 
discussed in Subsection 6.1, whereas the results obtained from logistic regression to examine 
Hypotheses 9 through 16 are presented and analysed in Subsection 6.2.      
6.1  EMPIRICAL RESULTS: CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
This subsection presents and discusses the empirical results regarding the FCS 
determinants. Specifically, it reports the extent to which a broad composite CG index, corporate 
ownership structure and corporate board/audit characteristics can explain observable changes in 
firm-level CS. Table 33 provides a summary of hypotheses (1 to 8) and results to facilitate 
comparison, and Table 34 reports details of these results. Four analyses are presented in Table 34 
to demonstrate the individual impact of CG index, ownership structure and board/ audit 
characteristics, as well as the collective influence of all CG variables on the FCS. Only CG index, 
in addition to control variables, was examined in the first analysis, in order to see its effect on the 
FCS separate from other CG variables; the results of this analysis are reported in Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 34. The F-Stat, which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, rejects the 
null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of CG index and control variables are equal to 
zero. The model is able to explain about 66% of the changes in the FCS as indicated by the 
adjusted R
2
. The coefficients on CG index, profitability and dividend policy have a negative 
relationship with the FCS, at least at the 5% significance level, whereas firm size have a 
significant and positive association. In contrast, growth, tangible assets and business risk have an 
insignificant relationship with the FCS. Second, ownership structures were tested separately from 
other CG variables to examine their individual effects on the FCS; the results of this analysis are 
reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 34. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of ownership 
variables, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is rejected, as the probability of F-Stat 
is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The adjusted R
2 
is 0.65, indicating that 
approximately 66% of variability in the FCS is jointly explained by these variables. Although the 
sign of ownership variables is in line with their predicted significance, except for block and 
government and ownerships, all of them have insignificant relationships with the FCS.  
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In contrast, a number of control variables have a significant impact on the FCS. Firm size 
is significantly and positively associated with the FCS, while profitability and dividend policy are 
significantly and negatively correlated with the FCS. Board and audit characteristics along with 
control variables were examined in the third analysis to investigate their impact separately from 
other CG variables. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 34 report the results of this analysis, and indicate 
that the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients of board size, audit firm size, CG committee 
and control variables are not equal to zero is accepted, as the probability of F-Stat is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. The adjusted R
2 
is 0.66, suggesting that these variables 
jointly explain 66% of variability in the FCS. The analysis shows that audit firm size, CG 
committee, profitability and dividend policy each have a significant and negative association with 
the FCS, whereas firm size have a significant and positive relationship. In contrast, board size, 
growth, tangible assets and business risk have no significant effect on the FCS.  
The results of multivariate regression of the FCS on eight CG variables and the control 
variables are presented in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 34 as a final analysis in order to observe the 
joint effect of all CG variables on the FCS. The study rejects the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients of explanatory and control variables are equal to zero because of the F-
Stat, which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The 66% of variability in the 
FCS is jointly explained by these variables, as indicated by the adjusted R
2
. Overall, CG index, 
audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee each have a statistically significant and 
negative relationship with the FCS. In contrast, ownership variables and board size are 
statistically insignificantly associated with the FCS. The inclusion of all CG variables shows that 
the signs of all the coefficients remain unchanged from the first, second and third analysis, with 
little change in the level of significance and magnitude. For instance, CG index and CG 
committee, which were statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels, are now statistically 
significant at 10% and 5%, respectively. These changes are expected as a result of the 
interrelationships between all variables. Further discussion of these results is provided in the 
following subsections. In particular, the empirical results of CG variables are discussed in 
Subsection 6.1.1, and Subsection 6.1.2 discusses the empirical results related to control variables.  
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Table 33: A summary of all hypotheses and findings for the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance 
Dependent variable                                                                                                              Firm capital structure (FCS) 
Explanatory variables OCGI Ownership variables Board/Audit variables All 
Governance 
Variables 
Hyp
. No 
Expect-
ed sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Government 
ownership 
1 +    - Insignificant Rejected  
  
- Insignificant Rejected 
Institutional 
ownership 
2 -    - Insignificant Rejected  
  
- Insignificant Rejected 
Foreign  
ownership 
3 -    - Insignificant Rejected  
  
- Insignificant Rejected 
Block  
ownership 
4 -    + Insignificant Rejected  
  
+ Insignificant Rejected 
Omani CGI  5 - - 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted     
  
- 
Significant 
      (10%) 
Accepted 
Board size 6 -/+       - Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
CG committee    7 -       - 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted - 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Audit firm size 
8 
 
- 
 
      - 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted - 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Note: Column 1 presents the eight variables that are represented the tested hypotheses. Columns 2 to 12 present information relating to hypotheses one to eight with regard to the impact of corporate 
governance on capital structure.  
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Table 34: The relationship between capital structure and corporate governance 
       OCGI Ownership variables Board/Audit variables                   All 
Independent variables                 
Ex.Sig 
Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign 
Panel A: CG variables    
  OCGI - -0.4327 0.0133**           -      -        -      - -0.3218 0.0701* 
  GOVOWN +            -       - -0.6742 0.1668        -      - -0.5379 0.2760 
  INSOWN -            -       - -0.0819 0.7346        -      - -0.0614 0.8018 
  FOROWN -            -       - -0.1595 0.5797        -      - -0.1340 0.6373 
  BLKOWN -           -       - 0.1462 0.5928        -      - 0.0744 0.7842 
  BSIZE -/+            -       -        -       - -2.9417 0.3183 -2.6574 0.3735 
  BIG4 -            -       -        -       - -14.7656 0.0757* -14.2975 0.0877* 
  CGCOM -            -       -        -       - -22.4803 0.0079*** -18.0108 0.0352** 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0197 0.7671 -0.0106 0.8698 -0.0121 0.8550 -0.0011 0.9861 
  ROA  -198.3216 0.0000*** -197.8174 0.0000*** -197.2871 0.0000*** -195.5175 0.0000*** 
  LNTA  20.0832 0.0040*** 20.0306 0.0044*** 21.5998 0.0015*** 22.5801 0.0010*** 
  TNGAS  -0.1492 0.4088 -0.1388 0.4418 -0.1569 0.3806 -0.1469 0.4123 
  DIVPO  -37.3017 0.0158** -37.7818 0.0134** -37.6399 0.0135** -35.5215 0.0183** 
  BSRK  24.9899 0.7785 17.9443 0.8396 26.9219 0.7621 31.0842 0.7269 
  2001  -8.8435 0.5811 10.0638 0.4578 8.9656 0.5171 -5.3534 0.7379 
  2002  -1.1016 0.9306 13.7124 0.2363 13.0835 0.2657 1.5490 0.9016 
  2003  8.8326 0.3307 17.5378 0.0520* 17.0457 0.0612* 10.4105 0.2500 
  2004  5.0169 0.4933 7.8060 0.2832 7.3442 0.3137 5.0251 0.4830 
  2006  1.2011 0.8460 -0.0253 0.9967 -0.7424 0.9036 0.1859 0.9758 
  2007  -6.1424 0.4639 -8.7302 0.3009 -9.8468 0.2410 -8.1554 0.3280 
  2008  -19.1412 0.0507** -22.2925 0.0254** -22.6974 0.0203** -20.7669 0.0316** 
  2009  -25.1430 0.0073*** -28.8247 0.0028*** -29.3156 0.0019*** -26.9868 0.0034*** 
  2010  -31.7471 0.0014*** -35.5872 0.0006*** -35.3971 0.0004*** -32.8806 0.0007*** 
  2011  -34.7840 0.0021*** -41.8198 0.0005*** -37.8655 0.0008*** -37.7748 0.0008*** 
  Basic materials -1.6796 0.9564 0.7594 0.9804 -8.8742 0.7574 1.2876 0.9656 
  Consumer services -28.3537 0.3047 -31.0486 0.2774 -31.8561 0.2124 -26.3853 0.3440 
  Consumer goods 47.7609 0.1094 40.1612 0.1784 43.9628 0.1093 45.2694 0.1132 
  Financials 2.8443 0.9316 -1.7004 0.9592 4.8828 0.8718 6.4809 0.8388 
  Health care -0.5961 0.9886 3.3515 0.9383 -3.4895 0.9317 0.4038 0.9925 
  Industrials 20.6124 0.4281 14.6316 0.5742 17.6065 0.4560 20.8170 0.4126 
  Telecommunications -77.6360 0.0258** -60.0079 0.1648 -82.8478 0.0177** -62.6788 0.1422 
  Utilities 49.6327 0.2628 54.6716 0.2361 54.2037 0.2029 60.7700 0.1698 
Constant     -167.4461    0.1344  -188.2159      0.1029   -177.3239     0.1138   -185.3337     0.1096 
Adj. R
2
     0.6586   0.6575  0.6603                0.6607 
F-Stat      86.3509***     77.1545
***
     80.8572
***
              68.8730
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                 2.1506   2.1471  2.1421                2.1411 
Number  f observations   1152   1152  1152                 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Omani CG index (OCGI) is un-weighted CG index. Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership 
(INSOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) are measured as percentage of government, institutional and foreign ownership to total firm ordinary 
shareholdings. Block ownership (BLKOWN) is measured as percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. 
Board size (BSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors on the firm’s board. Audit firm size (BIG4) is measured as dummy variable where a firm 
takes 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
The presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM) is measured as dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm has set up a corporate 
governance committee, 0 otherwise. Growth (GROWTH) is measured by Tobin’s Q. Profitability (ROA) is measured as operating profit to total assets. 
Firm size (LNTA) is measured by natural log of total assets.Tangible assets (TNGAS) is measured as fixed assets divided by total assets.  Dividend policy 
(DIVPO) is measured as dividends per share divided by earnings per share. Business risk (BSRK) is measured as standard deviation of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets. In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry are excluded from the model. The 
parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes 
adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics.  
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6.1.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
Panel A of Table 34 reports the empirical results of CG variables, including CG index, 
ownership variables and board and audit characteristics. First, the coefficient on government 
ownership is negative and statistically insignificant, so H1, which postulates that there is a 
statistically significant positive association between firm-level CG and the FCS can be rejected. 
This means that the presence of the state as a major investor has no explanatory power in 
explaining the variations in the FCS, which is contrary to the current study’s prediction that 
government ownership drives CS. Theoretically, the negative coefficient on government 
ownership is consistent with the prediction that managers tend to carry debt at a sub-optimal level 
in order to enjoy free available cash, as their positions are guaranteed by the state. The negative 
influence of government ownership is further supported by the view that the market for corporate 
control does not seem to be effective in encouraging managers in such firms to use optimal levels 
of debt, because they have greater support from the major long-term investor, the government, 
and use this power to protect themselves from a variety of risks. Empirically, this result lends 
empirical support to the result reported by Hussainey and Aljifri (2012), who document no 
significant effect of government ownership on the FCS. In contrast, this result is inconsistent with 
prior empirical evidence (e.g., Gul, 1999; Al-Sakran, 2001; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Li et 
al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011) that government ownership has a significant and positive relationship 
with the FCS.  
Second, the coefficient on institutional ownership is negative and statistically 
insignificant. This leads the study to reject H2, that institutional ownership is significantly and 
negatively associated with the FCS. This result implies that large institutional investors have no 
impact on the FCS, which is not in line with the prediction that institutional investors may tend to 
use debt financing as a CG mechanism to reduce managers’ ability to engage in excessive 
perquisite consumption, by forcing them to employ higher level of leverage. The inverse 
relationship between institutional ownership and the FCS is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that the higher communication and monitoring that large institutional investors have 
making them less relying on using debt financing to reduce agency problems. Empirically, this 
result offers support to the Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed’s (2009) study that report that institutional 
ownership is not significantly correlated with the FCS, but contrasts with other studies (e.g., 
Michaely and Vincent, 2012; Hsu and Wang, 2013) that document a significant negative 
relationship between the percentage of ownership held by institutional investors and firm-level 
CS.   
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Third, the model finds a statistically insignificant and negative association between 
foreign ownership and the FCS. This suggests that H3, that foreign ownership and the FCS are 
significantly and negatively associated, is rejected. This result reveals that foreign ownership has 
no significant impact on firm-level CS, which is contrary to the expectation that foreign investors 
may tend to force firms to employ higher levels of leverage as a governance device. 
Theoretically, the negative association between the two variables is consistent with the prediction 
that firms with a large proportion of foreign ownership might not need to use more debt to 
mitigate agency problems because foreign investors act as a substitute mechanism for debt. 
Empirically, this result supports Zou and Xiao’s (2006) evidence that foreign ownership has no 
significant impact on the CS of Chinese firms. However, this result differs from prior studies 
(e.g., Gurunlu and Gursoy, 2010) that report a significant and negative relation, as well as those 
(e.g., Le and Phung, 2013) that report a significant and positive association.  
Fourth, the coefficient on block ownership is positive and statistically insignificant, so the 
current study rejects H4, that block ownership is significantly and negatively associated with the 
FCS. This result indicates that block ownership has no explanatory power in explaining the 
variability in the FCS, which rejects the current study’s expectation that block ownership can 
determine the level of leverage, as about 55% of firms’ shares are held by block holders. 
Theoretically, the positive coefficient on block ownership is consistent with the prediction that 
managers in firms with high levels of block ownership may be forced by block holders to use 
higher debt levels in order to act in line with their interests. This result does not lend empirical 
support to prior studies (e.g., Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Suto, 2003) reporting that block 
ownership and debt ratio are negatively associated, and other studies (e.g., Sheikh and Wang, 
2012; Ganguli, 2013) that document a significant and positive relation. In contrast, it lends 
empirical support to the view that block holders use debt as a CG mechanism to discipline 
managers.  
Fifth, unlike the ownership variables examined in this study, the OCGI, which is the main 
variable, has a significant relationship with firm-level CS. In particular, the coefficient on the 
OCGI is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, suggesting that H5 
is empirically supported. Quantitatively, holding all the other variables within the model constant, 
the result suggests that an increase a 10% in the OCGI will result in a 0.322 decrease in the use of 
total debt in financing firms’ operations. This result lends empirical support to AT’s assumption 
that CG is a significant determinant of CS. It shows that firms with better CG tend to employ 
lower levels of leverage than those with poor CG structures. The significant negative association 
between the OCGI and the FCS is consistent with the theoretical prediction that firms with poor 
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CG use higher levels of leverage as a substitute for CG, to discipline managers to act in line with 
shareholders’ interests. Empirically, this result is in line with prior studies (e.g., Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Rijal and Bahadur, 2010; Haque et al., 2011; Jiraporn 
et al., 2012) that report evidence that leverage and governance are inversely associated.  
Sixth, board size is found to be statistically insignificant and negatively associated with 
the FCS. This leads the study to reject H6, that board size has a statistically significant 
relationship with the FCS. The negative relationship between board size and the FCS is in line 
with the theoretical prediction that larger boards may not need to use debt as a control mechanism 
because they have a diversity of experience and skills that enables them to effectively mitigate 
agency problems. Empirically, this result lends empirical support to Hussainey and Aljifri’s 
(2012) evidence that firm board size has no significant impact on the FCS. In contrast, this result 
is contrary to previous empirical studies (e.g., Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011) that report a 
significant and negative relation, and other prior studies (e.g., Sheikh and Wang, 2012) that 
document a significant and positive association.  
Seventh, in consistent with the OCGI’s result variable, the presence of a CG committee is 
found to be statistically significant and negatively correlated to the FCS at the 5% level of 
significance, indicating that H7 is empirically supported. This result suggests that firms with CG 
committees tend to use less leverage than those that do not set up CG committees. It is in line 
with the theoretical prediction that because CG committees ensure that CG provisions adopted by 
the firm are followed, firms that establish CG committees are expected to implement better CG 
mechanisms and thus reduce managerial-self interest instead of using debt financing as a 
substitute mechanism for CG. The CG committee-CS relation has not been examined in the 
literature; this study offers empirical evidence showing that CG committee is a significant 
determinant of firm-level CS.  
Finally, the model shows that audit firm size has a significant impact on the FCS. In 
particular, the coefficient on audit firm size is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level of significance, suggesting that H8 is empirically supported. This result implies that firms 
audited by larger audit firms tend to use lower levels of leverage. Theoretically, this result in line 
with the prediction that because large audit firms are better able to reduce information 
asymmetries, moral hazard and adverse selection problems than small audit firms, firms audited 
by larger audit firms may not need to use high levels of leverage as a CG mechanism to reduce 
the level of asymmetric information. This result offers empirical evidence to the limited 
international evidence on the effect of audit firm size on CS. It is not in line with Hussainey and 
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Aljifri (2012), who report that the quality of external auditors has no significant influence on the 
FCS. 
6.1.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The empirical results related to control variables are presented in Panel B of Table 34. The 
coefficient on firm size is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The 
positive relation between firm size and the FCS is consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
large firms tend to employ more leverage than small firms because they are more diversified, 
motivated to benefit from tax shields, less subject to bankruptcy risk, and have large tangible 
assets and better access to credit markets. This result lends empirical support to prior studies 
(e.g., Noulas and Genimakis, 2011; Dang, 2013) that document a positive association between 
firm size and the FCS. The positive relation between the FCS and firm size is in line with Omet 
and Mashharawe’s (2002) and Sbeiti’s (2010) studies conducted in the Omani context.  
The coefficient on profitability and dividend policy is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. These results indicate that profitable firms and firms with 
higher dividend payments tend to employ lower levels of leverage. Theoretically, the result for 
profitability supports the view that profitable firms employ less leverage because they have more 
retained earnings than non-profitable firms. The negative coefficient of dividend policy is in line 
with theoretical predictions that firms with higher dividend payments tend to employ lower levels 
of leverage because they mitigate agency costs associated with free cash flow available to 
managers by using dividend payments as a substitute mechanism for debt financing. The 
significant negative results for both variables are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Feidakis 
and Rovolis, 2007; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009) that report evidence that profitability and the FCS are 
negatively associated, and those (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2012) that provide 
evidence that dividend policy has a negative impact on the FCS. The negative effect of 
profitability on the FCS is consistent with the evidence reported by Omet and Mashharawe 
(2002) and Sbeiti (2010), who conducted their analyses in Oman.  
Unlike the control variables mentioned above, the model finds a statistically insignificant 
association between the FCS and growth, tangible assets and business risk. The results for these 
variables are contrary to the theoretical predictions that growth, tangible assets and business risk 
are significant determinants of CS. The coefficient on tangible assets is negative, lending 
empirical support to Sbeiti’s (2010) finding of an insignificant relationship between tangibility 
and leverage among Omani listed firms. The result for business risk shows that business risk has 
a positive relationship with the FCS, providing empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Al-
Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2009) that provide empirical evidence of no 
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significant relation between the two variables. Finally, an examination of the estimated 
coefficients on year and industry dummies shows that years 2008 to 2011 have significant 
explanatory powers in explaining variations in the FCS. The coefficients on these variables are 
negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level of significance. These results lend 
empirical support to past studies (e.g., Benkraiem and Gurau, 2013) that suggest that the FCS 
changes over time.    
  To sum up, in light of continuing debate in the literature on CG as an influential factor of 
corporate policy decisions, this study provides empirical evidence that CG is a significant 
determinant of the FCS. Unlike most prior studies, and in response to recent calls in the literature, 
the impact of CG on the FCS has been examined using a CG index rather than individual CG 
mechanisms. This study also considers determinants that have not been widely investigated in the 
literature, such as government ownership and CG committee. This subsection has discussed the 
impact of CG on the FCS among Omani listed firms during the period 2001 to 2011. It reported 
the extent to which the OCGI, ownership structure and board/audit characteristics are able to 
explain variations in firm-level CS. The results of this examination are reported in Tables 33 and 
34, and are largely in line with theoretical and empirical literature. First, the results suggest that 
ownership variables, namely government ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and block ownership, have an insignificant relationship with the FCS. This implies that 
shareholders’ rights are not significant determinants of firm-level CS. Second, the model finds a 
statistically significant negative association between firm-level CG and the FCS. Third, the 
results reveal that board size has no significant impact on the FCS. Fourth, the results suggest that 
audit firm size and the FCS are significantly and negatively associated. Finally, the results 
indicate that the presence of a CG committee has a significant negative influence on the FCS.   
6.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE CHOICE OF FINANCING    
As indicated in Section 1, the second objective of the current study is to examine the 
extent to which firm-level CG drives the choice of financing, namely equity issuance. Thus, this 
Subsection presents the logistic regression results on the relationship between CG mechanisms 
and the EISSUE (hypotheses nine to sixteen). Tables 35 and 36 illustrate a summary of these 
results and the logistic regression results, respectively. In particular, Table 36 reports the results 
of the four analyses that examine the potential reaction of the EISSUE to: individual influence of 
CG index (Columns 3 and 4), ownership variables (Columns 5 and 6), board/audit variables 
(Columns 7and 8) and the joint effect of all CG variables (Columns 9 and 10). In the first 
analysis, the EISSUE was regressed on only CG index along with control variables in order to 
observe the OCGI’ influence separately from other CG variables, such as board size, audit firm 
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size and CG committee. The results indicate that the alternative hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficients of the OCGI and control variables are not equal to zero is accepted as the LR-Stat is 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. The McFadden R-squared indicates that 14% 
of variability in the EISSUE is jointly explained by these variables. This model predicts that the 
OCGI, growth, tangible assets and business risk are significant determinants of the EISSUE. The 
second analysis examines the individual impact of ownership variables in addition to control 
variables on the EISSUE. The LR-Stat is statistically significant at 1% level of significance 
suggesting that the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the ownership and control 
variables are equal to zero is rejected. The 14% of observable changes in firm-level EISSUE is 
explained by this model as indicated by the McFadden R-squared. The results of this analysis 
show that government ownership, institutional ownership, growth, profitability, firm size, and 
business risk have significant association with the EISSUE. In the third analysis, board and audit 
characteristics were examined separately from other CG variables to test their individual effects 
on the EISSUE; the results of this analysis indicate that the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
these variables, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is rejected, as the probability of 
the LR-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The McFadden R-squared 
indicates that approximately 14% of variability in the EISSUE is jointly explained by these 
variables. This analysis’s results show that board and audit characteristics have no significant 
effects on the EISSUE, while growth, profitability, firm size, tangible assets and business risk 
each is significantly associated with the EISSUE.  
The final analysis accounts for all CG variables in order to investigate the collective 
influence of a CG index, ownership variables, board size, audit firm size and CG committee on 
the EISSUE. The current study accepts the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients of eight CG 
and control variables are different from zero, as the LR-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance. The McFadden R-squared suggests that 15% of the variability in the 
EISSUE is jointly explained by these variables. The results of logistic regression of eight CG 
variables and control variables indicate that variables that have been predicted to be significant by 
the above analyses are still significant. The OCGI, government ownership, institutional 
ownership, growth, firm size, and business risk are significantly associated with the EISSUE, at 
least at the 10% level of significance. Because all variables are included, the level of significance 
of some variables changed, but the signs of all the coefficients remain unchanged. For instance, 
the coefficient on institutional ownership becomes statistically significant at 10%, whereas 
previously it was statistically significant at the 5% level. These changes are caused by the 
interrelated relationships between all variables. The following two subsections discuss these 
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results further. Subsection 6.2.1 discusses the empirical results of CG variables, while the control 
variables’ results are discussed in Subsection 6.2.2.  
6.2.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables   
Panel A of Table 36 reports empirical results of CG index, ownership variables, board 
size, audit firm size and CG committee. First, the coefficient on government ownership is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, which leads the study to accept H9, that 
there is a statistically significant negative association between government ownership and the 
EISSUE. This indicates that firms with a large percentage of government ownership will be less 
likely to choose equity over debt. Theoretically, the significant negative impact of government 
ownership is in line with ATs’ prediction that firms with greater government ownership tend to 
use debt financing to reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, as such 
firms suffer from asymmetric information more than non-government firms. This is further 
supported by the fact that the existence of large government ownership motivates managers to 
issue debt over equity, because they can borrow from the state at lower rates (Friend and Lang, 
1988). The potential influence of government ownership on the EISSUE has not yet been 
empirically investigated in literature.  
Second, the coefficient on institutional ownership is positive and statistically significant. 
Hence, the present study accepts H10, that institutional ownership has a statistically significant 
positive relationship with the EISSUE at the 10% level of significance. This means that firms 
with large proportion of institutional investors prefer equity issuance over debt financing to 
finance their activities. The positive influence of institutional ownership is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that firms with large institutional ownership, where equity issuance is less 
costly, as institutional holdings reduce information asymmetry, may be motivated to issue equity 
over debt in order to attract new investors, who will not need to collect costly private information 
(Smith, 1976; Chung et al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 2004). This result lends empirical support to 
prior studies (e.g., Brous and Kini, 1994; Mande et al., 2012) that report evidence that firms with 
a large percentage of institutional ownership tend to make equity issuance decisions.  
Third, the model predicts an insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and the 
EISSUE. This leads the current study to reject H11, that the relationship between foreign 
ownership and the EISSUE is statistically significant. This result implies that foreign ownership 
has no explanatory power in explaining the variations in the EISSUE. The negative association 
between foreign ownership and the EISSUE is in line with AT’s prediction that foreign 
shareholders may force firms to issue debt instead of equity because debt is considered a 
governance device that assists foreign shareholders to mitigate information asymmetry associated 
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with foreign ownership (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Le and Phung, 2013). Further, firms with a 
large percentage of foreign ownership may tend to issue debt because they can easily access 
international capital markets, taking advantage of foreign investors’ reputations and relationships. 
Empirically, prior studies do not consider foreign ownership as a potential determinant when 
investigating the factors that may drive the choice of financing.  
Fourth, the coefficient on block ownership is negatively related to the EISSUE, but it is 
not statistically significant. Thus, H12, that block ownership has a statistically significant 
association with the EISSUE, is rejected. This suggests that block ownership is not a significant 
determinant of firms’ choice to issue equity. The inverse relationship between block ownership 
and the EISSUE is consistent with the theoretical prediction that firms with many block holders 
tend to issue debt over equity. The debt issuance can be used by block holders to reduce 
opportunistic managerial actions and increase their ability to monitor of managers. The negative 
influence of block ownership is also supported by the expectation that block holders do not prefer 
to share potential profits (Ryen et al., 1997; Koch and Shenoy, 1999) or control rights (Cespedes 
et al., 2010) with new investors. The CS literature does not provide any empirical international 
evidence of the impact of block ownership on the choice of financing.  
Fifth, the OCGI, which is the main variable, is found to be statistically significant in 
explaining the choice of financing. Specifically, this result suggests that firm-level CG plays a 
crucial role in influencing firms to issue equity over debt. As shown in Table 35, the current 
study accepts H13, that there is a statistically significant positive association between firm-level 
CG and equity issuance at the 1% level of significance. Quantitatively, holding all the other 
variables within the model constant, the result indicates that any increase in the OCGI will result 
in a 0.010 increase in the likelihood of selecting equity compared to debt. The strongly positive 
relationship is in line with the theoretical prediction that CG mitigates agency problems, to a level 
where equity issuance becomes firms’ first choice to meet their external financing needs (Mande 
et al., 2012). Firms with better CG structures are motivated to issue equity rather than debt, as 
they aware that potential investors prefer to invest in better-governed firms, and are willing to pay 
a premium for their shares. Empirically, and given the limited number of studies examining the 
relationship between CG and a firm’s choice of financing, the statistically significant positive 
association is consistent with Mande et al. (2012), who report evidence that firms with high-
quality governance choose equity over debt.  
Sixth, the coefficient on board size reveals that board size is not a significant determinant 
of the EISSUE. This rejects H14, that board size is statistically significantly associated with the 
EISSUE. The present study finds that board size has no explanatory power in explaining the 
236 
 
 
variations in the EISSUE. The negative relationship between board size and the EISSUE in line 
with the theoretical prediction that firms with small boards tend to issue equity over debt because 
small boards are more connected with strong governance (Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008) than 
large boards. Board size has not been empirically examined as a potential factor influencing 
firms’ financing choice.  
Seventh, the model predicts a statistically insignificant and negative relationship between 
the presence of a CG committee and the EISSUE. This leads to reject H15, that CG committee 
has a significant positive association with equity issuance. Theoretically, the negative impact of a 
CG committee on the EISSUE is consistent with the prediction that firms may be encouraged by 
CG committees to use debt financing as a governance mechanism to support the CG mechanisms 
already in place. The empirical literature shows no evidence on the relationship between the 
presence of a CG committee and firms’ choice to issue equity or debt.  
Finally, audit firm size has a positive and statistically insignificant association with the 
EISSUE. This leads the study to reject H16, that there is a statistically significant association 
between audit firm size and the EISSUE. The positive relationship is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that firms audited by large audit firms are considered to have better CG 
structures, motivating them to issue equity over debt, because potential investors are willing to 
pay more for better-governed firms’ shares. This result does not lend empirical support to Chang 
et al.’s (2009) evidence that firms audited by Big Six audit firms tend to issue equity over debt.  
6.2.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
Panel B of Table 36 reports the empirical results of growth, profitability, firm size, 
tangible assets, dividend policy, business risk, and year and industry variables. These results 
suggest several conclusions. Although the model finds that profitability (posiotive), tangible 
assets (positive) and dividend policy (negative) have no explanatory powers in explaining a 
firm’s choice of equity, growth, firm size, business risk, years 2006 to 2008, year 2010 and 
financials sector are found to be significant determinants of FCS. For instance, The impact of 
firm growth in determining the EISSUE is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, 
indicating that firms with greater opportunities for growth tend to issue equity over debt. This is 
in line with the theoretical prediction that firms with higher growth may avoid debt issuance in 
order to maintain their financial flexibility (Kayhan and Titman, 2007). Further, since growth 
firms perform better than non-growth firms, new investors may be encouraged to pay a higher 
price in order to invest in those firms, which in turn motivates growth firms to issue equity over 
debt. This result lends empirical support to Mande et al.’s (2012) evidence that growth firms tend 
to issue equity.   
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The estimated coefficient on firm size is statistically significant in explaining a firm’s 
choice of equity. It is positive and statistically significant at 10% level, indicating that large firms 
tend to issue equity over debt. This result is in line with the theoretical predictions that because of 
large firms are less sensitive to asymmetric information (e.g., Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), new investors may consider 
them as attractive investments, which in turn motivate such firms to issue equity over debt, as 
they expect that potential investors are willing to pay a premium for their shares. This result does 
not lend empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Chang et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2008; Mande et 
al., 2012) that provide evidence that larger firms choose debt over equity.  
Business risk is significant, but has negative impact. In particular, the coefficient on 
business risk is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that business risk 
has a negative impact on the likelihood of selecting equity over debt. Theoretically, this result is 
consistent with the prediction that since firms with higher business risk suffer from high 
information asymmetry, variable cash flows and adverse selection, they are more likely to issue 
debt over equity. This is because of the lower information costs associated with debt issuance and 
they can increase cash flows through tax shields as opposed to equity issuance, where dividends 
are not tax deductible, as well as using debt financing in order to reduce the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers. This result lends empirical support to past studies (e.g., 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Chang et al., 2009; Mande et al., 2012) that report empirical 
evidence that firms with higher financial deficits tend to issue debt over equity.  
With respect to year and industry variables, some have significant explanatory powers in 
explaining variations in the EISSUE. The coefficients on years 2006 to 2008, year 2010 and the 
financial sector are positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level of significance. 
These results are in line with prior studies (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012) that suggest that year and 
industry are important determinants of the choice of financing.  
 In conclusion, limited prior studies have examined certain factors that explain a firm’s 
choice between equity and debt, and a few of them focus on the impact of CG structures on the 
choice of financing. The current study examines the potential relationship between CG 
mechanisms and choice of financing, namely equity issuance within the Omani context over the 
period 2001 to 2011. Subsection 6.2 has discussed the empirical results of this examination, 
which are largely consistent with theoretical and empirical literature. First, the model predicts 
that government ownership (negative impact) and institutional ownership (positive impact) are 
significant determinants of the EISSUE. Second, the results indicate that the OCGI has a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the EISSUE. Finally, the results reveal that 
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foreign ownership, block ownership, board size, audit firm size and CG committee have no 
explanatory powers in explaining a firm’s choice of equity.  
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Table 35: A summary of all hypotheses and findings for the relationship between equity issuance and corporate governance 
Dependent variable                                                                                                              Firm equity issuance (EISSUE) 
Explanatory variables OCGI Ownership variables Board/Audit variables All 
Governance 
Variables 
Hyp. 
No 
Expect-
ed sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Government 
ownership 
9 -    - 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted  
  
- 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Institutional 
ownership 
10 +    + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted  
  
+ 
Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Foreign  
ownership 
11 -/+    - Insignificant Rejected  
  
- Insignificant Rejected 
Block  
ownership 
12 -/+    - Insignificant Rejected  
  
- Insignificant Rejected 
Omani CGI  13 + + 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted     
  
+ 
Significant 
      (1%) 
Accepted 
Board size 14 -/+       - Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
CG committee    15 +       + Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 16 -/+       + Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
Note: Column 1 presents the eight variables that are represented the tested hypotheses. Columns 2 to 12 present information relating to hypotheses nine to sixteen with regard to the impact of corporate governance on capital 
structure. 
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Table 36: The relationship between equity issuance  and corporate governance 
  OCGI Ownership variables Board/Audit variables    All 
Independent 
variables                  
Ex.Sig Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign 
Panel A: CG variables    
  OCGI + 0.0105 0.0003
***
        -     -      -     - 0.0103 0.0006
***
 
  GOVOWN -      -       - -0.2023 0.0790
*
      -     - -0.2308 0.0520
*
 
  INSOWN +      -       - 0.0050 0.0251
**
      -     - 0.0042 0.0675
*
 
  FOROWN -/+      -       - -0.0019 0.4714      -     - -0.0022 0.4233 
  BLKOWN -/+      -       - -0.0017 0.4821      -     - -0.0013 0.5865 
  BSIZE -/+      -       -        -     - -0.0043 0.8746 -0.0147 0.6090 
  BIG4 -/+      -       -        -     - 0.0792 0.4727 0.0629 0.5698 
  CGCOM +      -       -        -     - 0.0871 0.4756 -0.0084 0.9464 
Panel B:Control variables 
  GROWTH  0.0024 0.0228
**
 0.0030 0.0056
***
 0.0025 0.0190
**
 0.0031 0.0054
***
 
  ROA  0.8192 0.1201 0.8898 0.0989
*
 0.9475 0.0707
*
 0.7393 0.1775 
  LNTA  0.0569 0.1454 0.0992 0.0115
**
 0.0738 0.0839
*
 0.0815 0.0737
*
 
  TNGAS  0.0032 0.0953
*
 0.0027 0.1579 0.0032 0.0901
* 
0.0028 0.1535 
  DIVPO  -0.1551 0.6265 -0.0735 0.8200 -0.0999 0.7522 -0.1264 0.7021 
  BSRK  -4.4600 0.0135
**
 -4.2207 0.0191
**
 -4.6842 0.0099
***
 -4.2093 0.0211
**
 
  2002  0.1671 0.4361 -0.0576 0.7914 -0.0396 0.8541 0.1447 0.5036 
  2003  0.1931 0.3394 0.1501 0.4670 0.1503 0.4589 0.1958 0.3400 
  2004  0.0636 0.7590 0.1669 0.4139 0.1549 0.4412 0.0715 0.7339 
  2006  0.4852 0.0112
**
 0.7117 0.0001
***
 0.6576 0.0003
***
 0.5359 0.0060
***
 
  2007  0.6991 0.0003
***
 0.9463 0.0000
***
 0.8984 0.0000
***
 0.7519 0.0002
***
 
  2008  0.7984 0.0000
***
 1.0620 0.0000
***
 1.0059 0.0000
***
 0.8505 0.0000
***
 
  2009  0.2473 0.2188 0.5012 0.0065
***
 0.4558 0.0131
**
 0.2857 0.1595 
  2010  0.3696 0.0688
*
 0.6388 0.0005
***
 0.5816 0.0015
***
 0.4122 0.0443
**
 
  2011  0.1530 0.4648 0.4527 0.0185
**
 0.3669 0.0579 0.2177 0.3059 
  Basic materials 0.6843 0.1454 0.7092 0.1246 0.7966 0.0838
*
 0.6256 0.1827 
  Consumer services 0.4453 0.3427 0.4426 0.3356 0.5414 0.2377 0.3540 0.4496 
  Consumer goods 0.6628 0.1686 0.6219 0.1898 0.7848 0.0961
*
 0.5356 0.2672 
  Financials 1.1265 0.0183
**
 1.0715 0.0235
**
 1.1804 0.0116
**
 1.0113 0.0352
**
 
  Health care 0.5287 0.3884 0.2732 0.6663 0.5714 0.3509 0.2976 0.6371 
  Industrials 0.7985 0.0932
*
 0.7789 0.0950
*
 0.9101 0.0510
*
 0.6813 0.1501 
  Utilities 0.5799 0.2697 0.5912 0.2601 0.5599 0.2760 0.6166 0.2473 
Constant     -3.6558     0.0001
***
       -4.0024    0.0000
***
       -3.6870     0.0000
***
       -3.9384    0.0001
***
 
McFadden R-squared 0.1444  0.1441              0.1362   0.1531 
LR-Stat 181.2061
***
 180.8058
***
         170.9241
***
   192.1199
***
 
Number  of observations               1049               1049              1049 1049 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Omani CG index (OCGI) is un-weighted CG index. Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional 
ownership (INSOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) are measured as percentage of government, institutional and foreign ownership to total firm 
ordinary shareholdings. Block ownership (BLKOWN) is measured as percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm 
shareholdings. Board size (BSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors on the firm’s board. Audit firm size (BIG4) is measured as dummy 
variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young 
and KPMG), 0 otherwise. The presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM) is measured as dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm 
has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. Growth (GROWTH) is measured by Tobin’s Q. Profitability (ROA) is measured as 
operating profit to total assets. Firm size (LNTA) is measured by natural log of total assets.Tangible assets (TNGAS) is measured as fixed assets 
divided by total assets.  Dividend policy (DIVPO) is measured as dividends per share divided by earnings per share. Business risk (BSRK) is measured 
as standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry 
were excluded from the model. Year 2001 and Telecommunications industry were excluded by Eviews software as both are perfectly predicts binary 
response failure. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.  
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7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section discusses the results of a number of robustness analyses. The central aim is to 
check the extent to which the results obtained in Section 6 are robust or sensitive to alternative 
models and estimations. As indicated in Subsection 4.2.5, these sensitivity analyses consider the 
following issues: (i) whether the original results are sensitive to the weighted CG index; (ii) 
whether the main results are sensitive to alternative measures of CS; (iii) whether the reported 
results are sensitive to financial firms; whether the main results are sensitive to unobserved firm-
specific characteristics; (iv) whether the original results are sensitive to the period of 
examination; and (v) whether the main results are sensitive to endogeneity problem. This section 
is divided into two subsections. Subsection 7.1 discusses the results of robustness tests related to 
the FCS, while the results of robustness tests associated with the EISSUE are reported and 
discussed in Subsection 7.2.  
7.1 ROBUSTNESS TESTS: CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The results reported in Table 34 were checked by carrying out a number of robustness 
analyses. The results of these analyses are reported and discussed below; both the main results 
and robustness results are reported in the same table, to facilitate comparison. These analyses 
indicate that the main results are largely robust, supporting the present study’s evidence that 
better-governed firms employ lower levels of leverage compared to those with poor governance 
structures.  
7.1.1 Results Based on Alternative Corporate Governance Proxy 
In order to address the suggestion in the literature that the use of a weighted CG index 
may lead to different results, the current study constructed a weighted CG index (WOCGI). As 
explained in Essay 1, this study adopts Beiner et al.’s (2006) procedure in constructing a 
weighted CG index as an alternative measure of CG.28 The un-weighted OCGI was replaced by 
the weighted WOCGI in equation (1), and the results are reported in Table 37. This table reports 
the results of both the un-weighted CG index (Columns 3 and 4) and the weighted CG index 
(Columns 5 and 6). The F-Stat and the adjusted R
2 
in both analyses indicate similar results. The 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory and control variables are equal to zero is 
rejected, as the F-Stat is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The adjusted R
2 
                                                 
28
 Details of this procedure can be found in Essay 1, Subsection 7.1.  
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implies that 66% of the variability in the FCS is jointly explained by explanatory ad control 
variables. 
Overall, the model finds that the WOCGI, audit firm size, presence of a CG committee, 
profitability, firm size and dividend policy each have a significant relationship with the FCS. 
Further discussion is provided below, shedding more light on the main sensitivities of this 
analysis.  
7.1.1.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
The model finds that the WOCGI, audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee are 
significantly and negatively associated with the FCS, whereas ownership and board size variables 
have no significant impact on the FCS. The direction of the coefficients and the level of 
significance of the eight CG variables have not changed compared to those of the un-weighted 
CG index. In particular, the main variable the WOCGI is still negative and statistically significant 
at the 10% level of significance.  
7.1.1.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables 
The direction of the coefficients and the level of significance of the control variables 
remain the same as those of the un-weighted CG index. Firm size is still positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance, while profitability and dividend policy are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Similarly, tangible assets and 
business risk remain statistically insignificant associated with the FCS.   
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Table 37: The results of capital structure based on weighted corporate governance index 
 Un-weighted  index Weighted  index 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  WOCGI -         -      - -0.3336 0.0682
*
 
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
            -     - 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -0.5394 0.2728 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 -0.0640 0.7939 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 -0.1299 0.6478 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 0.0740 0.7852 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 -2.6888 0.3680 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -14.4179 0.0853
*
 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -18.1998 0.0312
**
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 -0.0007 0.9914 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -195.5679 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 22.3469 0.0011
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 -0.1489 0.4061 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -35.7015 0.0180
**
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 29.5102 0.7400 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -5.5760 0.7330 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 1.3122 0.9172 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 10.4526 0.2494 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 4.9867 0.4825 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 0.1608 0.9790 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 -8.5326 0.3038 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 -21.2399 0.0276
**
 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 -27.4869 0.0028
***
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 -33.3711 0.0006
***
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 -38.2312 0.0007
***
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 1.1311 0.9698 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 -26.6030 0.3393 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 45.2950 0.1132 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 6.0439 0.8493 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 1.0871 0.9800 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 20.4359 0.4200 
  Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 -63.2559 0.1382 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 61.5422 0.1649 
Constant       -185.3337     0.1096        -180.7855    0.1185 
Adj. R
2
                   0.6607 0.6607 
F-Stat                 68.8730
***
   68.8706
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                   2.1411 2.1407 
Number of observations                    1152 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Weighted Omani CG index (WOCGI), un-weighted Omani CG index 
(OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), 
block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance 
committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), 
Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and 
Gas industry were excluded from the model. The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes 
the F-statistics. 
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7.1.2 Results Based on Alternative Measures of Capital Structure 
As indicated in Subsection 4.2.1.1, book total debt scaled by the total equity of a firm was 
the main measure of the FCS. Following the suggestion in the literature that using alternative 
definitions of CS may bring different results, the current study uses two alternative measures of 
CS, namely short-term debt and long-term debt, in order to ascertain the extent to which the main 
results reported in Section 6 are sensitive to these ratios. These measures permit the study to 
investigate whether firm-level factors which explain variation in the FCS would be different 
between the long-term and short-term. Bevan and Danbolt (2002, pp.160), for instance, conclude 
that “analyses of gearing based solely upon long-term debt provide only part of the story, and a 
fuller understanding of CS and its determinants requires a detailed analysis of all forms of 
corporate debt”. They report evidence that UK firms use long-term debt to finance fixed assets, 
whereas their reciprocal tangibility is financed by short-term debt. In addition, recent empirical 
studies report evidence that factors influencing CS can differ from the short-term to the long-
term. For example, Harford et al. (2008) report that firms with better CG, namely those with 
more independent directors, tend to hold more short-term debt. In a similar vein, Brockman et al. 
(2010) report evidence that firms with higher managerial ownership tend to use more short-term 
debt. In response to these findings, amongst others, both short-term and long-term debt ratios are 
used along with total debt ratio to measure the FCS. Long-term debt is defined as the book value 
of the total long-term debt at the end of a financial year divided by the book value of equity at the 
end of the financial year. It indicates what proportion of total debt the firm is using to finance its 
assets. Short-term debt is defined as the book value of the total short-term debt at the end of a 
financial year divided by the book value of equity at the end of the financial year. In this sense, 
the short-term debt measures a firm’s ability to meet its obligations within one year. 
The FCS is re-calculated using short-term debt and long-term debt ratios, and the 
relationship between the FCS and CG is re-estimated using the same equation (1). Table 38 
shows OLS regression results of the main results (Columns 3 to 4), those based on short-term 
debt ratio (Columns 5 to 6) and those based on long-term debt ratio (Columns 7 to 8). The short-
term debt and long-term debt models reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the eight 
CG variables as well as the control variables are equal to zero, as indicated by the F-Stat. The 
adjusted R
2 
in both models indicate that about 55% and 68% of the variability in the FCS are 
jointly explained by these models, respectively, compared to 66% by the main model. Overall, 
ownership variables and board size are not statistically significant. In contrast, CG index and 
audit firm size are only statistically significant in the long-term debt model, while the presence of 
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a CG committee is only statistically significant in the short-term debt model. These results are 
further discussed below, and the main sensitivities of the two models’ results are identified.  
7.1.2.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
the level of significance and the direction of the coefficients on some variable has 
changed. The short-term debt model shows that the sign on the coefficient of institutional 
ownership, which was negative, is now positive whereas block ownership is now negative, which 
was previously positive. The model indicates that the coefficient on audit firm size, which was 
statistically significant, is now statistically insignificant. The presence of a CG committee 
becomes significant at 1% level, which was statistically significant at 5% level. 
The long-term debt model finds a positive relation between the FCS and government 
ownership, which was negative and statistically insignificant as predicted by the main model. The 
coefficient on audit firm size, which was statistically significant at 10% level, is now statistically 
significant at 5% level. The main variable, OCGI, which was predicted to be significantly 
associated with the FCS in the main model shows a significant relationship with the FCS only in 
long-term debt model. The coefficient on the OCGI is still negative, but statistically insignificant, 
as predicted by the short-term debt model. This may be attributed to the fact that some CG 
implementations may take more than one year before their desired outputs take effect.  
7.1.2.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables 
Consistent with the results of the main model, the short-term debt and long-term debt 
models predict that profitability, firm size and divided policy are statistically significant, except 
for tangible assets, which was statistically insignificant and is now statistically significant at the 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Growth and business risk remain statistically insignificant in 
both short-term and long-term models as predicted by the main model. Limited sensitive cases 
were observed regarding the sign on the coefficient of these variables. Tangible assets, which was 
negative in the main model, is now positive in the short-term debt model. Similarly, limited 
sensitive cases were observed regarding the year and industry dummies with respect to the 
direction and significance level. The short-term debt model shows that the sign on the 
coefficients of year 2004, year 2006 and health care sector are now negative, which were positive 
in the main model. The significance level of year 2008, year 2009, year 2011 and 
telecommunications sector, which were statistically significant at 5%, 1%, 1% and insignificant, 
are now insignificant, 5%, 10% and 10% levels, respectively as predicted by the short-term debt 
model, respectively. The long-term debt model indicates that the sign on the coefficient of year 
2001 is now positive, which was negative in the main model, whereas and basic materials sector, 
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which was predicted positive by the main model is now negative. The model also shows that the 
significance level of year 2004, 2008 and year 2009 are now significant at 5%, 10% and 5%, 
which were insignificant, significant at 5% level and significant at 1% level, respectively.  
Table 38: The results of capital structure based on alternative measures  
            Total debt    Short-term debt   Long-term debt 
Independent variables Exp.Sign Coefficient Sign Coefficient Sign Coefficient Sign 
Panel A: CG variables    
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
 -0.0271 0.7973 -0.1858 0.0832
*
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -4.1627 0.4423 12.5592 0.0073
***
 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 0.0299 0.8063 -0.0219 0.8276 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 -0.1008 0.4179 0.0977 0.3816 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 -0.0234 0.8571 0.1292 0.1938 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 -1.5016 0.3067 -0.2216 0.8623 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -0.9590 0.8442 -7.8726 0.0424
**
 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -10.7260 0.0074
***
 -4.3807 0.3976 
Panel B:Control variables    
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 -0.0253 0.4799 -0.0030 0.9274 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -100.7686 0.0000
***
 -83.4387 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 9.3302 0.0018
***
 9.4832 0.0000
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 0.2128 0.0130
**
 -0.3384 0.0000
***
 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -17.5026 0.0237
**
 -23.9678 0.0042
***
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 27.8071 0.5933 -43.0656 0.3109 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -0.6807 0.9427 4.8501 0.5209 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 1.4477 0.8395 4.5491 0.5054 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 7.5720 0.1512 8.4198 0.1324 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 -0.3369 0.9316 9.3280 0.0191
**
 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 -3.1464 0.3807 1.2523 0.7475 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 -6.8850 0.1191 1.8015 0.7159 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 -7.8331 0.1161 -10.7190 0.0512
*
 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 -10.8370 0.0261
**
 -13.3135 0.0174
**
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 -12.8222 0.0083
***
 -18.2343 0.0014
***
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 -11.0643 0.0529
*
 -22.0674 0.0001
***
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 6.1492 0.6754 -8.2148 0.8012 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 -5.0915 0.7134 -7.8828 0.8091 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 21.8685 0.1293 22.9008 0.4815 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 8.1927 0.5954 1.8690 0.9540 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 -16.0824 0.3880 21.3686 0.5827 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 16.4438 0.2579 6.3443 0.8370 
 Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 -39.3729 0.0639
*
 -34.0999 0.3305 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 32.5899 0.1815 3.5060 0.9244 
Constant    -185.3337     0.1096     -93.8597     0.0615
*
  -59.5144     0.1782 
Adj. R
2
                   0.6607 0.5460              0.6799 
F-Stat                 68.8730
***
   42.9234
***
            75.0406
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                   2.1411 2.1452              2.0994 
Number  of observations        1152                1152               1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional 
ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), 
the presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible 
assets (TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil 
and Gas industry were excluded from the model. The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.1.3 Results Based on Non-Financial Firms   
As indicated in Subsection 4.1.1.2, the main analysis was carried out using financial and 
non-financial firms. The present study addresses past studies’ argument that financial firms 
should be excluded from analysis because they are heavily regulated and their leverage may not 
be interpreted like those of non- financial firms. The current study addresses this by re-estimating 
the FCS-CG relation employing only non-financial firms. Table 39 reports a multivariate 
regression of the CS on the eight CG variables along with control variables based on all firms 
(Columns 3 to 4), and only non-financial firms (Columns 5 to 6). 
The F-Stat is significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the null 
hypothesis, that the coefficients of eight CG and control variables are not different from zero, is 
rejected. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 65% of the variability in the FCS is jointly predicted 
by those variables. Overall, the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in terms of 
the influence of CG on CS between financial and non-financial firms is accepted, as the results 
produced by this analysis and those of the main test are largely similar. This analysis predicts that 
CG index, board size, the presence of a CG committee, profitability and tangible assets are 
significant, whereas ownership variables, audit firm size, growth, firm size and business risk are 
not significant. These results suggest several conclusions, which are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
7.1.3.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
A limited number of sensitivities are observed. First, board size becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance, which was previously insignificant in the main model, 
while audit firm size, which was statistically significant, is now no longer significant. Second, the 
OCGI and CG committee variables become statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, where they were previously statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels. 
Finally, the direction of the coefficients on institutional, foreign and block ownership variables 
has changed, but remain statistically insignificant.   
7.1.3.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
The significance level on the coefficients of some variables has changed, but they remain 
largely similar to those reported by the main model. The coefficient on firm size was statistically 
significant but no longer is, while tangible assets, was statistically insignificant but has become 
statistically significant. The significance level on the coefficient of year 2008 becomes 
statistically insignificant, while year 2001, consumer goods sector, industrials sector and utilities 
sector were statistically insignificant in the main model and are now significant. Similarly, the 
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sign on the coefficients of some variables has changed. Growth, year 2007, consumer services 
sector and telecommunications sector become positive, whereas year 2002 and health care sector 
are now negatively related to the FCS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 39: The results of  capital structure based only on non-financial firms 
 Financial and non-financial Non-financial 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
 -0.4905 0.0267
**
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -0.3845 0.3553 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 0.1734 0.4672 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 0.1931 0.5401 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 -0.3426 0.1751 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 -6.1845 0.0377
**
 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -7.7357 0.3563 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -17.0682 0.0624
*
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 0.0511 0.4933 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -239.5187 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 0.4514 0.9420 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 -0.6091 0.0010
***
 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -22.7590 0.1733 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 136.8439 0.1735 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -29.0623 0.0851
*
 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 -15.4624 0.2321 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 0.1200 0.9900 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 0.5988 0.9424 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 8.0398 0.2855 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 1.1823 0.9048 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 -8.9934 0.4323 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 -18.5839 0.0850
*
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 -22.7425 0.0346
**
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 -31.7061 0.0110
**
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 29.3393 0.3086 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 8.1592 0.7659 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 62.0772 0.0271
**
 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 Excluded 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 -42.3289 0.3210 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 49.2413 0.0757
*
 
  Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 24.8655 0.5342 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 118.3178 0.0058
***
 
Constant       -185.3337    0.1096          199.0276     0.0542
*
 
Adj. R
2
                   0.6607 0.6478 
F-Stat                 68.8730
***
 50.2151
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                   2.1411 2.1564 
Number of observations                     1152 858 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), 
institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size 
(BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), 
profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). 
In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model. The 
parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.1.4 Results Based on the Fixed-Effects Model  
The current study controls for the concern that CS behaviour might be affected by 
unobserved firm-level characteristics, which simple OLS regression may not be able to account 
for. The Hausman test was applied to choose between a fixed-effects model and a random-effects 
model, and its result (not reported here) indicates that the fixed-effects model is appropriate. 
Thus, the relationship between the FCS and CG was re-estimated using the fixed-effects model. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 40, alongside the results of 
the main analysis, which reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40: The results of capital structure based on the fixed-effects model 
 Simple  OLS Fixed effects 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
 -0.3619 0.0956
*
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -0.3342 0.3669 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 -0.2896 0.1535 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 -0.2224 0.3202 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 0.1209 0.5391 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 -0.1382 0.9569 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -22.4723 0.0023
***
 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -21.5121 0.0310
**
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 0.0269 0.6803 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -183.3475 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 20.2848 0.0000
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 -0.1600 0.3271 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -37.8066 0.0248
**
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 1.9581 0.9820 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -8.5303 0.5609 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 -1.0673 0.9336 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 4.7761 0.6517 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 2.2185 0.7723 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 1.4231 0.8500 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 -7.3596 0.4187 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 -22.6414 0.0241
**
 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 -30.3761 0.0019
***
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 -36.2580 0.0004
***
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 -42.7312 0.0000
***
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656                  -               - 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 -149.7048 0.3243 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 8.9558 0.9575 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 -24.2289 0.8368 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 30.0877 0.7470 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 8.5046 0.8957 
  Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 -77.4918 0.2679 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 10.5573 0.9062 
Constant       -185.3337     0.1096         -115.7082    0.2797 
Adj. R
2
                   0.6607    0.6947 
F-Stat                 68.8730
***
       18.5045
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                   2.1411     2.0440 
Number of observations                     1152    1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership 
(INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of 
corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), 
Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were 
excluded from the model. Basic materials industry was excluded by Eviews software due to collinearity. The parameter estimates are obtained 
by OLS estimation. The asterisks 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R
2
 denotes adjusted R square. F-
Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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The null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between observed and predicted 
values is rejected, as the F-Stat is significant at the 1% level. Similar to the main model, the 
adjusted R
2
 is 0.69, indicating that about 70% of the variability in the FCS is explained by this 
model. Overall, CG index, audit firm size, CG committee, profitability, firm size and dividend 
policy have a significant relationship with the FCS. The main sensitivity between this analysis’s 
results and those predicted by the main model are discussed below.    
7.1.4.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
The sign on the coefficients of all variables remains unchanged. Similarly, the 
significance level of all variables has not changed, except, the coefficient on audit firm size, 
which was statistically significant at 10% level, is now statistically significant at 1% level.  
7.1.4.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The significance level on the coefficients of all variables remain the same as those 
predicted by the main model whereas the sign on few coefficients has changed. Specifically, the 
sign on the coefficients of growth was negative but now is positively related to the FCS, while 
year 2002 and financials sector are now negative, which were previously positive, and all remain 
statistically insignificant.  
7.1.5 Results Based on the Sample Period  
As previously discussed, the current study employs a sample of 116 Omani listed firms 
from 2001 to 2011. Thus, to ascertain whether there are differences in its results with respect to 
the period of examination, the present study re-runs its regressions by splitting its sample into two 
sub-samples: Pre-2003 (i.e., from 2001 to 2002) and Post-2003 (i.e., from 2003 to 2011) periods. 
Table 41 shows OLS regression results for all three periods. The results of Pre-2003 and Post-
2003 periods are generally consistent with the main results. Importantly, it is evident from the 
reported results that the main variable (OCGI) is insignificant in the Pre-2003 period compared 
with that of the Post-2003 period, suggesting that the introduction of the 2002 Omani CG Code 
appears to have helped in reducing firms’ levels of leverage. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the eight CG variables in addition to the control variables are equal to zero is 
rejected, as indicated by the F-Stat in both sub-samples. The analysis of the Pre-2003 period 
produces lower adjusted R
2 
(31%) compared with that of the Post-2003 period (62%). Generally, 
CG index, presence of a CG committee, profitability, firm size and dividend policy are still 
statistically significant in the Post-2003 period, while profitability and firm size remain 
statistically significant in the Pre-2003 period. The key sensitivities between each of the two sub-
samples’ results and the main results are discussed further below.    
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Table 41: The results of capital structure based on the sample period 
          2001/2011         Pre 2003        Post 2003 
Independent variables Exp.Sign Coefficient Sign Coefficient Sign Coefficient Sign 
Panel A: CG variables    
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
 0.0260 0.9666 -0.8249 0.0084
***
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -0.3660 0.6639 -0.4855 0.2872 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 1.0005 0.0525
*
 0.0103 0.9664 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 0.0911 0.8987 -0.0823 0.7843 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 -0.1498 0.7638 0.1106 0.7037 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 0.4881 0.9290 -2.8145 0.4021 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -7.4767 0.7205 -7.4126 0.4376 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -76.2227 0.1974 -30.3087 0.0060
***
 
Panel B:Control variables    
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 0.0064 0.9741 -0.0017 0.9800 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -538.6550 0.0000
***
 -227.2742 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 26.5299 0.0026
***
 20.6205 0.0025
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 -0.3151 0.3612 -0.0855 0.6458 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -49.5592 0.4176 -33.6387 0.0531
*
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 -177.2390 0.5458 67.4659 0.5112 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379  -      -    -      - 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 11.2516 0.3863    -      - 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500  -      - -7.7560 0.5080 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830  -      - -1.6311 0.8318 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758  -      - 3.5355 0.5914 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280  -      - -1.6174 0.8531 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
  -      - -16.0394 0.1124 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
  -      - -21.7047 0.0229
**
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
  -      - -28.2444 0.0040
***
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
  -      - -34.2139 0.0021
***
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 -15.7762 0.8608 12.3124 0.6694 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 -21.9455 0.8074 -18.3500 0.5088 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 22.1681 0.8053 59.5562 0.0301
**
 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 -18.6072 0.8373 15.0631 0.6448 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 -81.1048 0.4809 28.6199 0.7431 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 -0.5274 0.9953 46.1698 0.0784
*
 
 Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422   -      - -18.6507 0.6920 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 -28.5830 0.7742 66.8893 0.1757 
Constant    -185.3337     0.1096   -254.0384     0.1288   -146.7139     0.1997 
Adj. R
2
                  0.6607 0.3181 0.6221 
F-Stat                68.8730
***
     4.8131
***
 51.9959
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                  2.1411 1.7951 2.1468 
Number  of observations      1152                 190 962 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), 
institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit 
firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm 
size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model (2001/2011). Year 2001 and 
Telecommunications industry were excluded from the model (Pre 2003) by E-views software due to collinearity. Similarly, E-
views software excluded year 2001 and 2002 from the model (Post 2003) because of perfect collinearity. The parameter 
estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics.  
7.1.5.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables   
The sign and significance level on the coefficients of the CG variables are more consistent 
with the main results in the Post-2003 period than the Pre-2003 period. The direction on the 
coefficients of the OCGI, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and board size were 
negative in the main model, and become positive in the Pre-2003 period. In contrast, the sign on 
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the coefficients of all variables remains unchanged, except that institutional ownership becomes 
positive in the Post-2003 period. The significance levels on the coefficients of all variables 
become insignificant in the Pre-2003 period, except that institutional ownership, which was 
insignificant in the main model, becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. In contrast, all 
variables’ significance is as predicted by the main model, with little change, except that audit 
firm size is no longer significant, as predicted by the Post-2003 period model. For instance, the 
coefficients on CG index and CG committee, which were statistically significant at the 10%  and 
5% levels, become statistically significant at the 1% level.  
7.1.5.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The two sub-samples’ results are largely in line with the main results, except that dividend 
policy is only significant in the Post-2003 period model. The sign on the coefficients of some 
variables has changed, especially those related to year and industry dummies in both sub-
samples. For instance, the direction on the coefficients of basic materials sector, financials sector, 
health care sector, industrials sector and utilities sector were positive in the main model; they 
become only negative in the Pre-2003 period model but remain statistically insignificant.  
7.1.6 Results Based on the Lagged Structure Model   
As indicated in Subsection 7.4 of Essay 1, a number of procedures have been conducted 
in this study in order to mitigate the influence of endogenity. Additionally, the simultaneity 
problem that may arise as a result of lagged CG practices is addressed in this subsection. In 
particular, the lagged structure model, as an alternative econometric model, is used to account for 
time-lag in firm-level CS and firm-level CG association. The CG and control variables were 
lagged by one year, as specified in the following equation. 
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         (3) 
 
Where all variables remain as defined in equation (1), except that a one-year lag was 
introduced for CG and control variables, reducing the total number of firm-year observations 
from 1,152 to 1,036. The results based on the estimated lagged CS-CG structure are reported in 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 42, alongside the main results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same 
table. 
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The F-Stat is significant, suggesting that the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
significant difference between observed and predicted values is accepted. The adjusted R
2 
suggests that 26% of the variability in the FCS is explained by the lagged structure model, which 
is lower than that indicated by the un-lagged structure model. Overall, the lagged structure model 
predicts that CG index, institutional ownership, board size, CG committee, profitability, firm size 
Table 42: The results of capital structure based on the lagged structure model 
 Un-lagged structure Lagged structure 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
 -0.4487 0.0967
*
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 11.7892 0.1197 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 0.5837 0.0000
***
 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 0.1342 0.3964 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 0.2213 0.1831 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 -3.7239 0.0499
*
 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -1.8651 0.7836 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -53.1087 0.0000
***
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 -0.0096 0.8755 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -447.1803 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 22.3227 0.0000
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 0.0993 0.4167 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -42.8031 0.0396
**
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 -169.0010 0.1454 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -30.8766 0.1101 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 -14.5668 0.3834 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 -13.2176 0.3534 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 -1.4777 0.9123 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 -11.7298 0.3912 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 2.0966 0.8750 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 -34.0892 0.0113
**
 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 -27.2521 0.0333
**
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 -25.5851 0.0581
*
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 -0.7984 0.9597 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 27.4040 0.0616
*
 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 12.7642 0.3596 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 72.2821 0.0000
***
 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 28.0190 0.0691
*
 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 -45.0013 0.0774
*
 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 59.6218 0.0003
***
 
  Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 -5.0540 0.8343 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 68.7131 0.0061
***
 
Constant       -185.3337    0.1096        -212.3258     0.0000*** 
Adj. R
2
                  0.6607 0.2603 
F-Stat                68.8730
***
    13.6380
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                  2.1411 0.7676 
Number of observations                   1152                      1036 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), 
institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size 
(BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), 
profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). 
In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model. The 
parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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and dividend policy are significant determinants of CS. The main sensitivities are discussed 
below.   
7.1.6.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
Limited cases of sensitivities can be observed. The direction on the coefficients of all 
variables remains unchanged, except government ownership, institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership, which were negative and become positive. The significance level on the coefficients 
of some variables has changed. For instance, CG committee becomes statistically significant at 
the 1% level, and formerly was statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, the coefficients 
of institutional ownership and board size, which were statistically insignificant, become 
statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively.   
7.1.6.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The significance level on the coefficients of growth, profitability and firm size remain the 
same as predicted by an un-lagged structure model. Some year and industry variables show some 
changes related to their significance level. For example, the significance level on the coefficients 
of basic materials sector, consumer goods sector, financials sector, health care sector, industrials 
sector and utilities sector become statistically significant at least at the 10% level of significance, 
which were previously insignificant in the main model. In addition, the sign of the coefficients on 
some control variables has changed. For instance, the direction of the coefficients on business 
risk, years 2002 to 2004, year 2006, and health care sector were positive in the main model and 
become negative in lagged structure model.   
7.1.7 Results Based on the Two-Stage Least Squares Model  
In order to further ascertain the extent to which the main results are significantly 
influenced by the presence of endogeneity problem, the 2SLS methodology is adopted. The 
current study addresses the possibility that endogeneity problem may arise because of omitted 
variables and/or simultaneity (Larcher and Rusticus, 2010). This can occur if the main variable, 
OCGI, which was assumed to be exogenous in equation (1), is correlated with the error term 
because the model does not include other significant variables (data limitation) and/or the 
dependent and independent variables are simultaneously determined (Wooldridge, 2009). This 
may lead to biases and inconsistency in the OLS results (main results). Thus, the present study 
employs the widely used 2SLS technique to further check the possibility of biases caused by 
endogeneity problem. In doing so, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test was applied to first 
check whether endogeneity is present. Following Larcher and Rusticus’ (2010) methodology, this 
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test involves two stages: In the first stage the OCGI is regressed on control variables, and its 
predicted value is saved as P-OCGI.  



n
i
ititiit CONTROLSOCGI
1
0                                                                                       (4) 
 
Where the OCGI and CONTROLS remain the same as defined in equation (1).  
 
In the second stage, the OCGI, P-OCGI and control variables are included in the following 
equation. 
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The results of this test indicate that the alternative hypothesis that endogeneity is present 
is accepted, as P-OCGI (P-value = 0.042)29 is statistically significantly correlated with the FCS. 
As a result, 2SLS was performed to examine the extent to which the main results are affected by 
endogeneity problem.  
In the first stage the OCGI is regressed on eight control variables and four alternative CG 
variables, as specified in equation (6). The selection of the alternative CG variables was based on 
the theoretical and empirical literature, and data availability (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Vafeas, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Petra, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008; McCabe and Nowak, 
2008; Tariq et al., 2014). These variables include: (i) the number of non-executive directors on 
the board; (ii) the number of board directors’ meetings; (iii) board diversity on the basis of 
nationality; and (iv) capital expenditure.   
 

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1
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Where OCGI refers to the Omani CG index, and BDIV, NEXD, NBMs, and CAPEX are defined as 
board diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, 
the number of board directors’ meetings and capital expenditure. CONTROLS refer to the eight 
control variables, namely, growth, porfitability, firm size, tangible assets, dividend policy, 
business risk and industry and year dummies.   
                                                 
29
The results of the first and second stages of the Hausman test are not reported here for reasons of brevity. The guidance of this 
test is that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity problems is rejected if the coefficient on the predicted value from the first 
stage regression is significant in the second stage (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
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Once the regression is run, the predicted value of the OCGI and the residuals are saved and 
referred to as P-OCGI and R-OCGI, respectively, in order to obtain an instrumental variable for 
the OCGI. The correlation matrix (not reported here) suggests that the predicted value of the 
OCGI (P-OCGI) is significantly correlated with the OCGI and insignificantly associated with the 
R-OCGI. This means that P-OCGI is a relevant and valid instrument for the OCGI. In the second 
stage, equation (1) is re-estimated using P-OCGI as opposed to the OCGI, as specified below.  
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Table 43 reports the results of 2SLS regression (Columns 5 and 6) alongside the main 
results (Columns 3 and 4). The null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between 
observed and predicted values is rejected, as the F-Stat is significant at the 1% level. The adjusted 
R
2 
suggests that about 71% of the variability in the FCS is explained by the 2SLS model, which is 
higher than that indicated by the OLS model. Overall, the 2SLS model predicts that the P-OCGI, 
CG committee, profitability, firm size and dividend policy have a significant relationship with the 
FCS. The key sensitivities between the OLS and 2SLS models are discussed below.   
7.1.7.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
Two cases of sensitivity are observed. First, the direction of the coefficient on board size 
becomes positive but remain statistically insignificant. Second, the significance level on the 
coefficients of the P-OCGI and CG committee, formerly statistically significant at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively, become statistically significant at the 1% level, while audit firm size is 
now no longer statistically significant.  
7.1.7.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables    
The significance level on the coefficients of control variables remains the same as 
reported by the OLS model, expect those related to year and industry variables. For instance, 
years 2001 to 2007 and basic materials sector, consumer services sector, consumer goods sector, 
financials sector, heath care sector and industrials sector were statistically insignificant, and 
become significant. The sign of the coefficients on some year and industry variables shows some 
changes. For example, years 2007 to 2011, consumer services sector and telecommunications 
sectors were negative, and now become positive.   
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Table 43: The results of capital structure based on  the two stage least squares model 
 Simple  OLS 2SLS 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.3218 0.0701
*
                  -      - 
  POCGI -                -       - -17.2863 0.0000
***
 
  GOVOWN + -0.5379 0.2760 -0.5888 0.1793 
  INSOWN - -0.0614 0.8018 -0.0103 0.9632 
  FOROWN - -0.1340 0.6373 -0.1358 0.5975 
  BLKOWN - 0.0744 0.7842 0.0515 0.8323 
  BSIZE -/+ -2.6574 0.3735 3.3725 0.2328 
  BIG4 - -14.2975 0.0877
*
 -12.2188 0.1125 
  CGCOM - -18.0108 0.0352
**
 -24.1224 0.0011
***
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  -0.0011 0.9861 0.0696 0.2407 
  ROA  -195.5175 0.0000
***
 -130.7585 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  22.5801 0.0010
***
 55.1614 0.0000
***
 
  TNGAS  -0.1469 0.4123 -0.1727 0.2949 
  DIVPO  -35.5215 0.0183
**
 -31.6091 0.0204
**
 
  BSRK  31.0842 0.7269 38.8267 0.6395 
  2001  -5.3534 0.7379 -797.4610 0.0000
***
 
  2002  1.5490 0.9016 -617.7935 0.0000
***
 
  2003  10.4105 0.2500 -334.6902 0.0000
***
 
  2004  5.0251 0.4830 -113.4718 0.0000
***
 
  2006  0.1859 0.9758 15.2647 0.0103
***
 
  2007  -8.1554 0.3280 49.9098 0.0000
***
 
  2008  -20.7669 0.0316
**
 56.3144 0.0000
***
 
  2009  -26.9868 0.0034
***
 68.1588 0.0000
***
 
  2010  -32.8806 0.0007
***
 66.5287 0.0000
***
 
  2011  -37.7748 0.0008
***
 46.2945 0.0004
***
 
  Basic materials  1.2876 0.9656 172.4530 0.0000
***
 
  Consumer services  -26.3853 0.3440 150.0638 0.0000
***
 
  Consumer goods  45.2694 0.1132 206.1811 0.0000
***
 
  Financials  6.4809 0.8388 124.2198 0.0004
***
 
  Health care  0.4038 0.9925 -9.5542 0.8294 
  Industrials  20.8170 0.4126 202.2030 0.0000
***
 
 Telecommunications  -62.6788 0.1422 41.4236 0.3550 
  Utilities  60.7700 0.1698 55.9852 0.1984 
Constant       -185.3337     0.1096             -4.3886    0.9686 
Adj. R
2
                  0.6607 0.7069 
F-Stat                68.8730
***
   85.0482
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                  2.1411 2.1112 
Number of observations                   1152 1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Instrumental variable for the CG 
index (POCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership 
(FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate 
governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets 
(TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 
and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model. The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. 
F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.2 ROBUSTNESS TESTS: THE CHOICE OF FINANCING  
This subsection discusses the extent to which the results reported in Table 36 are sensitive 
to alternative CG measurement, financial firms and endogeneity problem. The results of these 
analyses indicate that the main results are considerably robust, supporting the current study’s 
evidence that firms with better governance are more likely to select equity over debt than firms 
with poor CG structures.  
7.2.1 Results Based on Alternative Corporate Governance Proxy 
As explained earlier, an un-weighted index was used in the current study’s main analysis. 
The un-weighted OCGI in equation (1) was replaced by a weighted OCGI, and the results are 
reported in Table 44: Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the un-weighted OCGI and Columns 
5 and 6 report those of the weighted OCGI. The LR-Stat is significant, suggesting that the 
alternative hypothesis that the coefficients of variables are not equal to zero is accepted. The 
McFadden R-squared indicates that the weighted OCGI model explains 15% of the variability in 
the EISSUE, which is similar to that reported by the un-weighted OCGI model. Overall, the 
weighted OCGI model predicts that CG index, government ownership, institutional ownership, 
growth, firm size and business risk are significant determinants of the EISSUE. The following 
discussion outlines the main sensitivities of this analysis.   
7.2.1.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
Despite changes in the magnitude of coefficients, the sign and significance level of the 
coefficients on all CG variables remain the same as those reported by the un-weighted OCGI 
model.  
7.2.1.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
Similarly, the direction and significance level on the coefficients of all control variables 
have not changed. 
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7.2.2 Results Based on Non-Financial Firms     
This study addresses the possibility that the inclusion of financial firms in its data set may 
lead to different results by re-regressing equation (1) using only non-financial firms (807 firm 
years). The results reported in Table 45 show that firms with better CG structures, lower 
proportions of government ownership, large stakes of shares held by institutional investors, lower 
concentrated ownership, high growth and more profitability tend to issue equity over debt. The 
LR-Stat is significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the 
Table 44: The results of equity issuance based on weighted corporate governance index 
 Un-weighted  index Weighted  index 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  WOCGI +          -      - 0.0116 0.0005
***
 
  OCGI + 0.0103 0.0006
***
            -       - 
  GOVOWN - -0.2308 0.0520
*
 -0.2250 0.0579
*
 
  INSOWN + 0.0042 0.0675
*
 0.0043 0.0596
*
 
  FOROWN -/+ -0.0022 0.4233 -0.0021 0.4362 
  BLKOWN -/+ -0.0013 0.5865 -0.0014 0.5653 
  BSIZE -/+ -0.0147 0.6090 -0.0143 0.6175 
  BIG4 -/+ 0.0629 0.5698 0.0676 0.5414 
  CGCOM + -0.0084 0.9464 -0.0004 0.9975 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0031 0.0054
***
 0.0031 0.0050
***
 
  ROA  0.7393 0.1775 0.7200 0.1888 
  LNTA  0.0815 0.0737
*
 0.0869 0.0544
*
 
  TNGAS  0.0028 0.1535 0.0031 0.1035 
  DIVPO  -0.1264 0.7021 -0.1071 0.7457 
  BSRK  -4.2093 0.0211
**
 -4.1607 0.0225
**
 
  2002  0.1447 0.5036 0.1643 0.4507 
  2003  0.1958 0.3400 0.1936 0.3455 
  2004  0.0715 0.7339 0.0597 0.7780 
  2006  0.5359 0.0060
***
 0.5198 0.0083
***
 
  2007  0.7519 0.0002
***
 0.7472 0.0002
***
 
  2008  0.8505 0.0000
***
 0.8491 0.0000
***
 
  2009  0.2857 0.1595 0.2857 0.1592 
  2010  0.4122 0.0443
**
 0.4132 0.0440
**
 
  2011  0.2177 0.3059 0.2199 0.3008 
  Basic materials  0.6256 0.1827 0.6314 0.1775 
  Consumer services  0.3540 0.4496 0.3669 0.4317 
  Consumer goods  0.5356 0.2672 0.5370 0.2649 
  Financials  1.0113 0.0352
**
 1.0197 0.0332
**
 
  Health care  0.2976 0.6371 0.3365 0.5925 
  Industrials  0.6813 0.1501 0.6951 0.1412 
  Utilities  0.6166 0.2473 0.6095 0.2522 
Constant           -3.9384     0.0001
***
             -4.1083     0.0000
***
 
McFadden R-squared   0.1531   0.1533 
LR-Stat    192.1199
***
                 192.3895
***
 
Number of observations  1049 1049 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Weighted Omani CG index (WOCGI), un-weighted Omani CG index 
(OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), 
block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance 
committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), 
Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and 
Gas industry were excluded from the model. Year 2001 and Telecommunications industry were excluded by Eviews 
software as both are perfectly predicts binary response failure. The parameter estimates are obtained by logistic 
regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
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coefficients of eight CG and control variables are not different from zero is rejected. The 
McFadden R-squared indicates that about 13% of the variability in the EISSUE is jointly 
predicted by these variables. The key sensitivities of this analysis are discussed below. 
7.2.2.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables  
Limited sensitivities are observed. First, the significance level on the coefficients of 
government ownership and institutional ownership, which were statistically significant at the 
10% level, become statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, the significance level on the 
coefficient of block ownership, which was statistically insignificant, becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Finally, the direction on the coefficient of CG committee becomes 
positive, but remains statistically insignificant.  
7.2.2.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The sign and significance levels on the coefficients of some control variables have 
changed. The significance level on the coefficients of growth and year 2007 are now statistically 
significant at the 5% level, which were previously significant at 1% level. The coefficients of 
firm size, business risk and year 2010 become statistically insignificant, which were statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level, while profitability is now significantly related to the EISSUE,  
which was insignificantly associated with the EISSUE. The sign on the coefficients of years 2002 
to 2004 become negative but remain statistically insignificant.   
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7.2.3 Results Based on the Two-Stage Least Squares Model  
The Hausman test was used to check for the existence of endogeneity. This test involves 
two stages. In the first stage, the OCGI is regressed on control variables, and its predicted value is 
saved as P-OCGI.  
 
Table 45: The results of equity issuance based only on non-financial firms 
 Financial and non-financial Non-financial 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI + 0.0103 0.0006
***
 0.0123 0.0015
***
 
  GOVOWN - -0.2308 0.0520
*
 -0.3416 0.0190
**
 
  INSOWN + 0.0042 0.0675
*
 0.0060 0.0221
**
 
  FOROWN -/+ -0.0022 0.4233 -0.0010 0.7666 
  BLKOWN -/+ -0.0013 0.5865 -0.0061 0.0340
**
 
  BSIZE -/+ -0.0147 0.6090 -0.0387 0.3155 
  BIG4 -/+ 0.0629 0.5698 0.0376 0.7508 
  CGCOM + -0.0084 0.9464 0.1089 0.4821 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0031 0.0054
***
 0.0031 0.0150
**
 
  ROA  0.7393 0.1775 1.2461 0.0664
*
 
  LNTA  0.0815 0.0737
*
 0.0147 0.7992 
  TNGAS  0.0028 0.1535 -0.0012 0.6316 
  DIVPO  -0.1264 0.7021 -0.4563 0.2963 
  BSRK  -4.2093 0.0211
**
 -2.3379 0.2941 
  2002  0.1447 0.5036 -0.0541 0.8421 
  2003  0.1958 0.3400 -0.0761 0.7841 
  2004  0.0715 0.7339 -0.0608 0.8102 
  2006  0.5359 0.0060
***
 0.3999 0.0794
*
 
  2007  0.7519 0.0002
***
 0.4981 0.0325
**
 
  2008  0.8505 0.0000
***
 0.6853 0.0031
***
 
  2009  0.2857 0.1595 0.1983 0.4108 
  2010  0.4122 0.0443
**
 0.2265 0.3517 
  2011  0.2177 0.3059 0.0526 0.8381 
  Basic materials  0.6256 0.1827 0.5105 0.2513 
  Consumer services  0.3540 0.4496 0.2212 0.6196 
  Consumer goods  0.5356 0.2672 0.3558 0.4394 
  Financials  1.0113 0.0352
**
 Excluded 
  Health care  0.2976 0.6371 0.0762 0.9022 
  Industrials  0.6813 0.1501 0.5227 0.2446 
  Utilities  0.6166 0.2473 0.7107 0.1676 
Constant           -3.9384     0.0001
***
             -2.0028     0.0858
*
 
McFadden R-squared    0.1531  0.1297 
LR-Stat    192.1199
***
   105.5830
***
 
Number of observations  1049 807 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), 
institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size 
(BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), 
profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets (TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). 
In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model. Year 
2001 and Telecommunications industry were excluded by Eviews software as both are perfectly predicts binary 
response failure. The parameter estimates are obtained by logistic regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.  
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In the second stage, the EISSUE is regressed on the OCGI, P-OCGI and control variables. 
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The results of this test lead the present study to accept the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity, as P-OCGI (P-value = 0.373) is statistically insignificantly associated with the 
EISSUE. Despite this result, the widely used 2SLS technique was employed in order to avoid any 
doubt. As indicated in Subsection 7.1.7, the P-OCGI is used as an instrumental variable for the 
OCGI. The relationship between equity issuance and CG is re-estimated by using the P-OCGI 
instead of the OCGI, as specified below.  
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The results of the 2SLS are presented in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 46. The LR-Stat is 
significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
significant difference between observed and predicted values is accepted. The McFadden R-
squared implies that about 17% of the variability in the EISSUE is jointly predicted by 
explanatory and control variables. In general, the 2SLS model predicts that the P-OCGI, 
government ownership, institutional ownership, growth and business risk have a significant 
relationship with the EISSUE. Further discussion of the main sensitivities of the 2SLS results is 
provided below.  
7.2.3.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables   
The sign and significance level on the coefficients of all CG variables remain the same as 
predicted by the logistic model, except that the significance level on the coefficient of 
institutional ownership was statistically significant at the 10% level and is now statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
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7.2.3.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables   
The direction and the level of significance on the coefficients of this group of variables 
show some changes. For instance, the significance level on the coefficients of firm size, year 
2007 and year 2010, which were statistically significant at least at the 10% level, are now 
statistically insignificant, while years 2002 and 2003 become significantly correlated with the 
EISSUE. The sign on the coefficients of years 2009 to 2011 are now negative but remain 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 46: The results of equity issuance based on the two stage least squares model 
 Logistic   model 2SLS model 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI + 0.0103 0.0006
***
                  -      - 
  POCGI +              -      - 0.0419 0.0000
***
 
  GOVOWN - -0.2308 0.0520
*
 -0.2286 0.0538
*
 
  INSOWN + 0.0042 0.0675
*
 0.0050 0.0276
**
 
  FOROWN -/+ -0.0022 0.4233 -0.0025 0.3593 
  BLKOWN -/+ -0.0013 0.5865 -0.0021 0.3888 
  BSIZE -/+ -0.0147 0.6090 -0.0268 0.3637 
  BIG4 -/+ 0.0629 0.5698 0.0664 0.5557 
  CGCOM + -0.0084 0.9464 -0.0003 0.9979 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0031 0.0054
***
 0.0033 0.0035
***
 
  ROA  0.7393 0.1775 0.2018 0.7182 
  LNTA  0.0815 0.0737
*
 0.0176 0.7038 
  TNGAS  0.0028 0.1535 0.0029 0.1378 
  DIVPO  -0.1264 0.7021 -0.0841 0.8019 
  BSRK  -4.2093 0.0211
**
 -3.8479 0.0369
**
 
  2002  0.1447 0.5036 1.0036 0.0000
***
 
  2003  0.1958 0.3400 0.5520 0.0077
***
 
  2004  0.0715 0.7339 0.0292 0.8876 
  2006  0.5359 0.0060
***
 0.2507 0.2094
*
 
  2007  0.7519 0.0002
***
 0.4006 0.0499 
  2008  0.8505 0.0000
***
 0.4381 0.0350
**
 
  2009  0.2857 0.1595 -0.1431 0.5020 
  2010  0.4122 0.0443
**
 -0.0283 0.8955 
  2011  0.2177 0.3059 -0.1877 0.4004 
  Basic materials  0.6256 0.1827 0.3711 0.4429 
  Consumer services  0.3540 0.4496 0.1040 0.8285 
  Consumer goods  0.5356 0.2672 0.2746 0.5806 
  Financials  1.0113 0.0352
**
 0.8689 0.0794
*
 
  Health care  0.2976 0.6371 0.2922 0.6573 
  Industrials  0.6813 0.1501 0.3983 0.4124 
  Utilities  0.6166 0.2473 0.6949 0.2075 
Constant           -3.9384     0.0001
***
             -4.0479    0.0001*** 
McFadden R-squared    0.1531  0.1686 
LR-Stat    192.1199
***
 211.6213
***
 
Number of observations  1049 1049 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Un-weighted Omani CG index (OCGI),  Instrumental variable for the CG 
index (POCGI), Government ownership (GOVOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), foreign ownership 
(FOROWN), block ownership (BLKOWN), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of corporate 
governance committee (CGCOM), growth (GROWTH), profitability (ROA), firm size (LNTA), Tangible assets 
(TNGAS), Dividend policy (DIVPO), Business risk (BSRK). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, year 2005 
and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model. Year 2001 and Telecommunications industry were excluded 
by Eviews software as both are perfectly predicts binary response failure. The parameter estimates are obtained by 
logistic regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.  
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
As indicated in Section 1, Oman has reviewed its corporate regulatory framework by 
initiating a number of corporate reforms aimed at making firms less vulnerable to financial 
distress and bankruptcy following the 1997 Asian crisis. These reforms started with the 
introduction of the Capital Market Law in 1998, amending the Companies Act 1974 several times 
and establishing the CMA in 1998. Importantly, Omani authorities realised the need to improve 
the quality of domestic firms’ governance in order to ensure high standards of corporate 
behaviour. As a result, the CG code was issued in 2002 and effectively implemented in 2003; this 
is regarded as a major CG regime reform aimed at improving CG practices.  
The code contains a number of CG recommendations to assist firms in mitigating agency 
problems associated with corporate policy decisions, including those related to CS and the choice 
of financing. These recommendations were built on an Anglo-American model and drawn from 
the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, and principally relate to the composition and functions of the 
board of directors (see Essay 1, Table 2). This study examines the extent to which reliance on an 
Anglo-American model can provide effective CG mechanisms, given the differences between 
Omani and developed corporate settings. In particular, whether the Omani code recommendations 
have significant impact on managerial decisions that are related to employing different levels of 
debt and the choosing between debt and equity or not. The impact of these recommendations on 
these issues is expected to be different from what is reported in developed countries because the 
differences in corporate contexts. Specifically, religious notions, informal rules and ownership 
concentration suggest that Omani managers may have different views from managers in 
developed countries in constructing CS. Prior studies in developed countries report empirical 
evidence that CG mechanisms have a significant influence on the FCS. Thus, it becomes 
important to investigate how and why a firm’s CG mechanisms may influence CS in a non-
developed country like Oman, where empirical evidence is lacking.    
Unlike a few studies on CS in Oman (Abdulla, 1998; Omet and Mashharawe, 2002; 
Sbeiti, 2010), this study empirically conducts its investigation in order to expand current 
understanding of firms’ financial decision-making. It employs one of the largest and most 
extensive data sets to date on CG and CS in emerging economies (i.e., a sample of 116 Omani 
listed firms from 2001 to 2011, giving a total of 1,152 firm year observations), and a broad CG 
index consisting of 72 CG provisions. Similarly, it uses a CG index to perform its investigation 
instead of examining individual CG mechanisms, in response to recent calls that CG should be 
examined as a set. Arguably, this distinguishes the current study from most prior studies that 
examine the CS-CG relation using single-dimensional characteristics of CG, without considering 
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the interrelationships between CG mechanisms. The present study is further distinct from past 
studies by examining four types of ownership structures and factors that have not been widely 
investigated in the literature, such as government ownership, foreign ownership and the presence 
of a CG committee.  
This section provides a summary of the results discussed in Sections 6 and 7. In 
particular, Subsection 8.1 summarises the empirical results of the FCS and the EISSUE. 
Subsection 8.2 summarises the empirical results of robustness analyses related to the FCS and the 
EISSUE. Subsection 8.3 discusses the policy implications and recommendations of these results. 
The contributions of this study are discussed in Subsection 8.4, and its limitations and 
suggestions for further research are discussed in Subsection 8.5.  
8.1 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE CHOICE OF FINANCING: THE 
MAIN RESULTS   
In line with theoretical and empirical literature, analysis of the extent to which CG drives 
CS and the choice of financing suggests that, on average, better-governed firms tend to 
significantly employ lower levels of leverage and issue equity over debt compared to their 
poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, an examination of hypothesis five (H5) reveals a 
statistically significant negative association between firm-level CS and firm-level CG. 
Quantitatively, holding all the other variables within the model constant, the result suggests that 
an increase in the OCGI will result in a 0.322 percent decrease in the use of total debt in 
financing firms’ operations. Theoretically, the negative association between the OCGI and firm-
level CS is consistent with the prediction that firms with poor CG employ higher levels of 
leverage as a substitute for CG, to ensure managers act in line with shareholders’ interests. This 
result lends empirical evidence to prior studies (e.g., Rijal and Bahadur, 2010; Haque et al., 2011; 
Jiraporn et al., 2012) on the relationship between firm-level CS and firm-level CG.  
An examination of hypothesis thirteen (H13) suggests that there is a statistically 
significant positive association between firm-level CG and the EISSUE. Quantitatively, holding 
all the other variables within the model constant, the result indicates that an increase in the OCGI 
by one unit will result in a 0.010 percent increase in the likelihood of selecting equity compared 
to debt. The significant positive relationship between firm-level CG and the EISSUE is in line 
with the theoretical prediction that CG mitigates agency problems to a level where equity 
issuance becomes the first choice for firms to meet their external financing needs. This result 
lends empirical support to the admittedly limited literature (e.g., Mande et al., 2012) on the 
association between the EISSUE and firm-level CG.   
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In addition to H5 and H13, which are regarded the main hypotheses, the results of the rest 
of hypotheses examined in this study are summarised below. H1 predicts that there is a 
statistically significant positive association between government ownership and the FCS. H1 was 
rejected, as the coefficient on government ownership is negative and statistically insignificant. 
This result lends empirical support to the result reported by Hussainey and Aljifri (2012), who 
report empirical evidence of no significant effect of government ownership on the FCS.  
H2 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between 
institutional ownership and firm capital structure decision. The coefficient on institutional 
ownership is negative but statistically insignificant, so the study rejects H2. The inverse 
relationship between institutional ownership and the FCS is consistent with Al-Fayoumi and 
Abuzayed’s (2009) evidence that institutional ownership is not statistically associated with the 
FCS.  
H3 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between foreign 
ownership and firm capital structure decision. H3 was rejected because the coefficient on foreign 
ownership is negative and statistically insignificant. This result is in line with Zou and Xiao’s 
(2006) empirical evidence that foreign ownership does not affect firm-level CS.  
H4 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between block 
ownership and firm capital structure decision. H4 was rejected, as the coefficient on block 
ownership is positive and statistically insignificant. This result is inconsistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Sheikh and Wang, 2012; Ganguli, 2013) that report empirical evidence that block 
ownership has a significant positive impact on the FCS.  
H6 predicts that there is a statistically significant association between board size and the 
FCS. The coefficient on board size is negative but statistically insignificant, so the study rejects 
H6. The inverse relation lends empirical support to Hussainey and Aljifri’s (2012) evidence that 
firm board size has no significant influence on the FCS.  
H7 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between the 
presence of a CG committee and firm capital structure decision. The coefficient on CG 
committee is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that 
H7 is empirically supported. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction that a CG 
committee ensures that CG provisions adopted by a firm are followed, which in turn motivates 
firms to employ lower levels of leverage, as they do not need to use debt financing as a substitute 
mechanism for CG. This result offers empirical evidence not previously found in the literature, 
implying that a CG committee is a significant determinant of firm-level CS. 
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 H8 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between audit firm 
size and firm capital structure decision. H8 was accepted, as the coefficient on audit firm size is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. This result is in line with the 
prediction that firms audited by larger audit firms may not need to use high levels of leverage as a 
CG mechanism because large audit firms are better able to reduce information asymmetries, 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems than small audit firms. This evidence is contrary to 
Hussainey and Aljifri’s (2012) report that the quality of external auditors has no significant 
influence on the FCS.   
H9 predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association between 
government ownership and the EISSUE. The coefficient on government ownership is negative 
and statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that H9 is empirically supported. This 
result is in line with the theoretical prediction that firms with greater government ownership tend 
to use debt financing as a control mechanism to reduce managerial self-interested behaviour. This 
result offers empirical evidence suggesting that government ownership is a significant 
determinant of equity issuance; past studies have not considered this determinant in their 
investigations.   
H10 predicts that there is a statistically significant positive association between 
institutional ownership and the EISSUE. H10 was accepted, as the coefficient on institutional 
ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction that firms with large institutional ownership may be 
motivated to issue equity over debt because they aware that new investors do not need to collect 
costly private information as a result of the presence of institutional investors. This result lends 
empirical support to prior results (e.g., Brous and Kini, 1994; Mande et al., 2012) that equity 
issuance is preferred by firms with a large percentage of institutional ownership.   
H11 predicts that there is a statistically significant association between foreign ownership 
and the EISSUE. The coefficient on foreign ownership is negative but statistically insignificant, 
so the study rejects H11. The literature shows no international evidence of a link between the two 
variables.   
H12 predicts that there is a statistically significant association between block ownership 
and the EISSUE. H12 was rejected, as the coefficient on block ownership is not statistically 
significantly related to the EISSUE. Similarly, there is no empirical evidence on the potential 
reaction of equity issuance to ownership concentration.   
H14 predicts that there is a statistically significant association between board size and the 
EISSUE. The coefficient on board size is negative but statistically insignificant, so the study 
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rejects H14. Board size as a potential determinant of equity issuance has not yet been examined 
in the literature.  
H15 predicts that there is a statistically significant association between the presence of a 
CG committee and equity issuance. H15 was rejected, as the coefficient on CG committee is 
statistically insignificant. The impact of the presence of a CG committee on a firm’s choice to 
issue equity or debt is not investigated in the literature.   
The finial hypothesis predicts that there is a statistically significant association between 
audit firm size and the EISSUE. The coefficient on audit firm size is positive but statistically 
insignificant, so the study rejects H16. This result is not in line with Chang et al.’s (2009) 
evidence that firms audited by Big Six audit firms prefer equity issuance. 
8.2  CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE CHOICE OF FINANCING: THE 
ROBUSTNESS RESULTS   
Many additional analyses were carried out to ascertain the robustness of the main results. 
Overall, the main results are robust to alternative measures and estimations, supporting the 
current study’s evidence that CG recommendations introduced by the 2002 CG code have had a 
significant impact on the FCS and the EISSUE. This subsection summarises the results of these 
analyses. First, a CG weighted index was used instead of an un-weighted index in order to check 
how much the main results can be affected by a weighted index. Both robustness analyses related 
to the FCS and the EISSUE indicate that the main results are not sensitive to a weighted index.  
Second, firm-level CS was calculated by using book total debt ratio as a main measure of the 
FCS. The FCS was re-calculated by using short-term debt and long-term debt ratios in order to 
account for the suggestion in the literature that using alternative definitions of CS may generate 
different results. The coefficient on the OCGI is negative but statistically insignificant in the 
short-term debt model, and statistically significant and negatively associated with the FCS in the 
long-term debt model. Third, prior studies argue that financial firms are heavily regulated, and 
their leverage and financing decisions may not be similar to those of non-financial firms. The 
FCS-CG and the EISSUE -CG relations were re-estimated by employing only non-financial firms 
to account for the possibility that the inclusion of financial firms in the current study’s data set 
may lead to different results. The results of these analyses are largely consistent with the main 
results, confirming the current study’s argument that the impact of CG on both types of firms is 
similar. Fourth, the relationship between CS and CG was re-estimated using a fixed-effects model 
in order to account for unobserved firm-level characteristics. The results of this analysis are 
largely in line with the main results, indicating that CG has a significant negative relationship 
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with the FCS. Fifth, the main results of CS were checked for the sample period. The splitting of 
the sample into two sub-samples, namely before implementing the 2002 CG code (Pre-2003) and 
after implementation (Post-2003), and re-running the OLS regression on both samples, shows 
that the OCGI is only had a significant effect during the Post-2003 period. This confirms the 
main result that the 2002 CG code has helped Omani firms reduce their levels of leverage. Sixth, 
the lagged structure model was adopted as an alternative econometric model to account for time-
lag in firm-level CS and firm-level CG association. The results of this analysis remain 
qualitatively the same as those predicted by the main analysis. Finally, 2SLS methodology was 
performed to account for potential endogeneities resulting from omitted variables and/or 
simultaneity. The results of these analyses suggest that the main results of the FCS and the 
EISSUE models are largely robust, where the main variable OCGI is still significant and 
negatively associated with the FCS and has a significant and positive link with the EISSUE.    
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS    
Despite initial expectations that the impact of CG on CS and the choice of financing in the 
Omani context may be different from developed countries, the current study’s analyses indicate 
that CS decisions are driven by CG structures. The results demonstrate that firm-level CG, audit 
firm size, CG committee, government ownership and institutional ownership are statistically 
significant determinants of variation in the FCS and the EISSUE decisions. These results suggest 
policy implications and recommendations.    
First, contrary to concerns that reliance on an Anglo-American model may be a barrier to 
effective CG mechanisms in Oman due to differences between Oman and developed countries, 
the evidence suggests that CG mechanisms proposed by the 2002 CG code, in addition to other 
CG measures in the Companies Law, have assisted firms in mitigating agency problems and 
reducing agency costs associated with their CS decisions. Omani firms with better governance 
structures appear to rely less on debt financing as a CG mechanism, in order to alleviate agency 
costs and align managers’ interests with shareholders, than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
The joint effect of those CG mechanisms has also shown a significant impact on financing 
decisions. The likelihood of choosing equity over debt financing increases in firms with better 
governance structures, where effective CG mechanisms seem to assist Omani firms in reducing 
the cost of equity, which in turn increases their willingness to issue equity rather than debt. This 
suggests that firms with poor CG structures may not be considered attractive by potential 
investors, which increases their cost of capital, as agency costs would be higher in such firms. 
Firms should implement effective CG systems in order to access equity capital markets by 
weighing up the costs involved. Thus, Omani policy makers (e.g., CAM, MSM) should stress that 
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firms need to keep improving their CG structures. For instance, as suggested by the current 
study’s results that the presence of a CG has a significant impact on firm-level CS, policy makers 
should encourage firms to set up CG committees that ensure that CG recommendations adopted 
by firms are followed and regularly reviewed.   
Second, the results related to ownership structures show that shareholders’ rights have no 
significant effect on firm-level CS among Omani listed firms, but do have a significant impact on 
the EISSUE. Firms with large institutional ownership and lower government ownership tend to 
issue equity. Although the Omani government, institutional investors, foreign investors and block 
holders own around 6%, 20%, 11% and 55% of listed firms’ shares, respectively, they have no 
influential role in CS. This is contrary to the theoretical prediction that CS can be considerably 
influenced by ownership. The general lack of influence on both the FCS and the EISSUE may be 
related to the significant impact of informal rules on shareholders. For instance, block holders are 
expected to use their powers to monitor managers by replacing those who perform poorly instead 
of using debt financing as a control mechanism. Thus, a real commitment is required from those 
shareholders to perform their duties as CG mechanisms in order to mitigate agency problems and 
minimise agency costs.    
Third, the insignificant relationship between board size and the FCS and the EISSUE 
implies that board size has no influence in determining the extent to which a firm employs 
leverage and whether it issues equity or debt. This is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction 
that the board has the most authority in providing clear strategies to guide managers in structuring 
CS. This finding may result from the possibility that board directors find it difficult to assist firms 
to decide between higher or lower levels of leverage and choose between equity and debt. 
Managers prioritising family, tribe and personal relationships may carry debt at a sub-optimal 
level in order to enjoy free cash. Policy makers should perhaps introduce governance mechanisms 
that make board members more involved in actively monitoring managers. CG provisions that do 
not allow board members to be related to any managers may be one step in this direction.   
Finally, the results indicate that firm-level CS is lower in firms audited by large audit firms 
and firms that have CG committees, whereas the EISSUE is not influenced by these determinants. 
The significant impact of these determinants may suggest that firms not audited by a large audit 
firms, and without a CG committee, might be considered less attractive to new investors, as 
information asymmetries, moral hazard and adverse selection problems are expected to be higher 
in such firms. The insignificant effect of these determinants on firms’ financing selection 
suggests that firms should re-evaluate their CG systems by choosing a better quality auditor 
and/or improving their board committees. This could enable firms to more easily access equity 
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markets and lower the cost of equity, until it becomes cheaper than debt financing. Policy makers 
can contribute to this by encouraging firms to have CG committees and along with audit 
committee that was suggested by the 2002 CG code, as well as improving audit quality by 
introducing restrictions on how audit firms operate. 
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS  
As explained earlier, the current study is distinct from past studies in general and those 
that examine CS determinants in an Omani context in particular. Prior studies in Oman are 
limited in number (Abdulla, 1998; Omet and Mashharawe, 2002; Sbeiti, 2010) and scope. They 
examine general CG determinants, unlike the current study. The present study seeks to overcome 
the limitations of existing cross-sectional and time series studies, and those examining the impact 
of individual CG mechanisms on the FCS and the EISSUE, by using a multi-theoretical approach, 
panel data methodology and a self-constructed CG index. Examining various aspects of corporate 
financial behaviour in a non-developed country like Oman is regarded as important in order to 
expand our understanding of firms’ financial decision-making behaviour; this behaviour is 
expected to be different from what is reported in developed contexts because of features 
associated with the Omani corporate setting. Thus, this study makes a number of new 
contributions to the extant CG and CS literature.   
First, unbalanced panel data of 116 firms from nine different industries from 2001 to 2011 
was gathered, producing a total of 1,152 firm year observations over the 11-year period. The 
present study provides detailed empirical evidence on why and how a firm’s CG might influence 
its level of CS and its the EISSUE in Oman. Unlike many existing studies, this study does not 
restrict its sample to only large firms; all firms with sufficient data are sampled in order to 
strengthen the generalisability of the results. Similarly, this study seeks to reduce the effect of 
some statistical problems, such as multicollinearity and unobserved heterogeneity among 
variables associated with either cross-sectional or time series approaches, by adopting panel data 
methodology (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009). The results drawn from this study suggest that, 
on average, better-governed firms tend to employ lower levels of leverage and select equity 
financing more than their poorly-governed counterparts. This lends empirical support to the 
admittedly limited literature examining the impact of CG on the FCS and the EISSUE, helping fill 
the gap in the literature.  
Second, the evidence highlights the importance of ownership structure as a CG 
mechanism determining the EISSUE, which is in line with prior results suggesting that 
shareholder’ rights can impact how firms construct their CSs and finance their activities. Unlike 
past studies that restrict their analyses to a few types of ownership, which may not provide a 
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broder understanding of the impact of such determinants, this study examines four types of 
ownership. It provides empirical evidence that firms with government ownership tend not to issue 
equity when seeking new or additional financing, whereas those with many institutional investors 
prefer to issue equity over debt.  
Third, the current study examines some factors that have not been widely investigated. It 
provides empirical evidence that firms audited by large audit firms and firms with CG 
committees tend to use lower levels of leverage.  
Fourth, the study helps answer the question of what determines CS by adopting a multi-
theoretical approach. It draws on a number of theories from CG and CS literature in order to 
develop a multi-theoretical framework, which incorporates insights from trade-off, pecking order, 
signalling, market timing, signalling and agency theories. This framework contributes to attempts 
to arrive at a uniform theoretical framework that helps researchers to understand firms’ 
motivations to construct their CSs.  
Fifth, unlike most prior studies, which exclude financial firms from their analyses, the 
present study provides empirical evidence that there is no significant difference in the influence 
of CG on the FCS and the EISSUE between financial and non-financial firms. This should 
encourage researchers, especially in emergimg countries, to include financial firms in their 
analyses, as both types of firms tend to react almost the same way towards CG systems due to 
weak corporate enforcement.  
Finally, despite many existing studies, the current study provides empirical evidence on 
the association between CG and the FCS and the EISSUE using different models and estimations 
in order to test the robustness of its results. The main results of this study are fairly robust across 
a number of econometric models that sufficiently account for alternative CG and CS proxies, 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics, time period and different endogeneity problems.  
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although the current study’s results are fairly robust and important, weaknesses need to 
be clearly articulated. First, the study’s measures for the other CG, ownership, the FCS and the 
EISSUE variables may or may not accurately reflect actual CG, ownership, the FCS and the 
EISSUE in practice due to potential measurement errors. Using alternative measures for several 
variables was extremely difficult due to data limitations. Hence, additional CG and CS proxies 
beyond those used in this study can be employed in order to overcome problems associated with 
measurement errors. Second, reliance on only corporate annual reports for CG information may 
limit the availability of data, whereas other sources of information, such as analysts’ reports, can 
complement corporate annual reports. Future studies may be motivated to search for additional 
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sources of data in order to obtain more detailed information. For instance, different sources of 
data may allow future research to use other CG information and market values in addition to book 
values in calculating the FCS. Third, although the current study sought to include the most 
influential variables in its models, it may be subjected to omitted variables as a result of 
unavailable data. Future research may include orher determinants in addition to those examined 
in this study in overcoming the problem of omitted variables. Fourth, the present study includes 
only listed firms in its data set; the study was unable to include non-listed firms, which could 
have strengthened the generalisability of its results. Future research may benefit by examining 
listed and non-listed firms and financial and non-financial firms. Fifth, although the current study 
examines a considerable number of variables, determinants related to specific aspects of the 
Omani context, such as informal rules, religious notions and cultural practices, which motivated 
the current study’s investigation, have not been examined. Future research may improve its 
analysis by examining how external CG structures, such as the media and the market for 
corporate and managerial control, as well as Omani-specific issues, such as religious notions, 
cultural practices and social norms, impact on the FCS and the EISSUE. Finally, using only a 
quantitative methodology to perform its analyses may limit the ability to interpret the results; 
using both quantitative and qualitative (e.g., interview and survey) methodologies can be helpful 
in overcoming this problem.  
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ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the impact of corporate governance (CG) on corporate earnings 
management (EM) behaviour. Employing one of the largest and extensive dataset to-date on CG 
and EM in emerging economies (i.e., a sample of 116 Omani listed firms from 2001 to 2011 and 
1,152 firm year observations) and a broad CG index consisting of 72 CG provisions, the study 
finds that, on average, better-governed firms tend to engage significantly less in EM than their 
poorly-governed counterparts. It also finds that government ownership, institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership, audit firm size and board diversity on the basis of gender are negatively 
associated with EM. In contrast, block ownership, board size and CG committee have positive 
relationship with EM. The study’s results are fairly robust across a number of econometric 
models that sufficiently account for alternative CG and EM proxies, as well as different 
endogeneity problems. Overall, its findings are generally consistent with the predictions of its 
multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, signalling, stakeholder, and 
stewardship theories. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; earnings management; multi-theoretical approach; emerging 
economies; Oman; endogeneity. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background  
As economic, social and political systems have become larger and more complex, 
different forms of agency problems have emerged as a result. The agency problem associated 
with the separation of ownership and control, along with information asymmetry between 
different stakeholders, has led to accounting scandals and corporate failures, such as Enron, 
HealthSouth, Tyco and WorldCom, among others (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005). The widespread failure in international accounting and financial reporting has 
largely been suggested to be a result of ineffective control procedures that fail to curb 
opportunistic managerial behaviour.30 In particular, the absence of effective internal controls 
allows managers to have discretion in managing earnings in order to reap personal benefits at the 
expense of shareholders and other stakeholders resources. Importantly, EM practices employed 
by managers have a negative influence on firm value.31 Such practices affect the credibility and 
transparency of financial reporting, which different stakeholders largely rely on when making 
investment decisions. Consequently, academics and professionals have encouraged firms to adopt 
CG systems designed to mitigate opportunistic managerial behaviour by separating management’ 
decisions and their control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For instance, the board of directors, through 
its committees, especially the audit committee, plays a crucial role in ensuring reliable and 
accurate financial reporting, and hence reducing EM practices (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-
Ballesta, 2009). As a result, researchers have been keen to investigate the extent to which CG 
would be able to mitigate EM practices in different corporate settings.   
Although a considerable number of studies have examined the association between EM 
practices and CG, most have focused on specific CG mechanisms, such as board characteristics 
(e.g., Stockmans et al., 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013) and audit characteristics (e.g., Iatrdis, 2012; 
Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2014). In contrast, studies investigating this relation through multi-
dimensional characteristics of CG are limited (Bowen et al., 2008; Bekiris Doukakis, 2011). In 
this regard, previous studies (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008) indicate 
that it is imperative to examine CG mechanisms as an integrated system instead of testing them 
independently, because some can complement or substitute each other. Dechow et al. (2010, 
                                                 
30
 For instance, in eight out of ten firms that had scandals in 2002, the roles of chairperson and chief executives were held by the 
same person, indicating a clear weakness in their internal control procedures according to agency theory (Albrecht et al, 
2004). Similarly, Dechow et al. (1996) report evidence that firms with boards of directors dominated by management tend 
to manipulate earnings.   
31
 See Schipper (1989) for an overview of the definition of earnings management, and Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a detailed 
overview of earnings management incentives. 
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pp.383) discuss this issue and state that “Using only a limited set of corporate governance 
measures results in econometric problems (e.g., inconsistent coefficient estimates) that can lead 
to invalid inferences”. This may suggest that using one-dimensional characteristics of CG may 
not provide a clear picture of CG’s role in reducing EM practices. Thus, researchers are 
encouraged to use multi-dimensional characteristics of CG to examine this relation in order to see 
a wider picture. However, most prior studies have been conducted in developed countries, where 
institutional structures and corporate settings are largely similar, while limited evidence has been 
reported from emerging economies in general and the MENA in particular (Alves, 2012; Wang, 
2014). As a result, and in line with the growing debate in the literature on the ability of different 
CG measures to mitigate agency problems and reduce agency costs within different business 
environments, this essay sets out to examine the important issue of CG by investigating its 
influence on EM practices in emerging country like Oman.     
Theoretically, EM practices are considered a type of agency cost; hence, they are mainly 
related to agency theory (Davidson et al., 2005, Prior et al., 2008). Agency theory suggests that 
due to the separation of ownership and control, managers are more likely to engage in unethical 
behaviour in order to gain personal benefits at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Such behaviour involves agency costs, as shareholders are unable to monitor managers 
alone. Although shareholders and debt holders attempt to mitigate such negative behaviour by 
using different forms of contracts (e.g., compensation contracts and debt covenants), managers 
have been found to engage in EM practices when a firm’s earnings are more/less than the 
compensation target, or when they draw closer to defaulting on debt covenants (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Sun, 2013). Agency theory suggests that CG 
provides a set of constraints that curbs opportunistic managerial behaviour and reduce agency 
costs. Specifically, CG measures can ensure compliance with financial accounting standards and 
disclose credible financial reporting (Verriest et al., 2013). Thus, agency theory has documented 
a direct link between EM practices and CG mechanisms. However, unlike agency theory, 
stakeholder theory assumes that conflict of interest is inherent in the association between 
managers and all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). Based on this assumption, a manager is 
considered to be an agent for all stakeholders and his/her opportunistic managerial behaviour can 
have serious consequences for all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995). In this view, 
EM practices affect not only shareholders, but also other stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers 
and employees, among others. Importantly, stakeholder theory claims that the CG system does 
not represent all stakeholders’ interests, and employing CG measures alone is not adequate to 
protect stakeholders from opportunistic managerial behaviour. It suggests additional institutional 
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structures that serve as further monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, such as labour unions, 
consumer unions and special-interest groups, among others (Hill and Jones, 1992; Letza et al., 
2004).  
Researchers in developed countries have used different theoretical predictions and 
explanations to examine the effect of CG measures on EM practices. They have reported 
empirical evidence that CG standards can either reduce or mitigate EM practices. Since most 
emerging economies have adopted CG standards in advanced economies, the question of whether 
adopting and implementing these measures will reduce EM practices must be asked. Therefore, 
the extent to which researchers in emerging economies will find similar results to those reported 
by researchers in developed countries given legal enforcement and investment protection in those 
countries are weaker (Al-Jabri and Hussain, 2012; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013). For 
instance, board directors are not as independent as their counterparts in the US and the UK, which 
weakens their ability to monitor managers (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009). Thus, 
using the same theoretical predictions and explanations to investigate the effect of CG on EM 
practices in emerging countries deepens our understanding of the effectiveness of CG standards 
in influencing managerial decision-making behaviour in general and EM in particular.    
Therefore, this study aims to shed more light on the impact of CG on one aspect of 
corporate financial decision-making, EM behaviour, in one emerging economy, Oman. In 
response to the 1997 Asian crisis and international corporate development, the Omani 
government has adopted a number of governance reforms.32 These reforms aim to restore investor 
confidence and protect stakeholders’ interests. Among these reforms was the issuing of a 
voluntary CG code by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2002, which is regarded as the 
most advanced governance regulation in Oman. The code includes a series of recommendations 
which aim to regulate the management of firms listed on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM). 
Importantly, it was designed to encourage firms to implement good CG standards which mean 
less opportunistic managerial behaviour and better stock market performance. For instance, it 
recommends firms establish an audit committee to review financial statements and ensure that 
there is no change in accounting policies and principles, as well as detect any financial reporting 
irregularities (Omani CG code, 2002, Appendix 3).  
Despite Oman’s early attempts to adopt a CG code compared with its counterparts in the 
region,33 the code seems to face a number of challenges. For example, even though the Omani 
CG code’s provisions were mainly drawn from the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992, this code 
                                                 
32See Essay 1, Section 2 for more information on CG reforms in Oman. 
33See Essay 1, Table 1 for more of an overview on CG codes in the MENA region. 
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formulates governance recommendations in a simple form and adopts limited provisions. Further, 
there are major differences between Oman and the UK in terms of factors which may have 
implications for achieving the code’s objectives, including factors such as institutional structures. 
In this regard, Mueller (1995) indicates that adopting pre-designed CG structures without taking 
into consideration the context in which these structures will be implemented may not lead to 
better CG practices. These challenges may raise critical concerns on the effectiveness of CG 
mechanisms proposed by the code to provide effective control procedures that curb managerial 
self-interest in general and mitigate EM practices in particular.    
1.2 Motivation 
This study is designed to assess the extent to which CG measures are useful in 
understanding EM behaviour among Omani listed firms. In this sense, Oman is regarded as a 
good environment in which to conduct such investigation because of its unique features, which 
differentiate it from developed countries. These characteristics are: religious notions, informal 
rules34 and ownership structures. First, Oman is a conservative society where religion has a 
remarkable effect on the way individuals think and behave. In this context, managers are more 
likely to make their decisions in line with Shariah law.35 This is considered to be different from 
managers in developed countries, who are supposed to make decisions consistent with 
shareholders’ interests. Prior studies have reported evidence that religion has an impact on 
managerial decision processes (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009), financial reporting (e.g., Dyerng et 
al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012), and tax fraud and tax evasion (e.g., Stack and Kposowa, 2006; 
Richardson, 2008). Thus, religious adherence in Oman is expected to influence managers to 
engage less in EM practices. This may result from the fact that religious individuals are 
considered relatively more risk averse, and are more likely to avoid any litigation resulting from 
engaging in unethical behaviour, such as EM practices. Kartk and Schwarze (2008) report 
evidence that Muslims are significantly more risk averse than Protestants. This may suggest that 
religious notions can serve as a complementary CG mechanism preventing Omani managers from 
reporting EM (Callen et al., 2010).  
Second, prior studies (e.g., Williamson, 2000) indicate that informal systems have a great 
impact on formal systems, and firms may adopt some practices that are congruent with social 
expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This impact tends to be greater in emerging economies 
where legal enforcement is weaker (Allen et al., 2005). In this regard, Oman can be viewed as a 
collectivistic country where firms are expected to be influenced by both formal and informal 
                                                 
34Similar to Essay 1 and 2 religious notions and informal rules are not empirically tested due to data limitation. 
35Shariah Law is based on the Qur'an and the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings, which serve as guidance for Muslims in all  
aspects of life (Kamla et al., 2006). 
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systems (Moideenkutty et al., 2011). Specifically, managerial behaviour is likely to be influenced 
by informal rules, where managers have long-term commitments to family, tribe and personal 
relationships, rather than formal rules, such as CG systems (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Common, 
2008; Chahine et al., 2009; Boytsun et al., 2011). This may suggest that such rules render CG 
measures ineffective in mitigating EM practices among Omani listed firms. For instance, though 
the roles of chairperson and chief executive are split in most listed firms, in some firms both 
directors are related, or from the same tribe, which in turn can weaken the monitoring role of the 
firm’s board. Arguably, informal rules give influential power to managers to behave 
opportunistically at the expense of shareholders. One manifestation of such behaviour is engaging 
in EM practices in order to create either personal, family and tribe benefits or to deceive potential 
investors that their firms have good financial prospects.    
Finally, previous studies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988) indicate 
that different ownership structures may lead to different motivations to control and monitor 
managerial decision processes, which may have important implications for mitigating EM 
practices. In this sense, Oman has diversified ownership structures which provide ideal setting for 
examining the monitoring role played by those structures in reducing EM practices. Importantly, 
the ownership structure of firms is characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership, which 
is distinct from firms in the US and the UK, where ownership is diffuse (Najib, 2007; Elsayed, 
2007; Omran et al., 2008; Bishara, 2011). In this context, the agency problem can be viewed 
differently from in the US and the UK, where conflicts of interest tend to be between majority 
and minority shareholders rather than between managers and shareholders (Chen and Zhang, 
2014). Large shareholders may behave opportunistically in order to expropriate minority 
shareholders by either seeking personal benefits or imposing personal preferences that may go 
against minority shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aleves, 2012). This may 
suggest that large shareholders are expected to force managers to report EM in order to achieve 
their objectives (Jaggi and Tsui, 2007). Arguably, it is expected that ownership concentration in 
Oman may not perform its function as a good CG mechanism in reducing agency costs and 
increasing monitoring. Instead, it is anticipated to increase managerial motivation to report EM.  
The unique characteristics of the Omani corporate setting may suggest different results 
from what is reported in developed countries regarding CG’ ability to mitigate EM. While studies 
in developed countries report evidence that CG has a crucial impact on EM practices, to the best 
of the current study’s knowledge, there is no prior study that investigates CG-EM relationship in 
the MENA region in generaly, but Oman in particular. Therefore, examining the relationship 
between firm-level EM and firm-level CG in the Omani context can be crucial in providing a 
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complete understanding of why and how a firm’s CG strategy might drive and/or constrain its 
EM practices.  
1.3 Research questions and contributions 
Given the unique aspects of the Omani corporate setting and the absence of empirical 
evidence, the main purpose of this study is to investigate how effective the CG measures 
suggested by the Omani voluntary code, in addition to other CG mechanisms proposed by other 
laws, such as Companies Law, constrain EM practices. Specifically, using one of the largest and 
extensive sample of Omani listed firms for the period 2001 to 2011, this study empirically 
examines the extent to which board and audit characteristics and different ownership structures 
influence EM practices. In doing so, the study extends, as well as makes a number of new 
contributions to the growing body of literature on the nature of the association between CG and 
EM. First, unlike most prior studies that attempt to examine the effect on single CG measures on 
EM, this study employs an comprehensive measure of CG, comprising of 72 CG provisions in 
investigating this relation. Second, distinct from past studies, it contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence on why and how four different types of ownership structure, namely 
government, institutional, foreign and block ownership drive EM. Finally, it contributes to the 
extant literature by examining how a number of unique board characteristics, including board 
diversity on the basis of gender and presence of a CG committee influence EM.  
1.4 Structure of the essay  
This study is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
institutional framework of CG and accounting and auditing standards in Oman. The section 3 
reviews existing literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design. 
Section 5 discusses OLS assumptions and descriptive statistics. Section 6 discusses the empirical 
findings. Section 7 discusses robustness tests. The final section provides the summary and 
conclusion.  
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2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT 
STANDARDS IN OMAN  
This section discusses the state of CG and EM with specific focus on the corporate 
regulations, accounting, and auditing standards within the Omani corporate context. Briefly, and 
as has been indicated in Essay 1, the Omani CG regulatory framework can be classified into two 
bodies, namely (i) external; and (ii) internal systems. First, the external CG system consists of the 
key financial regulatory and enforcement bodies (e.g., CMA and MSM) that play a crucial role in 
ensuring that both mandatory and voluntary corporate regulations are properly implemented. In 
particular, a number of governance circulars have been released by CMA, such as a circular 
dealing with related party transactions, and one addressing CG rules. Importantly, the CMA 
issued a UK-style voluntary code of good CG practices in 2002, which is regarded as the first and 
most advanced CG regulation in the entire MENA region. The code applies to all firms listed on 
the MSM, and was effectively implemented in 2003. Second, the internal CG system consists of 
key statutory and voluntary laws that have a number of CG provisions, which were proposed to 
reduce EM practices.  
In order to operate in the market, Omani firms have to comply with the following laws. 
First, the Omani Companies Law no. 4 of 1974 and its amendments are significant because they 
have some governance provisions aimed at mitigating managerial self-interest. For instance, the 
law attempts to curb opportunistic managerial behaviour that can lead to EM practices by not 
allowing managers to engage in activities that can create conflict of interests without 
authorisation from shareholders (Article, 108). The law also focuses on the important role of the 
external auditor in ensuring that financial reports are accurate and reliable by requiring firms to 
appoint an external auditor who is independent and not remain in post for more than four years 
(Article 111). Second, the Capital Market Act no.80 of 1998 and its amendments are also crucial 
since its publication was in direct response to international and local CG developments, such as 
the 1997 Asian crisis and international corporate failures. Although most of its provisions relate 
to the listing and trading of securities, the Act also has a number of governance provisions on 
obligatory quarterly and annual reports, obligations for publishing reports and obligations to 
disclose accurate information. These provisions are designed to reduce information asymmetry 
and help stakeholders access necessary information to make investment decisions.  
Third, the 2002 voluntary Code of good CG practices is the first and most sophisticated 
governance regulation in the MENA region. It aims to curb opportunistic managerial behaviour 
by separating management decisions and their control (Dry, 2003). Its CG recommendations 
comprise 28 articles and address four broad topics: (i) board of directors; (ii) external auditors 
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and internal control systems; (iii) accounting and auditing; and (iv) disclosure and transparency. 
Importantly, the code has several provisions related to the board of directors and accounting and 
auditing that aim to reduce EM practices. Board directors are required to understand financial 
reports, and at least one of them should have expertise in financial accounting and corporate 
finance. As well, the board has to approve interim and annual financial statements (Article 5). In 
addition, the code pays close attention to the audit committee’s role. It requires that at least one 
member should have expertise in accounting and finance (Article 7). The audit committee is also 
required to review annual and quarterly financial reports. Specifically, it should detect any 
changes in accounting policies, principles and accounting estimates, any deviation from 
International Accounting Standards (IASs)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
and any financial fraud (Omani CG code, 2002). Furthermore, the code recognises the importance 
of external audits in mitigating EM practices. Firms are not recommended to appoint external 
auditors for more than four consecutive financial years, and audit firms are not recommended to 
provide audit and non-audit services to the same firm. Arguably, although these provisions may 
help limit EM practices, they are inadequate because they do not take the Omani context into 
consideration; many of these provisions can be seriously influenced by informal rules.    
 The institutional framework for accounting and auditing profession in Oman, however, is 
based on IASs/IFRS. The first law that was promulgated with the aim of organising the 
accounting and auditing profession was passed in 1986; requiring professional accountants and 
auditors to comply with IASs/IFRS in preparing financial reports. According to this law, auditors 
must obtain a licence renewable every three years in order to be qualified as external auditors, 
and they are also required to comply with IASs/IFRS in conducting their audits. Therefore, 
IASs/IFRS apply as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to all firms 
and banks, without any amendments.  
On the one hand, the adoption and application of IASs/IFRS can be expected to improve 
the quality of finanicial reports and minimise reporting irregularities in the form of less 
engagement in EM practices in Omani firms. On the other hand, it raises concerns over the 
possibility that the applicaton of IASs/IFRS may rather offer managers the opportunity to engage 
more in EM practices, as implementing such standards demands extensive training, which 
involves costs that many firms, arguably, may not be able to afford. In addition, ownership is 
highly concentrated primarily through government and block holdings, and thus, casting doubt as 
to whether a UK-style voluntary CG regime be effective in improving CG practices by enhancing 
financial reporting and minimising EM. Arguably, this provides an interesting context, whereby 
the association between CG and EM practices can be empirically investigated. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES  
This section discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the relation between EM 
practices and CG. It is organised as follows. Subsection 3.1 will discuss the most relevant extant 
theories that attempt to explain the association between EM practices and CG. Subsection 3.2 
will set out the central theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature that attempt to 
link CG mechanisms with EM practices.  
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The theoretical framework enables the present study to explain and justify its hypotheses 
and interpret its findings regarding the potential influence of different CG mechanisms on EM 
practices. Similar to essay 1 and 2, multi-theoretical approach is adopted in this essay in order 
gain theoretical insights from agency, signalling, stakeholder and stewardship theories. The study 
presents and discusses the central trust of each of these four theories below.    
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory (AT) was formally developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. They built 
their theory on the assumption that there are conflicts of interest between owners and managers. 
Due to the separation of ownership and control, AT predicts that managers are expected to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour in order to gain personal benefit at the expense of 
shareholders, and such behaviour leads to costs that minimise shareholders’ wealth. AT focuses 
on two means by which such conflict of interest can be mitigate, namely writing contracts and 
CG mechanisms.  
First, owners write contracts with managers in order to limit and restrict managerial self-
interest and align managers’ interests with their own. In particular, compensation contracts are 
designed based on accounting numbers to attract managers to increase firms’ value, which in turn 
maximises managers’ wealth. Highly remunerative management contracts are expected to have 
both positive and negative implications on the way that managers make decisions. On the one 
hand, compensation contracts may motivate managers to make more of an effort to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth, which in turn maximises their own wealth. On the other hand, due to all 
contracts are unavoidable incomplete, managers may expropriate owners by engaging in EM 
practices. In this regard, managers may use accounting choices to manage earnings 
upward/downward if they are higher/lower than targeted (Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995). This 
may suggest that EM practices can be considered as a type of agency cost that may minimise 
shareholders’ wealth (Davidson et al., 2005; Prior et al., 2008). Thus, AT predicts that managers 
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are more likely to engage in EM practices by manipulating accounting numbers in order to reap 
personal benefits at the expense of shareholders. Such behaviour damages the reliability of 
financial reporting, creates information asymmetry between managers and owners, and causes 
additional agency costs that minimise shareholders’ wealth.  
Second, past studies (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shilefere and Vishny, 
1986; Williamson, 1988) have argued that CG provides a set of constraints that ensure reliable 
and accurate financial reporting, mitigate information asymmetry and reduce agency costs. In this 
sense, AT offers a framework by which owners can stop opportunistic managers from engaging 
in EM practices. Specifically, AT assumes that an increase in the credibility of financial reporting 
arising from effective CG structures (e.g., independent non-executive directors, and a 
remuneration committee and audit committee) should curb EM practices. This may suggest that 
poorly governed firms may be easily manipulated by managers through using accounting 
numbers. For instance, in a case where the positions of chairperson and chief executive are filled 
by the same person, a firm’s management may manage earnings upward year prior the election of 
directors’ board in order to increase firm value that more likely to positively reflect on the 
possibility for chief executive to be re-appointed for the second time. In contrast, manager’s 
discretion on financial reporting in better governed firms is limited by effective CG mechanisms 
where firm’s management actions are supervised by the board of directors through its 
committees. Therefore, AT has documented a direct link between EM practices and CG 
structures, where the former is considered an agency cost and the latter a monitoring mechanism.  
3.1.2 Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory (SKT) mainly was introduced by Freeman (1984), who proposed that 
the firm should be accountable to a broad range of stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). This 
assumption may be justified by the fact that different stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, 
employees and society, are considered influential players in improving the profitability and 
competitiveness of a firm (Letza et al., 2004). Based on its assumption, SKT challenges the 
agent-principle model proposed by AT by extending the purpose of a firm from only maximising 
shareholders’ wealth to maximising all stakeholders’ wealth (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Specifically, it argues that each stakeholder has implicit or explicit contracts with 
the firm, and managers are considered agents for all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 
1995). This implies that conflicts of interest are inherent in the association between managers and 
all stakeholders, where the latter may loss their utilities as a result of opportunistic managerial 
behaviour (Hill and Jones, 1992).  
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In particular, managerial self-interest in the form of EM practices can have serious 
consequences for all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995; Lee, 1998). For instance, 
managers may be motivated to manage earnings in order to reduce labour costs, which impacts 
negatively on employees (D’Souza et al., 2000). This may suggest that stakeholders need to 
protect their utilities from opportunistic managers. In this sense, SKT claims that stakeholders 
have ownership rights and should participate in decision-making processes (Kelly and Parkinson, 
1998). Hence, CG systems should consider stakeholders’ interests as well as shareholders’ 
interests, which can lead to more accurate and unbiased information provided by managers 
(Turnbull, 1994). For instance, stakeholders can play an important role in enhancing monitoring 
of managers by acting as independent non-executive board directors.  
In addition, because each stakeholder has his/her own interests, which generally conflict 
with other stakeholders’ interests (Prior et al., 2008), SKT argues that a CG system does not 
represent all stakeholders’ interests, and employing only CG measures is not enough to deter 
managers from reporting earnings (Letza et al., 2004). It suggests additional institutional 
structures that could serve as further monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, such as labour 
unions, consumer unions and special-interest groups (Hill and Jones, 1992). For instance, 
stakeholders may attempt to limit opportunistic behaviour through boycotts and lobbying, which 
may give them indirect control over managers and thus hinder managers from reporting EM 
(Baron, 2001). In sum, accounting scandals and corporate failures affect not only shareholders, 
but also other stakeholders. Thus, the underlying objective of SKT is to reduce the possibility of 
stakeholders failing to maximise their utility as a result of managerial self-interest behaviour 
including EM practices, and suggest institutional structures along with CG structures to curb such 
behaviour.  
3.1.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory (SGT) mainly was developed by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross 
(1977), and is based on an assumption concerning information asymmetry that managers are 
better informed about their firms than shareholders or other stakeholders. Typically, managers 
have more information about accounting policies, principles and estimates used to produce a 
firm’s financial reports than stakeholders, where the latter mainly rely on these reports to make 
their investment decisions (Xie et al., 2003). In this respect, stakeholders face two main 
challenges: (i) how they can select the most capable management (Rhee and Lee, 2008); and (ii) 
how they ensure that managers do not use their private information to engage in unethical 
behaviour (Kapopoolos and Lazaretou, 2007). Arguably, a reduction in information asymmetry is 
likely to assist stakeholders to deal with these challenges (Connelly et al., 2011).  In context of 
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EM practices where managers have been reported to engage in such unethical behaviour, SGT 
suggests that firms have to find ways to mitigate information asymmetry (Morris, 1987; 
Rutherford, 2003). This allows firms to signal the credibility and transparency of their financial 
reporting (e.g., adopting effective internal control procedures will be considered by stakeholders 
as a signal of quality information) (Healy and Palepu, 2001). According to SGT, increased 
transparency of CG practices enables firms to differentiate themselves from those with potential 
EM practices (Salama et al., 2010). For instance, by establishing an audit committee, firms signal 
to stakeholders that financial reports are fairly prepared and presented, and these reports are a 
credible resource for making investment decisions. Since managers may employ accounting 
choices to manage earnings, capital providers can rely on CG structures to assess quality firms 
when firms seeking external financing (Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995). In contrast, firms with 
poor governance structures are likely to increase stakeholders uncertainty about firms earnings 
quality, suggesting that they are less committed to accountability (Certo et al., 2001). Thus, SGT 
provides theoretical foundation that CG acts as signal of a firm’s quality, and concerns related to 
EM practices are mitigated through implementing good CG practices, allowing stakeholders to 
distinguish between high and low quality firms (Morris, 1987).  
3.1.4 Stewardship Theory  
The major contributors of this theory are Hutton (1995) and Kay and Silberston (1995), 
who argued that a firm’s purpose is to maximise its overall wealth (Letza et al., 2004). The agent-
principle relationship is viewed differently by stewardship theory (SWT) compared to AT, SKT 
and SGT. SWT posits that managers are trustworthy and should be fully empowered to perform 
their duties because their interests are aligned with shareholders (Hutton, 1995; Kay and 
Silberston, 1995). This implies that there are no conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders, and the greater power of managers allows them to work towards shareholders’ 
interests (Davis et al., 1997). In this regard, shareholders trust managers, who are anticipated to 
provide credible and transparent financial reports to meet shareholders’ expectations. SWT 
argues that managers are less likely to engage in EM practices because the concept of trusteeship 
is associated with CG mechanisms. The trust is assured because of two main factors that work as 
alternative CG mechanisms. First, market for corporate control can serve as a CG mechanism by 
making mangers less engaging in unethical behaviour, such as EM practices (Fama, 1980). 
Further, managers are expected to be motivated to run the firm in line with shareholders’ interests 
in order to protect their reputations as expert decision makers (Daily et al., 2003). Second, 
managers’ stewardship can be assured by external auditors who examine how well managers 
prepare and present financial statements that reflect the firm’s true value (Iatridis, 2012). Despite 
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its conceptual basis, there are concerns about how realistic SWT is, as managers have been 
reported to abuse their power and pursue private gains at the expense of shareholders by engaging 
in EM practices (Kay and Silberston, 1995; Albrecht et al., 2004; Letza et al., 2004; Choo and 
Tan, 2007).    
3.2 PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES   
Given the absence of empirical evidence in Oman, this study aims to examine the 
relationship between firm-level EM and firm-level CG among Omani listed firms. Hence, this 
subsection will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature. 
Following prior studies, different theoretical predictions and explanations will be used to link CG 
mechanisms with EM practices in order to develop the study’s hypotheses. The developed 
hypotheses will be tested to confirm or reject the results reported in developed countries, as these 
findings are not necessarily expected to apply to Omani firms. This will allow the study to 
provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of CG in mitigating agency problems associated 
with managerial self-interest in the form of EM practices in an emerging country with different 
institutional and CG structures. Previous studies in developed countries mainly rely on one-
dimensional characteristics of CG (e.g., board characteristics and audit characteristics), which 
may not provide a broad picture of CG’s role in mitigating EM practices.  
In contrast, this study employs multi-dimensional characteristics of CG that can be used 
as an integrated system instead of testing each dimesion independently. Specifically, the 
explanatory variables employed in this study are classified into two groups. The first group is 
ownership variables, including: (i) government ownership; (ii) institutional ownership; (iii) 
foreign ownership; and (iv) block ownership. The second is CG variables, including: (i) firm-
level CG; (ii) board size; (iii) presence of a CG committee; (iv) audit firm size; and (v) board 
diversity on the basis of gender. The selection of these explanatory variables was in line with EM 
and CG literatures, and due to data limitations that forced the study to include only these 
variables. Brief theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature around each explanatory 
variable are discussed in the following subsections.  
3.2.1 Ownership Variables   
Corporate ownership structures have been suggested to play an important role in CG, as 
they can help monitor managerial behaviour in general and ensuring reliable and accurate 
accounting information in particular. Specifically, previous studies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Morck et al., 1988) indicate that different ownership structures may lead to different 
motivations to control and monitor managerial decision processes, which may have significant 
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implications for mitigating EM practices. Past studies that have examined the effect of ownership 
structure on EM practices mainly consider institutional and concentrated ownership; government 
and foreign ownership have not been widely investigated. In contrast, and given the diversified 
ownership structures of Omani listed firms, this study aims to examine the relationship between 
EM practices and four types of ownership structure, namely government ownership, institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership and block ownership. The following subsections will briefly set out 
the central theoretical arguments and extant empirical literature around each type and its relation 
with EM practices.    
3.2.1.1 Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 
In many emerging countries where the state holds large portions of shares in listed firms, 
the government is expected to play crucial role in firm decisions. The agency problem associated 
with the separation of ownership and control, along with information asymmetry, is more likely 
to appear in firms with government ownership than in those with non-government ownership 
(Ding et al., 2007). The government has different interests in profit and non-profit objectives than 
managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003). For instance, the 
government as a large shareholder may influence a firm to participate in social and environmental 
activities (e.g., corporate social responsibility) that are aimed at developing society and 
improving the image of the state (Boycko et al., 1996). The government, like other shareholders, 
is confronted with the problem of ensuring that managers do not use private information for 
personal benefit. This may suggest that governments have a greater interest in monitoring 
managers in order to achieve their profit and non-profit goals. In particular, the government as a 
major long-term shareholder requires reliable and accurate financial reports to ensure that 
managers are not engaging in EM practices. Theoretically, however, the presence of the 
government as a shareholder in a firm is expected to have either positive or negative implications 
on managerial decisions in general and EM practices in particular. On the one hand, managers in 
firms with a large proportion of government ownership may not be motivated to manage earnings 
because of the greater influence of government interference with managerial appointments, where 
governments as powerful stakeholders (i.e., stakeholder theory) of the firm can put pressure on 
shareholders to replace or dismiss managers.  
On the other hand, according to AT, there is a potential conflict of interest between 
government representatives and the government itself, where representatives may collude and 
connive with managers in managing earnings in order to gain personal benefits at the expense of 
the government and other shareholders (Ding et al., 2007; Li et al., 2011). Further, managers in 
firms with large government ownership are less likely to be influenced by the market for 
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corporate control, such as takeover because the government is unlikely to support takeover offers 
as it considers itself a long-term investor in all firms (Mak and Li, 2001). This can protect 
managers from a variety of risks, such as employment risk, and may offer them the opportunity to 
engage in EM practices.  
Empirically, limited studies have directly investigated the relationship between 
government ownership and EM practices (e.g., Ding et al., 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011), and 
thus provides opportunities to contribute to the extant literature. Most of the few existing studies 
have mainly examined the CG-EM association by either comparing state-owned and privately-
owned firms, or focusing only on state-owned firms (e.g., Li et al., 2011), and thereby arguably 
limiting the generalisability of their findings. Generally, a number of studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 
2003; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b) report government ownership enhances 
corporate disclosure with particular focus on voluntary and social responsibility disclosures. With 
specific reference to CG and EM, using 273 privately-owned and government-owned Chinese 
firms listed in 2002, Ding et al. (2007) examine the relationship between ownership structures 
and EM practices, and provide empirical evidence that government-owned firms engage in lower 
levels of EM than privately-owned firms. Similarly, using a sample of 557 Chinese listed firms 
from 1998 to 2006, Wang and Yung (2011) report empirical evidence that state-owned firms 
exhibit a lower level of accrual-based earnings management. In contrast, Li et al. (2011) employ 
544 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2008 and report empirical evidence that state ownership 
is significantly related to EM practices among Chinese listed firms. Within the Omani corporate 
context, government ownership is high with particular interests in improving the quality of 
financial reporting, including encouraging the adoption of IASs/IFRS. Therefore, in line with the 
negative theoretical prediction and empirical evidence, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Institutional Ownership (INSOWN)  
Corporate monitoring by institutional investors has been suggested to play an important 
role in reducing managerial self-interested behaviour (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008). AT suggests that managers in firms with a large proportion of institutional 
ownership are expected to be effectively monitored because institutional investors serve as a CG 
mechanism that provides active monitoring over management. Unlike individual investors, large 
institutional investors have more resources, including knowledgeable experts who can 
professionally evaluate firms’ financial reports and detect any irregularities (Smith, 1976; Jarrell 
 H1. There is a statistically significant negative association between government 
ownership and firm EM practices. 
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et al., 1988; Hawley, 1995). The ability of large institutional investors to actively monitor 
managers is also supported by the voting power that they have, which allows them to discipline 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Hawley, 1995; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). In this 
sense, investment institutions with large stake of shares in a firm are motivated to reduce 
managers’ ability to opportunistically engage in EM practices.   
In contrast, many critics argue that the efficient monitoring hypothesis regarding 
institutional ownership is invalid. It has been argued that institutional investors do not pursue 
active monitoring because they are passive, collusive or myopic (Sundaramurth et al., 2005). 
Specifically, institutional investors are more likely to sell their shares in poorly performing firms 
rather than pursue active monitoring that calls upon additional resources (Roe, 1990). 
Institutional investors may not use their voting power because it may affect their business 
relations with the firm they invest in. This can negatively reflect on their monitoring role in the 
sense that institutional investors may collude and connive with managers in order to gain private 
benefits at the expense of other shareholders (Pound, 1988; Black, 1992). Further, most 
institutional investors focus on short-term firm performance, which may motivate managers to 
engage in EM practices in order to meet their earnings expectations (Bushee, 1998). These views 
suggest that it is unlikely that investment institutions holding many shares in a firm can provide 
active monitoring that reduces EM practices.   
Prior empirical evidence (e.g., Chung et al., 2002; Mitra and Credy, 2005; Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Wang, 2014) is generally consistent with the negative 
expectation of the theoretical literature in examining the association between institutional 
ownership and EM practices. For instance, using a sample of UK firms from 1997-2010, Wang 
(2013) reports empirical evidence that institutional investors with long-term investment are better 
motivated to constrain EM than those with short-term investment. Similarly, using a sample of 
834 firm-year observations, Cornett et al. (2008) report US empirical evidence that EM practices 
are lower when there is institutional representation on the board. In contrast to the negative 
findings observed in the above studies, there exists limited empirical evidence of no significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and EM practices (e.g., Koh, 2003; Siregar and 
Utama, 2008). For instance, using a sample of 114 Indonesian firms, Siregar and Utama (2008) 
provide empirical evidence that institutional ownership has no significant influence on EM 
practices. Koh (2003) reports empirical evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
institutional ownership and income-increasing discretionary accruals among Australian firms 
during 1993-1997. Given the negative predictions of the theoretical and empirical literature, it 
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can be hypothesised that institutional ownership is likely to negatively influence EM practices. 
Hence, the second hypothesis of this study is: 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 
In the context of global capital markets, it seems apparent that foreign institutional 
investors have become an important component of equity markets, and are likely to influence 
domestic firms’ policy decisions. Prior studies suggest that foreign ownership plays an important 
role in promoting CG around the world (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
Theoretically, one consequence of high levels of foreign ownership in firms can be a low rate of 
opportunistic managerial behaviour, including EM practices, because domestic firms try to meet 
foreign investors’ expectations of having good CG practices (Leuz et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 
2011). In addition, foreign institutional investors are expected to provide active monitoring 
because they are less likely to have long-term business relations with the firm they invest in 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003). This is supported by the view that foreign institutional investors have 
the incentive to effectively monitor local firms’ managers because they care about their 
reputations, and comply with both home and foreign regulations (Lel, 2013). Arguably, the 
presence of foreign ownership makes managers in local firms less motivated to engage in EM 
practices and more encouraged to provide reliable and accurate financial reporting. Unlike 
domestic firms, foreign shareholders face issues that domestic shareholders do not, such as 
distance and language barriers (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007); this affects their ability to provide 
active monitoring and may suggest that foreign ownership is less likely to mitigate EM practices 
in local firms.      
Empirically, the relationship between foreign ownership and EM practices has not been 
widely investigated (e.g., Li et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2012; Lel, 2013), and therefore, offers unique 
opportunities to make new contributions to the prior CG and EM literature. For instance, using a 
sample of about 190,000 firm-year observations from 75 countries in the period 1999-2012, Lel 
(2013) reports empirical evidence that foreign ownership is associated with lower EM practices. 
Similarly, Guo et al. (2012) report Japanese evidence that foreign ownership provides active 
monitoring, which limits EM practices. Limited studies have reported no significant association 
between foreign ownership and firm-level EM. For instance, using a sample of 544 firm-year 
observations from 2004-2008, Li et al. (2011) report evidence that the estimated coefficient on 
foreign ownership is negative, but statistically insignificant, indicating little evidence that foreign 
H2. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
institutional ownership and firm EM practices. 
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ownership can mitigate EM practices among Chinese listed firms. Given the negative predictions 
of the theoretical and empirical literature, foreign ownership is expected to negatively influence 
EM practices. Therefore, the third hypothesis of this study is:   
 
 
3.2.1.4 Block Ownership (BLKOWN)  
Unlike US and UK markets, ownership concentration is considered a characteristic of 
emerging markets, where the ownership structure of most firms, even listed firms, is 
characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership (Chen and Zhang, 2014). Thus, ownership 
concentration is expected to play an important role in corporate policy decisions. Theoretically, 
prior studies have provided two opposite predictions regarding whether the existence of 
substantial block holders leads to reduced or increased firm-level EM practices. One stream of 
research concludes that block holders have great incentives to actively monitor managers and 
serve as a CG mechanism (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mehran, 1992). Large block holders are more 
motivated than small shareholders to monitor managers in order to protect their investments since 
they can lose more from managerial self-interest than small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Friend and Lang, 1988; Mehran, 1992). The incentive of block holders to seek control over 
managers is supported by their ability to easily access information and their voting power, which 
allows them to eliminate and replace those performing poorly. Further, because large block 
holders focus more on long-term investments, managers may not be under pressure to engage in 
EM practices in order to meet their short-term earnings expectations (Alves, 2012). Thus, 
managers in firms with a high concentration of ownership are less encouraged to engage in EM 
practices, and the relationship between ownership concentration and EM practices is expected to 
be negative.  
Another stream of research claims that ownership concentration does not provide efficient 
monitoring that limits EM practices. Proponents of this view contend that the agency problem in 
firms with a high concentration of ownership may tend to be between majority and minority 
shareholders rather than between managers and shareholders (Chen and Zhang, 2014). In this 
respect, large shareholders may tend to expropriate minority shareholders and impose their 
preferences against minority shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aleves, 2012). 
This may suggest that large shareholders may behave opportunistically in order to create private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders by forcing managers to report earnings (Jaggi 
H3. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
foreign ownership and firm EM practices . 
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and Tsui, 2007). Thus, ownership concentration may not be considered a good CG mechanism, 
and it is more likely to increase managerial motivation to report earnings.  
Empirically, a negative relationship has been reported by a number of studies (e.g., Ali et 
al., 2008; Aleves, 2012). For example, using a sample of 34 Portuguese listed firms in the period 
2002-2007, Aleves (2012) reports empirical evidence that ownership concentration has a negative 
relationship with discretionary accruals as a measure of EM practices. Similarly, using a sample 
of 1,001 Malaysian firm-year observations, Ali et al. (2008) report empirical evidence that 
ownership concentration is negatively and significantly associated with EM practices.  
In contrast, in line with the positive expectation of the theoretical literature, limited 
studies (e.g., Haw et al., 2004; Kim and Yi, 2006) offer empirical evidence that ownership 
concentration impacts positively on EM practices. For example, using a sample of 15,159 Korean 
public and listed firms in the period 1992-2000, Kim and Yi (2006) report a positive relation 
between large block holders and EM practices. Contrary to the negative and positive findings 
observed in the above studies, other studies (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007; Ding 
et al., 2007; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013) provide mixed evidence of the relationship 
between ownership concentration and EM practices. For example, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 
(2013) conduct a cross-country study of Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 2006-2009. 
Using a sample of 1,740 firm-year observations, they report empirical evidence that ownership 
concentration tends to be effective in curbing EM practices when the proportion of shares held by 
large shareholders is not very high; when this proportion reaches around 35.1%, EM practices 
will increase as a result. A limited number of studies report no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and EM practices. For instance, using a sample of 434 out of 1,218 
Australian listed firms in 2002, Davidson et al. (2005) report empirical evidence that the presence 
of large shareholders has no significant relationship with EM practices. In similar manner, Lo et 
al. (2010) report empirical evidence that ownership concentration does not significantly influence 
the extent of price manipulation in related-party sales transactions. Given the Omani context, 
where firms have high levels of ownership concentration and the expectation that managers and 
block shareholders are highly influenced by informal rules, the relation between concentrated 
ownership and EM practices is expected to be positive. Hence, following the positive expectation 
of the theoretical literature, the fourth hypothesis of this study is: 
 
 
H4. There is a statistically significant positive association between  
ownership concentration and firm EM practices. 
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3.2.2 Corporate Governance Variables   
The vast majority of previous studies tend to limit their findings to specific CG 
mechanisms (e.g., board and audit characteristics) in examining the relationship between EM 
practices and CG (Larcker et al., 2007; Bowen et al., 2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011). 
Evaluating the possible effect of CG on various aspects of corporate financial behaviour based on 
individual CG variables may not provide a clear picture. It has been indicated that CG 
mechanisms should be examined as an integrated system instead of testing them individually, 
since some of them may complement or substitute each other (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Bowen et al., 2008). In this regard, limited studies examine the relationship between EM 
practices and CG through multi-dimensional characteristics of CG with mixed results. For 
instance, Shen and Chih (2007) report evidence that better governed firms tend to conduct less 
earnings management. In contrast, Bowen et al. (2008) provide evidence that the relationship 
between CG score and EM practices is not statistically significant. This may suggest that further 
examination is required in order to expand our understanding of the joint effect of CG measures 
on EM practices. This subsection will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments and the 
extant empirical literature relating to how firm-level broad composite CG index, board size, the 
presence of a CG committee, audit firm size, and board gender diversity may impact on a 
corporate EM practices.    
3.2.2.1 Firm-level Composite Corporate Governance Index (OCGI) 
A central debate in CG literature is whether CG can influence corporate policy decisions 
in different corporate contexts. Specifically, a number of theoretical perspectives drive research 
on the positive impact of CG on EM practices. As predicted by AT, managers are likely to 
engage in EM practices because of the conflict of interest between them and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In addition to written contracts, AT suggests that CG provides a set of 
constraints that ensure reliable and transparent financial reporting (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Shilefere and Vishny, 1986). This implies that CG is considered a monitoring mechanism 
through which shareholders can prevent managers from engaging in EM practices. A similar 
concept is suggested by SKT, where opportunistic managers are assumed to affect all 
stakeholders; hence, CG can further deter managers from reporting EM (Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Turnbull, 1994; Jones, 1995). Further support is provided by SGT’s suggestion that managers 
have more information than shareholders, and are suspected of using their private information for 
personal benefit (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977). One way to resolve asymmetric 
information is adopting CG that allows managers to credibly signal that financial reports are 
fairly prepared and presented. This may suggest that implementing good CG mechanisms allows 
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investors to distinguish between firms with potential EM practices and those of earnings quality. 
The common conclusion from these theories is that managers in poorly governed firms are more 
likely to behave opportunistically by engaging in EM practices in order to personally benefit at 
the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders than those of better-governed firms.   
Whereas a number of studies have examined the relationship between a number of 
individual CG mechanisms and EM (e.g., Stockmans et al., 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013; Lin et al., 
2006; Iatrdis, 2012), studies investigating the association between a broad composite CG index 
and EM are rare. However, the limited studies that examine the association between firm-level 
EM and firm-level CG are generally report that better governed firms tend to engage less in EM 
(e.g., Shen and Chih, 2007; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; Leventis and Dimitropulos, 2012). For 
instance, using a sample of 1,890 firm-year observations over fiscal years from 2003 to 2008, and 
employing a CG index, Leventis and Dimitropulos (2012) report US evidence that better 
governed banks tend to engage less in EM practices. Similarly, Shen and Chih (2007) conducted 
a cross-country study of nine countries during the period 2001-2002 and report empirical 
evidence that the CG index is negatively related to EM practices. In contrast, using a sample of 
2,106 US firms from 2002 to 2003, and developed a set of indices from comprehensive set of 
structural indicators of CG, Larcker et al. (2007) report empirical evidence that CG indices have 
a mixed relationship with abnormal accruals as a measure of EM. Different from the above 
studies, using a sample of 3,154 firm-year observations from the period 1993-1998, Bowen et al. 
(2008) report no statistically significant relationship between CG and accounting discretion.  
Within the Omani corporate setting, CMA, MSM and regulatory authorities are keen on 
firms adopting good CG practices with the expectation that they will have positive impact of 
corporate performance and practices, including disclosure, financial transparency and EM. Given 
the negative predictions of the theoretical and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that CG 
quality proxied by comprehensive CG disclosure index is expected to negatively influence EM 
practices. Hence, the fifth hypothesis of this paper is:  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Board Size (BSIZE)   
The board of directors has been suggested to play a significant role in mitigating agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). From AT’s perspective, board 
characteristics are considered to be CG mechanisms that provide shareholders with protection 
against self-interested managers. Among these characteristics, board size is viewed as an 
H5. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
firm-level corporate governance and firm EM practices. 
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influential factor that is likely to influence the board’s role in controlling agency problems. This 
leads researchers to investigate whether board size is associated with the board’s ability to curb 
opportunistic managers from reporting EM. Theoretically, firms with larger boards can be less 
effective in monitoring managers because such boards may suffer from coordination and 
communication problems (Jensen, 1993). This may suggest that directors are confronted with the 
problem of being dominated by managers who may exert pressure over them (Jensen, 1993). 
Thus, smaller boards are expected to provide more effective monitoring in reducing EM 
practices. An alternative perspective is that firms with larger boards have greater diversity in 
experience and skills than smaller boards, which permits them to professionally evaluate firms’ 
financial reports and detect any financial reporting irregularities (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 2002). For 
instance, more directors with accounting and finance backgrounds would enhance a board’s 
capability to detect any changes in accounting policies, principles and estimates, any deviation 
from accounting standards, and any financial fraud. Hence, effective monitoring is more likely to 
be found in larger boards, which can assist in reducing managers’ incentive to engage in EM 
practices.   
Empirically, although prior studies have provided some insights into the role of board size 
in mitigating EM practices, their results are mixed. A negative relationship has been reported by a 
number of studies (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2010). For example, using a sample of 
9,290 firm-year observations for the period 1998-2005, Ghosh et al. (2010) provide empirical 
evidence that firms with large boards have fewer discretionary accruals. In contrast, other studies 
(e.g., Rahman and Ali, 2006; Epps and Ismail, 2009; Alves, 2012) offer an empirical evidence 
that board size has a positive relationship with EM practices. For example, using a sample of 97 
Malaysian listed firms for the period 2002-2003, Rahman and Ali (2006) have reported empirical 
evidence that EM practices and board size are significantly and positively related. Other studies 
have reported no significant relationship. For instance, using a sample of 5,189 firm-year 
observations for the period 1998-2003, Firth et al. (2007) report empirical evidence that board 
size has no significant effect on firm-level EM. A significant relationship between board size and 
EM is predicted in this study without specifying the direction of the coefficient. Therefore, the 
sixth hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
 
 
H6. There is a statistically significant association between  
board size and firm EM practices. 
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3.2.2.3 Corporate Governance Committee (CGCOM) 
Given the increased focus on board composition, board committees are considered 
internal CG mechanisms that help the board actively monitor managers. Among these 
committees, a CG committee, as its name applies, is expected to fulfil the important role of 
assisting the board in ensuring good CG practices within a firm. In this sense, a CG committee 
aims to promote CG practices by clearly defining governance arrangements and ensuring that the 
governance framework adopted by the firm is followed and updated. Arguably, clearly set 
guidelines on best CG practices provided by a CG committee are more likely to reduce managers’ 
discretion on financial reporting. For instance, firms with a CG committee are likely to disclose 
more information regarding accounting policies, principles and estimates that have been used to 
produce the firm’s financial reports (e.g., Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2012a). This may suggest that 
the presence of a CG committee helps investors differentiate between firms with potential EM 
practices and those without. Therefore, the theoretical prediction on the relationship between the 
presence of a CG committee and EM practices is more likely to be negative than positive.  
Unlike other board committees (e.g., audit committee), however, the presence of a CG 
committee and its potential impact on EM practices has not been empirically investigated in the 
literature. Thus, evaluating the extent to which the presence of a CG committee drives EM 
practices may expand our understanding of one aspect of corporate accounting behaviour. 
Generally, using a sample of 169 South African listed corporations from 2002 to 2006, Ntim et 
al. (2012a) report that firms that voluntarily set up CG committees tend to disclose their CG 
practices significantly more than those that do not. Thus, and by extension, this study will expect 
Omani firms that voluntarily set up CG committees to monitor corporate practices and 
disclosures including those relating to EM practices to engage less in EM than those that do not 
have CG committees. Thus, following the negative expectation of the theoretical literature, the 
seventh hypothesis of this study is:   
 
 
3.2.2.4 Audit Firm Size (BIG4)  
Accounting scandals, such as Enron, emphasise the crucial role of audit quality, where an 
external auditor’s ability to professionally monitor managers by verifying financial statements is 
influenced by his/her audit quality. The low audit quality is likely to limit an external auditor’s 
capability to serve as an external CG mechanism, hence, provide the opportunity for managers to 
engage in EM practices. Though the same auditing standards are applied by both large and small 
audit firms, the former has been suggested to provide higher audit quality (e.g., Big-4 audit firms) 
H7. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
the presence of a CG committee and firm EM practices. 
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compared with those of smaller audit firms (DeAngelo, 1981). In this regard, prior studies (e.g., 
DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Uang et al., 2006) indicate that large audit firms have 
more capability and resources to provide high-quality audits, and care very much about their 
reputation. This may suggest that firms audited by large audit firms signal to shareholders that 
their financial reports are fairly prepared and presented, and these reports can be a credible 
resource in making investment decisions. Firms audited by small audit firms may be considered 
to have potential EM practices because managers often use techniques that are difficult for small 
audit firms with limited resources and experience to identify. Arguably, managers in firms 
audited by large audit firms are less motivated to engage in EM practices, which leads the current 
study to expect a negative relationship between audit firm size and EM practices.    
Empirically, a negative relationship has been reported by a number of studies (e.g., 
Becker et al., 1998; Chia et al., 2007; Francis and Wang, 2008; Kent et al., 2010; Iatrdis, 2012). 
For example, using a sample of 498 Australian listed firms for the period 2000-2006, Kent et al. 
(2010) report empirical evidence that large audit firms have a significant negative relationship 
with discretionary accruals. Similarly, using a sample of 498 firms from South Africa and Brazil 
during the period 2005-2010, Iatrdis (2012) reports empirical evidence that firms audited by large 
audit firms exhibit a greater reduction in discretionary accruals. In contrast, no significant 
relationship has been reported by some studies. For instance, using a sample of 434 Australian 
firms during the 2000, Davidson et al. (2005) report empirical evidence that there is statistically 
insignificant association between EM practices and audit firm size. Similarly, Firth et al. (2007) 
report empirical evidence that audit firm size has no significant impact on EM practices. In line 
with the negative prediction, however, the eighth hypothesis proposed in this study is: 
 
 
 
3.2.2.5 Board Diversity on the Basis of Gender (GNDR) 
Because female board members are expected to enhance firms’ governance, firms face 
increased pressure from governments and non-governmental organisations to allow female 
directors to participate in the boardroom (Admas and Ferreia, 2009). Specifically, gender-diverse 
boards may provide better monitoring over managers and improve the quality of earnings 
(Srinidhi et al., 2011). Thus, board diversity on the basis of gender is expected to influence firm 
EM practices. Prior studies indicate that female directors are more sensitive to ethical issues (e.g., 
Bernardi and Arnold, 1997) and exhibit greater risk aversion (e.g., Powell and Ansic, 1997; 
Sunden and Surette, 1998) and has better board meetings attendance record (e.g., Admas and 
H8. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
audit firm size and firm EM practices. 
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Ferreia, 2009) than male directors. Female board participation is likely to create formal and 
informal discussions between board directors (reducing information asymmetry) and result in 
greater accountability for managers’ decisions (improved monitoring) (Admas and Ferreia, 2009). 
Further, female board participation can assist boards to benefit from wide pool of talent by 
bringing different skills and experience into boardroom. Thus, this can improve the boards’ 
professionalism in evaluating firms’ financial reports and detecting any financial reporting 
irregularities (Pfeffer, 1972; Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Arguably, a mix of male and female non-
executive directors on a board may provide better monitoring over managers and in turn mitigate 
EM practices (Adams and Ferreia, 2009, Srinidhi et al., 2011).    
Empirically, most previous studies (e.g., Clikeman et al., 2001; Krishnan and Parsons, 
2008) mainly examine the effect of gender on earnings quality by considering female members of 
senior managers. For instance, using a sample of 770 firm-year observations over 1996 to 2000, 
Krishnan and Parsons (2008) report empirical evidence that gender diversity in top management 
is positively and significantly associated with earnings quality. In contrast, studies examining the 
impact of gender on earnings quality by considering female presence on boards are limited. For 
instance, using a sample of 2,480 firm-year observations over 2001 to 2007, Srinidhi et al. (2011) 
report empirical evidence that firms with female directors exhibit a greater reduction in 
discretionary accruals. Similarly, Gavious et al. (2012) report evidence that the presence of 
females on the board is negatively associated with EM practices. Contrary to the above studies, 
using a sample of 525 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2005, Sun et al. (2011) report 
empirical evidence that female directorship of audit committees has no significant influence in 
constraining EM practices. Given the theoretical prediction and empirical literature, it can be 
hypothesised that board diversity on the basis of gender is likely to negatively influence EM 
practices. Hence, the final hypothesis of this study is:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
H9. There is a statistically significant negative association between  
board diversity on the basis of gender and firm EM practices.   
301 
 
 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section discusses the research design in order to explain how the developed 
hypotheses will be tested. It explains how the sampled firms were selected, the sources of data, 
the employed research methodology and the statistical methods used to analyse the data. This 
section is organised as follows. Subsection 4.1 describes the sample selection and data sources. 
Subsection 4.2 discusses the research methodology.     
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
The dataset used in this study is drawn from the population of Omani firms listed on the 
MSM during 2001-2011. The initial sample consists of 168 firms as of December 2011, sorted 
into nine industries, which are: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financial 
services, industrial, utilities, health care, telecommunications, and oil and gas. To arrive at the 
final sample, eliminations were made based on the following criteria: (i) a firm must have 
complete data for at least one year on CG and accounting and financial information over 2001 to 
2011 inclusive; and (ii) any given industry-year must have at least 10 observations over the 11 
years examined. There were three main reasons for setting these criteria. First, the data collection 
started with financial year 2001 since it was the first year for which data was available. Second, 
the sample ends in the 2011 because it was the latest year for which data was available. Third, for 
the purpose of comparability with prior studies (e.g., Peasnel et al., 2000; Kim and Yi, 2006; Ali 
et al., 2008; Epps and Ismail, 2009), each industry had to have at least 10 observations, as the EM 
measures used in this study require an estimation of a cross-sectional regression for each 
industry, and using fewer than 10 observations can make the estimation inefficient (McNichols, 
2000). Finally, as the criteria allowed firms to enter and exit the sample, and thus the crucial 
problem of survivorship bias is obviated.  
Using these criteria, as outlined in Table 47, 48 firms were excluded due to unavailability 
of their annual reports, and four firms were eliminated due to inadequate data. Therefore, the 
sample procedure produced unbalanced panel data of 116 unique firms from different industries 
and producing a total of 1,152 firm year observations over the 11-year period investigated. To the 
best of the current study’s knowledge, this is by far the largest dataset to be used in any MENA 
study on CG. Overall, the sample of 116 represents approximately 69% of the total population of 
168 Omani listed firms.36 
 
                                                 
36See Table 1 of Essay 1 for a more detailed overview of the sample selection procedure. 
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Table 47: Sample selection procedure and fimes’ year distribution  
Panel A:  Sample selection process 
Criteria No. of firms 
Initial Listed Firms on the MSM as of 31/12/2011 168 
    Firms with no data available                    (48) 
    Firms with missing data                               (4) 
Final sample 116 
Panel B: Time distribution 
Year No. of firm-year observation 
  2001   95 
  2002   96 
  2003   97 
  2004 102 
  2005   94 
  2006 104 
  2007 112 
  2008 113 
  2009 114 
  2010 115 
  2011 110 
Total firm-year observations 1152 
Source: Muscat Securities Market’s website  
 
Similar to Essays 1 and 2, this study includes financial firms in its dataset. Although the 
nature of financial firms’ accruals may differ from those of non-financial firms, prior studies that 
examine the relation between CG and EM have not provided any empirical evidence to confirm 
the theoretical argument that the impact of CG on accruals in non-financial firms is not 
comparable to those in financial firms because the latter are subject to more specific accounting 
requirements. As a result, this study aims to provide empirical evidence of whether there is a 
significant difference in CG’s influence on EM practices between financial and non-financial 
firms in an emerging country like Oman, where corporate regulations and enforcements are 
expected to be weaker as the case in many emerging countries (Albu and Girbina, 2015). The 
current study expects that the influence of CG on each financial and non-financial firms would 
not be significantly different among Omani listed firms. In providing such evidence, this study 
uses 116 firms (both financial and non-financial firms) to examine its hypotheses (main analysis). 
Robustness test is then performed based only on 87 non-financial firms to examine whether the 
findings based on both non-financial and financial firms are sensitive to financial firms.  
However, the study’s analysis is limited by the availability of information related to its 
measures of EM and CG. It relies on accounting, financial and CG information which was hand-
collected from annual reports for each firm. The principal sources of annual reports are the Rest 
of World Filings of the Perfect Information Database,37 the MSM website,38 firms’ websites and 
                                                 
37The Rest of World Filings’s official website: w.w.w.perfectinfo.com 
38The MSM’s official website: w.w.w.msm.gov.om 
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DataStream. Therefore, due to availability, accessibility, funding and time constraints (as the 
study had to be completed within the timeframe of a PhD), unbalanced panel data from 116 
firms,39 resulting in 1,152 firm-year observations for eleven years, from 2001 to 2011, was 
believed to be sufficient to extend the literature on the relationship between EM practices and 
CG. 
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
As explained previously, this study employs four main types of variables to conduct its 
analyses, namely: (i) EM’s variable; (ii) a composite CG index; (iii) other CG and ownership 
variables; and (iv) control variables. Thus, this subsection presents the research methodology 
employed in this study to examine these variables that were discussed in subsection 3.2. 
Specifically, subsection 4.2.1 will discuss the EM’s measurement. Subsection 4.2.2 will discuss 
the CG measurements. Subsection 4.2.3 will discuss the justification for the control variables and 
their measurements. Subsection 4.2.4 will discuss the model specification. Finally, subsection 
4.2.5 will discuss a number of statistical tests performed before and after examining the study’s 
hypotheses.  
4.2.1 Earnings Management Measurement (Dependent Variable) 
Managers have incentives to exercise discretion over accounting choices and estimates in 
order to report earnings, which is considered an invisible practices. Detecting such exercises is no 
easy task. Previous studies have attempted to develop valid and powerful measures that assist 
researchers in examining firm-level EM. Thus, a number of approaches have been suggested and 
used by researchers to examine different issues related to EM. Following McNichols (2000), EM 
measurements can be classified into three common approaches of aggregate accruals, specific 
accruals and distribution of earnings. These approaches are discussed briefly below, along with 
the study’s reasons for adopting the appropriate approach.  
First, the aggregate accruals approach assumes that managers are likely to prefer engaging 
in EM practices through accruals accounting, since these practices are hard to detect and require 
fewer costly instruments with which managers can manipulate accounting numbers (Young, 
1999). The approach defines accruals accounting (total accruals) as the sum of two components, 
namely discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals, where the former represents EM 
practices and the later represents actual accruals. Hence, the difference between total accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals is assumed to be a proxy for EM practices (discretionary accruals). 
This suggests that not all accruals are considered EM practices, because managers may use 
                                                 
39See Appendix 1 for a full list of firms employed in this study.  
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limited discretion (non-discretionary accruals) to increase information content of earnings, which 
does not reflect any attention of EM practices (Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001).   
Second, similar to the aggregate accruals approach, the specific accruals approach relies 
on accruals to test for EM practices, but focuses only on a single accrual or a set of specific 
accruals rather than total accruals. Proponents of this approach argue that managers can be 
expected to change either a small proportion of total accruals, or some specific accruals 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988; McNichols, 2000). According to this approach, researchers can 
rely on their accounting knowledge and experience in modelling the behaviour of each specific 
accrual to identify its discretionary and non-discretionary components (McNichols, 2000).     
Third, unlike the above approaches, the distribution approach does not rely on accruals in 
examining EM practices. It focuses on the density of distribution of earnings after management 
(e.g., frequency of annual earnings realisations and quarterly earnings realisations) in order to 
detect EM practices. Specifically, the approach focuses on the behaviour of earnings a round 
thresholds to test the extent to which the incidence of earnings amounts above and below the 
specific thresholds are normally distributed, or indicate discontinuities due to discretion used by 
managers (McNichols, 2000). Prior studies (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999) argue that when a firm is motivated to manage earnings above a benchmark, then the 
distribution of earnings after manipulated compared to the expected earnings amounts tend to 
have less observations below the threshold and more observations above the threshold. Hence this 
approach allows researchers to identify whether the flow of earnings above and below certain 
thresholds is distributed smoothly or a result of firms engaging in EM practices.    
The three approaches each have their strengths and shortcomings; this study adopts the 
aggregated accruals approach for the following reasons. First, although a direct association 
between a single accrual or set of accruals can be estimated by adopting a specific approach, 
more accounting knowledge and experience are required in order to specify a particular accrual; 
as well, the findings generated by this approach are difficult to generalise because specific 
accruals represent a small part of the discretionary component, and other parts may be 
manipulated (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Dechow et al., 2010). Second, although EM 
practices can be estimated at certain thresholds and researchers are not required to estimate 
discretionary accruals by applying the distribution approach, this approach does not enable 
researchers to measure the magnitude of EM. Finally, although researchers may have difficulty 
estimating a direct association between total accruals and explanatory factors by employing the 
aggregated accruals approach, this approach allows the study to examine other explanatory 
factors (e.g., CG and audit variables) and measure the magnitude of EM because the magnitude 
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of earnings is important component of this examination. Further, unlike the other two approaches, 
the aggregated accruals approach considers all instances of EM as it focuses on total accruals; 
hence, the findings can be generalised. Importantly, it is the most commonly used approach; a 
large number of studies have used this approach to examine different issues in general and the 
relationship between EM practices and CG mechanisms in particular, which allows the study to 
compare the findings with prior studies.     
4.2.1.1 Aggregated Accruals Approach Models 
Prior studies that have adopted the aggregated accruals approach use different 
discretionary accruals models to measure firm-level EM, such as the Healy Model (1985), the 
DeAngelo Model (1986), the Jones Model (1991), the modified Jones Model (1995), the Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995), the Dechow and Dichev Model (2002), the Larcker and 
Richardson Model (2004) and the Kothari et al. Model (2005). Despite the limited predictive 
accuracy and power associated with each model in detecting EM, the modified Jones Model 
(1995) and the Kothari et al. Model (2005) have been chosen in this study to examine firm-level 
EM for the following reasons. First, there is no theory that specifies which model is the best 
proxy for EM practices. Second, using more than one model is in line with a large number of 
previous studies, which allows the study to compare its findings with those studies. Third, data 
limitations compel the present study to employ these models. Finally, these models are widely used in 
the literature (e.g., Jiang et al, 2008; Sun and Liu, 2013) to examine EM practices. In this regard, 
Dechow et al. (2010) indicate that there is no single best measure of EM practices, and the two 
chosen models are wide-spread models of accruals in the literature. Jones et al. (2008) examine 
the performance of 10 discretionary accruals models and provide empirical evidence that the 
modified Jones Model (1995) provides high predictive power in detecting fraudulent earnings. 
More recently, Peek et al. (2013) examine the performance of the modified Jones Model (1995) 
and report empirical evidence that the model exhibits a good ability to detect EM practices. 
Therefore, and in line with past studies (e.g., Kim and Yi, 2006; Mousell et al., 2014; 
Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2014), the modified Jones Model (1995) will be used to calculate firm-
level EM in the main analysis, and the Kothari et al. Model (2005) will be employed to measure 
EM in the robustness test. The modified Jones Model is discussed further below whereas the 
Kothari et al. Model will be discussed in the section 7.    
    The modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) is based on the notion that discretion 
is likely to be exercised over revenue, receivables, gross property, plant and equipment in 
estimation periods. Unlike the Jones Model (1991), the modified Jones Model suggests that any 
change in receivables should be deducted from a change in revenues, since the model assumes 
306 
 
 
that a change in receivables is considered to be discretionary accruals, as managers can manage 
earnings through revenues by manipulating credit sales recognition. The modified Jones Model is 
estimated using the following expression: 
 
      =  +    +   +                          (1)                         
 
All variables are divided by lagged total assets in order to mitigate heteroskedasticity problem, 
and the cash flow approach is adopted in order to calculate total accruals, which in line with 
considerable number of prior studies (e.g., Hribar et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2005; Chen and 
Zhang, 2014). The coefficients estimated from equation (1) are used in equation (2) in order to 
estimate non-discretionary accruals as follows:  
 
          =  + (  -  )   +               (2) 
 
Where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except  is included which 
presents receivables in year t less receivables in year t – 1 for firm i. 
 
After the non-discretionary accruals value (NDA) is computed from equation (2), the amount of 
discretionary accruals (DA) can be calculated using the following equation: 
 
        =   -                                                 (3) 
                                                                     
 
Where: 
 
  TAC Total accruals in year t for firm i, calculated as net income minus operating 
cash flow. 
  TA Total assets in year t – 1 for firm i. 
  ΔRev Revenues in year t less revenues in year t – 1 for firm i. 
  PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i. 
  εit Error term in year t for firm i. 
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As earlier indicated, the modified Jones Model will be used to capture firm-level EM 
(independent variable), and will be included in the regression model to test the hypotheses 
developed in subsection 3.1.      
4.2.2 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures Measurements   
As previously discussed in subsection 3.2, the CG index, individual CG variables, namely 
board size, CG committee, audit firm size and board diversity on the basis of gender, and 
ownership structures, in the form of government ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership and block ownership, are used in this study to test the impact of CG mechanisms on 
EM practices. Distinct from most prior studies that adopt one-dimensional characteristics of CG 
to examine the relationship between CG and EM practices, the current study investigates this 
relation through multi-dimensional characteristics of CG. Using a CG index rather than 
individual CG measures is in line with limited prior studies (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 
2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011) that examine the association between firm-level EM and firm-
level CG. Arguably, examining CG mechanisms as an integrated system instead of testing them 
independently is expected to allow the study to gain a wider picture of CG’s role in reducing EM 
practices. 
 Briefly, as illustrated in Table 48, the CG index, CG variables and ownership structures 
were measured as follows. First, as discussed in subsection 4.2.1 of Essay 1, the Omani CG index 
(OCGI) was used to measure firm-level CG. It comprises 72 CG provisions constructed in four 
broad categories, namely board of directors, accounting and auditing, external auditors and 
internal control systems, and disclosure and transparency. The vast majority of these provisions 
were taken from the 2002 voluntary Omani code of CG, while some came from the 1974 
Companies Law in order to achieve comprehensive CG index. Appendix 2 details the four 
categories of CG provisions. The un-weighted approach and simple binary coding scheme were 
adopted in order to construct and code the OCGI. Each of the 72 CG provisions was coded 1 if 
this provision was applied by the firm and 0 otherwise. Second, board size (BSIZE) was 
measured in line with prior studies (e.g., Cornett et al., 2008; Ghosh et al., 2010), as the total 
number of directors on the firm’s board. In line with past studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a), CG 
committee (CGCOM) was measured as a dummy variable, where a firm scored 1 if it had a CG 
committee and 0 otherwise. Similarly, in line with previous studies (e.g., Epps and Ismail, 2009; 
Chen and Zhage, 2014), audit firm size (BIG4) was measured as a dummy variable, where a firm 
scored 1 if it was audited by one of the Big-4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. Board diversity on the 
basis of gender (GNDR) was also measured consistently with prior studies (e.g., Adams and 
Ferreire, 2009), as a dummy variable where a firm scored 1 if there was at least one woman on its 
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board and 0 otherwise. Finally, block ownership (BLKOWN) was measured in a similar manner 
to prior studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 2005; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013), as a percentage of 
shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. Government 
(GOVOWN) was measured as a dummy variable, where a firm scored 1 if it had a government 
ownership and 0 otherwise. Institutional ownership (INSOWN) (e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; 
Wang, 2014) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) (e.g., Ali et al., 2008; Lel, 2013) were 
measured as a percentage of each type of ownership out of total firm shareholdings.         
4.2.3 Justification for Control Variables  
In addition to CG variables, this study controls for a number of relevant variables that 
have been identified by past studies as factors affecting EM practices in order to reduce potential 
omitted variables bias. Following the existing literature and due to data limitations, this study 
considers a number of firm characteristics as control variables including firm size, growth, 
leverage, and profitability. The central theoretical arguments and the extant empirical literature 
that attempts to link these variables with EM practices are discussed briefly below.    
4.2.3.1 Firm Size (LNTA) 
EM research reveals that firm size may affect firm-level EM. Two opposing theoretical 
explanations have been offered for this. One view is that because large firms are more vulnerable 
to high political costs than small firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), managers in such firms 
are motivated to decrease these costs by using accruals that provide low levels of reported income 
(Cahan, 1992). This view is supported by the argument that large firms are encouraged to record 
large discretionary accruals because their operations are complex, and users often have difficulty 
detecting such practices (Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Further, large firms are closely observed by 
outsiders (e.g., financial analysts, investors and the media), and they are expected to adopt 
aggressive accounting policies in order to meet outsiders’ expectations (Richardson et al., 2002). 
Thus, the association between firm size and firm-level EM is anticipated to be positive.  
The opposing view is that managers in large firms are less likely than those in small firms 
to exploit latitude in accounting discretion because they engage in good CG practices, have lower 
information asymmetry and are monitored by big audit firms (Chen and Chih, 2007; Peni and 
Yahamaa, 2010). In this sense, large firms are expected to provide high levels of disclosure on 
accounting policies, principles and estimates that have been used to produce the firms’ financial 
reports in order to signal to a variety of stakeholders that these reports are credible and 
transparent. Hence, a negative relationship between firm size and firm-level EM is predicted.  
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The empirical evidence, however, on the relationship between firm size and firm-level 
EM is mixed. Support for a negative expectation is found in a considerable number of prior 
studies (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta and Garacia-Meca, 2007; Ali et al., 2008; Ghosh et al., 2010; 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012; Gonzalez and Garcia-Mcca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013) which 
provide empirical evidence that large firms engage less in EM practices. For instance, using a 
sample of 18,513 firm-year observations over the period 1996-2010, Sun and Liu (2013) provide 
empirical evidence that the coefficient on firm size is negative and significant, consistent with the 
notion that large firms exhibit fewer discretionary accruals. Similarly, using a sample of 9,290 
firm-year observations, Ghosh et al. (2010) report US empirical evidence that firm size has a 
negative and statistically significant influence on discretionary accruals.  
In contrast, few past studies (e.g., Chung et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2007; Alves, 2012) 
report a positive relationship between firm size and firm-level EM. For example, using a sample 
of 303 firm-year observations over 2002 to 2007, Alves (2012) reports Portuguese empirical 
evidence that the coefficient on firm size is positive and significant, which is in line with the 
positive prediction that large firms are encouraged to record large discretionary accruals. 
Similarly, using a sample of 2,237 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2003, Chen et al. (2007) 
report empirical evidence that firm size has a positive and statistically significant sign in relation 
to discretionary accruals. Contrary to the positive and negative findings observed in the above 
studies, some studies (e.g., Chen and Chih, 2007; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Bekiris and 
Doukakis, 2011; Chen and Zhang, 2014) provide empirical evidence of no significant relation 
between the two variables. For instance, using a sample of 447 Chinese listed firms for a five-
year period (2002-2006), Chen and Zhang (2014) provide empirical evidence that firm size has a 
positive, but not statistically significant, effect on firm-level EM. In this study, as in prior studies 
(e.g., Davidson et al., 2005; Ghosh et al., 2010) firm size is labelled as LNTA and calculated as 
the natural log of total assets.  
4.2.3.2 Growth (GROWTH ) 
It is widely accepted that firms with growth opportunities are targeted by financial 
analysts and investors, which makes growth a potential factor affecting firm-level EM. 
Specifically, opportunistic managers in high-growth firms may be motivated to engage in EM 
practices in order to maintain growth when it becomes slow or reverses (Summer and Sweeney, 
1998). Managers in such firms are expected to use income-increasing accruals in order to report 
growing earnings, and avoid mentioning any decrease in growth or unmet expectations because 
of the severe pressure they face from capital markets participants (Chen and Chih, 2007). Failure 
to report growing earnings may mean that firms with increased growth opportunities lose many 
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potential investors, and may not be able to access external sources of finance (Sanchez-Ballesta 
and Garacia-Meca, 2007). Thus, firm-level EM is expected to be influenced positively by growth.  
However, most prior empirical studies (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta and Garacia-Meca, 2007; 
Jiang et al., 2008; Peni and Yahamaa, 2010; Gonzalez and Garcia-Mcca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 
2013) are consistent with positive prediction that firm growth is significantly and positively 
associated with firm-level EM. For instance, using a sample of 1,740 firm-year observations 
covering fiscal years 2006-2009, the cross-country study of Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2013) 
reports empirical evidence that growth has a positive and significant (at the 1% level) effect, and 
that growth increases the use of discretionary accruals. Similarly, using a sample of 1,955 firm-
year observations over 2006-2009, Peni and Yahamaa (2010) provide empirical evidence that the 
coefficient on growth is statistically significantly positive, suggesting that firms with high growth 
are associated with income-increasing accruals.  
In contrast, there has been little evidence of a negative relationship between growth and 
firm-level EM. Using a sample of 1,890 firm-year observations during the period 2003 to 2008, 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) report empirical evidence that the coefficient on growth is 
statistically significant and negatively related to firm-level EM. They attribute their findings to 
the higher quality audits that banks with high growth undergo. In a similar manner, using a 
sample of 17,574 firm-year observations for a four-year period (1997-2000), Lai (2009) examines 
whether high-growth firms tend to engage in EM practices even when they hire Big-5 auditors. 
He provides empirical evidence that managers in high-growth firms are less likely to report 
earnings only when their firms are audited by Big-5 audit firms. However, in this study growth is 
measured in line with prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al, 2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011), labelled 
as GROWTH and calculated as current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
4.2.3.3 Leverage (LVRG ) 
As firms often tend to employ different levels of debt in their capital structures when 
seeking new or additional financing, firms’ accounting policies are likely to be influenced by 
leverage (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). This leads the current study to consider 
leverage as influential factor affecting EM practices. In this regard, debt covenants are designed 
to restrict unethical managers from making risky financial and investment decisions that conflict 
with debt holders’ interests. Because these covenants are based on accounting numbers, managers 
may tend to engage in EM practices in order to meet debt covenant requirements (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). In particular, and consistent with the debt hypothesis, highly 
leveraged firms are more likely to adopt income-increasing accruals than less leveraged firms 
when they get closer to defaulting on debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Press and 
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Weintrop, 1990). Opportunistic managers in highly leveraged firms may tend to shift their 
reported earnings from the future to the present in order to avoid any decline in operating cash 
flows, which allows them to circumvent restrictions indicated in debt agreements (Sweeney, 
1994). Managers may prefer such practices even when they are unable to avoid defaulting, 
because an income-increasing accruals approach improves their ability to bargain with debt 
holders in cases of renegotiation, and gain more concessions from them (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). In addition, opportunistic managers in highly leveraged firms may have a tendency to use 
abnormal accruals in order improve cash flows by adopting different methods, such as delaying 
purchases of inventory and payment of payables, and accelerating collection of receivables 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Thus, leverage is expected to have a positive relationship with 
firm-level EM. In contrast, debt financing can be considered as a substitute for CG and a useful 
device in ensuring managers act in line with shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 
1996; Jiraporn et al., 2012). In particular, using higher levels of leverage may render managers 
less able to engage in EM practices because they are monitored by creditors who have a great 
incentive and ability to ensure that managers do not use discretionary accruals that can harm their 
investments. Arguably, highly leveraged firms are anticipated to engage less in EM practices. 
Hence, a negative association between leverage and firm-level EM is expected.  
Empirical evidence on the association between leverage and firm-level EM is 
inconclusive. The existing literature presents much evidence of the influence of leverage on firm-
level EM, where most previous studies generally show a positive association between the two 
variables (e.g., Lai, 2009; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2014; 
Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013). For instance, using a sample of 204 firm-
year observations for the fiscal years 2002-2007, Alves (2012) provides empirical evidence that 
leverage is significantly positively related to firm-level EM among Australian listed firms. 
Similarly, using data from three European countries, namely Italy, Greece and Span, Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2011) report empirical evidence that the coefficient on leverage is positive and 
statistically significant for all sampled firms and for each country separately, except Italy, where 
it is positive, but not statistically significant. In contrast, a negative relation between leverage and 
firm-level EM has been reported by a limited number of studies (e.g., Piot and Janin, 2007; Sun 
and Liu, 2013). For example, using US data, Sun and Liu (2013) report empirical evidence that 
the coefficient on leverage is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with high 
leverage are less likely to engage in EM practices. Similarly, using a sample of 120 French listed 
firms over 1998 to 2001, Piot and Janin (2007) report empirical evidence rejecting the debt 
hypothesis, which is the leverage, is negatively and statistically significant related to firm-level 
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EM. In this study, leverage is measured as in prior studies (e.g., Sanchez-Ballesta and Garacia-
Meca, 2007; Srinidhi et al., 2011), labelled as LVRG and calculated as book total debt scaled by 
the total assets of a firm.   
4.2.3.4 Profitability (ROA) 
Profitability has been suggested to play an important role in various aspects of corporate 
financial behaviour. In particular, managers in firms with excess cash flow may be motivated to 
engage in EM practices in order to gain personal benefits at the expense of shareholders. Two 
arguments have been made to explain this prediction. On the one hand, according to AT, 
managers in more profitable firms are expected to manage earnings either upward or downward if 
the current earnings are greater or smaller than what was targeted. For instance, managers may 
tend to manage earnings downward in order to not distribute any dividends to shareholders, 
which allows them to enjoy available cash flow, or may manage earnings upward to meet their 
compensation targets (Healy, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Gaver et al., 1995). Hence, a positive 
relationship is predicted between profitability and firm-level EM. On the other hand, some 
studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012) report empirical evidence that profitable 
firms provide more information than less profitable firms in order to signal that they are managed 
professionally and that their annual reports are credible and transparent. This may suggest that 
disclosure can serve as a CG mechanism informing shareholders of a firm’s quality and its true 
value. In a similar manner, and inconsistent with the debt hypothesis, managers in more 
profitable firms are less likely to adopt income-increasing accruals because their firms have 
internal resources for capital investment, and the ability to meet their financial obligations on 
time if they need additional financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Elliott et al., 2008). Thus, profitability and firm-level EM can be predicted to be 
negatively associated.  
However, the literature shows that the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
profitability and firm-level EM is mixed. A number of studies (e.g., Kim and Yi, 2006; Chen et 
al, 2007; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013) have found that profitability impacts positively on 
firm-level EM. For instance, using a sample of 15,159 firm-year observations for the 1992-2000 
period, Kim and Yi (2006) examine the effect of a number of factors on the extent of EM 
practices. In particular, they report empirical evidence that the coefficient on profitability is 
positive and statistically significant in Korean public and private firms. Similarly, using a sample 
of 2,237 firm-year observations covering 2002 and 2003, Chen et al. (2007) include profitability 
among other control variables in their examination of the association between CG mechanisms 
and firm-level EM in a Taiwanese context. They provide empirical evidence supporting the 
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positive prediction that profitable Taiwanese firms tend to engage more in EM practices than less 
profitable firms. In contrast, a group of studies (e.g., Haw et al., 2004; Hwang et al., 2013) has 
provided empirical evidence of a negative relationship. For example, using a sample of 25,210 
firm-year observations from 22 countries over the period 1988 to 2000, Haw et al. (2004) report 
empirical evidence rejecting AT’s assumption that there is a statistically significant negative 
association between firm-level EM and profitability. Similarly, using a sample of 3,757 firm-year 
observations for the 1996-2003 period, Hwang et al. (2013) examine the effectiveness of the 
2000 Taiwanese disclosure regulation in reducing EM practices, and report empirical evidence 
showing a significant and negative effect of profitability on firm-level EM. Some studies report 
no significant association. For instance, Rahman and Ali (2006) report empirical evidence that 
profitability has no significant impact on firm-level EM by examining 97 Malaysian listed firms 
for a two-year period (2002-2003). Similarly, using a sample of 216 firm-year observations over 
2004 to 2008, Anglin et al. (2013) investigate the effect of CG quality and several control 
variables on EM practices in U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts. They find that profitability is 
unrelated to firm-level EM (positive effect, but not statistically significant). In this study, 
profitability is measured as in prior studies (e.g., Wang and Young, 2011; Anglin et al., 2013), 
labelled as ROA and calculated as the ratio of operating profit to total assets.   
Table 48: Definition of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variable 
  DA Discretionary accruals represent a firm-level EM practices as measured by modified 
Jones Model. 
Independent variables 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index.  
  BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. 
  GOVOWN 1 if a firm has government ownership, 0 otherwise. 
  INSOWN Percentage of institutional ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  FOROWN Percentage of foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  BSIZE Total number of directors on the board of a firm. 
  BIG4 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  CGCOM 
  GNDR 
1 if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
1 if a firm has at least one woman on its board, 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
  LNTA Natural log of total assets. 
  ROA (%) Operating profit to total assets. 
  GROWT (%) Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVRG (%) Book total debt scaled by total assets of a firm.  
  INDUSTRY & YEAR Dummies for each of the eight industries and the ten years. 
 
Further, managers operating in certain industries may be more motivated to manipulate 
earnings than other industries and they may exercise their discretionary in some years more than 
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other years. Hence, in line with past studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2013), the 
current study controls for year and industry effects in addition to the above control variables in 
order to capture potential changes in EM, as levels of EM practices are expected to be different 
across industries and years. In particular, eight industry dummies out of nine industries and ten 
years dummies out of eleven years are included in any single equation in order to avoid a 
dummy-variable trap.  
4.2.4 Model Specification 
As indicated earlier, this study aims to examine the relationship between firm-level CG 
and firm-level EM in Omani listed firms. It adopts a quantitative approach by using unbalanced 
panel data analysis to investigate this relation, for the reasons discussed in subsection 4.1.1 of 
Essay 1. In doing so, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as an estimation method and multiple linear 
regressions as a statistical technique are applied in order to answer the main research question of 
whether better governed firms tend to engage more or less in EM practices. In particular, firm-
level EM as a dependent variable will be regressed on several explanatory variables in order to 
examine the following hypotheses. Further, in line with prior studies (e.g., Jaggi and Tsui, 2007), 
the study adopts signed discretionary accruals because the current study intends to measure firm-
level EM in the presence of a particular directional prediction as the relation between signed 
abnormal accruals and CG variables can be predicted. In this regard, Bowen et al. (2008, pp.397) 
state that “signed measured of abnormal accruals are more appropriate when researchers can 
hypothesize the direction of the earnings management conditioned on a specific event”. Hence, it 
is believed that the signed abnormal accruals rather than absolute abnormal accruals are the best 
measure of firm-level EM. However, the developed hypotheses that are going to be examined are 
summarised below.  
 
  H1 There is a statistically significant negative association between government 
ownership and firm EM practices 
 
  H2 
 
There is a statistically significant negative association between institutional 
ownership and firm EM practices. 
 
  H3 There is a statistically significant negative association between foreign ownership and 
firm EM practices.  
 
  H4 There is a statistically significant positive association between ownership 
concentration and firm EM practices.  
 
  H5 There is a statistically significant negative association between CG index and 
firm EM practices. 
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  H6 There is a statistically significant association between board size and firm EM 
practices.  
 
 H7 There is a statistically negative significant association between the presence of a CG 
committee and firm EM practices.  
 
  H8 
 
There is a statistically negative significant association between audit firm size and 
firm EM practices.  
 
  H9 
 
There is a statistically negative significant association between board diversity on the 
basis of gender and firm EM practices.   
 
The relationship between CG mechanisms and EM practices, controlling for the influence of 
other relevant factors and assuming all relations are linear, is estimated using the following 
regression model: 
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           (4)                                                               
Where:  
  DA Discretionary accruals 
  α Constant term 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index 
  GOVOWN Government ownership 
  INSOWN Institutional ownership 
  FOROWN Foreign ownership 
  BLKOWN Block ownership 
  BSIZE Board size 
  BIG4   Audit firm size 
  CGCOM Presence of a CG committee 
  GNDR Board diversity on the basis of gender 
  CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability, (ROA), leverage 
(LVRG), industry, and year dummies. 
  ε Error term 
 
 
4.2.5 Statistical Analyses  
Similar to Essays 1 and 2, a number of statistical analyses will be carried out before 
examining the study’s hypotheses. Specifically, OLS assumptions, namely linearity, normality, 
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multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, will be tested in order to ensure that 
OLS estimation is statistically appropriate to perform the study’s analyses. After testing and 
approving OLS as an appropriate estimation method, empirical analyses will be conducted and 
discussed in the empirical results section. The reported results will then be checked by 
performing various sensitivity analyses. In particular, the reported results will be tested to 
examine the extent to which they are robust or sensitive to the use of alternative CG index, 
alternative EM’s measurement, financial firms, the sample period, the unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics and the endogeneity problem.   
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5 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS   
This section discusses OLS assumptions before the current study carries out its analysis in 
order to ensure that OLS is an appropriate estimation for its analysis. This section also presents 
the descriptive statistics. Specifically, Subsection 5.1 discusses a number of statistical tests 
examining OLS assumptions of linearity, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, normality and 
multicollinearity. Subsection 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent, explanatory 
and control variables.  
 
5.1 TESTS OF THE OLS ASSUMPTIONS  
This essay employs the same statistical tests used in Essays 1 and 2. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used to test for unit root or stationary in all variables. This allowed 
the current study to identify which variables exhibit non-stationarity in the mean (Fuller, 1996). 
The results of this test are presented in Table 49. In this table, all variables included in the model 
appear to have no unit root, and hence the current study accepts the null hypothesis that a variable 
has no a unit root.   
 
Table 49: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
Variables ADF Unit Root Test 
  DA -31.4733
***
 
  OCGI   -5.75412
***
 
  GOVOWN   -9.27199
***
 
  INSOWN   -9.52149
***
 
  FOROWN -10.4960
***
 
  BLKOWN -10.5810
***
 
  BSIZE   -9.5512
***
 
  BIG4   -12.7914
***
 
  CGCOM -12.3361
***
 
  GNDR -10.4234
***
 
  GROWTH -13.0767
***
 
  LVRG -10.1540
***
 
  ROA -12.6456
***
 
  LNTA   -7.8817
***
 
Notes: DA denotes the firm-level EM practices, OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN 
represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, 
BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes 
the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of 
gender, GROWTH denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on asset the measure of 
profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
 
In addition to the above statistical test, OLS assumptions of linearity, serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity, normality and multicollinearity were tested. First, similar to prior studies (e.g., 
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Ghosh et al., 2010) the effects of outliers are mitigated by winsorising DA and control variables 
at the 5% and 95% levels.  
Second, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test was performed in order to detect 
for the presence of autocorrelation. Table 50 illustrates the results of this test. It reveals the 
presence of serial correlation in the model, as the probabilities of both the F-statistics and Chi-
Square reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level of significance.  
 
Table 50: Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation 
F-Statistics   7.2732
***
 
Obs*R-squared 14.7962
***
 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
Third, heteroskedasticity was tested using the White general test (Gujarati, 2003). Table 
51 shows that the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity is rejected at the 1% level of significance, 
as indicated by the probabilities of both the F-statistics and Chi-Square. As a result, the current 
study had to resolve the problems associated with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by 
using the first-order autoregressive method and employing a standard error estimate that has been 
modified to account for homoskedasticity, as suggested by Brooks (2007). Therefore, the present 
study is assured that the problems of serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are resolved.   
 
Table 51: Heteroskedasticity test: White test 
F-Statistics      1.5477
***
 
Obs*R-squared  523.8164
***
 
Notes: The asterisk *** indicate significance at the 1% level 
 
Fourth, skewness and kurtosis were used to test for the normality assumption. Table 54 
presents skewness and kurtosis statistics for the dependent, explanatory and control variables. 
The skewness statistics show that the variables are not symmetrically distributed; hence, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, but this rejection is relatively mild. Similarly, kurtosis statistics indicate 
that the null hypothesis that the variables are mesokurtically distributed is rejected. In order to 
mitigate the presence of non-normalities in the used variables, different types of transformations, 
such as natural log, square root and rank, were used to create better results, but the actual 
variables show better results than the transformed variables. Brooks (2007) indicates that the 
impact of non-normality will not be severe if the sample size is sufficiently large. Further, he 
points out that non-normality can result from some types of heteroskedasticity; hence, resolving 
heteroskedasticity can improve the normality of the variables. Therefore, the current study is 
confident that any remaining non-normality would not violate the OLS assumptions, as the 
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sample size is large (1,152 firm-year observations) and the problem of heteroskedasticity was 
resolved, as discussed above. Further, the skewness and kurtosis results are similar to those of 
prior studies that have used OLS estimation (e.g., Rahman and Ali, 2006; Anglin et al., 2013).  
Finally, multicollinearity was checked using two statistical tests. First, the correlation matrix was 
constructed among all variables using Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients and 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. Table 53 illustrates no serious 
multicollinearity among all variables: both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric 
correlation coefficients show low coefficients for all variables. Among the variables, the strongest 
correlation is observed between firm size and board size (0.441, 0.391), as reported by Pearson’s 
and Spearman’s coefficients, respectively. Second, Tolerance statistics and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) statistics were computed in order to test for multicollinearity. Table 52 shows that 
the maximum Tolerance is 0.934 and the maximum VIF is 2.149, indicating no major problem of 
multicollinearity. Overall, the statistical tests indicate that OLS assumptions are not seriously 
violated, regardless of any remaining non-linearities, heteroskedasticities, non-normalities and 
multicollinearities in the variables. Thus, OLS is approved as an appropriate estimation method 
with which to perform the empirical analyses. 
 
Table 52: Multicollinearity test: Tolerance statistic and Variance Inflation Factor 
Variables Tolerance VIF 
  OCGI 0.789 1.267 
  GOVOWN 0.714 1.401 
  INSOWN 0.691 1.448 
  FOROWN 0.549 1.823 
  BLKOWN 0.675 1.482 
  BSIZE 0.784 1.275 
  BIG4   0.860 1.163 
  CGCOM 0.789 1.267 
  GNDR 0.934 1.071 
  GROWTH 0.875 1.143 
  LVRG 0.673 1.486 
  ROA 0.688 1.454 
  LNTA 0.465 2.149 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN 
denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN, denotes block ownership, BSIZE 
denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the 
corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of gender, GROWTH denotes firm growth, 
LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on asset the measure of profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size.  
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Table 53: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of the dependent and explanatory variables 
  DA OCGI GOVOWN INSOWN FOROWN BLKOWN BSIZE BIG4 CGCOM GNDR GROWTH LVRG ROA LNTA 
DA  0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 0.004 -0.016 -0.018 0.015 -0.001 0.032 0.060
** 0.278*** 0.014 
OCGI 0.039  0.155
*** 0.015 0.076** -0.007 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.299*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.077*** 0.173*** 0.347*** 
GOVOWN -0.027 0.154
***  -0.031 0.047 0.109*** 0.085*** 0.062** 0.048* 0.059** -0.114*** -0.118*** 0.206*** 0.154*** 
INSOWN 0.006 0.029 -0.062
**  -0.029 0.226*** -0.001 0.000 0.010 -0.050* -0.036 0.044 0.035 -0.163*** 
FOROWN 0.005 0.072
** 0.038 -0.150***  0.339*** 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.067** -0.128*** 0.021 0.005 0.140*** 
BLKOWN 0.022 0.068
** 0.118*** 0.314*** 0.355***  -0266*** -0.161*** -0.013 0.054* 0.053* 0.094*** -0.128*** -0.223*** 
BSIZE -0.023 0.046 0.101
*** -0.045 -0.044 -0.272***  0.252*** -0.055* 0.013 -0.111*** -0.032 0.054*  0.391*** 
BIG4 -0.018 0.030 0.062
** -0.011 -0.007 -0.160*** 0.255***  0.110*** 0.056* -0.072** -0.039 0.098*** 0.377*** 
CGCOM -0.003 0.279
*** 0.048 0.016 0.019 -0.009 -0.052* 0.110***  0.022 0.012 -0.177*** 0.069** 0.092*** 
GNDR -0.007 0.079
*** 0.059** -0.019 0.057 0.051* 0.006 0.056* 0.022  0.017 0.057* 0.045 0.110*** 
GROWTH 0.016 -0.006 -0.088
*** -0.043 -0.096*** 0.044 -0.096*** -0.073** -0.004 0.014  -0.043 -0.197*** -0.149*** 
LVRG 0.090
*** 0.092*** -0.081*** 0.059** 0.046 0.084*** -0.009 -0.034 -0.193*** 0.046 -0.055*  -0.346*** 0.044 
ROA 0.285
*** 0.180*** 0.207*** 0.024 -0.041 -0.114*** 0.080*** 0.101*** 0.064*** 0.057* -0.193*** -0.335***  0.179*** 
LNTA -0.009 0.275
*** 0.169*** -0.187*** 0.087*** -0.206*** 0.441*** 0.369*** 0.069*** 0.113*** -0.176*** 0.086*** 0.170***  
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. DA denotes the firm-
level EM practices, OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, BLKOWN 
denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on 
the basis of gender, GROWTH denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. The correlation matrix depicts the strength and sign of the relationship amongst the 
variables. ***, ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This subsection presents descriptive statistics. Table 54 illustrates descriptive statistics for 
each used variable, including the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum 
and maximum, while Table 55 reports descriptive statistics based on industry group. The 
descriptive statistics are discussed in the following subsections. Subsection 5.2.1 discusses 
descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. Descriptive statistics of CG and control variables 
are discussed in Subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Subsection 5.2.4 discusses descriptive statistics 
based on industry group.  
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Management (Dependent variable) 
Panel A of Table 54 presents descriptive statistics for firm-level EM practices among 
Omani listed firms. It shows that earnings management, denoted by the signed discretionary 
accruals (DA), ranges from -0.1946 to 0.3301, with an average of 0.0304 for the period 2001 to 
2011. This reveals that Omani listed firms, on average, appear to manage their earnings upwards 
with average abnormal accruals equal to 3% of lagged total assets. The standard deviation of the 
DA is 0.1017, indicating that there is relative variation in the DA among the sampled firms. The 
skewness and kurtosis statistics of the DA are 0.3842 and 3.3259, respectively, suggesting that the 
DA is moderately skewed and has leptokurtic distribution.40 As indicted in Subsection 5.1, the 
results of both skewness and kurtosis statistics reflect the non-normality in the DA, but this is 
assumed not to harm the normality assumption, as the current study’s sample is larger, and 
heteroskedasticity that may cause the non-normality is already resolved. Further, the skewness 
and kurtosis results are not very different from those reported by previous studies (e.g., Rahman 
and Ali, 2006; Anglin et al., 2013).   
In addition, the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients presented in Table 53 show that the DA is positively and significantly associated with 
leverage and profitability. This suggests that EM is significantly higher for firms with greater 
leverage and profitability. Omani managers in highly leveraged and profitable firms may be 
motivated to engage in EM practices in order to meet debt covenant requirements (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994) and/or meet their compensation targets (Healy, 1985; Jensen, 
1986; Gaver et al., 1995). Furthermore, Figure 8 displays the average of the DA over the sampled 
period. It compares the levels of the DA conducted by Omani listed firms; it is clearly observed 
that the amount of the DA varies largely across eleven years. The level of the DA increased from 
                                                 
40
Gujarati (2003) indicates that the absolute critical values for accepting skewness and kurtosis are zero and three, respectively, 
and OLS estimation can be used even in moderately large samples. He defines kurtosis statistics with a value greater than 
three as leptokurtic distribution. Brooks (2007, pp.162) states “leptokurtic distribution is one which has fatter tails and is 
more peaked at the mean than a normally distributed random variable with the same mean and variance … it is thus 
desirable to stick with OLS if possible, since its behaviour in a variety of circumstances has been well researched”.  
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2001 to 2005, with a slight decrease in 2006. Importantly, the level of DA was highest in the 
years of financial crisis (2007 = 0.0656; 2008 = 0.0504). This may suggest that Omani managers 
engaged more in EM practices in these years to mitigate the negative impact of this crisis on their 
firms’ financial reports. After this period, there was a dramatic decrease in 2009, and more 
increases in 2010 and 2011. Overall, the average DA is consistent with a number of past studies 
(e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; Jiang et al., 2008; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; 
Anglin et al., 2013). For instance, using a sample of 373 firms listed on the NewYork Stock 
Exchange during the period 1991-1998, Mitra and Cready (2005) report an average DA of 0.045. 
Importantly, Figure 8 provides preliminary evidence that Omani managers used accounting 
choices to manage earnings during the sampled period.  
 
           
           Figure 8: Earnings Management levels over the sampled period 
 
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables 
Panel B of Table 54 presents descriptive statistics for CG variables, including ownership 
variables. First, it reveals that CG index, denoted by the OCGI, ranges from 1.3900 to 88.8900, 
with an average of 47.8973. The standard deviation of the OCGI is 21.7746, suggesting that there 
is a significant variation in the OCGI among Omani listed firms. Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients reported in Table 53 show that the OCGI is 
positively and significantly correlated with government, foreign and block ownership structures, 
CG committee, board diversity on the basis of gender, profitability and firm size. The presence of 
government ownership, labelled as GOVOWN, ranges from 0.0000 to 1.0000, with an average of 
0.2578. The standard deviation of GOVOWN is 0.4376, suggesting that there is significant 
323 
 
 
variation in GOVOWN. The institutional ownership (INSOWN) variable shows that, with an 
average of 20%, listed firms in the MSM tend to have many institutional investors. The INSOWN 
ranges from 0.0000 to 0.9085, with a standard deviation of 22.6782, suggesting that the variation 
in INSOWN is significant. Foreign investors (FOROWN), on average, hold 11% of total firm 
ordinary shareholdings. The standard deviation of FOROWN is 20.0972, indicating that there is 
substantial variation in FOROWN. The block ownership (BLKOWN) variable rages from 0.0000 
to 0.9947, with an average of 55%, and has the highest standard deviation (24.3699) of all the CG 
variables. This lends support to the current study’s argument that the high levels of concentrated 
ownership may have important implications for the monitoring role played by ownership 
structures in reducing EM practices. The average size of firms’ boards (BSIZE) is seven 
directors. Of these firms, the smallest board had three members, and the largest had thirteen. The 
big audit firm (BIG4) variable, on average, shows that 71% of the sampled firms were audited by 
one of the biggest four audit firms as opposed to 29% of firms audited by non-Big4 audit firms. 
The CG committee (CGCOM) variable shows a mean of 16%, suggesting that 0.16 of firms on 
average have a CG committee. Finally, the board diversity on the basis of gender variable, 
denoted by GNDR, shows that around 18% of firms have female board members. The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics of CG and ownership variables reject the null hypothesis that these 
variables are normally distributed. Similarly, different types of transformations were used to 
produce better results, but none of these transformations led to better results. As discussed in 
Subsection 5.1, the non-normalities in most of these variables are mild, as the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics are around the acceptable values. Further, the non-normality of these variables 
is assumed not to violate OLS assumptions, because the sample size is large and hetroskedasticity 
was already resolved (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2007).  
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables  
Panel C of Table 54 presents descriptive statistics for control variables. The average 
growth ratio, denoted by (GROWTH), ranges from 0.1990 to 1.8570, with an overall mean for 
the full sample of 0.7858. The leverage (LVRG) variable ranges from 0.0001 to 0.9530, with an 
average of 0.3300. The lowest mean value comes from the profitability variable (ROA), with an 
average of 0.0573, and a minimum of -0.1368 and a maximum 0.2500. Finally, firm size 
(LNTA), as proxied by natural logarithm of total assets, ranges from 14.4500 (RO16.56mn) to 
19.9400 (RO562.09mn), with an average of 16.6222 (RO16.56mn). All control variables have 
relatively large standard deviations indicating that there is significant variation in these variables. 
The null hypothesis that the control variables are normally distributed is rejected, as indicated by 
the skewness and kurtosis statistics, but these values are close to acceptable values. Likewise, the 
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actual variables produced better results than any transformed variables. The violation of OLS 
assumptions as a result of the skewness and kurtosis statistics is not assumed to be severe, 
because the current study uses a large number of firm-year observations (1,152), and the 
hetroskedasticity that could cause this problem (non-normality) has been resolved (Gujarati, 
2003; Brooks, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Descriptive Statistics Based on Industry Group 
EM literature (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2013) suggests that the DA exercised 
by managers is expected to vary across industries. Hence, examining the extent to which 
variability in the amounts of the DA is driven by industrial factor is valuable in order to expand 
our understanding regarding EM practices among Omani listed firms. Using a calculated mean of 
the DA, Table 55 and Figure 9 present a comparison of the levels of the DA across the nine 
industries. In response to the suggestion in the literature that the nature of financial firms’ 
accruals may differ from those of non-financial firms, the current study employed t-test in order 
to examine whether there is a significant difference in EM patterns between financial firms and 
non-financial firms. Panels A to I of Table 55, as well as Figure 9, clearly show that there is 
variability in the DA levels among the nine industries. The Panels indicate that financial firms 
appear to engage more in EM practices than non-financial firms, as indicated by t-test values. The 
mean of the signed DA for basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financial, 
Table 54: Summary descriptive statistics of earnings management 
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
  DA    0.0304    0.0308   0.1017   0.3842 3.3259 -0.1946    0.3301 
Panel B: Explanatory variables 
  OCGI 47.8973 54.1667 21.7746  -0.9200 2.6976   1.3900 88.8900 
  GOVOWN   0.2578    0.0000   0.4376   1.1073 2.2261   0.0000    1.0000 
  INSOWN 20.3921  12.4205 22.6782   1.0529 3.2718   0.0000 90.8500 
  FOROWN 10.4591    0.0000 20.0972   2.0874 6.8314   0.0000 90.1300 
  BLKOWN 54.8402 56.5927 24.3699  -0.3106 2.4292   0.0000 99.4700 
  BSIZE   7.3437   7.0000   1.7885   0.7651 3.1554   4.0000 13.0000 
  BIG4   0.7100   1.0000   0.4539  -0.9259 1.8574   0.0000   1.0000 
  CGCOM   0.1588   0.0000   0.3656   1.8665 4.4839   0.0000   1.0000 
  GNDR   0.1770   0.0000   0.3819   1.6918 3.8622   0.0000   1.0000 
Panel C: Control variables 
  GROWTH   0.7858   0.6735   0.4408   0.9024 3.0564   0.1990   1.8570 
  LVRG   0.3300   0.2678   0.2937   0.6378 2.2736   0.0001   0.9530 
  ROA   0.0573   0.0504   0.0980   0.0161 2.7295  -0.1368   0.2500 
  LNTA 16.6222 16.4241   1.4732   0.5497 2.6375 14.4500 19.9400 
Notes: DA denotes the firm-level EM practices, OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index, GOVOWN 
represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, 
BLKOWN denotes block ownership, BSIZE denotes the variable that is used to capture the size of board, BIG4 denotes 
the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis 
of gender, GROWTH denotes firm growth, LVRG denotes leverage, ROA denotes return on asset the measure of 
profitability, LNTA, denotes firm size. Std.Dev denotes standard deviation. The Skewness and Kurtosis are used as 
measures to test for normality assumption. 
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industrial, utilities, health care, and telecommunications sectors is 0.0050, 0.0059, 0.0063, 
0.0071, 0.0008, 0.0042, 0.0005, -0.0005 and 0.0007, respectively. It is clearly observed that 
financial, consumer services, consumer goods and basic materials have the highest average DA 
among the nine industries. In particular, the independent sample’s t-test for equality of means 
between financial firms and firms operating in basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services and industrial sectors rejects the null hypothesis that the means are equal at least at the 
5% significance level. Figure 9 shows that all industries appear to manage their earnings 
upwardly and downwardly, while they only manage their earnings upwardly in 2003 to 2005, 
with the highest level of DA in 2007. Overall, the differences in the DA levels support the 
theoretical expectation that firms may be more motivated to manipulate earnings depending on 
which industry they operate in.  
 
 
 
            Figure 9: Earnings Management levels by industry 
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   Table 55: Descriptive statistics of earnings management based on industrial groups 
 Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Basic Materials (BM)  0.0050  2.624
***
  0.0385 -0.1946  0.3014 
2001  0.0026  0.631  0.0240 -0.0770  0.1539 
2002  0.0041  1.259  0.0194 -0.0727  0.0808 
2003  0.0051  0.948  0.0310 -0.1706  0.1259 
2004  0.0056  1.189  0.0281 -0.1347  0.1427 
2005  0.0034  0.384  0.0485 -0.1946  0.3014 
2006  0.0073  1.093  0.0408 -0.0958  0.2642 
2007  0.0060  0.710  0.0529 -0.1673  0.2826 
2008  0.1136  1.426  0.0499 -0.1122  0.2632 
2009 -0.0008  0.192  0.0283 -0.1725  0.1643 
2010  0.0071  1.038  0.0427 -0.1300  0.2709 
2011  0.0031  0.519  0.0371 -0.1668  0.1800 
Panel B: Consumer Goods (CG)  0.0059  2.305
**
  0.0510 -0.1900  0.3077 
2001  0.0025  0.597  0.0418 -0.1900  0.1630 
2002  0.0054  0.582  0.0539 -0.1617  0.2573 
2003  0.0046  0.463  0.0580 -0.1185  0.3066 
2004  0.0062  0.803  0.0455 -0.1052  0.2567 
2005  0.0125  1.283  0.0539 -0.1116  0.2527 
2006  0.0024  0.303  0.0485 -0.1542  0.2742 
2007  0.0137  1.513  0.0574 -0.1246  0.2787 
2008  0.0049  0.719  0.0427 -0.1812  0.2352 
2009 -0.0048 -0.645  0.0470 -0.1730  0.1982 
2010  0.0042  0.595  0.0444 -0.1684  0.2110 
2011  0.0136  1.319  0.0634 -0.1449  0.3077 
Panel C: Consumer Services (CS)  0.0063  3.572
***
  0.0356 -0.1817  0.2882 
2001 -0.0002 -0.043  0.0262 -0.1360  0.1613 
2002  0.0035  0.862  0.0237 -0.0986  0.1105 
2003 -0.0001 -0.038  0.0306 -0.1662  0.1226 
2004  0.0132  1.813  0.0435 -0.0121  0.2848 
2005  0.0083  1.138  0.0403 -0.1738  0.2018 
2006  0.0095  1.429  0.0405 -0.1556  0.2643 
2007  0.0114  1.462  0.0491 -0.1023  0.2881 
2008  0.0063  0.939  0.0422 -0.1817  0.2713 
2009  0.0074  1.413  0.0328 -0.1607  0.1681 
2010  0.0049  1.156  0.0266 -0.1645  0.1022 
2011  0.0046  1.305  0.0218 -0.0530  0.1369 
Panel D: Financials (FI)  0.0071   0.0603 -0.1943  0.2612 
2001 -0.0106   0.0649 -0.1928  0.2488 
2002 -0.0019   0.0431 -0.1892  0.2475 
2003  0.0003   0.0604 -0.1912  0.2503 
2004  0.0164   0.0585 -0.1744  0.2522 
2005  0.0142   0.0547 -0.1030  0.2612 
2006  0.0131   0.0562 -0.0984  0.2485 
2007  0.0255   0.0831 -0.1809  0.2594 
2008  0.0106   0.0819 -0.1897  0.2562 
2009 -0.0006   0.0523 -0.1943  0.2568 
2010  0.0025   0.0311 -0.1924  0.1335 
2011  0.0069   0.0500 -0.1644  0.2506 
Panel E: Health Care (HE)  0.0008  1.001  0.0162 -0.1134  0.2968 
2001 -0.0001 -0.583  0.0015 -0.0151  0.0000 
2002 -0.0008 -0.663  0.0077 -0.0755  0.0000 
2003  0.0017  0.770  0.0130  0.0000  0.1189 
2004  0.0008  0.468  0.0112 -0.0203  0.1115 
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Continuation: Table 55      
Panel E: Health Care (HE) Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
2005  0.0028  0.517  0.0305 -0.0232  0.2968 
2006  0.0010  0.623  0.0101  0.0000  0.1031 
2007  0.0042  0.819  0.0322  0.0000  0.2911 
2008 -0.0001 -0.076  0.1385 -0.1134  0.0940 
2009  0.0009  0.800  0.0077  0.0000  0.0718 
2010 -0.0007 -0.503  0.0096 -0.1029  0.0127 
2011 -0.0006 -0.371  0.0108 -0.1076  0.0352 
Panel F: Industrials (IN)   0.0042  2.223
**
  0.3818 -0.1728  0.3301 
2001  0.0060  0.728  0.0469 -0.0575  0.3301 
2002  0.0034  0.688  0.0289 -0.1392  0.1335 
2003  0.0026  0.615  0.0253 -0.1035  0.1779 
2004  0.0066  0.911  0.0429 -0.1728  0.2706 
2005  0.0073  0.933  0.0432 -0.1190  0.2686 
2006  0.0037  0.602  0.0376 -0.1545  0.2686 
2007  0.0045  0.680  0.0415 -0.1555  0.2722 
2008  0.0122  1.364  0.0560 -0.1630  0.3091 
2009 -0.0003 -0.068  0.0351 -0.1694  0.1521 
2010 -0.0003 -0.073  0.0276 -0.1570  0.1041 
2011  0.0016  0.540  0.0183 -0.0701  0.0895 
Panel G: Oil and Gas (OG)   0.0005  1.197  0.0098 -0.0459  0.2778 
2001  0.0002  0.583  0.0021  0.0000  0.0210 
2002  0.0003  0.591  0.0036  0.0000  0.0360 
2003  0.0004  0.587  0.0048  0.0000  0.0476 
2004 -0.0004 -0.583  0.0045 -0.0459  0.0000 
2005  0.0133  0.563  0.0130  0.0000  0.1271 
2006  0.0002  0.590  0.0023  0.0000  0.0244 
2007  0.0005  0.593  0.0058  0.0000  0.0615 
2008  0.0024  0.582  0.0260  0.0000  0.2778 
2009  0.0000  0.852  0.0003  0.0000  0.0037 
2010  0.0005  0.579  0.0061  0.0000  0.0662 
2011  0.0005  0.583  0.0061  0.0000  0.0649 
Panel H: Telecommunications (TE)  -0.0005 -1.596  0.0063 -0.1176  0.0000 
2001  0.0000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2002  0.0000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2003  0.0000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2004  0.0000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2005 -0.0003 -0.563  0.0030 -0.0299  0.0000 
2006 -0.0008 -0.590  0.0091 -0.0934  0.0000 
2007 -0.0005 -0.593  0.0055 -0.0585  0.0000 
2008 -0.0010 -0.582  0.0110 -0.1176  0.0000 
2009 -0.0003 -0.582  0.0037 -0.0396  0.0000 
2010 -0.0014 -0.808  0.0114 -0.1020  0.0000 
2011 -0.0007 -0.789  0.0056 -0.0524  0.0000 
Panel I: Utilities (UT)  0.0007  0.904  0.0156 -0.0695  0.3098 
2001  0.0029  0.594  0.0285  0.0000  0.2766 
2002 -0.0007 -0.651  0.0068 -0.0665  0.0000 
2003  0.0002  0.349  0.0043 -0.0146  0.0402 
2004 -0.0002 -0.288  0.0055 -0.0440  0.0305 
2005  0.0005  0.290  0.0108 -0.0242  0.1005 
2006 -0.0011 -0.849  0.0079 -0.0670  0.0000 
2007  0.0001  0.079  0.0094 -0.0396  0.0848 
2008  0.0036  0.750  0.0305 -0.0131  0.3098 
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Continuation: Table 55      
Panel I: Utilities (UT)   Mean T-Test Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
2009 -0.0000 -0.008  0.0063 -0.0575  0.0256 
2010  0.0005  0.243  0.0141 -0.0663  0.1329 
2011  0.0016  0.562  0.0180 -0.0695  0.1634 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in Panels A, B, 
C, E, F, G, H and I test for equality means between basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, health 
care, industrials, oil and gas, telecommunications, utilities and financial firms, respectively. A mean difference with (***), 
(**) and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Std.Dev denotes standard deviation. 
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the empirical results related to the relationship between firm-level 
EM, measured by the DA calculated according to a modified Jones Model (1995), and firm-level 
CG proxied by the Omani CG index. Table 57 reports OLS regression results and Table 56 
facilitates the following of these results by providing a summary of each hypothesis and its 
results. In particular, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 57 report only the results of CG index, Columns 
5 and 6 report those related only to ownership variables, Columns 7 and 8 report the results of 
only board and audit variables, and Columns 9 and 10 report the results of multivariate 
regression of the DA on all variables. This allows the study to see the individual effect for each 
group of variables, as well as their joint effect on EM. In order to examine only the effect of CG 
as an integrated system on EM practices, the Omani CG index, in addition to control variables, is 
included in the regression, as reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 57. The probability of F-Stat 
is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, indicating a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of CG index and control variables are equal to zero. 
The adjusted R
2 
reveals that about 18% of the changes in the DA are explained by these 
variables. The coefficient on CG index is statistically and significantly negative, which is 
consistent with the present study’s hypothesis. All the control variables are statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level of significance, except year and industry variables. 
According to Columns 5 and 6, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the eight variables, in 
addition to year and industry dummies, are equal to zero is rejected, as indicated by the F-Stat, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The adjusted R
2 
is 0.18, suggesting 
that 18% of the variability in the DA is jointly explained by these variables. The coefficients on 
government, institutional and block ownership structures are statistically significant at least at 
the 10% significance level. The direction of these coefficients is in line with the current study’s 
hypotheses, whereas the coefficient on foreign ownership structure variable is statistically 
insignificant. In relation to the impact of board and audit variables on EM practices, the results 
reported in Columns 7 and 8 reveal that these variables are insignificant in explaining variability 
in firm-level EM. The alternative hypothesis, that the coefficients of four determinants and 
control variables are different from zero, is accepted. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 18% of 
the variability in the DA is jointly predicted by these variables.  
In order to take into account the interrelated relationships between CG index, board and 
audit characteristics and ownership structure in their impact on EM practices, all nine variables 
are included in the model along with control variables. The F-Stat remains statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level, and the adjusted R
2 
indicates that 18% of the variability 
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in the DA is jointly explained by these variables. However, the significance level on a few 
variables has changed. For instance, the coefficient on CG index, which was statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level (Columns 3 and 4), is now statistically significant at the 
10% level (Columns 9 and 10). The interrelated relationships between all variables may cause 
these sensitivities. Overall, CG index, government ownership and institutional ownership are 
found to be statistically significantly negative associated with the DA, whereas block ownership, 
growth, leverage and profitability are positively and statistically significant over the entire 
sample period. In contrast, the coefficients on foreign ownership, board size, audit firm size, CG 
committee and board diversity on the basis of gender are statistically insignificant. The results 
based on all the explanatory variables are discussed below. In particular, Subsection 6.1 
discusses the empirical results of CG variables, and Subsection 6.2 discusses the empirical 
results of control variables.   
 
6.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES  
Panel A of Table 57 reports the empirical results for CG index, ownership structures and 
board and audit variables. First, the coefficient on CG index is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance. This supports H5, that there is a statistically 
significant and negative relationship between CG and firm EM practices (see Columns 13 to 15 
of Table 56). This finding suggests that effective CG structures appear to constrain EM practices, 
leading to improved earnings quality. Theoretically, the negative coefficient on the OCGI is in 
line with a number of theoretical perspectives, such as AT, SKT and SGT, which suggest that 
managers in poorly governed firms are expected to behave opportunistically by engaging in EM 
practices in order to personally benefit at the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Many previous studies limit their investigation to specific CG mechanisms (e.g., board and audit 
characteristics); the collective effect of CG measures in the form of a CG index provided in this 
study shows that better governed firms tend to conduct less EM. This in line with recent 
suggestions in the literature (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008; Dechow et 
al., 2010) that CG mechanisms should be examined as an integrated system instead of 
individually. Hence, the multi-dimensional characteristics of the CG approach provide additional 
convincing evidence on the pooled effect of internal and external mechanisms on earnings 
quality. The finding of a linear relationship between CG and the DA seems to support the current 
study’s expectation that CG recommendations proposed by the Omani code, combined with 
religious notions, tend to prevent managers from engaging in EM practices. In addition, the 
magnitude of the OCGI is very low (-0.0005), indicating that informal systems, such as family, 
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tribal and personal relationships, may affect the ability of CG mechanisms to mitigate EM 
practices among Omani listed firms. Empirically, this finding is consistent with limited studies 
that examine the association between firm-level EM and firm-level CG using multi-dimensional 
characteristics of CG (e.g., Chen and Chih, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; 
Leventis and Dimitropulos, 2012). In contrast, this result differs from past studies that report no 
statistically significant relationship between CG and EM practices (e.g., Bowen et al., 2008).   
Second, the model finds a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
government ownership and the DA at the 5% level of significance, which means that H1 is 
supported. This finding implies that the presence of the government as a shareholder in a firm 
leads to reduced EM practices. Quantitatively, holding all the other variables within the model 
constant, it indicates that a reduction in government ownership by one unit will increase the use 
of EM practices by 0.019. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with SWT’s suggestion that 
government ownership can serve as a CG mechanism that stops managers from reporting EM. In 
contrast, the finding does not support AT’s argument that potential conflicts of interest between 
government representatives and the government itself can motivate managers to engage more in 
EM practices. The influential power of government ownership is supported by descriptive 
statistics, where about 26% of Omani listed firms have government investors, which indicates 
that having the government as an investor appears to play a crucial role in corporate financial 
decision-making. In particular, government ownership seems to serve as a CG mechanism that 
curbs managers from engaging in EM practices because of the greater influence of its interference 
with managerial appointments. Empirically, this finding is in line with Ding et al. (2007) and 
Wang and Yung (2011), who report a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
government ownership and EM practices, but is contrary to Li et al. (2011), who document that 
government ownership is statistically significant and positively associated with EM practices. 
Third, the coefficient on institutional ownership is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level of significance; hence, H2, that there is a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm EM practices, is supported. This finding 
indicates that investment institutions holding many shares in a firm can provide active monitoring 
that reduces EM practices. Theoretically, this result is in line with the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis suggesting that institutional investors are expected to serve as a CG mechanism that 
provides active monitoring over management. Empirically, this finding is similar to those 
reported by some prior studies (e.g., Chung et al., 2002; Mitra and Credy, 2005; Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Wang, 2014), but contrasts with some other past studies 
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(e.g., Koh, 2003; Siregar and Utama, 2008) that document empirical evidence of no significant 
relationship.  
Fourth, unlike above ownership variables, the model finds no significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and EM practices. This finding seems to suggest that foreign 
ownership does not explain variation in the DA; hence, H3, that there is a statistically significant 
and negative relationship between foreign ownership and firm EM practices, is rejected. This 
finding is in line with the theoretical prediction that foreign institutional investors, in contexts 
where distance and language can be significant barriers, are less likely to mitigate EM practices 
in local firms. However, the insignificant impact of foreign ownership lends empirical support to 
the finding reported by Li et al. (2011), but does not support the findings of other past studies 
(e.g., Lel, 2013; Guo et al., 2012) that provide empirical evidence that foreign ownership is 
associated with lower EM practices. Within the Omani context, the impact of foreign ownership 
in constraining EM practices appears to be less significant than observed in other contexts, such 
as the Japanese setting.  
Fifth, block ownership is found to be statistically significant and positively related to the 
DA, at the 10% level of significance, indicating that H4 is empirically supported. This finding 
implies that managers in firms with a high concentration of ownership are more engaged in EM 
practices than those in firms with lower levels of ownership concentration. Theoretically, the 
positive coefficient on block ownership is contrary to the view that block holders have great 
incentives to actively monitor managers and serve as a CG mechanism to curb managers from 
reporting earnings. It is important to indicate that the ownership structure of Omani listed firms is 
characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership (around 55%), as shown by the 
descriptive statistics. Thus, the positive relation between the two variables can be explained by 
the present study’s expectation that block ownership in the Omani setting is more likely to 
increase managerial motivation to report EM practices rather than performing as a CG 
mechanism in reducing EM practices. Both managers and block shareholders are likely to be 
highly influenced by informal rules, where the latter may force the former to report earnings in 
order to expropriate minority shareholders. This finding lends empirical support to some prior 
studies (e.g., Haw et al., 2004; Kim and Yi, 2006), but not others, which document a negative 
relationship (e.g., Ali et al., 2008; Aleves, 2012) or no significant association (e.g., Davidson et 
al., 2005; Lo et al, 2010).   
Sixth, the coefficient on board size is positive but not statistically significant. The 
statistically insignificant and positive DA-board size nexus indicates that H6, suggesting that 
board size has no explanatory power in explaining the DA, is rejected. Theoretically, this finding 
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is in line with the view that larger boards can be less effective in monitoring managers, as 
directors are confronted with the problem of being dominated by managers who may take 
advantage of dominating directors to report earnings. Empirically, this finding is consistent with 
prior studies (e.g., Firth et al, 2007) that report no significant relationship. In contrast, the 
statistically insignificant relationship between board size and the DA is contrary to prior studies 
(e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2010) that report a statistically significant and negative 
association between the two variables, as well as other studies (e.g., Rahma and Ali, 2006; Epps 
and Ismail, 2009; Ales, 2012) that report empirical evidence that EM practices and board size are 
positively associated. In the Omani context, this finding seems to suggest that the monitoring role 
of the firm’s board is weaker than other corporate contexts in mitigating EM practices. This is 
expected to result from the powerful influence of informal rules on the firm’s board, where 
directors may have long-term commitments to family, tribal and personal relationships, which 
take precedence over formal rules, such as CG systems.  
Seventh, the statistically insignificant and positive coefficient on the presence of a CG 
committee does not lend empirical support to H7, that the establishment of a CG committee 
impacts negatively on EM practices. The result reveals an unexpected weak relation between the 
DA and the presence of a CG committee. This finding is not in line with the theoretical prediction 
that managers’ discretion in financial reporting can be reduced through clearly set guidelines on 
the best CG practices provided by a CG committee. The statistically insignificant coefficient on 
CG committee seems to indicate that CG committees do not have a role in helping a firm’s board 
to actively monitor managers with regard to EM practices. This can be related to the possibility 
that members of CG committees may find it difficult to improve the CG practices among Omani 
listed firms in the presence of informal rules. Empirically, the literature shows that the 
relationship between the two variables has not examined previously. Thus, the current study 
opens the door for further investigation to examine the potential impact of the presence of a CG 
committee on EM practices in other corporate settings.  
Eighth, audit firm size is found to be statistically insignificant and negatively associated 
with the DA, indicating that H8 is rejected. Although 71% of the sampled firms are audited by 
one of the Big 4 audit firms (see Table 54), this finding does not lend empirical support to the 
theoretical prediction that managers in firms audited by large audit firms are less motivated to 
engage in EM practices. Empirically, it supports the results of Davidson et al. (2005) and Firth et 
al. (2007), who report that audit firm size has no significant impact on EM practices. In contrast, 
it contrasts with studies (e.g., Francis and Wang, 2008; Kent et al., 2010; Iatrdis, 2012) that 
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report empirical evidence that large audit firms have a significant negative relationship with the 
DA.    
Finally, the coefficient on board diversity on the basis of gender is negative but not 
statistically significant, indicating that H9, that there is a statistically negative significant 
association between board diversity on the basis of gender and firm EM practices, is rejected. 
This finding is contrary to the view that gender-diverse boards may provide better monitoring 
over managers and improve the quality of earnings. This finding may result from the possibility 
that female representation on Omani listed boards is restricted by conservative traditions that may 
not allow women to improve board monitoring. Empirically, this  finding is consistent with the 
result of Sun et al. (2011), who report empirical evidence that female directorship has no 
significant influence in constraining EM practices. In contrast, it does not support the results of 
Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Gavious et al. (2012), who report empirical evidence that firms with 
female directors exhibit a greater reduction in EM practices.   
6.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES  
Panel B of Table 57 presents the results of the potential reaction of the DA to several 
control variables. The coefficient on firm growth is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that high-growth 
firms may be more motivated to engage in EM practices than low-growth firms. Quantitatively, 
holding all the other variables within the model constant, it suggests that an increase in firm 
growth by one unit will result in a 0.019 increase in the use of the DA. The statistically significant 
and positive association lends empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Peni and 
Yahamaa, 2010; Gonzalez and Garcia-Mcca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013) that report evidence that 
high-growth firms tend to engage in EM practices. In contrast, this finding is contrary to some 
studies (e.g., Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) that find a negative relationship between the two 
variables.  
The result of the leverage variable shows that leverage is statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance, and positively related to EM practices. Theoretically, this finding does not 
support the idea that debt financing can be considered as a useful device in reducing EM 
practices. In contrast, it is in line with the view that highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
engage in EM practices than less leveraged firms because managers tend to report earnings in 
order to meet debt covenant requirements. Empirically, it does not offer empirical support to the 
results reported by past studies (e.g., Piot and Janin, 2007; Sun and Liu, 2013) that indicate that 
firms with high leverage are less likely to engage in EM practices. In contrast, it lends empirical 
support to other studies (e.g., Lai, 2009; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012; Chen and 
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Zhang, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013) that report evidence that 
leverage and firm-level EM are statistically significantly and positively correlated.  
Profitability is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, and 
positively associated with EM practices. This finding is contrary to the theoretical prediction that 
profitable firms are less likely to engage in EM practices because they have internal resources for 
capital investment. In contrast, it supports AT’s prediction that profitable firms tend to manage 
their earnings if the current earnings are greater or smaller than what was targeted. Empirically, it 
is contrary to some prior studies (e.g., Haw et al., 2004; Hwang et al., 2013) that report empirical 
evidence that profitability has a statistically significant and negative relationship with the DA, as 
well as other studies (e.g., Rahman and Ali, 2006; Anglin et al., 2013) that document no 
significant association between the two variables. In contrast, it offers empirical support to the 
results of prior studies (e.g., Kim and Yi, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 
2013) that find that profitability impacts positively on EM practices.  
The model finds a statistically significant relationship between firm size and EM 
practices. The coefficient on firm size is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance. This finding leads empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2012; Gonzalez and Garcia-Mcca, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2013) reporting that firm 
size and firm-level EM are statistically significant and negatively correlated. By contrast, it does 
not lend empirical support to other prior studies (e.g., Chen and Chih, 2007; Siregar and Utama, 
2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; Chen and Zhang, 2014) that provide empirical evidence of no 
significant relation between the two variables, and other studies (e.g., Chung et al., 2002; Chen et 
al., 2007; Alves, 2012) that provide empirical evidence of a positive relation.  
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the year and industry variables show that some of 
them have explanatory powers in explaining variations in the DA. Specifically, years 2001 to 
2003, year 2009 and the telecommunications sector have a statistically significant and negative 
association with EM practices at least at the 10% level. The results of year and industry variables 
lend support to prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 201) that suggest that EM 
practices vary across years and industries.   
 To sum up, the current study examines the relationship between firm-level CG and firm-
level EM in Omani listed firms. Tables 56 and 57 show the findings related to CG and control 
variables examined in this study. Overall, the findings are consistent with theoretical and 
empirical literature. First, the findings suggest that government ownership has a statistically 
significant impact on EM practices. Second, the findings indicate that EM practices are 
significantly lower in firms with institutional ownership. Third, the findings reveal that foreign 
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ownership has no statistically significant impact on EM practices. Fourth, the findings suggest 
that firms with higher levels of ownership concentration engage significantly in EM practices. 
Sixth, the findings indicate that better governed firms engage less in EM practices. Seventh, the 
findings show that large board size is insignificantly related to EM practices. Eighth, the findings 
suggest that being audited by a Big Four audit has an insignificant relationship with EM 
practices. Finally, the findings indicate that female representation on Omani corporate boards has 
an insignificant association with EM practices. Hence, this study provides empirical evidence that 
better governed firms engage less than poorly governed firms in EM practices in settings where 
religious notions, informal rules and concentration of ownership play an important role in 
corporate financial decision-making. These findings show the positive influence of the Omani 
state’s governance reforms, which aim to regulate the management of firms listed on the MSM 
and make the Omani economy less vulnerable to accounting scandals and corporate failures. 
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Table 56: A summary of all hypotheses and findings for the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance 
Dependent variable                                                                                                              Firm earnings management (DA) 
Explanatory variables OCGI Ownership variables Board/Audit variables All 
Governance 
Variables 
Hyp. 
No 
Expect-
ed sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
 status 
Finding  
sign 
Finding  
significance 
Hypothesis 
 status 
Finding  
sign 
Finding  
significance 
Hypothesis 
 status 
Finding  
sign 
Finding  
significance 
Hypothesis 
 status 
Government 
ownership 
1 -    - 
Significant 
      (5%) 
Accepted  
  
- 
Significant 
      (5%) 
Accepted 
Institutional 
ownership 
2 -    - 
Significant 
      (5%) 
Accepted  
  
- 
Significant 
      (5%) 
Accepted 
Foreign  
ownership 
3 -    - Insignificant 
 
Rejected  
  
- Insignificant 
 
Rejected 
Block  
ownership 
4 +    + 
Significant 
    (10%) 
Accepted  
  
+ 
Significant 
      (10%) 
Accepted 
Omani CG 
Index 
5 - - 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted     
  
- 
Significant 
      (10%) 
Accepted 
Board size 6 +/-       + Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
CG committee    7 -       + Insignificant 
 
Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm 
size 
8 
 
- 
 
      - Insignificant 
 
Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Gender 9 -       - 
 
Insignificant 
 
Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Note: Column 1 presents the ninth variables that are represented the ninth tested hypotheses. Columns 2 to 12 present information relating to hypotheses one to nine with regard to the DA.  
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Table 57: The effect of corporate governance on corporate earnings management 
  
          OCGI   Ownership variables 
Board/Audit      
variables 
            All 
Independent variables      Ex.Sig Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign Coef. Sign 
Panel A: CG variables    
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0402
**
    -     - -       - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 
  GOVOWN - - - -0.0188 0.0136
**
 -       - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 
  INSOWN - - - -0.0003 0.0235
**
 -       - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 
  FOROWN - - - -0.0001 0.6519 -       - -0.0001 0.6638 
  BLKOWN + - - 0.0003 0.0660
*
 -      - 0.0003 0.0575
*
 
  BSIZE +/- - - - - 0.0045 0.7519 0.0146 0.2994 
  BIG4 - - - - - -0.0050 0.4949 -0.0035 0.6237 
  CGCOM - - - - - 0.0072 0.3971 0.0123 0.1525 
  GNDR - - - - - -0.0098 0.2153 -0.0108 0.1651 
Panel B:Control variables    
  GROWTH  0.0208 0.0029
***
 0.0189 0.0064
***
 0.0212 0.0026
***
 0.0195 0.0045
***
 
  LVRG  0.0882 0.0000
***
 0.0905 0.0000
***
 0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0933 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4650 0.0000
***
 0.4819 0.0000
***
 0.4689 0.0000
***
 0.4872 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0603
*
 -0.0056 0.0263
**
 -0.0058 0.0348
**
 -0.0049 0.0813
*
 
  2001  -0.0477 0.0072
***
 -0.0239 0.0663
*
 -0.0221 0.0928
*
 -0.0444 0.0131
**
 
  2002  -0.0402 0.0079
***
 -0.0222 0.0699* -0.0201 0.1004 -0.0381 0.0138
**
 
  2003  -0.0358 0.0113
**
 -0.0251 0.0571
*
 -0.0247 0.0660
*
 -0.0341 0.0175
**
 
  2004  -0.0005 0.9673 0.0031 0.7931 0.0033 0.7781 0.0003 0.9776 
  2006  -0.0062 0.5824 -0.0064 0.5699 -0.0065 0.5645 -0.0053 0.6340 
  2007  0.0079 0.5498 0.0054 0.6852 0.0063 0.6307 0.0078 0.5547 
  2008  0.0205 0.1429 0.0178 0.1992 0.0188 0.1802 0.0207 0.1323 
  2009  -0.0318 0.0059
***
 -0.0349 0.0026
***
 -0.0341 0.0036
***
 -0.0315 0.0067
***
 
  2010  -0.0097 0.4027 -0.0130 0.2654 -0.0118 0.3066 -0.0094 0.4204 
  2011  0.0116 0.3286 0.0062 0.6058 0.0098 0.4131 0.0095 0.4297 
  Basic materials -0.0293 0.2428 -0.0471 0.0740
*
 -0.0356 0.1731 -0.0414 0.1188 
  Consumer services -0.0180 0.4719 -0.0385 0.1504 -0.0250 0.3359 -0.0343 0.2016 
  Consumer goods -0.0186 0.4708 -0.0413 0.1351 -0.0269 0.3114 -0.0386 0.1649 
  Financials -0.0140 0.5875 -0.0321 0.2375 -0.0192 0.4715 -0.0298 0.2723 
  Health care 0.0195 0.5191 0.0070 0.8273 0.0186 0.5491 0.0076 0.8127 
  Industrials -0.0193 0.4618 -0.0419 0.1322 -0.0284 0.2977 -0.0389 0.1674 
  Telecommunications -0.1518 0.0000
***
 -0.1741 0.0000
***
 -0.1598 0.0000
***
 -0.1765 0.0000
***
 
  Utilities -0.0267 0.3716 -0.0340 0.2748 -0.0299 0.3284 -0.0379 0.2216 
Constant        0.0948
**
     0.0961
**
      0.0808
*
            0.0787 
Adj. R
2
     0.1795   0.1818     0.1757            0.1838 
F-Stat       11.4799
***
     10.4666
***
       10.0765
***
            9.0940
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.              2.0175   2.0169    2.0203            2.0154 
Number  of observations               1152   1152     1152              1152 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Omani CG index (OCGI) is un-weighted CG index. Government ownership 
(GOVOWN) is measured as a dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm has government ownership, 0 otherwise. 
Institutional ownership (INSOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) are measured as percentage of institutional and foreign 
ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. Block ownership (BLKOWN) is measured as percentage of shares held by 
shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. Board size (BSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors 
on the firm’s board. Audit firm size (BIG4) is measured as dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm is audited by one of 
the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. The 
presence of corporate governance committee (CGCOM)  is measured as dummy variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm has set 
up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. Board diversity on the basis of gender (GNDR) is measured as dummy 
variable where a firm takes 1 if a firm has a female director on its board, 0 otherwise. Growth (GROWTH) is measured by 
current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. Leverage (LVRG) is measured as book total debt scaled by total 
assets of a firm. Profitability (ROA) is measured as operating profit to total assets. Firm size (LNTA) is measured by natural 
log of total assets. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic materials sector, consumer 
goods, consumer services, financial, health care, industrial, utilities and Telecommunications sectors, respectively. Year 
dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry 
were excluded from the model in order to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
This section discusses the extent to which the findings obtained in Section 6 are robust or 
sensitive to alternative models and estimations. Specifically, a series of robustness analyses were 
conducted on the following issues. First, whether the original findings are sensitive to alternative 
measures of CG and EM. Second, whether the original findings are driven by financial firms. 
Third, whether the main results are sensitive over the sample period. Fourth, whether the 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics have an impact on the original results. And finally, 
whether the original findings are suffer from endogeneity problem. Accordingly, this section is 
organised as follows. Subsection 7.1 reports and discusses findings based on the weighted CG 
index. Subsection 7.2 reports and discusses findings based Kothari et al.’s (2005) Model. 
Subsection 7.3 reports and discusses findings based only on non-financial firms. Subsection 7.4 
reports and discusses findings based on sampled period. Subsection 7.5 reports and discusses 
findings based on the fixed-effects model. Subsection 7.6 reports and discusses findings based on 
a lagged structure model. Subsection 7.7 reports and discusses findings based on a Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) model. In order to facilitate comparison, both the original findings and 
each robustness test’s results will be presented in the same table. Overall, the robustness tests 
suggest that the main findings are generally robust and not sensitive to all these issues. These 
analyses are discussed below, with particular focus on the sensitivities between each robustness 
analysis’ results and the main results.  
7.1 RESULTS BASED ON ALTERNATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PROXY  
As indicated in Essays 1 and 2, the un-weighted approach was adopted in order to 
construct the CG index that was used to measure CG among Omani listed firms. Following 
Beiner et al.’s (2006) procedure in constructing a weighted CG index,41 the current study 
accounts for the likelihood that using a weighted CG index may result in different findings. In 
doing so, the un-weighted CG index was replaced by a weighted CG index in equation (1). Table 
58 reports OLS regression results of both the original findings and those from the weighted CG 
index. Specifically, the findings reported in Columns 9 to 10 of Table 57, which are based on the 
un-weighted CG index, are repeated in Columns 3 to 4 of Table 58. According to Table 58, the 
F-Stat and the adjusted R
2 
are similar to those reported by the un-weighted CG index. The F-Stat 
is significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the nine CG 
variables, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero. The adjusted R
2 
reveals that about 
18% of the variability in the DA is jointly explained by these variables. Overall, the original 
                                                 
41See Subsection 7.1 of Essay 1 for more details on this procedure. 
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findings are not sensitive to the weighted CG index. CG variables including weighted CG index, 
government ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership still statistically significant 
at least at the 10% significance level. Further, the control variables are also in line with the main 
findings. These findings are discussed further in the following subsections, with particular focus 
on the main sensitivities of this analysis.  
7.1.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Similar to the main model, weighted CG index and government, institutional and block 
ownership are statistically significant, whereas foreign ownership, board size, presence of a CG 
committee, audit firm size and board diversity on the basis of gender are statistically 
insignificantly related to EM practices among Omani listed firms. The direction of the 
coefficients on CG variables has not changed compared to those of the un-weighted CG index, 
while the statistical significance of the coefficient on CG index has changed. In particular, the 
coefficient on the OCGI, which was statistically significant at 10%, is now statistically 
significant at 5%. The statistical significance of the rest of the variables remains unchanged.  
7.1.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
Control variables including growth, leverage, profitability, firm size, years 2001 to 2003, 
year 2009 and telecommunications sector are significant and consistent with the main findings. 
Similar to CG variables, the direction of the coefficients on control variables has not changed 
compared to those of the un-weighted CG index, except for year 2004, which was positive and is 
now negative, while the statistical significance of the coefficient on a few variables has changed. 
Specifically, the statistical significance of the coefficients on years 2001 and 2002, which were 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level, are now statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
remainder of the variables remain unchanged.  
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7.2 RESULTS BASED ON ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
As indicated in subsection 4.2.1.1, the modified Jones Model (1995) was adopted as the 
main method to calculate firm-level EM, and the current study examines the robustness of its 
Table 58: The results based on weighted corporate governance index 
 Un-weighted  index Weighted  index 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  WOCGI -            -      - -0.0006 0.0420
**
 
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
                 -     - 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0185 0.0152
**
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 -0.0003 0.0287
**
 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0001 0.6566 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0003 0.0594
*
 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0148 0.2941 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0035 0.6202 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0122 0.1492 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0110 0.1577 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0195 0.0046
***
 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0936 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.4863 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0051 0.0636
*
 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0500 0.0091
***
 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0425 0.0097
***
 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0361 0.0129
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 -0.0004 0.9760 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0051 0.6477 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0076 0.5630 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0204 0.1380 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0317 0.0062
***
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0097 0.4049 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0091 0.4452 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.0412 0.1210 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.0342 0.2034 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.0381 0.1695 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 -0.0306 0.2591 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.0062 0.8465 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.0390 0.1656 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1766 0.0000
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0375 0.2255 
Constant  0.0787   0.0878
*
 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838 0.1847 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
     9.1404
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154 2.0154 
Number of observations                     1152 1152 
Notes: OCGI and WOCGI denote the un-weighted and weighted Oman corporate governance indexes, respectively. 
GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. 
BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance 
committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm 
leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies 
represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer 
services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial sector, utilities sector and Telecommunications sector, 
respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 
and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order to avoid the dummy variable trap. The asterisks ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the 
F-statistics.  
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main results by using a different method to compute EM, namely Kothari et al.’s (2005) Model. 
In the case of stratified-random samples of firms, the modified Jones Model (1995) has been 
suggested to be miss-specified (Dechow et al., 1995). Kothari et al. (2005, pp.165) state that 
“ﬁrms classiﬁed as having abnormally high or low levels of earnings management are those that 
manage more than would be expected given their level of performance”. They indicate that the 
modified Jones Model does not account for the potential association between accruals and 
performance. Thus, Kothari et al.’s (2005) Model uses a performance-matched firm’s 
discretionary accrual to control for the effect of performance on estimated discretionary accruals. 
In their model, the lag of ROA is added into the modified Jones Model (1995) as an additional 
regressor, and the residuals of this model represent the DA. The Kothari et al. Model (2005) is 
presented below:    
 
        =  + (   -  )  +   +                               (5)                      
 
Once the DA is calculated using the Kothari et al. Model (2005), the EM-CG relation is re-
estimated using the following regression model: 
 
    





n
i
ititi
ititititit
ititititit
CONTROLS
GNDRCGCOMBIGBSIZEBLKOWN
FOROWNINSOWNGOVOWNOCGIDA
1
98765
43210
4



       (6)                                            
Where:  
  DA Discretionary accruals represent a firm-level EM practices as measured by 
Kothari et al. Model (2005). 
  α Constant term. 
  OCGI Omani corporate governance index. 
  GOVOWN Government ownership. 
  INSOWN Institutional ownership. 
  FOROWN Foreign ownership. 
 
Where: 
 
   TAC Total accruals in year t for firm i, calculated as net income  minus operating 
cash flow. 
   TA Total assets in year t – 1 for firm i. 
   ΔRev Revenues in year t less revenues in year t – 1 for firm i. 
   ΔRec Receivables in year t less receivables in year t – 1 for firm i. 
   PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i. 
   ROA Income before extraordinary items in year t – 1 for firm i. 
   εit Residual represents firm-level EM.  
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  BLKOWN Block ownership. 
  BSIZE Board size. 
  BIG4   Audit firm size. 
  CGCOM Presence of a CG committee. 
  GNDR Board diversity on the basis of gender. 
  CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability, 
(ROA), leverage (LVRG), industry, and year dummies. 
  ε Error term. 
 
Table 59 shows OLS regression results of both the main findings (Columns 3 to 4) and 
the findings based on an alternative measure of EM developed by Kothari et al. (2005) Model 
(Columns 5 to 6). The F-Stat reveals that the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between observed and predicted values is rejected. The adjusted R
2
 is approximately 0.10, which 
is less than in the main results, suggesting that about 11% of the variability in the DA is explained 
by this model. Generally, CG index, government ownership, institutional ownership, block 
ownership, CG committee, growth, profitability, leverage, years 2001 to 2003, year 2009 and 
telecommunications sector variables are significant at least at the 10% level of significance. 
These results will be discussed further below.   
7.2.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Most CG variables that have been predicted to be significantly associated with EM in the 
main model still show a significant relationship with the DA. The direction and the significance 
level of the coefficients on CG index and ownership variables have not changed. Similarly, the 
sign and the statistical significance of board size, audit firm size and board diversity on the basis 
of gender remain unchanged and statistically insignificant, while the presence of a CG committee 
becomes statistically significant at the 10% level, which was statistically insignificant in the main 
model.  
7.2.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
Panel B of Columns 5 to 6 shows similar results to those found by the modified Jones 
Model, except for firm size. The results indicate that firm size, which was statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance, is now no longer statistically significant. The 
remaining variables are the same regardless of which model is used.  
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Table 59: The results based on alternative measure of earnings management 
 Modified Jones model Kothari et al  model 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 -0.0005 0.0747
*
 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0183 0.0167
**
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 -0.0003 0.0367
**
 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0001 0.6697 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0003 0.0784
*
 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0126 0.3723 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0041 0.5661 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0142 0.0994
*
 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0101 0.1964 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0208 0.0025
***
 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0900 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.1841 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0019 0.4971 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0416 0.0196
**
 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0371 0.0167
**
 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0334 0.0201
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 0.0007 0.9530 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0055 0.6221 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0073 0.5800 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0202 0.1437 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0313 0.0071
***
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0098 0.4049 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0095 0.4302 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.0432 0.0920 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.0381 0.1423 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.0384 0.1537 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 -0.0260 0.3225 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.0045 0.8865 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.0396 0.1466 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1857 0.0000
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0415 0.1717 
Constant  0.0787 0.0198 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838 0.1069 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
      5.3018
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154 2.0162 
Number of observations  1152 1152 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent 
government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. 
CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of 
gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of 
profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic 
materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial 
sector, utilities sector and Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are 
used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.3 RESULTS BASED ONLY ON NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS 
As explained in Subsection 4.1, the current study includes both financial and non-
financial firms (116 firms) in its dataset. Prior studies argue that because accruals are not the 
same in both types of firms, as financial firms are subject to specific accounting requirements, 
financial firms should be excluded from analysis in examining the impact of CG. In contrast, the 
present study argues that both types of firms do not behave considerably differently from each 
other because the nature of the Omani corporate setting is different from the developed countries; 
hence, financial firms can be included. Specifically, Omani financial and non-financial firms 
operate in an environment where corporate regulations and enforcement are anticipated to be 
weaker, which may mean that CG has a similar impact on both types of firms. Further, although 
past studies have excluded financial firms from their datasets, literature in EM and CG does not 
provide empirically support for their arguments. Thus, the current study will test its main finding 
in order to confirm or reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the 
impact of CG on EM between financial and non-financial Omani listed firms. In doing so, the 
relationship between EM and CG is re-estimated by including only non-financial firms (87 firms) 
in order to examine the extent to which they are sensitive to financial firms. Equation (4) is used 
to perform this examination; the findings are discussed below.   
Table 60 reports the results of financial and non-financial firms (Columns 3 to 4), and 
only non-financial firms (Columns 5 to 6). The F-Stat and adjusted R
2
 show similar values to 
those reported by the main test. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of included variables are 
not different from zero is rejected, as the F-Stat is significant at the 1% level of significance. The 
adjusted R
2 
indicates that about 16% of the variability in the DA is jointly predicted by 
explanatory and control variables. Overall, the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the influence of CG on EM between financial and non-financial firms is accepted, as 
this test produces similar results to those reported by the main test. The relationships between the 
DA and CG index, government ownership, block ownership, board size and CG committee are 
significant. Similarly, the majority of the control variables’ results are consistent with the main 
findings. These results suggest several conclusions, which are discussed in the following 
subsections.  
7.3.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Limited cases of sensitivity have been found. First, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the OCGI, which was statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, is 
now statistically significant at the 1% level. Second, the institutional ownership, which was 
statistically significant at the 5% level, is now no longer statistically significant. Third, board 
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size, which was statistically insignificant, becomes statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, the CG committee variable, which was statistically insignificant, is now statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance. The sign and significance of the remaining CG 
variables have not changed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 60: The results based only on non-financial firms 
 Financial and non-financial  Non-financial 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 -0.0008 0.0018
***
 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0201 0.0184
**
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 -0.0002 0.1418 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0003 0.1837 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0003 0.0610
*
 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0324 0.0366
**
 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0088 0.2172 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0168 0.0803
*
 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0135 0.1279 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0170 0.0182
**
 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0836 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.4369 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0002 0.9441 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0513 0.0071
***
 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0432 0.0080
***
 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0305 0.0395
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 -0.0026 0.8477 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0138 0.2830 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0010 0.9424 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0143 0.3494 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0336 0.0100
*
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0137 0.3166 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0075 0.5916 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.0400 0.1417 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.0338 0.2233 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.0386 0.1784 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 Excluded 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.0046 0.8868 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.0384 0.1857 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1829 0.0000
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0438 0.1715 
Constant  0.0787 -0.0006 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838  0.1594 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
       6.2359
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154   2.0073 
Number of observations  1152 858 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent 
government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. 
CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of 
gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of 
profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic 
materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial 
sector, utilities sector and Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are 
used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.3.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
Despite a limited number of sensitivities regarding year and industry dummies, the 
direction and significance level of the control variables are largely in line with those reported by 
the main test. There are limited sensitive cases. First, growth and year 2009, which were 
statistically significant at the 1% level, are now statistically significant at 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. Second, years 2001 to 2002, which were statistically significant at the 
5% level, are now statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Finally, firm size, which 
was statistically significant at the 10% level, is now statistically insignificant.  
7.4 RESULTS BASED ON THE SAMPLE PERIOD 
In order to ascertain whether the main findings are sensitive over the sample period, the 
relationship between  firm-level EM  and firm-level CG was re-estimated by including a dummy 
(Pre_2003-2011) which takes the value of 1 if an observation is in the 2003 to 2011 period, and 0 
otherwise. A positive but statistically insignificant coefficient on the Pre_2003-2011 dummy is 
observable, implying that the main results are not sensitive to the sample period. The results of 
this analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 61, in addition to the results of the main 
analysis reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same table. The null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between observed and predicted values is rejected, as the F-Stat is 
significant at the 1% level. Similar to the main analysis, the adjusted R
2
 test is 0.18, indicating 
that 18% of the variability in the DA is explained by explanatory and control variables. The key 
sensitivities between this analysis and the main analysis are discussed below.  
7.4.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Despite changes in the magnitude of coefficients, the sign and significance level of the 
coefficients on all CG variables remain the same as those reported by the main analysis. The 
OCGI, government ownership and institutional ownership are statistically significant and 
negatively associated with the DA, whereas block ownership has a statistically significant and 
positive relationship with the DA. Board and audit variables remain statistically insignificant 
determinants.  
7.4.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
Similarly, the direction and significance level on the coefficients of all control variables 
have not changed, except limited cases of sensitivities related to year dummies. Years 2001 to 
2002, which were statistically significant at 5% level, become statistically insignificant. The 
direction on the coefficient of year 2004 becomes negative but remains statistically insignificant.  
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Table 61: The results based on the sample period 
 2001/2011 Post 2003/2011 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 -0.0004 0.0639
*
 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0184 0.0157
**
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 -0.0003 0.0307
**
 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0001 0.6674 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0002 0.0583
*
 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0148 0.2941 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0034 0.6397 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0123 0.1512 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0107 0.1672 
  Pre-2003           -      - 0.0361 0.1014 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0193 0.0049
***
 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0932 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.4669 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0050 0.0790
*
 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0096 0.4419 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0028 0.8715 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0347 0.0168
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 -0.0001 0.9972 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0064 0.6166 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0074 0.5700 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0205 0.1388 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0321 0.0064
***
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0097 0.4088 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0092 0.4455 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.0411 0.1210 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.0342 0.2022 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.0382 0.1677 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 -0.0295 0.2758 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.0076 0.8100 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.0386 0.1704 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1762 0.0000
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0377 0.2230 
Constant  0.0787  0.0436 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838                     0.1831 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
       8.8161
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.                    2.0154                     2.0155 
Number of observations                     1152                       1152 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent 
government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. 
CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of 
gender. Pre-2003 denotes dummy variable. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA 
denotes the return on asset as a measure of profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy 
variables that are used to capture the basic materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer services sector, financial 
sector, health care sector, industrial sector, utilities sector and Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies 
represent dummy variables that are used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry 
were excluded from the model in order to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.5 RESULTS BASED ON THE FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL 
In order to check whether unobserved firm-specific characteristics affect the original 
results, the current study uses a fixed-effects model, as suggested by the Hausman test,42 to re-
estimate the impact of CG on EM. The results of this analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 62, in addition to the results of the OLS that are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of the same 
table. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the nine CG variables in addition to control 
variables are equal to zero is rejected, as indicated by the F-Stat. The adjusted R
2 
(34%) is higher 
than that reported by the OLS model. Overall, the OCGI, government ownership, foreign 
ownership, board diversity on the basis of gender, leverage and profitability are predicted by the 
fixed-effects model to be significant determinants of the DA. The key sensitivities between the 
fixed-effects model and the OLS model are discussed below. 
7.5.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Limited cases of sensitivities were observed related to this group of variables. The main 
variable, the OCGI, which was predicted to be significantly associated with the DA in the main 
model still shows a significant relationship with the DA, with little change in the level of 
significance, where the OCGI, which was significant at the 10% level, becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Foreign ownership and board diversity on the basis of gender, which 
were statistically insignificant, become statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively, while block ownership, which was statistically significant, is no longer 
significant. The signs on the coefficients of institutional ownership and foreign ownership, which 
were negative in the OLS model, are now positive in the fixed-effects model. Similarly, the 
direction on the coefficient of board size, which was positive, is now negative.  
7.5.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables 
Panel B of Table 62 shows a limited number of sensitivities. The coefficients on growth 
and firm size, which were statistically significant, no longer are, whereas year 2008 and the 
health care sector, which were statistically insignificant, become statistically significant at 5% 
and 10% levels. Second, year 2001 and year 2009, which were statistically significant at the 5% 
and 1% levels, become statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Finally, the 
sign on the coefficients of some variables has changed where consumer services, consumer 
goods, financials and utilities sectors become positively related to the DA. 
 
                                                 
42For the purpose of brevity, the results of the Hausman test are not reported here.  
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7.6 RESULTS BASED ON THE LAGGED STRUCTURE MODEL 
The lagged structure model is adopted in this study as an alternative estimation method to 
address some concerns associated with endogenity problem, such as a time-lag in firm-level EM 
and firm-level CG relation. Similar to prior studies (e.g. Prior et al., 2008), this study lags all the 
used variables by one period, considering the possibility that lagged values may capture crucial 
Table 62: The results based on the fixed–effects model 
 Simple  OLS Fixed effects 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 -0.0005 0.0346
**
 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0187 0.0162
**
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 0.0002 0.2301 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 0.0005 0.0051
***
 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0000 0.8270 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 -0.0140 0.3734 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0005 0.9382 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0090 0.3099 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0153 0.0615
*
 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0076 0.2254 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0903 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.5243 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0035 0.2429 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0424 0.0042
***
 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0314 0.0129
**
 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0240 0.0278
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 0.0008 0.9326 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0108 0.2751 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0006 0.9529 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0230 0.0286
**
 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0217 0.0255
**
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0134 0.1841 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0068 0.4988 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 0.1373 0.4131 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 0.2840 0.1171 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 0.1222 0.3133 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.1471 0.0549
*
 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 0.0377 0.1943 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1559 0.0087
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 0.0256 0.7493 
Constant  0.0787 -0.0415 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838  0.3443 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
       5.0682
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154  1.9877 
Number of observations  1152                      1152 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent 
government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. 
CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of 
gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of 
profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture consumer 
goods sector, consumer services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial sector, utilities sector and 
Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture years’ 
effect (2001-2011).  Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap. Basic materials sector was excluded by Eviews software. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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dynamic structure in the DA that may be result from other factors that are not considered in this 
OLS analysis (Brooks, 2007). Therefore, the estimated lagged structure is performed using the 
following equation. 
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             (7) 
Where DA refers to discretionary accruals as a proxy of firm-level EM practices, which is 
measured by a modified Jones Model (1995), OCGI, GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, 
BLKOWN, BSIZE, BIG4, CGCOM and GNDR is defined as the Omani CG index, government 
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, block ownership, board size, audit firm 
size, presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of gender. CONTROLS refer 
to the six control variables, namely, growth, portability, leverage, firm size, industry dummies, 
and year dummies. The total number of firm-year observations is decreased from 1,152 to 1,036 
as a result of lagging the variables.  
Columns 5 to 6 of Table 63 report the findings of the lagged structure model. The F-Stat 
is statistically significant, indicating that the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
included variables are not equal to zero is accepted. The adjusted R
2 
suggests that about 18 % of 
the variability in the DA is explained by this model. Generally, the results predicted by the lagged 
structure model are largely consistent with those reported by the un-lagged structure model. The 
association between the DA and CG index, government ownership, institutional ownership, 
growth, leverage and profitability is statistically significant. The findings of this examination are 
discussed further below, with a focus on the main sensitivities between the lagged structure and 
the un-lagged structure models. 
7.6.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
The sign of the coefficients on all CG variables remain the same as those reported by the 
un-lagged structure model, while the statistical significance levels still significant for most. 
Specifically, the statistical significance of the coefficient on government, which was statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance, is now statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient on block ownership, which was statistically significant at the 10% level, becomes 
statistically insignificant. The remaining CG variables are still statistically insignificant as 
reported by un-lagged structure model. 
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7.6.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
The direction of the coefficients on control variables is in line with those reported in the 
main test, whereas limited cases of sensitivity are found regarding the statistical significance 
level. Growth and year 2009, which were statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, 
are now statistically significant at the 5% level. Firm size and year 2001, which were statistically 
significant at the 10 % and 5% levels of significance, respectively, are no longer significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 63: The results based on  the lagged structure model 
 Un-lagged structure Lagged structure 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664
*
 -0.0004 0.0894
*
 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152
**
 -0.0212 0.0062
***
 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304
**
 -0.0003 0.0331
**
 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0001 0.6878 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575
*
 0.0002 0.1992 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0114 0.4598 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0055 0.4565 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0112 0.1962 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0088 0.2785 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045
***
 0.0158 0.0281
**
 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000
***
 0.0842 0.0000
***
 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000
***
 0.4834 0.0000
***
 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813
*
 -0.0037 0.2165 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131
**
 -0.0103 0.9115 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138
**
 -0.0342 0.0375
**
 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175
**
 -0.0304 0.0344
**
 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 0.0041 0.7487 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0029 0.8181 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0095 0.4648 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0205 0.1158 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067
***
 -0.0303 0.0191
**
 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0075 0.5614 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0100 0.4508 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.0501 0.1254 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.0426 0.1976 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.0453 0.1707 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 -0.0366 0.2657 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 0.0038 0.9241 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.0522 0.1213 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000
***
 -0.1824 0.0003
***
 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0544 0.1420 
Constant  0.0787 0.0799 
Adj. R
2
  0.1838 0.1746 
F-Stat       9.0940
***
     7.8333
***
 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154 2.0086 
Number of observations  1152 1036 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent 
government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. 
CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on the base of 
gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of 
profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic 
materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial 
sector, utilities sector and Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are 
used to capture years’ effect (2001-2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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7.7 FINDINGS BASED ON THE 2SLS MODEL  
Because the main results of this study can be significantly affected by the presence of 
endogeneity,43 the widely used 2SLS technique is adopted in addition to lagged structure in order 
to further check the possibility of its presence, which may arise as a result of omitted variables 
and/or simultaneity (Larcher and Rusticus, 2010). In particular, the potential for this problem 
arises when the OCGI assumed to be exogenous in equation (4) is associated with the error term. 
This can occur when an important control variable is not included in the model (e.g., 
unavailability of the data) and/or when the dependent variable simultaneously determines the 
independent variable (Wooldridge, 2009). This may cause the OLS results (main results) to be 
biased and inconsistent. Following Larcher and Rusticus’ (2010) methodology, this study 
accounts for the possibility of biases caused by endogeneity by using 2SLS technique. In doing 
so, the Hausman test is employed to detect for the existence of endogeneity, which involves two 
stages. The first stage, as specified in the equation below, the OCGI is regressed on control 
variables and its predicted value is saved as P-OCGI. 



n
i
ititiit CONTROLSOCGI
1
0                                                     (8)                                                    
Where OCGI refers to the Omani CG index and CONTROLS refers to control variables, which 
are the same as those used in the main regression (equation 4). In the second stage, the OCGI and 
P-OCGI, in addition to the control variables, are included in following equation. 



n
i
ititiititit CONTROLSOCGIPOCGIDA
1
210                                   (9) 
Where DA refers to discretionary accruals measured by a modified Jones Model (1995), OCGI 
refers to the Omani CG index, P-OCGI refers to the predicted value of OCGI, CONTROLS 
refers to the control variables, which are the same as those used in the main regression (equation 
4).  
Although the Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, as the 
coefficient on the P-OCGI is not statistically significant (P-value = 0.109),44 the study carried out 
the 2SLS technique to avoid any doubt that there was no endogeneity problem. The 2SLS 
technique was performed as follows. In the first stage, the main variable, OCGI, is assumed to be 
determined by the six control variables and four alternative CG variables, where the choice of the 
alternative CG variables is based on the theoretical and empirical literature and the availability of 
                                                 
43
A discussion of endogeneity and techniques that have been used in accounting research to deal with this problem is provided by 
Chenhall and Moers (2007).  
44For the purpose of brevity, the results of both regressions (the first and second stages of the Hausman test) are not reported here. 
The guidance of this test is that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected if the coefficient on the predicted value 
from the first stage regression is significant in the second stage (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
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data. Drawing from the literature (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Petra, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008; McCabe and Nowak, 2008; Tariq et al., 2014), the 
alternative CG variables include board diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-
executive directors on the board, capital expenditure, and the number of board directors’ 
meetings. The first stage regression is specified as follows.  



n
i
ititiititititit CONTROLSCAPEXNBMsNEXDBDIVOCGI
1
43210            (10) 
Where OCGI refers to the Omani CG index, BDIV, NEXD, NBMs, and CAPEX are defined as 
board diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, 
the number of board directors’ meetings and capital expenditure. CONTROLS refers to the six 
control variables, namely, growth, porfitability, leverage, firm size, industry dummies, and year 
dummies.  
The predicted value and residuals of OCGI are saved and referred to as P-OCGI and R-
OCGI, respectively. The correlation matrix (not reported here) shows that the predicted value of 
the OCGI (P-OCGI) is significantly correlated with the OCGI and insignificantly associated with 
R-OCGI, indicating that the P-OCGI is a relevant and valid instrument for the OCGI. In the 
second stage, equation (4) is re-estimated by using the P-OCGI instead of the OCGI, as specified 
below.  
 





n
i
ititi
ititititit
ititititit
CONTROLS
GNDRCGCOMBIGBSIZEBLKOWN
FOROWNINSOWNGOVOWNOCGIPDA
1
98765
43210
4



                 (11) 
The results of 2SLS are presented in Columns 5 to 6 of Table 64. The F-Stat is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the included 
variables are equal to zero is rejected. The adjusted R
2 
indicates that 18% of the variability in the 
DA is driven by CG and control variables, which is very similar to that variability provided by the 
OLS model (main results). In general, the 2SLS’s results are very much in line with those 
reported by the OLS model. The DA is significantly associated with CG index, government 
ownership, institutional ownership, block ownership, growth, leverage, profitability and firm size. 
The key sensitivities between the 2SLS results and the OLS results are discussed further below. 
7.7.1 Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Variables 
Panel A of Table 64 show that the sign and significance level of the coefficients on CG 
variables remain essentially similar to those reported by the OLS model, except that block 
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ownership, which was statistically significant at the 10% level, becomes statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
7.7.2 Empirical Results of Control Variables  
The direction and significance level of the control variables show limited cases of 
sensitivities. First, the statistical significance of the coefficients on firm size and year 2003, 
which were statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, become statistically 
significant at 5% and 10% levels. Second, years 2001 to 2002, which were statistically significant 
at the 5% level, become statistically insignificant. Third, basic materials, consumer services, 
consumer goods, industrials and utilities sectors, which were statistically insignificant, become 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 5%, 5% and 5% levels, respectively. Finally, the sign of 
the coefficient on health care, which was positive, becomes negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 64: The results based on the two stage least squares model 
 Simple  OLS 2SLS 
Independent variables Exp. sign Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
Panel A: CG variables   
  POCGI                 -      - -0.0350 0.0546* 
  OCGI - -0.0005 0.0664*                   -     - 
  GOVOWN - -0.0185 0.0152** -0.0188 0.0146** 
  INSOWN - -0.0003 0.0304** -0.0004 0.0117** 
  FOROWN - -0.0001 0.6638 -0.0001 0.6419 
  BLKOWN + 0.0003 0.0575* 0.0003 0.0433** 
  BSIZE +/- 0.0146 0.2994 0.0136 0.3347 
  BIG4 - -0.0035 0.6237 -0.0043 0.5504 
  CGCOM - 0.0123 0.1525 0.0092 0.2805 
  GNDR - -0.0108 0.1651 -0.0115 0.1488 
Panel B:Control variables   
  GROWTH  0.0195 0.0045*** 0.0217 0.0019*** 
  LVRG  0.0933 0.0000*** 0.0967 0.0000*** 
  ROA  0.4872 0.0000*** 0.4884 0.0000*** 
  LNTA  -0.0049 0.0813* -0.0057 0.0427** 
  2001  -0.0444 0.0131** -0.0207 0.1127 
  2002  -0.0381 0.0138** -0.0187 0.1316 
  2003  -0.0341 0.0175** -0.0225 0.0894* 
  2004  0.0003 0.9776 0.0056 0.6349 
  2006  -0.0053 0.6340 -0.0051 0.6475 
  2007  0.0078 0.5547 0.0066 0.6165 
  2008  0.0207 0.1323 0.0186 0.1758 
  2009  -0.0315 0.0067*** -0.0352 0.0026*** 
  2010  -0.0094 0.4204 -0.0131 0.2635 
  2011  0.0095 0.4297 0.0066 0.5810 
  Basic materials  -0.0414 0.1188 -0.1249 0.0100* 
  Consumer services  -0.0343 0.2016 -0.1171 0.0159** 
  Consumer goods  -0.0386 0.1649 -0.1226 0.0125** 
  Financials  -0.0298 0.2723 -0.1118 0.0262 
  Health care  0.0076 0.8127 -0.0232 0.5186 
  Industrials  -0.0389 0.1674 -0.1169 0.0127** 
  Telecommunications  -0.1765 0.0000*** -0.1682 0.0000*** 
  Utilities  -0.0379 0.2216 -0.0841 0.0357** 
Constant  0.0787     0.2072** 
Adj. R2  0.1838  0.1839 
F-Stat      9.0940***      9.0957*** 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.0154  2.0172 
Number of observations  1152 1152 
Notes: POCGI denotes the instrumental variable for the CG index. OCGI denotes the Oman corporate governance index. GOVOWN, 
INSOWN, FOROWN, BLKOWN represent government, institutional, foreign, block ownership structures. BSIZ denotes board size. 
BIG4 denotes audit firm size. CGCOM denotes the presence of corporate governance committee. GNDR denotes board diversity on 
the base of gender. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. ROA denotes the return on asset as a measure of 
profitability. LNTA denotes firm size. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic materials 
sector, consumer goods sector, consumer services sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial sector, utilities sector and 
Telecommunications sector, respectively. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture years’ effect (2001-
2011). Year 2005 and Oil and Gas industry were excluded from the model in order to avoid the dummy variable trap The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj.R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-
statistics. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
As indicated in Section 1, Oman has conducted a series of governance reforms (e.g., the 
2002 CG code) as a response to the 1997 Asian crisis and international corporate developments. 
These reforms aim to curb opportunistic managerial behaviour by separating management’s 
decisions and their control. In particular, Oman has sought to make its economy less vulnerable 
to accounting scandals and corporate failures by encouraging a CG culture that aims to reduce 
managers’ ability to report earnings. Arguably, however, a number of challenges face Omani 
firms in implementing good CG standards, such as informal rules and ownership concentration. 
These challenges raise a critical question on the extent to which the CG system in Oman can 
provide effective control procedures that limit managers’ discretion in managing earnings. 
Further, Oman has adopted a UK-style CG system which may not be appropriate for its firms 
given the major differences between the two countries, such as institutional structures. These 
differences seem to have important implications for achieving good CG standards among Omani 
firms.   
This study argues that the uniqueness of the Omani context may suggest different results 
from what is reported in develoed countries regarding the effectiveness of the CG system in 
mitigating EM practices. Hence, examining the relationship between firm-level EM and firm-
level CG in this context is the central aim of this study. Primarily motivated by the unique Omani 
characteristics and the absence of prior empirical evidence on Oman, this study seeks to find 
whether the CG reforms conducted by the Omani state were effective in improving earnings 
quality. Specifically, it empirically investigates how effective the CG system is in constraining 
EM practices, in the form of recommendations suggested by the 2002 Omani voluntary code and 
CG mechanisms proposed by other laws, such as Companies Act no. 4 of 1974 and its 
amendments. Using a large sample of Omani listed firms (116 firms with a total of 1,152 firm-
year observations) for the period 2001 to 2011, this study empirically investigates the extent to 
which CG measures and different ownership structures influence EM practices.  
Until recently, most existing studies have examined this relation based on single-
dimensional CG characteristics. In contrast, and in response to recent calls in the literature (e.g., 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008), the current study employs multi-dimensional 
CG characteristics rather than examining CG mechanisms individually. An aggregate measure of 
CG comprising 72 governance provisions (the CG index) was mainly used to examine the 
association between CG and EM. The rationale has been to account for the interrelationships 
between CG mechanisms, as some can complement or substitute each other. Further, the present 
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study distinguishes itself from previous studies by examining four types of ownership structure in 
addition to a number of factors not yet examined extensively in the literature, namely government 
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block ownership, presence of a CG 
committee and board diversity on the basis of gender. This section summarises the findings 
presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6. Specifically, Subsections 8.1 and 8.2 provide a 
summary of the study findings based on the main analysis and robustness analysis. Subsection 
8.3 discusses the policy implications of these findings. Subsection 8.4 summarises the 
contributions of the study. Subsection 8.5 highlights the study’s limitations and suggests avenues 
for future research.  
8.1 RESULTS BASED ON THE MAIN ANALYSIS 
As indicated in Sections 1 and 3, most previous studies examine the relation between 
firm-level EM and firm-level CG by using single-dimensional CG characteristics (e.g., board or 
audit characteristics). This study responds to recent calls in the literature for additional 
investigation in order to expand our understanding of the collective effect of CG measures on EM 
practices. Generally, in line with most past studies, the findings in Section 6 indicate that there is 
a significant reverse association between CG and EM among Omani listed firms. This result was 
obtained by testing the main hypothesis (H5), that there is a statistically significant negative 
association between CG index and firm EM practices. The statistically significant and negative 
relation between the OCGI and the DA indicates that, on average, better-governed Omani listed 
firms tend to engage less in EM practices than poorly-governed firms. Quantitatively, holding all 
the other variables within the model constant, an increase of one unit in the OCGI will reduce the 
use of EM practices by 0.0005.  
As documented in Subsection 6, the negative evidence is consistent with the findings of 
some previous studies (e.g., Chen and Chih, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Bekiris and Doukakis, 
2011; Leventis and Dimitropulos, 2012), but is contrary to the result of Bowen et al. (2008) who 
report no significant relation between CG and EM practices. Theoretically, firms with high-
quality CG are more likely to have higher earnings quality, as CG provides a set of constraints 
that ensure reliable and accurate financial reporting, mitigate information asymmetry and reduce 
agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shilefere and Vishny, 1986; Williamson, 
1988). Managers’ discretion in financial reporting in better-governed firms is limited by effective 
CG mechanisms, where the firm’s management actions are supervised by the board of directors 
through its committees, among other CG mechanisms. Thus, CG mechanisms allow stakeholders 
to confidently distinguish between firms with potential EM and those with earnings quality by 
ensuring that the reported accounting numbers are credible. 
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In addition to the OCGI hypothesis, eight hypotheses related to government ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, block ownership, board size, audit firm size, presence 
of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of gender were tested in this study.  
The first hypothesis examined is that there is a statistically significant negative association 
between government ownership and firm EM practices. The coefficient on government 
ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This means that 
H1 is empirically supported, and the finding offers empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Ding 
et al., 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011) reporting that government ownership and EM are 
significantly and negatively associated, but opposes Li et al. (2011), who report empirical 
evidence that the variables are significantly and positively correlated. The negative evidence of a 
statistically significant government ownership-EM relation reflects the crucial role of the state as 
long-term investor in reducing EM practices; about 26% of Omani listed firms have shares hold 
by the government.  
The second hypothesis predicts that there is a statistically significant negative association 
between institutional ownership and firm EM practices. The coefficient on institutional 
ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, indicating that 
H2 is empirically supported. Also, the result indicates that investment institutions holding many 
shares in a firm can provide active monitoring that reduces EM practices. This finding offers 
empirical support to some prior studies (e.g., Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; 
Wang, 2014), but not others (e.g., Koh, 2003; Siregar and Utama, 2008), which report empirical 
evidence of no significant association.  
The third hypothesis predicts a statistically significant negative association between 
foreign ownership and firm EM practices. The coefficient on foreign ownership is negative but 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that H3 is not empirically supported. Further, it indicates 
that foreign ownership is less able to mitigate EM practices in the Omani context than in other 
corporate contexts, such as Japan.  The insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and 
EM practices is in line with some prior studies (e.g., Li et al., 2011), but not others (e.g., Lel, 
2013; Guo et al., 2012).  
The fourth hypothesis predicts a statistically significant positive association between 
block ownership and firm EM practices. The coefficient on block ownership is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, indicating that H4 is empirically 
supported. This result may stem from the expectation that managers and block holders are highly 
influenced by informal rules, where the latter do not acting as a CG mechanism to mitigate EM 
practices. Instead, block holders appear to force managers to engage in EM practices in order to 
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expropriate minority shareholders. Empirically, this finding is in line with some prior studies 
(e.g., Haw et al., 2004; Kim and Yi, 2006), but inconsistent with studies (e.g., Ali et al., 2008; 
Aleves, 2012) that document reverse association, as well as those (e.g., Davidson et al., 2005; Lo 
et al., 2010) that report no significant relation.  
The sixth hypothesis predicts a statistically significant association between board size and 
firm EM practices. The finding suggests that there is a statistically insignificant and positive 
relationship between the two variables, which means that H6 is not empirically supported. The 
non-relevance of board size in explaining changes in EM is likely to be attributed to the powerful 
influence of informal rules on the firm’s board. It seems that Omani directors have long-term 
commitments to family, tribe and personal relationships, rather than formal rules such as CG 
systems; this weakens their ability to reduce EM practices. This finding supports some prior 
studies (e.g., Firth et al., 2007), but not those (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2010) that 
report a statistically significant and negative association between the two variables, or other 
studies (e.g., Rahman and Ali, 2006; Epps and Ismail, 2009; Ales, 2012) that report empirical 
evidence that board size has a significant and positive relation with EM practices.  
The seventh hypothesis predicts a statistically significant negative association between the 
presence of a CG committee and firm EM practices. The coefficient on CG committee is positive 
and statistically insignificant, indicating that H7 is rejected. This study fails to provide empirical 
evidence that firms that set up a CG committee tend to engage less in EM practices. The finding 
suggests that a CG committee is unable to assist boards in curbing opportunistic managerial 
behaviour in the form of EM practices. This can stem from the possibility that Omani members of 
CG committees may either have less knowledge about good CG practices or find it difficult to 
improve the CG culture in Omani listed firms.  
The eighth hypothesis predicts a statistically significant negative association between 
audit firm size and firm EM practices. Although the sign of the coefficient on audit firm size is in 
line with the expected sign, its statistical significance is not, so the study rejects H8. Empirically, 
the statistically insignificant coefficient on audit firm size is in line with some prior studies (e.g., 
Davidson et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2007), but different from studies (e.g., Francis and Wang, 
2008; Kent et al., 2010; Iatrdis, 2012) that show a statistically significant and negative 
coefficient.  
The final hypothesis predicts a statistically significant negative association between board 
diversity on the basis of gender and firm EM practices. The estimated coefficient of board 
diversity on the basis of gender is negative but not statistically significant, so H9 is empirically 
rejected. Empirically, the finding supports some prior studies (e.g., Sun et al., 2011), but not 
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others (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gavious et al., 2012). The ineffectiveness of female 
representation on Omani listed boards in reducing EM practices may be attributed to conservative 
traditions.   
8.2 RESULTS BASED ON THE ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
As reported and discussed in Section 7, a number of robustness analyses were conducted to 
address a number of theoretical and empirical issues. This was done in order to assess the extent 
to which the findings obtained in Section 6 are robust or sensitive to alternative models and 
estimations. The robustness analyses include re-estimating the model using an alternative CG 
index, an alternative measure of EM, only non-financial firms, a fixed-effects model, a lagged 
structure model, a 2SLS model and examining whether the main results are sensitive over the 
sample period. Overall, the robustness analyses suggest that the statistically significant negative 
relationship between CG and EM is robust to alternative models and estimations. 
 First, the main model was re-estimated by replacing the un-weighted CG index with a 
weighted CG index in order to check whether using a weighted CG index would give different 
results. The findings are the same whether a weighted or an weighted index is used, offering 
support to the original findings. Second, the firm-level EM was re-computed by using Kothari et 
al.’s Model (2005), and the association between firm-level EM and firm-level CG was re-
estimated to check the extent to which the main findings are robust to alternative measure of EM. 
The majority of the findings based on Kothari et al.’s Model (2005) are similar to those reported 
in the main analysis, indicating that findings based on the modified Jones Model are not sensitive 
to alternative measures of EM. Third, the impact of CG on EM was re-estimated by including 
only non-financial firms (87 firms) in order to address the claim in the literature that the influence 
of CG on EM can be significantly different between financial and non-financial firms. The 
findings of the robustness analysis accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in terms of the influence of CG on EM between financial and non-financial firms. In 
other words, the findings based only on non-financial firms are robust and not sensitive to 
financial firms. This offers empirical support to the current study’s argument that CG has a 
similar impact on both types of firms because they operate in an environment where corporate 
regulations and enforcements are anticipated to be weaker. Fourth, the relationship between firm-
level EM and firm-level CG was re-estimated by including a dummy (Pre_2003-2011) in order to 
ascertain whether the main results are sensitive over the sample period. The results of this 
analysis indicate that the results predicted by the main model are not sensitive over the sample 
period. Fifth, in order to account for unobserved firm-specific characteristics, the influence of CG 
on EM was re-estimated using a fixed-effects model. This model predicted similar results to the 
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OLS model, indicating that the main results are not sensitive to unobserved firm-specific factors. 
Sixth, the main model was re-estimated using a lagged structure model in order to account for a 
time-lag in firm-level EM and firm-level CG that may lead to endogeneity problem. The findings 
of this analysis are largely in line with the main findings, suggesting that the original findings are 
not sensitive to alternative estimations, namely lagged structure, which reduces the likelihood that 
the main findings may suffer from endogenity problem. Finally, in addition to lagged structure, 
the widely-used 2SLS technique was performed in order to further check the extent to which the 
main findings may suffer from endogenity problem that may arise from omitted variables and/or 
simultaneity. The findings of 2SLS are consistent with the OLS findings, implying that the 
evidence of a statistical significant and negative relationship between CG and EM is not 
significantly sensitive to endogeneity problem. 
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Given the alternative models and estimations used, the statistically significant and negative 
association between EM and CG supports the theoretical and empirical literature. The finding 
suggests that, on average, better-governed Omani listed firms engage less in EM than those with 
poor governance structures. Similarly, the findings indicate that Omani listed firms with large 
government and institutional ownership tend to have greater reductions in EM, while firms with 
block ownership exhibit higher levels of EM. The conclusions derived from these findings 
suggest policy implications and recommendations.  
First, the finding of the OCGI suggests that the introduction of the 2002 Omani CG code, 
alongside the Companies Law, has assisted in slightly (i.e., the magnitude of OCGI is very low) 
improving the quality of earnings reported by Omani listed firms. This evidence seems to suggest 
that adopting a UK-style CG regime appears to be working to a certain degree, but may not 
provide effective control procedures that curb managerial self-interest in general and mitigate EM 
practices in particular without taking into account the Omani context (Mueller, 1995). Factors 
including informal rules and ownership concentration may negatively impact implementation of 
good CG standards. Further, the 2002 Omani CG code contains limited CG provisions, which 
may not be enough to encourage firms to engage in good CG practices, which in turn results in 
less EM practices. Similarly, reviewing the Omani listing and trading rules reveals that they do 
not have governance requirements that can support those suggested by the 2002 Omani code. 
Hence, the Omani authorities (e.g., CMA, MSM) should further reform the CG regulatory 
framework in order to create a more effective CG system that leads to improved financial 
reporting. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) indicate that countries must introduce additional 
CG reforms alongside CG codes in order to improve their CG practices; for instance, CG 
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provisions that prevent the chairperson and chief executive from being related or from the same 
tribe may help the monitoring role of the firm’s board. Some CG provisions relate to internal 
audit, and update the listing and trading rules may be required in order to improve financial 
reporting quality and generate more accurate and reliable information.  
In the same vein, the examination of the levels of EM indicates that EM practices exercised 
by Omani managers vary across industries. The findings indicate that financial, consumer 
services, consumer goods, and basic materials industries have higher average of EM. This may 
suggest that Omani policy makers should consider the characteristics of such industries before 
making any new CG reforms regarding reducing EM practices. This finding suggests that Omani 
firms in general, and those seeking new or additional financing in particular, should enhance their 
CG practices. This would allow them to attract new investors, as potential investors pay attention 
to CG practices to distinguish between firms with possible EM practices and those with quality 
earnings. CG can be considered by outsiders as a crucial determinant of financial reporting 
quality in Oman. Different Omani stakeholders (e.g., potential investors and debt holders) assume 
that managers’ discretion in financial reporting in better-governed firms is limited by effective 
CG mechanisms, through supervision by board committees and other CG mechanisms.  
Second, the findings related to government ownership indicate that the Omani state appears 
to hold large portions of shares in listed firms, and its presence as a shareholder in a firm leads to 
lower EM practices. These findings show the influential power of the state in corporate financial 
decision processes; about 26% of Omani listed firms’ shares are held by the state. This implies 
that the government’s role in providing active monitoring over managers benefits minority 
shareholders who can rely on these efforts to reduce EM practices in the firms they invest in. This 
may have an important implication: small and individual investors may tend to invest in firms 
with large portions of shares held by the state, as they can rely on these firms’ financial reporting 
to make investment decisions. In contrast, firms with no government ownership may lose a 
considerable number of potential investors. Thus, the major way in which Omani firms with no 
government ownership can attract small, individual investors is to engage in good CG practices 
that ensure new investors’ decisions are built on accurate and reliable information, and their 
interests and preferences will be protected.  
Third, EM practices in firms with large institutional ownership are lower, indicating that 
institutional investors tend to be associated with earnings quality. Omani policy makers should 
encourage a culture of diffuse ownership in order to increase monitoring over managers, limiting 
discretion in financial reporting. For instance, statutory corporate laws may include corporate 
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provisions that either exempt firms with diffuse ownership from some corporate requirements or 
give them some operating advantages in the Omani market.  
Fourth, contrary to other corporate settings (e.g., Japan), foreign ownership has no 
significant relationship with EM practices. This may suggest that foreign investors face 
problematic issues that restrict their ability to provide active monitoring. In this regard, Omani 
policy makers may be encouraged to relax some restrictions on foreign investors in order to 
benefit from foreign investors’ experiences in mitigating EM practices. Foreign investors care 
about their reputations, so they will be motivated to provide active monitoring.   
Fifth, the statistically significant and positive relation between block ownership and EM 
practices supports a view of Oman as an emerging country where high levels of concentrated 
ownership (around 55%) and block ownership do not seem to provide efficient monitoring of EM 
practices. This finding appears to suggest that block shareholders tend to increase managerial 
motivation to report earnings. In this regard, Omani policy makers should introduce CG 
provisions that protect minority shareholders from being expropriated by large shareholders. For 
instance, a CG provision that requires firms to have a minority shareholder representative on the 
board may be useful. Firms can be required to use a cumulative voting method (i.e., a one-share-
one-vote policy) that may increase the chance of a minority shareholder representative being 
appointed to the board.  
Sixth, the statistically insignificant relationship between board size and EM practices 
suggests that board size has no role in mitigating EM practices among Omani firms. This finding 
may be attributed to Omani board directors’ lack of financial and accounting experience. 
Although the 2002 CG Code requires board directors to understand financial reports, it seems that 
more rigid accounting and financial requirements are needed in order to activate board directors’ 
role in effectively monitoring managers. Further, another reason for insignificant finding of board 
size may be that Omani directors are less committed to formal rules, such as a CG system, than to 
informal rules, including family, tribe and personal relationships, making them unable to provide 
active monitoring.  
Seventh, the statistically insignificant and positive association between the presence of a 
CG committee and EM is contrary to the theoretical prediction. This may result from the 
likelihood that CG committee members face issues related to knowledge about identifying good 
CG practices and/or informal rules that limit CG committees’ ability to improve the quality of 
CG within Omani firms. Omani policy makers may be encouraged to introduce specific 
requirements that allow only directors who are experts in CG to be a member in CG committee.  
  364 
 
 
Eight, the relationship between audit quality (audit firm size) and EM was found to be 
negative but statistically insignificant, which does not support the theoretical prediction. This 
finding may be attributed to the recommendations of the 2002 CG Code, which require audit 
firms to report only on a limited number of governance issues, including: (i) the adequacy and 
efficacy of a firm’s internal control systems; (ii) whether a firm has the ability to carry out its 
business; and (iii) its ability to comply with its internal control systems. Hence, introducing new 
CG provisions that require audit firms to report on any change in accounting policies and 
principles, as well as detect any financial reporting irregularities, may be necessary in obtaining 
high-quality audits.  
Finally, the association between board diversity on the basis of gender and EM is also 
negative but not statistically significant, indicating that gender-diverse boards are not associated 
with better monitoring over managers and higher-quality earnings. This may be attributed to the 
small number of female directors on firm boards and/or conservative traditions that restrict 
females from effectively participating on Omani listed board. Firms are encouraged to make 
arrangements that facilitate the participation of women on the board. For instance, firms may 
advertise for female board directors in order to encourage more females to apply for positions. 
Omani policy makers may contribute by introducing CG provisions that require firms to disclose 
their boardroom diversity policies and show how these policies are implemented.  
Emerging countries’ regulatory authorities in general and Omani regulators in particular 
can benefit from this study in further reforming their regulations and suggesting CG 
recommendations that improve the quality of financial information. Importantly, the findings of 
this study suggest that Omani policy makers should find ways to mitigate the powerful influence 
of informal rules on implementing good CG practices. One major way to achieve this objective 
may be running workshops to educate people, especially young people, about the negative 
consequences of complying with such rules, reminding them that those informal rules conflict 
with Shariah Law.  
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS  
As indicated in Subsections 3.1 and 4.2.4, this study empirically examines the firm-level 
EM and firm-level CG relationship using a multi-theory approach and panel data methodology. 
Conducting this examination in an emerging country like Oman contributes to a number of major 
issues in the literature. In particular, researchers have been keen to investigate the extent to which 
a CG system is able to mitigate EM practices in different corporate settings. Since most emerging 
countries have adopted CG standards of developed countries, the question was the extent to 
which adoption of these measures by Omani policy makers would reduce EM practices, given the 
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weak legal enforcement and investment protection. A review of literature suggests an absence of 
empirical evidence on the effect of the Omani CG system on EM practices. Thus, this study 
provides insights on the impact of CG on one aspect of corporate financial decision-making, EM 
behaviour, in Oman and makes a number of contributions to the extant CG literature.   
First, using a sample of 1,152 firm-year observations over 2001-2011, the study offers the 
first empirical evidence on the effect of the Omani CG system on EM practices among Omani 
listed firms. This fills a gap in the literature, as limited empirical evidence has been reported from 
emerging countries in general and the MENA region in particular (Alves, 2012; Wang, 2014). 
Unlike many past studies, the study’s sample is not restricted to firms with large capitalisation 
(avoiding size bias), and includes all listed firms with sufficient data. The sample represents 69% 
of the total population, which allows the study’s findings to be generalised. The composition of 
the sample allowed the study to take advantage of panel data methodology by combining time 
series and cross sections. This assisted the study to mitigate some statistical problems, such as 
multicollinearity, and control for unobserved heterogeneity among variables (Gujarati, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2009).  
Second, consistent with literature suggesting that different ownership structures may lead to 
different motivations to control and monitor managerial decision processes, and different from 
previous studies that examine only a few ownership structures, this study offers empirical 
evidence on the reaction of different types of ownership structures towards EM practices. The 
empirical evidence highlights the importance of government ownership structure as a CG 
mechanism constraining EM practices in Oman. Arguably, this evidence is more convincing than 
that reported by past studies, because previous studies either examine the impact of government 
ownership on EM by comparing state-owned and privately-owned firms, or concentrate only on 
state-owned firms, while this study offers empirical evidence in the context where the state holds 
large portions of shares in many listed firms. Further, it offers empirical evidence that 
institutional ownership is a driving force of CG’s constraint on EM practices in Oman. The 
empirical evidence proves the negative prediction of the theoretical literature that firms with a 
large proportion of institutional ownership tend to exhibit lower levels of EM. Also, the ideal 
setting of Oman allows the study to provide empirical evidence that block ownership does not 
perform its duties as a CG mechanism in mitigating EM practices among listed firms. The 
empirical evidence confirms the current study’s expectation that Omani listed firms with a high 
concentration of ownership engage more in EM practices than those with less ownership 
concentration.  
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Third, unlike most prior studies, this study seeks to examine some factors that have not 
been extensively examined in literature, including foreign ownership, presence of CG committee 
and board diversity on the basis of gender. Although the findings suggest that these factors have 
no significant impact on EM practices in Oman, this attempt opens the door for further research 
in different contexts, as the theoretical literature offers a foundation to conduct such examination.  
Fourth, unlike most past studies that examine the impact of individual CG measures (e.g., 
board or audit characteristics) on EM practices, this study offers empirical evidence on the joint 
effect of CG on EM, using an aggregate measure of CG by relying on a self-constructed CG 
index comprising 72 governance provisions.  
Fifth, while most prior studies exclude financial firms from their examinations because 
these firms have specific CG and accounting requirements, the current study offers empirical 
evidence that there is no significant difference between the influence of CG on EM practices in 
financial and non-financial firms in Oman. This may motivate researchers, especially in emerging 
states, to include financial firms in their investigations, because the weak corporate regulations 
and enforcements in such countries make CG’s influence on EM practices in both financial and 
non-financial firms relatively similar.  
Finally, unlike most previous studies, this study offers empirical evidence on the EM-CG 
relation through alternative models and estimations. The main results were tested to ascertain the 
extent to which they are sensitive to alternative CG and EM measures, financial firms, sample 
period, fixed-effects model, lagged structure model, and 2SLS model.  
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with any empirical study, there are some limitations associated with this study. First, 
the findings may be subject to measurement problems. For instance, other measurements, such as 
audit fee, can be used to measure audit quality instead of using audit firm size. A considerable 
number of sampled firms did not provide enough information to be used as alternative 
measurements for several variables especially CG variables. Second, although the study includes 
a number of control variables, it may suffer from omitted variables bias. Third, the study relies on 
quantitative analysis to answer its research questions, which does not enable the study to interpret 
and explain unexpected relationships between some variables and EM practices. A qualitative 
approach45 in the form of an interview or survey may help identify possible explanations for such 
relations. Fourth, the study examines the impact of CG on EM in listed firms only; non-listed 
firms were excluded from the sample because of unavailable data. This may potentially limit the 
                                                 
45
Qualitative approach was on the agenda, but the study could not do it since a number of implications, such as accessibility, 
funding and time.  
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generalisability of the study’s findings. Fifth, the study uses only annual reports46 as the principal 
sources of data; including other sources, such as analysts’ reports, may help to obtain more 
information. Finally, the study was unable to examine Omani context-specific issues, such as 
religious notions, cultural practices and social norms, as they impact on EM practices. 
The limitations identified above offer avenues for future research. First, alternative 
measurements and variables can be used to improve the findings. For instance, although the study 
examines four types of ownership structures, future studies can re-examine the impact of 
ownership structures on EM practices by considering another type of ownership, namely 
managerial ownership. Future studies can also use alternative definitions for the same variables 
used in this study. This may result in significant findings, compared to those that show no 
significant effect in this study. Second, future studies can include both listed and non-listed firms 
in their samples in examining the relationship between firm-level EM and firm-level CG in the 
Omani context, in order to increase the generalisability of their findings. Third, future studies can 
develop a valid and powerful EM’s measure that assists researchers in examining firm-level EM. 
Fourth, future studies can re-examine the impact of CG on EM practices by addressing Omani 
context-specific issues, such as religious notions, cultural practices and social norms. Finally, 
future studies can apply alternative methodology, such as a qualitative approach, in examining 
the impact of CG on EM practices. Alternative methods, such as interviews, surveys and case 
studies, are expected to provide additional understanding of those findings that are contrary to the 
predicted literature and empirical results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46The reasons for relying on annual reports as the source of data have been discussed in Essay 1.  
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CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
Summary and Conclusion: Findings, 
Implications and Recommendations, 
Contributions, Limitations and Avenues 
for Future Research  
As discussed in all three essays, empirical evidence on why and how a firm’s CG might 
influence its policy decisions is generally limited; this is particularly true in emerging economics, 
especially those in the MENA region. Arguably, this limits current international understanding of 
how and why CG might influence a number of crucial managerial decisions, including voluntary 
CG disclosure, financing and earnings management in emerging economies. This thesis is thus 
designed to quantitatively assess the extent to which Omani CG reforms have been effective in 
improving corporate policy decisions by focusing on these three closely related CG topics over 
the 11-year period (2001-2011). The period examined in these three topics coincides with period 
in which the Omani authorities pursued CG reforms aimed at improving corporate performance. 
In particular, in response to the 1997 Asian crisis and international corporate development, the 
Omani government carried out a number of CG reforms. These reforms seek to restore investor 
confidence and protect stakeholders’ interests. The issuance of a voluntary CG Code by the CMA 
in 2002 is regarded as an important part of the reforms. The 2002 CG Code contains a series of 
recommendations which aim to regulate the management of firms listed on the MSM. 
Importantly, it is intended to promote a culture of compliance and CG disclosure, mitigate agency 
problems and reduce agency costs associated with managerial decisions.   
This thesis aims to achieve eight main objectives. First, it seeks to provide a detailed 
description of the level of listed firms’ voluntary compliance and disclosure with the 2002 Omani 
CG Code. Second, it hopes to ascertain whether the observed variability in levels of voluntary 
compliance and disclosure with the 2002 Omani CG Code can be explained by ownership 
structures and board and audit characteristics. Third, it intends to examine whether, on average, 
better-governed firms are likely to employ higher or lower levels of leverage in making their 
capital structure decisions. Fourth, it attempts to determine whether the estimated coefficients of 
ownership structure and board and audit features are able to explain the association between CG 
and capital structure decisions. Fifth, it seeks to investigate whether, on average, better-governed 
firms are likely to issue equity or debt when seeking new or additional financing. Sixth, it hopes 
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to determine whether the choice of financing can be explained by ownership structure and board 
and audit characteristics. Seventh, it examines whether better-governed firms are associated with 
lower levels of earnings management practices. Finally, it attempts to ascertain the extent to 
which ownership structure and board and audit characteristics can explain observable changes in 
firm-level earnings management.  
The a priori theoretical expectation of this thesis is that an effective CG system should 
lead to better corporate policy decisions. With no previous evidence on Oman, the thesis seeks to 
empirically investigate whether Omani listed firms that comply with the 2002 Omani voluntary 
CG Code, in addition to other CG mechanisms proposed by the Companies Act, tend to make 
better managerial decisions than their poorly-governed counterparts. The main findings of each 
essay are briefly summarised below.   
The first essay examines the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure with the 2002 
Omani CG Code among listed firms, and factors potentially determining such behaviour. The 
results indicate several conclusions. First, contrary to general concerns about the 2002 Omani 
voluntary CG Code’s ability to improve CG standards in Omani context, where informal rules 
and ownership concentration were expected to negatively impact on firms’ willingness to comply 
with the code, Omani firms have had some positive response to the voluntary code’s 
recommendations. Second, in spite of the initial theoretical prediction that the release of the 2002 
Omani voluntary CG Code would promote a culture of compliance and CG disclosure, the results 
clearly suggest that CG compliance and disclosure among listed firms is generally low. Third, the 
introduction of the 2002 Omani voluntary CG Code has had some positive impact in enhancing 
good CG practices, as the levels of compliance and disclosure after implementing the code are 
significantly higher than those before the code was implemented. Fourth, contrary to the 
expectation that the code’s reliance on an Anglo-American model may not improve CG practices 
due to the large differences between Oman and developed countries, the results show that the 
code was able to promote CG practices to some extent. Fifth, the findings indicate that ownership 
structures and board features have significant impact on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. 
Ownerships include government, institutional, and foreign are significantly and positively 
associated with firm-level voluntary CG disclosure whereas block ownership has significant and 
negative influence. Similarly, board characteristics include board size, the presence of CG 
committee, and board diversity on the base of nationality have significant and positive association 
with firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. These findings are generally consistent with the 
predictions of the study’s multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, 
resource dependence, legitimacy, and signalling/stakeholder theories, and in line with prior 
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studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).     
The second essay examines the impact of CG on managerial decision-making behaviour, 
namely capital structure and the corporate decision (choice) to issue equity or debt. It examines 
the influence of firm-level CG, ownership structure and board and audit characteristics on capital 
structure and equity issuance. Contrary to the initial expectation that the impact of CG 
recommendations on such managerial decisions might be different from what is reported in 
developed countries, because of the differences in corporate contexts, the results indicate that CG 
drives capital structure and the choice of financing among listed firms. On average, better-
governed firms employ significantly lower levels of leverage and issue equity over debt more 
than their poorly-governed counterparts. The empirical evidence suggests that there is a 
statistically significant negative association between firm-level capital structure and firm-level 
CG, and a statistically significant positive relationship between firm-level CG and equity 
issuance. Further, the results suggest that audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee 
have a significant and negative impact on capital structure, and government ownership and 
institutional ownership have significant effects on equity issuance, where the former has a 
negative impact and the latter a positive one. These findings are in line with theory (e.g., agency 
theory, signalling theory) and limited empirical literature (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012; Mande et al., 
2012).    
The final essay investigates the impact of CG on one aspect of corporate financial 
decision-making, namely earnings management behaviour. It examines the extent to which firms 
with high-quality CG are more likely to have higher earnings quality than firms with poor CG 
structures by testing the relationship between firm-level earnings management and firm-level CG, 
ownership structure and board and audit features. Contrary to the primary expectation of the 
inability of Oman’s CG system to effectively limit managers’ discretion in managing earnings, 
the results suggest that the Omani CG system has been able to mitigate earnings management to 
some degree. The results indicate that, on average, better-governed firms engage less in earnings 
management practices than poorly-governed firms. The empirical evidence reveals that firms 
with better CG structures, high government ownership and institutional ownership engage less in 
earnings management practices, while those with high block ownership engage more.  
Overall, the three essays provide empirical evidence that CG is a significant determinant 
of corporate policy decisions, where a number of agency problems associated with managerial 
decisions were mitigated through CG mechanisms. The case of Oman shows that emerging 
economies can utilise CG systems in reducing opportunistic managerial behaviour and making 
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their economies less vulnerable to financial crises. Given the unique aspects of the Omani 
corporate setting and the absence of prior empirical evidence, a number of implications and 
recommendations can be drawn from examining these three types of managerial decisions.  
First, considering the concerns that CG codes in these countries may not lead to the 
desired outcomes as they are based on an Anglo-American model, the main evidence that 
emerges from this thesis is that these concerns are not justified, but the differences between 
emerging and developed countries should be taking into account in either conducting new CG 
reforms or upgrading existing regimes. This evidence appears to be consistent with the suggestion 
that emerging economies tend to adopt commonly accepted standards of CG in order to be 
globally competitive and attract foreign investment. Further, it also seems to be in line with the 
concept of CG harmonisation, where countries with different types of CG systems tend to adopt 
similar CG structures to Anglo-American firms, rather than having different systems.  
Second, contrary to suggestion that the voluntary nature of CG codes means they are not 
effective in emerging economies, the findings in this thesis indicate that the voluntary Omani CG 
Code improves CG practices among Omani listed firms. This may suggest that, unlike mandatory 
CG systems (e.g., the 2000 Sarbanes-Oxley Act), policy makers in emerging economies can rely 
on voluntary CG regimes to improve CG practices in their countries.  
Third, the evidence that CG standards in Omani listed firms are generally improving 
implies that efforts by the CMA and the MSM have had a positive influence on CG practices. 
This may encourage other emerging countries who have not yet issued CG codes, such as Libya, 
to adopt such codes in order to improve CG practices.  
Fourth, the evidence from the three essays emphasises the importance of ownership 
structure as a CG mechanism and its role in managerial decision processes. It shows that 
shareholders, especially government, foreign and institutional shareholders, have a strong 
impetus to actively monitor CG standards in their firms. Individual investors, among others, may 
be encouraged to invest in firms with a high proportion of government, foreign and institutional 
ownership, as they expect more transparent information that helps them make optimal investment 
decisions. Policy makers in other emerging countries, such as Saudi Arabia, may be encouraged 
to relax some restrictions on foreign investors in order to benefit from their experiences in 
adopting and implementing high CG standards.  
Fifth, the relatively low and limited convergence in CG practices among Omani listed 
firms, however, suggests that there is a need to further enhance CG compliance and enforcement 
by the CMA and the MSM. Establishing a ‘compliance and enforcement’ unit that will 
continuously monitor CG practices may be a step in the right direction.  
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Sixth, consistent with the theoretical predictions, the evidence reveals that CG 
mechanisms proposed by the 2002 CG code, in addition to other CG measures in the Companies 
Law, have assisted firms in mitigating agency problems and reducing agency costs associated 
with their capital structure decisions, as well as helping them improve their earnings quality. This 
suggests that potential investors may consider firms with poor CG structures less attractive, 
which increases their cost of capital, as agency costs would be higher in such firms. New 
investors may be motivated to pay more attention to CG practices to distinguish between firms 
with possible earnings management and those with earnings quality. Further, individual investors, 
among others, may tend to invest in firms where large portions of shares are held by the state and 
institutional investors, as they can rely on financial reporting provided by such firms in making 
their investment decisions. Thus, policy makers in general and Omani regulators (e.g., CAM, 
MSM) in particular should stress upon firms the need to keep improving their CG structures. For 
instance, policy makers in emerging economies should encourage firms to set up CG committees 
that ensure that CG recommendations adopted by firms are followed and regularly reviewed.  
Seventh, unlike developed countries, in which there are diverse ownership structures, 
emerging economies have concentrated ownership, which appears to have important implications 
for implementing good CG standards. The evidence of decreasing CG compliance and disclosure 
and increasing managerial motivation to engage in earnings management in Omani firms with 
large block shareholders indicates that block ownership does not perform its function as a CG 
substitute mechanism. Instead, it appears to serve as an obstacle to CG compliance. Regulators in 
emerging economies in general and Omani policy makers in particular should introduce CG 
provisions that force firms with large shareholders to extend their compliance levels and protect 
minority shareholders from being expropriated by large shareholders. For example, a CG 
provision that requires firms to have minority shareholders’ representative on the board may be a 
step in this direction. Firms can be required to use a cumulative voting method (i.e., one-share-
one-vote policy) that may increase the chance that minority shareholders’ representative get 
appointed in the board.  
Finally, achieving good CG practices among firms operating in emerging economies 
appears to require more effective co-operation and co-ordination between the key financial 
regulatory and enforcement bodies that constitute CG systems in these countries. This can 
enhance legal enforcement, in turn improving managerial decisions by increasing compliance.  
A review of literature, however, reveals that a considerable number of existing studies 
investigating CG’s role in managerial decisions mainly concentrate on developed countries. Thus, 
this thesis extends the literature by providing insights on the impact of CG on three aspects of 
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corporate financial decision-making behaviour in an emerging economy, Oman. It also makes a 
number of new contributions to the growing body of literature on the nature of the association 
between CG and corporate policy decisions.  
First, using one of the largest and most extensive hand-collected data sets to date on CG 
compliance and disclosure in emerging countries (i.e., a sample of 116 firms from 2001 to 2011, 
with a total of 1,152 firm year observations), this thesis offers the first empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of CG reforms in improving corporate policy decisions among Omani listed firms. 
It provides detailed evidence on: (i) the level of compliance with the 2002 CG Code and other 
CG provisions suggested by the Companies Law among listed firms; (ii) why and how a firm’s 
CG might influence its level of capital structure; (iii) CG’s influence on the choice of financing; 
and (iv) the joint effect of the Omani CG system on earnings management practices. The findings 
from the thesis’s extensive summary descriptive statistics suggest that CG standards in listed 
firms differ widely over the eleven years investigated. They also show that, on average, better-
governed firms disclose more information, employ lower levels of leverage, issue more equity 
finance and engage less in earnings management practices.  
Second, this thesis provides a self-constructed CG index consisting of 72 CG provisions 
divided into four broad categories, namely board of directors, accounting and auditing, external 
auditors and internal control systems, and disclosure and transparency. This index can be used to 
examine CG’s role in influencing a number of crucial managerial decisions in Oman.  
Third, unlike most prior studies that attempt to examine the effect of individual CG 
measures (e.g., board or audit characteristics) on CG compliance and disclosure, capital structure 
decisions and earnings management, this thesis employs an comprehensive measure of CG, 
comprising 72 CG provisions in investigating these relations. This is in line with recent 
suggestion in the literature that CG can be better examined by a composite CG index rather than 
using individual CG mechanisms.   
Fourth, this thesis examines some factors that have not been widely investigated in the 
literature. It does not restrict its analyses to a few types of ownership and board and audit 
characteristics in examining why and how these determinants influence CG compliance level, 
capital structure decisions and earnings management. Instead, it contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence on four types of ownership, namely government ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block ownership, as well as a number of board 
characteristics and audit features, including board size, board diversity on the basis of gender, 
audit firm size, presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of nationality. The 
thesis’s examination shows that these factors significantly influence corporate policy decisions.  
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Fifth, this thesis contributes to the literature by using a multi-theoretical framework for 
developing hypotheses and interpreting findings. Unlike a single-theoretical approach, the 
methodology of using a multi-theoretical framework is useful in order to arrive at uniform 
theoretical framework that can be used to explain firms’ motivations for voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure, capital structure and earnings management, especially in complex 
corporate contexts, such as those in emerging economies, in which voluntary CG Codes may not 
be able to provide desired outcomes.  
Sixth, different from most past studies that exclude financial firms from their analyses, 
this thesis offers empirical evidence that including these firms does not affect the findings. The 
evidence suggests that there is no significant difference in terms of CG’s effect on CG disclosure, 
capital structure and earnings management among financial and non-financial firms. Unlike in 
developed countries, where financial firms are subject to additional governance requirements, the 
thesis concludes that both financial and non-financial firms in emerging economies are likely to 
react relatively the same towards CG systems, due to weak corporate regulations and enforcement 
in such countries.  
Finally, distinct from a considerable number of previous studies, this thesis provides 
empirical evidence on the relationship between CG and each of CG compliance level, capital 
structure decisions and earnings management using different econometric models and estimations 
in order to ensure the robustness of its results. The results reported by the robustness analyses 
confirm the a priori theoretical expectation that an effective CG system leads to better managerial 
decisions.  
Thus, the findings reported in this thesis seek to fill a gap in literature by offering 
empirical evidence from emerging economies in general and Oman in particular. Although the 
thesis’s findings are fairly robust and important, its weaknesses need to be acknowledged. Due to 
data limitations, it focuses mainly on how and why internal CG mechanisms drive CG 
compliance level, capital structure decisions and earnings management practices. Future research 
may examine how external CG structures, such as the media and the market for corporate and 
managerial control, as well as Omani context specific issues, such as ‘Shariah’ Law, cultural 
practices and social norms impact CG compliance, capital structure decisions and earnings 
management. In addition, although the thesis’s findings based on its weighted and un-weighted 
CG indices are essentially the same, future research may improve their analyses by employing a 
weighted CG index. In a similar vein, the thesis’s measures for other CG, ownership, capital 
structure and earnings management variables may or may not accurately reflect actual CG, 
ownership, capital structure and earnings management in practice due to potential measurement 
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errors. Finally, due to data limitations, the thesis is limited to Omani firms. Thus, future studies 
may adopt the thesis’s multi-theoretical framework to conduct cross-country analysis. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: A list of the names and industries of the 116 Omani sampled firms 
No Full Firm Name MSM CODE SECTOR 
1 Oman Filters Industry OFII Basic materials 
2 Oman Fiber Optic OFOI Basic materials 
3 Construction. Mat. Industry CMII Basic materials 
4 Oman Hol Investment OHII Basic materials 
5 Oman Cement OCOI Basic materials 
6 Gulf International Chemicals Company GICI Basic materials 
7 Oman Chlorine OCHL Basic materials 
8 Oman Textile Holding OTHI Basic materials 
9 Oman Fisheries OFCI Basic materials 
10 Oman Oil Marketing OOMS Basic materials 
11 Muscat Gases MGMC Basic materials 
12 Packaging Industries AKPP Basic materials 
13 National Pharm Medicine NPMI Basic materials 
14 Shell Oman Marketing SOMS Basic materials 
15 Maha Petroleum MHAS Basic materials 
16 Majan Glass MGCI Basic materials 
17 Muscat Thread Mills MTMI Basic materials 
18 Flexible IND. Packages FIPC Basic materials 
19 Al Fajar Al Alamia AFAI Basic materials 
20 Abrasives Manufacturing ABMI Basic materials 
21 Oman Ceramic Company OMCI Basic materials 
22 Oman Flour Mills  OFMI Basic materials 
23 Oman Packaging Company OPCI Consumer goods 
24 Food International NRCI Consumer goods 
25 Asaffa Foods SPFI Consumer goods 
26 Areej Vegetable Oil AVOI Consumer goods 
27 Gulf Plastic Industry GMPI Consumer goods 
28 Oman International Marketing OIMS Consumer goods 
29 Dhofar Fisheries DFII Consumer goods 
30 Dhofar Beverages DBCI Consumer goods 
31 Oman Refreshment ORCI Consumer goods 
32 National Mineral Water NMWI Consumer goods 
33 National Biscuit NBII Consumer goods 
34 Salalah Mills SFMI Consumer goods 
35 Sohar Poultry SPCI Consumer goods 
36 Oman and Emirates INV Holding OEIO Consumer goods 
37 Omani Euro Foods Industries OEFI Consumer goods 
38 National Real Esate Development  NRED Consumer goods 
39 Sweets of Oman OSCI Consumer goods 
40 Dhofar Beverages Food Stuff DPCI Consumer goods 
41 Nattional Detergent  NDTI Consumer goods 
42 Packaging CO.ILD PCLI Consumer goods 
43 Oman Agriculture DEV OADI Consumer goods 
44 Computer Stationery CSII Consumer services  
45 Al Hassan Engineering HECI Consumer services  
46 Oman Education & Training Inv OETI Consumer services 
47 Shaara Hospitality SAHS Consumer services 
48 Oman Hotels OHTS Consumer services 
49 Al Batinah Hotels BAHS Consumer services 
50 Gulf Hotels GHOS Consumer services 
51 Interior Hotels INHS Consumer services 
52 Al Buraimi Hotel ABHS Consumer services 
53 Majan College BACS Consumer services 
54 Port Services Corporation PSCS Consumer services 
55 Al Jazeira Services AJSS Consumer services 
56 National Hospitality Industry NHIS Consumer services 
57 Salalah Port Service SPSI Consumer services 
58 Hotels Mgmt. Investment HMCI Consumer services 
59 Kamil Power KPCS Consumer services 
60 Renaissance Services RNSS Consumer services 
61 Dhofar Tourism DTCS Consumer services 
62 Dhofar University DHUS Consumer services 
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63 Salalah Beach Resort SHCS Consumer services 
64 Galfar Engineering and COM GECS Consumer services 
65 Al Omaniya Financial Services AOFS Financial 
66 Global Investment GFIC Financial 
67 Gulf Investment Services Company GISI Financial 
68 Al Batinah Dev & Inv. Holding DBIH Financial 
69 Al Sharqia Investment SIHC Financial 
70 Al Shurooq Investment SISC Financial 
71 Financial Services FSCI Financial 
72 National Bank of Oman NBOB Financial 
73 Dhofar Investment and Development DIDI Financial 
74 Dhofar Insurance DICS Financial 
75 Oman Investment and Finance OIFC Financial 
76 Muscat National Holding MNHI Financial 
77 Oman United Institution OUIS Financial 
78 Oman Orix Leasing ORXL Financial 
79 National Finance NFCI Financial 
80 Ominvest OMVS Financial 
81 Bank Dhofar BKDB Financial 
82 National Finance NSCI Financial 
83 Fin Corporation FINC Financial 
84 Muscat Finance MFCI Financial 
85 United Finance UFCI Financial 
86 HSBC Bank Oman HBMO Financial 
87 Transgulf IND.INV. Holding TGII Financial 
88 ONIC.Holding ONIC Financial 
89 Bank Muscat BKMB Financial 
90 Taageer Finance TFCI Financial 
91 Bank Sohar  BKSB Financial 
92 Alaml Fund AIGI Financial 
93 Alhi Bank ABOB Financial 
94 Oman Cable Industry OCAI Industrial  
95 Al Oula DMGI Industrial 
96 Al Anwar Ceramic Tiles AACT Industrial 
97 Gulf Plastic Industries AKPI Industrial 
98 Al Jazeera Steel Product Company ATMI Industrial 
99 Dhofar Cattle-feed DCFI Industrial 
100 Gulf Stone GSCI Industrial 
101 National Aluminium NAPI Industrial 
102 Raysut Cement RCCI Industrial 
103 Oman Chromite OCCI Industrial 
104 Cement and Gypsum Products CGPI Industrial 
105 Voltamp Energy VOES Industrial 
106 Alanwar Holding  AAIT Industrial 
107 Medical Company MIIA Healthcare 
108 Oman Medical Projects  OMPS Healthcare 
109 Nawras  NWRS Telecommunications 
110 Oman Telecommmunication  OTEL Telecommunications 
111 National Gas NGCI Oil & Gas 
112 Enginering and Investment ONES Utilities 
113 Acwa Power Barka APBS Utilities 
114 SMN Power Holding SMNP Utilities 
115 United Power UECS Utilities 
116 Sohar Power SHPS Utilities 
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Appendix 2: A Full list of the Omani corporate governance index provisions  
Omani Corporate Governance Index 
Section No. OCGI Provision 
Range 
of 
Scores 
Total     
provision  
Per 
Section 
Board & Directors                                                                                                                                            39 
   1 Whether the board of directors’ number is between 5 and  12.    0-1  
   2 Whether the directors are clearly classified into executive, 
non-executive and independent directors.  
   0-1  
   3 Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO are split.    0-1  
   4 Whether the third of its board’s members is independent 
directors. 
   0-1  
   5 Whether the board is composed by a majority of non- 
executive directors.  
   0-1  
   6 Whether the directors’ membership number on other firms are 
specified and disclosed.  
   0-1  
   7 Whether directors’ membership number on other firms are 
less than 5. 
   0-1  
   8 Whether the board meets at least four times a year.     0-1  
   9 Whether the board meetings’ dates are disclosed.    0-1  
 10 Whether individual directors’ meetings record is disclosed.    0-1      
 11 Whether individual directors’ meetings attendance record at 
the general assembly is disclosed.  
   0-1  
 12 Whether directors’ remuneration, interests and share options 
are disclosed. 
   0-1  
 13 Whether top five managers’ remuneration are disclosed.    0-1  
 14 Whether individual directors’ service contracts, and notice 
period and severance fees are disclosed.  
   0-1  
 15 Whether the board approves interim and annual financial 
statements. 
   0-1  
 16 Whether a board’s report on the going concern status of firm 
is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 17 Whether the board has conducted a review on the 
effectiveness of firm’s internal control systems. 
   0-1  
 18 Whether there is a narrative on directors’ nomination 
procedures. 
   0-1  
 19 Whether a remuneration committee has been established.    0-1  
 20 Whether remuneration’s committee jurisdictions and duties 
are disclosed. 
   0-1  
 21 Whether the remuneration committee’s members are 
disclosed.  
   0-1  
 22 Whether the chairperson of remuneration committee is an 
independent. 
   0-1  
 23 Whether the majority of remuneration committee are 
independent. 
   0-1  
 24 Whether remuneration’s committee’s members’ remuneration 
is disclosed.  
   0-1  
 25 Whether remuneration’s committee members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 26 Whether a nomination committee has been established.    0-1  
 27 Whether nomination’s committee jurisdictions and duties are 
disclosed. 
   0-1  
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 28 Whether the nomination committee’s members are 
disclosed.   
   0-1  
 29 Whether the chairperson of nomination committee is an 
independent. 
   0-1  
 30 Whether the majority of nomination committee’s 
members are independent.   
   0-1  
 31 Whether nomination’s committee members’ 
compensation is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 32 Whether nomination’s committee members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 33 Whether a risk committee has been established.    0-1  
 34 Whether risk’s committee jurisdictions and duties are 
disclosed. 
   0-1  
 35 Whether the risk committee’s members are disclosed    0-1  
 36 Whether the chairperson of risk committee is an 
independent. 
   0-1  
 37 Whether the majority of risk committee’s members are 
independent.  
   0-1  
 38 Whether risk’s committee members’ remuneration is 
disclosed. 
   0-1  
 39 Whether risk’s committee members’ meetings attendance 
record is disclosed. 
   0-1  
Accounting & Auditing                                                                                                                                      7 
 40 Whether an audit committee has been established.    0-1  
 41 Whether audit’s committee jurisdictions and duties are 
disclosed. 
   0-1  
 42 Whether the audit committee’s members are disclosed.      0-1  
 43 Whether the chairperson of audit committee is an 
independent. 
   0-1  
 44 Whether the majority of audit committee’s members are 
independent.   
   0-1  
 45 Whether audit committee’s members’ compensation is 
disclosed.  
   0-1  
 46 Whether audit’s committee members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed. 
   0-1  
External Auditors & Internal Control Systems                                                                                                  4 
 47 Whether an external auditor’s report on adequacy and 
efficacy of firm’s internal control systems is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 48 Whether an external auditor report’s on firm’s 
compliance with its internal control system is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 49 Whether an external auditor report’s on firm’s ability to 
carry out its activities is disclosed. 
   0-1  
 50 Whether an external auditor report’s on frauds is 
disclosed.  
   0-1  
Disclosure and Transparency                                                                                                                            22 
 51 Whether there is a narrative on the distribution of 
shareholding. 
   0-1  
 52 Whether there is a narrative on how the firm is doing its 
activities in order to achieve its objectives. 
   0-1  
 53 Whether there is a narrative on investment opportunities.    0-1  
 54 Whether there is a narrative on firm’s financial and 
operational performance. 
   0-1  
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 55 Whether there is a narrative on risks and concerns and 
how are assessed and managed by the firm. 
   0-1  
 56 Whether there is a narrative on firm’s performance in 
comparison to board based index of MSM.  
   0-1  
 57 Whether the firm has obtained a certificate from external 
auditor on its CG practices. 
   0-1  
 58 Whether the firm has provided a separate chapter in its 
annual report on CG 
   0-1  
 59 Whether the firm provides a statement on the compliance 
or non-compliance with the code.  
   0-1  
 60 Whether there is a narrative on penalties and strictures 
that might be imposed on the firm.  
   0-1  
 61 Whether there is a narrative on financial transactions that 
may have conflict of interests. 
   0-1  
 62 Whether there is a narrative on high and low market share 
prices during each month. 
   0-1      
 63 Whether there is a narrative on the professional profile of 
external auditor. 
   0-1  
 64 Whether there is a narrative on dividend policy.    0-1  
 65 Whether there is a narrative on firm’s loans.    0-1  
 66 Whether the firm posts its results online.    0-1  
 67 Whether there is a narrative on firm’s convertible 
instrument. 
   0-1  
 68 Whether firm sends its half-yearly results to each 
shareholders or not.  
   0-1  
 69 Whether there is a narrative on firm’s analysis of segment 
and product wise performance.  
   0-1  
 70 Whether there is a narrative on how firm sees and 
predicts its future. 
   0-1  
 71 Whether the firm includes management discussion and 
analysis chapter as part of its annual report.  
   0-1  
 72 Whether there is a narrative on directors’ biography, 
experience and responsibilities. 
   0-1  
Four Sections Total  Corporate Governance Provisions       72 
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Appendix 3: Definition of the Omani corporate governance index provisions and measurement  
No Corporate Governance Provision Acronym Source Measurement 
Section 1: The board and Directors 
1 The board of directors’ number BDN CA 95  A binary number of 1 if the directors’ 
number between 5 and 12, 0 otherwise.   
2 Directors’ Classification. DCD  OCGC 3.4  A binary number of 1 if directors are 
clearly classified into executive, non-
executive and independent directors, 0 
otherwise.  
3 Role Duality DUAL OCGC 3.2  A binary number of 1 if the roles of 
chairperson and CEO are split, 0 
otherwise. 
4 Board’s independence BIDs OCGC 1.3  A binary number of 1 if the third of its 
board’s members is independent, 0 
otherwise. 
5 Majority of board’s directors MBDs  OCGC 1.1  A binary number of 1 if the board is 
composed by a majority of non-
executive directors, 0 otherwise. 
6 Membership of directors on other 
firms’ boards 
MDOFBs OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if membership of 
directors on other firms’ boards is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
7 Membership’s number of board of 
directors on other firms’ boards 
MNBOFBs CA 95 A binary number of 1 if each board’s 
member has no more than 5 
memberships on other firms, 0 
otherwise.  
8 Frequency of board meetings FBMs OCGC 4.0  A binary number of 1 if the board 
meets at least four times a year, 0 
otherwise.    
9 Board meetings’ dates BMDs OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if the board 
meetings number and dates are 
disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
10 Individual directors’ meetings 
attendance at the board 
IBDMs/B OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
directors’ meetings attendance record 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise.  
11 Individual directors’ meetings 
attendance  at general  assembly 
IBDMs/GA OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
directors’ meetings attendance record 
at the general assembly is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
12 Board of directors’ remuneration BDR  OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there are 
details of remuneration to all directors 
individually, 0 otherwise.     
13 Top five officers’ remuneration 5OFR OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there are 
details of remuneration to the top 5 
officers individually, 0 otherwise.       
14 Board service contracts BSC OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there are 
details of service contracts, notice 
period and severance fees to all 
directors, 0 otherwise.        
15 Approving financial statement 
 
AFS 
 
OCGC 
5.13  
A binary number of 1 if the board 
approves interim and annual financial 
statements, 0 otherwise. 
16 Going concern 
 
GC 
 
OCGC 
5.14  
A binary number of 1 if the board 
reports to shareholders about the going 
concern status of the firm, 0 otherwise. 
17 Review of internal control 
systems 
RICSs OCGC 
(P.26) 
A binary number of 1 if the board 
states that it conducted a review on 
states that it conducted a review on, 0 
otherwise. 
18 Narrative on directors’ 
nomination procedures. 
DN OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there is 
narrative on directors’ nomination, 0 
otherwise. 
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19 Remuneration committee’s 
existence 
 
R1CE 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the 
remuneration committee is established, 
0 otherwise. 
20 Remuneration committee’s terms 
&   reference 
 
R1CT&R 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on brief description of its 
jurisdictions and duties, 0 otherwise. 
21 Remuneration committee’s 
composition 
R1CC OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members 
are disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
22 Remuneration committee’s 
chairperson 
R1CCP 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its chairperson 
is independent, 0 otherwise.  
23 Remuneration committee’s 
majority of its members 
 
R1CMMs 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
its members are independent, 0 
otherwise. 
24 Remuneration  committee’s 
remuneration 
 
R1CR 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members' 
compensation is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
25 Remuneration  committee’s 
individual directors meetings  
R1CIMs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
member’s meetings attendance record 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
26 Nomination committee’s 
existence 
 
NCE 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the nomination 
committee is established, 0 otherwise. 
27 Nomination committee’s terms &   
reference 
 
NCT&R 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on brief description of its 
jurisdictions and duties is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
28 Nomination  committee’s 
composition 
NCC OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members 
are disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
29 Nomination committee’s 
chairperson 
 
NCCP 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its chairperson 
is independent, 0 otherwise. 
30 Nomination committee’s majority 
of its members 
 
NCMMs 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
its members are independent, 0 
otherwise. 
31 Nomination  committee’s 
remuneration 
 
NCR 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members' 
compensation is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
32 Nomination  committee’s 
individual directors meetings  
NCIMs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
member’s meetings attendance record 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
33 Risk Committee’s existence 
 
R2CE 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the risk 
committee is established, 0 otherwise. 
34 Risk Committee’s terms &   
reference 
 
R2CT&R 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on brief description of its 
jurisdictions and duties is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
35 Risk Committee’s composition 
 
R2CC 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members 
are disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
36 Risk Committee’s chairperson R2CCP 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its chairperson 
is independent, 0 otherwise. 
37 Risk Committee’s majority of its  
members 
R2CMMs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
its members are independent, 0 
otherwise. 
38 Risk Committee’s remuneration 
 
R2CR 
 
OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if its members' 
compensation is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
39 Risk Committee’s individual 
directors meetings  
R2CIMs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
member’s meetings attendance record 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise.  
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Section 2: Accounting and Auditing   
40 Audit Committee’s existence ACE OCGC 7.0 A binary number of 1 if the audit 
committee is established, 0 otherwise. 
41 Audit Committee’s terms &   
reference 
 
ACT&R OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on brief description of its 
jurisdictions and duties is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
42 Audit Committee’s composition ACC OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if its members 
are disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
43 Audit Committee’s chairperson 
 
ACCP OCGC 7.2 A binary number of 1 if its chairperson 
is independent, 0 otherwise. 
44 Audit Committee’s majority of its 
members 
 
ACMMs OCGC 7.1 A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
its members are independent, 0 
otherwise. 
45 Audit Committee’s remuneration 
 
ACR OCGC 7.6 A binary number of 1 if its members' 
compensation is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
46 Audit Committee’s individual 
directors meetings  
ACIMs OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if individual 
member’s meetings attendance record 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise.  
Section 3: External Auditors & Internal Control Systems 
47 Internal control systems 
 
ICSs 
 
OCGC 
9.4.A 
A binary number of 1 if the external 
auditor reports on adequacy and 
efficacy of firm’s internal control 
systems, 0 otherwise. 
48 Compliance with internal control 
systems 
 
CICSs 
 
OCGC 
9.4.C 
A binary number of 1 if the external 
auditor reports on firm’s compliance 
with its internal control systems, 0 
otherwise. 
49 Ability of the firm to carry out its 
activities 
 
AFCOAs 
 
OCGC 
9.4.B 
A binary number of 1 if the external 
auditor reports on firm’s ability to 
carry out its activities, 0 otherwise. 
50 Frauds  Fs  OCGC 9.5 A binary number of 1 if the external 
auditor reports about whether there are 
frauds or not, 0 otherwise. 
Section 4: Disclosure & Transparency   
51 Ownership structure  
 
OSD OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on distribution of 
shareholding, 0 otherwise.  
52 Industry structure and 
development 
 
ISD OCGC 
16.1 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on how the firm conducts its 
activities, 0 otherwise. 
53 Investment opportunities 
 
IOs OCGC 
16.2 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on investment opportunities, 
0 otherwise.  
54 Financial and operational 
performance 
 
FOP OCGC 
16.7 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on firm’s financial and 
operational performance, 0 otherwise.  
55 Risks and concerns 
 
R3Cs OCGC 
16.5 
A binary number of 1 if there is a there 
is a narrative on risks and concerns and 
how are assessed and managed by the 
firm. 
    narrative on how the firm assesses its 
current and future risks, 0 otherwise 
56 General performance 
 
GP OCGC 
16.3 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on firm’s performance in 
comparison to the index of MSM 
(relevant sector), 0 otherwise. 
57 Certificate from external auditor 
 
CEA OCGC 28 A binary number of 1 if the firm has 
external auditor’s certificate on CG, 0 
otherwise.  
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58 Chapter on CG 
 
CCG OCGC 26 A binary number of 1 if the firm 
provides a separate chapter in its 
annual report on CG, 0 otherwise.  
59 Compliance/non-compliance 
 
C/Non-C OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there is 
statement on the compliance or non- 
compliance with the code, 0 otherwise.  
60 Penalties and strictures 
 
PSs OCGC 
(P.27) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on whether the firm faced any 
penalties and strictures or not, 0 
otherwise. 
61 Related party transactions 
 
RPT OCGC 19 A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on related party transactions 
or not, 0 otherwise.  
62 Market price data 
 
MPD OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on high and low market share 
prices during each month, 0 otherwise.
   
63 External auditor’s profile 
 
EAP OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on professional profile of the 
external auditor, 0 otherwise.  
64 Dividend Policy  
 
PDs CA 105 A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on dividend policy, 0 
otherwise. 
65 Firm’s loan 
 
FL OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on loans or any external 
finance, 0 otherwise. 
66 Publishing results online 
 
PRO OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the firm posts 
its results online, 0 otherwise. 
67 Convertible instruments 
 
CIs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is 
narrative on whether the firm has 
convertible instrument or not, 0 
otherwise.  
68 Sending half- yearly results to 
shareholders 
 
SHYRSs OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the half-yearly 
results were sent to each shareholder, 0 
otherwise. 
69 Firm’s analysis of products 
 
FAP OCGC 
16.3 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on analysis of segment and 
product wise performance, 0 otherwise. 
70 Outlook future 
 
OLF OCGC 
16.4 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on how the firm sees and 
predicts its future, 0 otherwise. 
71 Management discussion & 
analysis 
 
MD&A OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if the firm 
includes management discussion 
chapter as part of its annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
72 Disclosure of directors’ biography DDB OCGC 
(P.28) 
A binary number of 1 if there is a 
narrative on directors’ biography, 
experience and responsibilities, 0 
otherwise.  
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